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Introduction: The “Jewish Issue” and the East- 
Central European Communist Systems
To the surprise of many, antisemitism resurfaced in East-Central Europe almost con-
currently with the collapse of Communism. It was present not only in publications 
by minor political groups and in the texts of fringe politicians, many of whom were 
returning émigrés, but was also present, at least in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 
and with increasing frequency, in pronouncements made by public figures with close 
ties to the political centre. One frequent claim was that antisemitism was a tool for 
political and intellectual actors to rally support among social groups most affected by 
the transitional crisis. While this explanation is clearly a possibility, or even a likeli-
hood, it fails to explain why such efforts were positively received by certain groups, 
or why a small but not insignificant minority in post-Communist countries proved 
receptive to the ideological message of political antisemitism.
Antisemitic politicians and ideologues were not acting in a vacuum. Sociological 
research conducted in the years immediately following the collapse of Communism 
showed that although the public expression of antisemitic views had been a pun-
ishable crime throughout the decades of Communism, and Communist regimes’ offi-
cial ideology had rejected and condemned antisemitism, a substantial part of society 
continued to harbour antisemitic prejudice. Indeed, surveys have shown that in the 
early 1990s, at least 10 per cent of the adult population in Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary could be regarded as strongly antisemitic.1 This proportion is clearly 
greater than what might be explained by the presence and activities of antisemitic 
élite fringe groups, which were still rather insignificant at the time. We may conclude 
therefore that in the four decades after World War II, anti-Jewish prejudice had sur-
vived beneath the surface of society, despite the prosecution of public displays of 
antisemitism, and the state’s official rejection of antisemitic ideology. Indeed, in view 
of the enduring nature of Communist regimes, whose “tenure” spanned several gen-
erations, it seems likely that antisemitism also received new impulses. This volume 
– the documents published and commented upon herein – supports the hypothesis 
formulated elsewhere that antisemitism:
[…] did not simply emerge out of nothing after the fall of Communism. In their efforts to impose 
the fullest possible control over society, the Communist parties that seized power in East-Central 
Europe after World War II eliminated the political, religious, social and cultural institutions of 
surviving Jewry, or made them dependent on the state. However, despite their total control over 
Jewish institutions and Jewish community life, East-Central European Communist Parties contin-
uously and systematically identified and regarded the conflicting historical memories about Jews, 
and the presence of Jews in Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian society, as a disturbing factor. 
They permanently kept the problem on the political agenda, and in this way they permanently 
1 See András Kovács, The Stranger at Hand. Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary 
(Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2011), 32–35.
DOI 10.1515/9783110411591-001
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(re)constructed their own “Jewish Questions”, which, then, they were eager to “solve”. […] This 
mostly concealed, but restless preoccupation with the “Jewish Question” kept the whole issue 
alive in the decades of Communist rule, and it explains to a great extent its open re-emergence 
after 1990.2
Continuity of the “Jewish question” and antisemitic discourse 
after the Holocaust
Post-Holocaust continuity of the antisemitic worldview, language and prejudice can 
be observed in several forms, the three most important of which were: (1) discourses 
in the everyday sphere; (2) reactions to differing Jewish and non-Jewish perceptions 
of pre-war antisemitism, the Holocaust, and reintegration of Jews in post-war society; 
and (3) the policies of the Communist parties before and after seizing power. 
A large amount of material gathered by the Hungarian political police points to the 
post-war survival of undisguised antisemitic views and a blunt antisemitic language in 
several radical anti-Communist circles. In her analysis of police surveillance and the 
ensuing court cases against right-wing youth groups in the 1960s, Éva Stan deisky cites the 
following typical conversation between the leader of a monitored group and his friends: 
If this were truly a government or system chosen by the Hungarian people, then they would not 
seek to deny people their intellectual freedom. In this regard, the Jews are their most faithful 
supporters. They keep some professions as a privilege for themselves, not allowing others access. 
And so the press, theatre, TV and radio, and foreign trade are primarily in their hands. Since they 
are Jews, they neglect the interests of the Hungarian people, and for the sake of their own power 
they place the country in the service of the Soviet Union.3
A whole series of memoirs published after 1990 prove that post-war experiences and 
events in the aftermath of the Communist takeover reproduced pre-war narratives4 
2 András Kovács, Antisemitic Elements in Communist Discourse. A Continuity Factor in Post-War 
Hungarian Antisemitism. In Antisemitism in an Era of Transition: Continuities and Impact in Post-Com-
munist Poland and Hungary, eds. François Guesnet and Gwen Jones (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
2014), 137. 
3 Éva Standeisky, Mélyrétegi metszet. Jobboldali fiatalok az 1960-as években [Deep Cross-Section. 
Right-wing youths in the 1960s]. In Éva Standeisky, Antiszemitizmusok [Antisemitisms] (Budapest: 
Argument, 2007), 96–130 (104). On everyday antisemitism in Poland, see Alina Cała, The Image of the 
Jew in Polish Folk Culture (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1995). On antisemitism in reporting on the post-1967 
antisemitic campaign, see Božena Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968. In the Shadow of the Past and 
of the Soviet Union (Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2012), 430–.
4 See Viktor Karády, Zsidóság és modenizáció a történelmi Magyarországon [Jewry and Moderniza-
tion in Historical Hungary]. In Viktor Karády, Zsidóság és társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek (1867–1945) 
[Jewry and Social Inequalities (1867–1954)] (Budapest: Replika, 2000), 7–40; and Krisztián Ungváry, A 
Horthy-rendszer mérlege [The Balance-Sheet of the Horthy Regime] (Budapest and Pécs: Jelenkor and 
OSZK, 2012), 20–38.
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that set and maintained boundaries between Jewish and non-Jewish sections of the 
middle class.5 In these narratives, which appeared mostly in private communication, 
traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes and prejudices were continuously present. As the 
late historian Pál Engel recalled family discourse in his childhood in the early 1950s: 
“In addition to my ‘Christian’ middle-class upbringing, I began to realize gradually my 
place in society, that there were ‘proles’, ‘petty bourgeois’, and ‘Jews’. We, however, 
were ‘gentlefolk’.”6
Even decades after the war, rival intellectual and middle-class groups interpreted 
confrontations in multiple areas as a conflict between Jews and non-Jews, and used 
narratives rooted in contradictory and opposing historical memories. In Hungary, 
which had the region’s largest post-Holocaust Jewish population and where Jews 
were, throughout the Communist period, very much visible in prominent intellectual 
positions, such conflicts sometimes became so acute that they even attracted the 
attention of the political leadership. A Party functionary described the situation after 
an inquiry in 1967 at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
as follows:
[E]veryone is aware of the conflicts, they [those who complain that Jews are dominating the profes-
sion – AK] have precise statistics on Jewish and non-Jewish functionaries filling leading historian 
positions, as they would say, even with a lantern one cannot come across elements of popular 
[that is, non-Jewish – AK] ancestry in these positions. […] [T]he question should be addressed in 
some form, because according to them, the statistics they reported on are the institutionalised 
reason for the increase of antisemitism.7 
The surviving elements of pre-war discourses on the “Jewish Question” and the 
old antisemitism were not the only factors to sustain the language of prejudice and 
stereotyping. Additional impulses came from the perception of conflicts that arose 
between surviving Jews and non-Jews after the war. In the immediate aftermath of the 
war, significant tensions arose in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland around such 
issues as: antisemitism in the interwar period; responsibility and legal accountability 
5 István Bibó, A zsidókérdés Magyarországon 1944 után [The Jewish Question in Hungary after 1944]. 
In István Bibó Válogatott tanulmányok [Selected Studies], ed. Tibor Huszár (Budapest: Magvető, 1986), 
621–798 (754–778); András Kovács, A zsidókérdés a mai magyar társadalomban [The Jewish Question 
in Hungarian Society Today]. In András Kovács, A Másik szeme. Zsidók és antiszemiták a háború utáni 
Magyarországon [The Eye of the Other. Jews and Antisemites in Post-War Hungary] (Budapest: Gon-
dolat, 2008); Aleksander Smolar, Les Juifs dans la mémoire polonaise [Jews in Polish Memory], Esprit, 
June 1987, 1–31; Heda Margolius-Kovály, Under a Cruel Star: A Life in Prague, 1941–1968 (Teaneck, NJ: 
Holmes and Meier, 1997), 45–47; Jan Lánicek, Czechs, Slovaks and the Jews, 1938–48. Beyond Idealiza-
tion and Condemnation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 188–190.
6 Pál Engel, Úrigyerekek tévúton [Young Ladies and Gentlemen on the Wrong Path], Népszabadság, 
12 May 2001. On the perpetuation of antisemitic stereotypes in private intellectual discourses of the 
1950s and 1960s, see Éva Standeisky, Értelmiségi antiszemitizmus a korai Kádár-korszakban [Intellec-
tual antisemitism in the early Kádár era]. In Standeisky, Antiszemitizmusok, 79–95.
7 National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/36/5/1967, (30 October 1967) 48–56.
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for the discrimination and persecution suffered by Jews; restitution of stolen or seized 
Jewish property; the fate of heirless Jewish assets; and reparations for Jewish victims.8 
In Hungary, additionally, an antisemitic discourse on “Jewish revenge” arose, which 
related to the role played by Jewish public prosecutors and judges in the prosecution 
of war criminals at the People’s Tribunals. The non-Jewish perception of Jewish sur-
vivors’ post-war status and social mobility further added to tensions. Due to the large 
proportion of Jews among Communist Party leaders, army officers and trade union-
ists in East-Central Europe, and in the post-war governments of the three countries, 
many segments of society perceived and rejected the new regime as an instance of 
“Jewish power.” This perception was reinforced by the visible upward social mobility 
of Jewish survivors who tried to overcome handicaps caused by the former regime’s 
antisemitic laws, which had prevented Jews from studying at university, or working in 
professions they were qualified for.9 
The third factor that strongly contributed to the continuity of antisemitic dis-
courses was Communist parties’ policy. When Communist parties started to fight for 
domination in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, they had to face the presence 
of traditions and language of the old “Jewish Question”, embedded antisemitism in 
society, and the conflicts of the post-Holocaust period. Even so, the policies of the 
respective Communist parties had a decisive influence on the extent to which such 
views and issues – and, in a general sense, the “Jewish Question” – remained on the 
agenda in the three countries in subsequent decades. 
Post-war and Stalinist Communist policy and the continuity of the 
“Jewish question”
Many local factors influenced the “Jewish policy” of Communist parties and states: 
the historical background to the legal, economic and social status of Jews; local tradi-
tions of antisemitism; the country’s role in World War II; events during the Holocaust; 
the number of Jewish survivors and the public positions they held; and the Commu-
8 See Eugene Duschinsky, Peter Meyer, Bernard D. Weinryb, Nicolas Sylvain (eds). The Jews in the 
Soviet Satellites (Ithaca, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1953); Bibó, op. cit.; Jan T. Gross, Fear. An-
tisemitism in Poland after Auschwitz: An Essay in Historical Interpretation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Lánicek, op. cit.
9 See Viktor Karády, Túlélők és újrakezdők [Survivors and Re-beginners] (Budapest: Múlt és Jövő, 
2002), 141–186; András Kovács, Hungarian Jewish Politics from the End of the Second World War until 
the Collapse of Communism. In Jews and the State. Dangerous Alliances and the Perils of Privilege. 
Studies in Contemporary Jewry, XIX, ed. Ezra Mendelsohn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
124–156; Smolar, op. cit.; Stanislaw Krajewski, Jews, Communism, and the Jewish Communists. In 
Jewish Studies at the CEU. Yearbook 1996–1999, ed. András Kovács (Budapest: Central European Uni-
versity, 2000), 119–133; Jeff Schatz, The Generation. The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of 
Poland (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991); Gross, op. cit., 226–243.
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nist movement and the Party’s “embeddedness” in post-war societies. Due to differ-
ences in these respects, “Jewish policy” varied from country to country. However, 
certain traits seem to be common in all East-Central European countries, and present 
throughout the Communist period, although their relative importance changed over 
time. 
The first common trait concerns church policy, since “Jewish policy” was consid-
ered one aspect of general policy towards the churches. This viewed the churches as 
political adversaries, proclaimed the official ideology of atheism, and generally aimed 
at diminishing religiosity and the influence of religious denominations. Although 
Communist church policy swung between repression and tolerance depending on 
local factors, and varied from country to country, the characteristics outlined above 
remained constant.10 
Second, Jewish survivors – many of whom were secular Jews with no ties to the 
religious community –also had to realize that the Communist states either completely 
rejected the institutional, ideological or cultural expression of national and minority 
identity, or tolerated it only under the strictest conditions. In those countries where 
Jewry was recognized exclusively as a religious denomination (Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and the GDR), Jews who maintained and occasionally displayed any secular 
form of Jewish identity were subject to repression, manifested in various forms of the 
official “anti-Zionist policy.” 
The third factor that created striking similarities in East-Central European Com-
munist countries’ “Jewish policy” was their membership of the Soviet political and 
military bloc. They had little choice but to adjust their policies on this issue to the 
position of the Soviet Union, and the political expectations of the Soviet leadership. 
Such expectations had a decisive impact on local “Jewish policy”. Throughout the 
entire Communist era, periodical changes in local “Jewish policies” reflected changes 
in Soviet policy, and the means by which they were realized. A number of sub-periods 
can be identified here: the years before the establishment of the total dictatorship 
(1945–49); the Stalinist era; the post-Stalinist “thaw”; the aftermath of the severance 
of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967; and, finally, the second half of the 1980s, 
the years of the system’s decline. 
The Communist parties, which had enjoyed very little pre-war social support or 
influence (at least in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia), faced serious legitimacy prob-
lems, and so attempted to represent views and support decisions which they deemed 
in line with majority expectations. Communist parties were aware that antisemitic 
traditions were still very much alive in society, and that a large number of people had 
greatly benefited from anti-Jewish discrimination and persecution. On many import-
ant issues that emerged in the post-war years, Communist parties tried to adjust their 
10 See Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1989); and Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Catholicism and Politics in Communist 
Societies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990). 
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rhetoric and policy to what they perceived as the majority position. Such was the case, 
for example, in conflicts over reparations, the restitution of stolen property, and post-
war antisemitic civil disturbances and pogroms.11 In these debates and decisions, 
Communist rhetoric and conduct had less in common with the positions of the Jewish 
organizations and community representatives than with those of other parties in the 
“anti-Fascist coalition”, such as the social democrats. Communist parties were quite 
prepared to ignore the sufferings of the persecuted Jews, their rightful demands for 
compensation, and their expectation that justice be served. To further Party politi-
cal interests, parties occasionally formed temporary or lasting alliances with known 
antisemites,12 and also sought to exploit latent antisemitism, or, at the very least, to 
make concessions to antisemites in the hope of increased political support. Today, it 
is generally acknowledged that the Communist parties benefited from incitement and 
the political exploitation of antisemitism, and even, on occasion, played a role in the 
unleashing of pogroms and other forms of violence, for instance in Kunmadaras and 
Miskolc in Hungary, and in Kielce and several other places in Poland.13 
The reason for this behaviour, however, is not to be sought merely in the oppor-
tunistic strategy of the Communists, but also in the way they regarded the surviving 
Jews in their country. Politicians of the various Communist parties – regardless of 
whether they were of Jewish descent or not – consistently took as their starting point 
the view that Jews represented a bounded group in society, whose collective interests 
not only conflicted with those of mainstream society, but also with the vision of the 
political system they wished to establish. 
Evidently, the Communist parties could not, in view of their ideological tradi-
tions, anti-Fascist rhetoric, and role in the “anti-Fascist” coalitions, overtly use the 
language of antisemitism; nor could they openly support antisemitic policies. For this 
reason, they instead chose to simply neglect the rightful and legitimate demands of 
Jewish survivors, and to discount them when making political decisions. 
This period also saw the development of a Party language that came to be used 
throughout subsequent decades when speaking about “Jewish affairs”. In this lan-
guage, old stereotypes and prejudices were often used in rather blunt fashion in 
non-public forums and in internal documents,14 whereas in material destined for 
11 See Duschinsky et. al. (eds), op. cit. 
12 See, for example, Gross, op. cit., 222–226. In Hungary, the National Peasant Party was the closest 
political ally of the Communist Party from 1945 until 1949. Some of the main figures in the Party had 
belonged to antisemitic populist circles prior to 1945. 
13 Much literature exists on the latent antisemitic policies of the Communist parties and post-Holo-
caust pogroms. The latter are described and analysed in Božena Szaynok, The Kielce Pogrom (July 4, 
1946), Accessed on 27 August 2016 at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-kielce-pogrom; Gross, 
op. cit.; and in János Pelle, Az utolsó vérvádak [The Last Blood Libels] (Budapest: Pelikán, 1995), 
167–247. For events in Czechoslovakia, see Lánicek, op. cit., 165–. This general feature of Communist 
policy is covered in detail in Gross, op. cit.; and Standeisky, Antiszemitizmusok, 15–38, 131–173.
14 See Kovács, Antisemitic Elements in Communist Discourse.
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public use, the word “Jewish” was replaced by code words such as “Zionist”, “cos-
mopolitan”, “urban bourgeois”, and “unreliable petit bourgeois elements infiltrating 
the Party”. Naturally, all this was done while formally maintaining the rejection of 
antisemitism. Such “double speak” emerged in the propaganda of the Communists 
and their allies in the immediate aftermath of the war.15 It appeared in a much more 
explicit form in the first post-war trials against Zionists, which were a direct conse-
quence of the outbreak of the Cold War,16 and it was also present in the language 
used in the Rajk trial in Budapest, the first major Soviet type show trial after the 
war.17 After the Communist takeover, and the subsequent Soviet policy turn against 
the newly-founded Jewish state of Israel, official propaganda began to employ the 
language of “anti-Zionism” far more consistently, both within the Party and during 
purges of Jewish officials from the army and state apparatus.18 Anti-Zionist rheto-
ric with a barely concealed antisemitic message assumed its most developed form 
during a series of investigations and court cases in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East 
Germany in 1952–1953, which were modelled on the antisemitic trials in the Soviet 
Union. East-Central European examples include the Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia, 
the arrest and detention of Hungary’s Jewish religious leaders, and the Merker affair 
in East Germany.19 
15 Erik Molnár, Zsidókérdés Magyarországon [The Jewish Question in Hungary], Társadalmi Szemle 
5 (1946); József Darvas, Őszinte szót a zsidókérdésben! [An Honest Word on the Jewish Question!], 
Szabad Nép, 25 March 1945.
16 A case in point was the court case initiated in Hungary in May 1949 against Zionist leader Béla 
Dénes, who was then imprisoned for four years. See Béla Dénes, Ávós világ Magyarországon. Egy ci-
onista orvos emlékiratai [The World of Secret Policemen in Hungary. Memoirs of a Zionist Doctor] 
(Budapest: Kossuth, 1991). On the prosecution of Zionist leaders in Hungary, see Ágnes Szalai, A ma-
gyarországi kommunista diktatúra zsidó áldozatai (1949–1954) [The Jewish Victims of the Communist 
Dictatorship in Hungary (1949–1954)]. In Tanulmányok a holokausztról, 4. kötet [Studies on the Holo-
caust, vol. 4], ed. Randolph L. Braham (Budapest: Presscon, 2006), 217–268. 
17 At the trial, “anti-Zionism” was still treated merely as a side issue: the original Jewish-sounding 
names of the Jewish defendants and their participation in pre-war Communist-Zionist movements 
were listed in minute detail. See Rajk László és társai a népbíróság előtt [László Rajk and his Associ-
ates at the People’s Tribunal] (Budapest: Szikra, 1949), 137. 
18 See Kovács, Antisemitic Elements in Communist Discourse; Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 
164–. 
19 For the minutes of the Slánský case, see Ministerstvo spravedlnosti, Proces s vedením protistát-
ního spikleneckého centra v čele s Rudolfem Slánským [Ministry of Justice, The Trial against the Le-
adership of the Conspiratorial Center of Traitors Headed by Rudolf Slánský] (Prague: Orbis, 1953). 
For an analysis of the court documents, see Jacob Ari Labendz, Lectures, Murder, and a Phony 
Terrorist: Managing “Jewish Power and Danger” in 1960s Communist Czechoslovakia, East Euro-
pean Jewish Affairs 44 (2014), 1, 84–108. For the Hungarian court cases, see Szalai, op. cit. On the 
Merker case, see Jeffrey Herf, East German Communists and the Jewish Question: The Case of Paul 
Merker, Journal of Contemporary History 29 (1994), 627–661; and Stefan Meining, Kommunistische 
Judenpolitik. Die DRR, die Juden und Israel (Münster, Hamburg, London: LIT Verlag, 2002), 159–176.
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The anti-Zionist turn in Communist policy was a serious disappointment for 
Jews, both those who sympathized with Marxist ideology and the Communist parties, 
and also those who were not attracted to Communist policies or to Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, but who believed that Communist universalist and anti-antisemitic rheto-
ric would abolish the language of the “Jewish Question” forever. Instead, they had 
to realize that the new path to assimilation offered by the Communists would not 
lead to the disappearance of boundaries based on stereotypes or prejudice. Indeed, 
the coded language of Communist discourse used in connection with Jews, its tacit 
inferences and predispositions to the existence of an invisible anti-Communist Jewish 
network, contributed to the construction of this boundary anew, whereby the old ste-
reotype of “dual loyalty” acquired new content. The image of the “anti-Christian” and 
“nation-destroying” Jew was replaced by one of the Zionist hostile to the working 
class and the Soviet Union, who marvelled at and secretly supported “Western impe-
rialism”, while pretending to be faithful to the socialist system and the Party.20 
Political practices grounded in the conviction that Jews were fundamentally dis-
loyal began long before the staging of the famous anti-Zionist trials. Immediately after 
the takeover of power, the Hungarian Communist Party leadership sought to limit the 
number of Jews within the government and Party apparatus by issuing internal direc-
tives. For party leaders of Jewish descent who issued such directives, or supported 
them inside the Party, the main motive for doing so was to refute the accusation of 
“Jewish power”, but the directives themselves referred, in the spirit of class-war rhet-
oric, to the unreliability of the “petit bourgeois” Jewish cadres: 
Comrade Rákosi […] has emphatically underlined that we should steer clear of “clever, petit 
bourgeois Jewish intellectuals”. We might have just as many problems with them as with the 
intelligent workers that we are going to bring in, with the difference, however, that whereas 
several years of laborious and toilsome work will bring forth its own fruit in the case of the 
worker cadres, in the case of the former group, we may never know when they will become spies 
and when they will spoil our efforts under the pretext of enforcing the Party line.21 
In the Stalinist anti-Zionist campaigns and trials of the early 1950s, such suspicions 
were transformed into grave accusations. They subsequently reappeared – with an 
unchanged structure but different content – in texts later used to criticize former 
Stalinist leaderships by several proponents of “Communism with a national face”, 
stating that Stalinist policy was a consequence of the “rootlessness” of the Jewish 
Stalinist leaders in their respective countries. This argument was used not only by 
some members of the Natolin faction in Poland, the later leaders of the antisemitic 
campaign of 1967,22 but even by the non-antisemitic Imre Nagy, who was Hungarian 
20 On this see Labendz, op. cit., 86–89.
21 Losonczy Géza levele Révai Józsefnek, 1949. július 14-én [Géza Losonczy’s Letter to József Révai, 14 
July 1949], Budapesti Negyed 8 (1995), 209–227. Letter published by Éva Standeisky. 
22 See Schatz, op. cit., 267.
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prime minister at the time of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. Prior to his trial and exe-
cution, Imre Nagy wrote the following in his notes regarding the Stalinist Rákosi-style 
leadership policy:
What explains such behaviour on the part of Rákosi’s clique? A crucial factor was that as most of 
them were Jews – indeed, mostly Jews from Moscow23 – consequently, broad sections of the Hun-
garian people had a hatred of them, turned against them, and were not willing to accept them 
as representatives of the Hungarian national interest, still less as their leaders. [...] Just as Stalin 
wanted to be more Russian than the Russians... so the Jewish Rákosi and his clique followed the 
same path, wanting to be more Hungarian than the Hungarians.24 
Jewish policy of the Communist states in the post-Stalinist period 
The post-Stalinist period of Communist policy brought changes in “Jewish policy.” 
After Stalin’s death, the anti-Zionist campaigns, with their thinly-veiled antisemitism, 
were halted for a time in the East-Central European countries. Indeed, from 1956 until 
1967, a “thaw” could be observed in this area, too. This changed only after the 1967 
war and the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel. At that time the antisemitic 
– “anti-Zionist” – campaigns re-emerged, particularly in Poland, but also in Czecho-
slovakia, after the suppression of the Prague Spring.25 
The post-Stalinist period also saw a change in the methods used by Soviet pol-
icy-makers to control the states in the Soviet bloc. In the first half of the 1950s, the 
Soviet Union had directly managed key areas of politics and the economy in the 
countries comprising the bloc. For instance, Poland’s Minister of Defence had been a 
Soviet general, Communist émigrés returning from the Soviet Union (some of whom 
were officers in the Soviet secret services) occupied key positions in the governments 
of the three countries, and in most government ministries, the resident Soviet “advi-
sors” had the major say. After 1956, certain areas remained under close Soviet control, 
including military and security matters. In general, however, one can state that while 
dependence on the Soviet Union severely limited the scope for action of the Warsaw 
Pact and Comecon countries in the fields of foreign and defence policy, the situation 
was different concerning domestic, economic, and also religious policy. The various 
countries were more able to develop independent policies or, in the terminology of 
the time, policies that were “better suited to local conditions”. 
23 Nagy meant that most members of the Rákosi group were Hungarian Communist emigrants who 
had lived in Moscow until 1945.
24 Imre Nagy, Snagovi jegyzetek. Gondolatok, emlékezések 1956–1957 [Snagov Notes: Thoughts and 
Recollections 1956–1957], ed. István Vida (Budapest: Gondolat, 2006), 93–94. 
25 See The Jewish Situation in Czechoslovakia after Dubcek. Background paper no. 13. London: Insti-
tute of Jewish Affairs in association with the World Jewish Congress 1969.
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Communist governments and politicians considered their policies towards Israel 
and their policies towards their Jewish communities different parts of the same 
problem. Evidently, the first reason was that emigration to Israel was an alternative 
available in the life strategies of Eastern European Jews throughout the period, regard-
less of whether or not they accepted the ideal of Zionism. Israel’s existence gave rise 
to a strong emotional identification even among those groups that were not seeking 
to migrate. The Jewish state was perceived as a direct result of the Holocaust, as a 
place where relatives, friends and old acquaintances had settled, and where refuge 
could be sought in the case of renewed persecution. Such perceptions of a special 
relationship were strengthened by the contemporary Israeli interpretation of political 
Zionism, which regarded the remaining European Jews as potential immigrants, and 
prioritized efforts to enable their emigration both at a political level and in practice. 
Unsurprisingly, the regulation of emigration, a factor that fundamentally influenced 
the life strategies of local Jewish populations, became the subject of both policy and 
political discourse related to Israel, and of policies towards the local Jewish commu-
nities. The documents in this volume illustrate this very well. 
Discourses and policies relating to domestic Jews were greatly influenced by 
international politics. After 1948, Israel had increasingly close ties with the West and 
found itself in constant conflict with the Arab states, which, in turn, sought an alli-
ance with the Soviet Union. With the exception of Romania after 1967, the Soviet Bloc 
countries gave their unconditional support to the Arabs in this conflict; still, uncondi-
tional support for Soviet policy was resisted not only by those Jews who were opposed 
to Communism; even many of those sympathetic to the Communist regime, and 
Jewish Party members or officials, were unable to fully identify with this policy. The 
Party leadership and Communist politics in general reacted to this phenomenon by 
making accusations of disloyalty and, in its extreme form, treason: Jews were accused 
of being the “fifth column of imperialism”.26 Even if policy on Jews and Jewish organi-
zations differed from country to country, the loyalty of Jews and Jewish organizations 
to Party policy – and thus to the regime – was viewed as questionable everywhere. 
Evidently, policy on Israel and on the Middle East conflict had to accommodate the 
interests of the Soviet Union in its status as superpower. Consequently, the presump-
tion of disloyalty of Jews and their organizations to this policy had a direct effect on 
26 For an analysis of the famous speech made by the Polish Party secretary, Władysław Gomułka, on 
19 June 1967 in which he allegedly referred to Poland’s Jews as a fifth column, see Szaynok, Poland–
Israel 1944–1968, 412–415. The same kind of language was used by the Czechoslovak secret service 
when justifying the drawing up of a full list of Czechoslovak Jews; see the documents of the “Pavauk” 
(Spider) initiative in this volume, as well as Alena Heitlinger, In the Shadow of the Holocaust and Com-
munism. Czech and Slovak Jews since 1945 (New Jersey and London: Transaction, 2006), 34; Jacob Ari 
Labendz, Renegotiating Czechoslovakia. The State and the Jews in Communist Central Europe: The 
Czech Lands, 1945–1990. PhD thesis, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University, 
2014, 209, 486. See also in this volume the speech made by Hungarian party leader, János Kádár, on 
13 June 1967 (Chapter 3, Document 10).
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government policies towards the local Jewish communities. Whereas Soviet politics 
and policy-makers now had little interest in the various countries’ policies towards 
their Jewish communities, suspicion of disloyalty required that appropriate political 
attention be given and responses sought.27
The policies of the Soviet Union and its allies towards Germany was a further 
special factor that contributed to the treatment of Jewish matters. When it became 
clear that efforts to establish a neutral and united Germany were illusory, and that 
West Germany was being drawn ever closer into the Western economic and defence 
community, Soviet policy switched to supporting the idea of “two Germanys”, 
whereby the Federal Republic of Germany – viewed as “revanchist” and neo-Fas-
cist – was treated as the manifestation of continuity with Hitler’s Germany, while the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), as the incorporation of anti-Fas-
cist traditions, became “the other Germany”. Such rhetoric was weakened, however, 
by increasingly good relations between the Federal Republic and Israel. While West 
Germany was willing to pay substantial reparations to the Jewish victims of wartime 
persecution, and took steps to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, the GDR 
stubbornly refused to acknowledge any responsibility for Nazi crimes, a stance that 
led Israel to rule out diplomatic relations with the East German state.28 
The East-Central European governments acted in line with the direction of Soviet 
policy. They sought to manipulate anti-Fascist sentiments, among them the emotions 
felt by Holocaust survivors, to organize protests against the FRG–Israeli rapproche-
ment by re-heating the libel of Zionist-Nazi collaboration. Such efforts, reflected in 
the documents in this volume, became more intense during the discussions on repa-
rations, during the Eichmann trial, and during the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions between the FRG and Israel. On these issues, Jewish organizations found them-
selves under strong pressure to support the government’s position, both domestically 
and on the international stage. This expectation had to be met even when it obviously 
ran counter to the fundamental interests of the local Jewish communities, such as on 
the issue of reparations.
Economic difficulties experienced by the East-Central European regimes also con-
tributed to the intertwining of domestic Jewish policy with foreign policy. By establish-
ing good relations with local Jewish communities, the leaders of the various countries 
which struggled with permanent foreign currency problems hoped to promote economic 
relations with both Israel and the United States. The aim was to create new opportuni-
ties in Western markets, and to facilitate favourable loans. Such hopes were expressly 
nurtured by the Israeli economic partners, who made no secret of their expectation that 
improved economic ties with the East-Central European regimes should be reciprocated 
by individual governments’ gestures towards their domestic Jewish populations. These 
27 On cooperation between the Soviet and Polish security organs, see Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–
1968, 325, 383.
28 Meining, op. cit., 106–108, 353.
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gestures were expected, first of all, in the field of facilitating emigration and easing 
contacts with international Jewish organizations. From the 1970s onwards, pressure 
on East-Central European governments steadily grew as American policy-makers 
regarded the situation of Soviet and other Eastern European Jews, their opportunities 
for emigration, and their unhindered contact with international Jewish organizations, 
as primary indicators of the state of human rights. Though in dire need for Western 
economic support, considering the political sensitivity of these issues, the Hungarian, 
Czechoslovak and Polish governments had to carefully weigh up how far they could go 
in improving economic relations and, in connection with this, in removing or mitigating 
restrictions on their local Jewish communities without annoying the Soviet Union or 
provoking economic retaliation from the Arab countries. 
For these reasons, the foreign and domestic threads of “Jewish policy” became 
inextricably intertwined. As the documents published in this volume reveal, even if 
“Jewish policy” in the various Communist countries was not determined exclusively 
by direct instructions from the Soviet Union, “Jewish matters” were repeatedly to be 
found on the political agenda of Soviet bloc states’ institutions even during those 
periods when “anti-Zionism” received less emphasis in Communist policy. The rele-
vant government, Party and security organs would then discuss such matters among 
themselves or occasionally at international level, whereby the conceptual frame and 
language of the “Jewish Question” was kept alive throughout the period. 
As was the case with other religious denominations, state control of Jewish organ-
isations was established by integrating them into the nomenklatura system of the 
Party-state. In practical terms, this meant that the Jewish religious denomination was 
made fully dependent, both financially and in terms of staff, on state bodies over-
seeing religious and denominational affairs. Their budgets (which came mostly from 
the state budget) were set by the state, while decisions on personnel (for instance, 
on congregation leaders, rabbis etc.) were made subject to the prior approval of 
the state. Jewish organizations in Hungary and Czechoslovakia could only function 
legally as denominational (that is, religious) institutions. In Poland, due to different 
historical traditions, a secular Jewish social and cultural institution, the Social and 
Cultural Association of Jews in Poland (TSKŻ), was allowed to function under close 
state control. In all three countries, the state authorities were suspicious of, and acted 
sooner or later to prohibit, any attempts to create organizations or to pursue activi-
ties that were not strictly controlled by officially approved institutions. Individuals 
involved in such efforts were usually subjected to repressive measures.29 
State authorities were particularly strict when it came to monitoring contacts with 
foreign and international Jewish organizations. There were political and ideological 
reasons for this, as international Jewish bodies were regarded as the representatives 
of hostile powers and, indeed, as cover organizations for foreign intelligence services. 
29 See, for further details, Heitlinger, op. cit., 105–142.; and Kovács, Hungarian Jewish Politics from 
the End of the Second World War, 124–156. 
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Another factor, however, was the state’s desire to cut off or control any financial source 
that might grant Jewish organizations a degree of independence. As the documents in 
this volume show, while membership of the WJC (World Jewish Congress) was permit-
ted or prohibited primarily in response to the WJC’s momentarily positive or negative 
stance towards both Soviet Jewry and Soviet policy, the main factor influencing policy 
towards international Jewish welfare organizations (above all, the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee and other related bodies) was economic, in particular, 
the hope of gaining access to Western currency reserves. Hence, in such cases, the aim 
was to strictly control contacts and to channel as much of the aid as possible to the 
state, which could then redistribute it from the centre. 
State authorities naturally imposed strict controls on institutional and private 
relations with Israel. Emigration to Israel was strictly regulated, although regulations 
were changed from time to time. Economic relations were maintained throughout 
the period, but their intensity varied over time as interests changed. One enduring 
concern was that such relations receive the least possible publicity, in order to prevent 
sanctions from and loss of trade with the Arab countries which, in terms of volume, 
was more significant. Limited publicity also served to minimize the risk of Soviet 
annoyance. Meanwhile, cultural relations, which the Israeli side would have liked to 
expand, were severely limited until the very late 1980s, and were prevented almost 
completely at the institutional level. In each of the East-Central European countries, 
Israeli diplomatic representations, diplomats and private individuals (business 
people and tourists) were strictly monitored.30 
In the Party-state regimes and the documents of their institutions, control and 
overt or covert influencing of domestic Jewish institutions and individuals, as well 
as relations with foreign Jewish organizations, were treated as intertwined affairs. 
The activities of Party, governmental and security organs were coordinated: from the 
late 1950s onwards, state organs maintained official relations with the Jewish institu-
tions through the State Office for Church Affairs (Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH) in 
Hungary, and the State Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Státní úřad pro věci církevní) 
in Czechoslovakia, the latter being amalgamated by the Ministry of Culture and Edu-
cation in 1956. These bodies passed on Party decrees and requirements on the basis 
of secret information provided by the Ministry of Interior. In this area too, however, 
there arose differences of opinion between various Party-state institutions: they often 
only supplied partial information to each other, and sought to realize their own insti-
tutional interests. In doing so, they even accepted minor conflicts with other insti-
tutions, as for instance, in Hungary in the mid-1960s, when the Ministry of Foreign 
30 See Labendz, Renegotiating Czechoslovakia, 444–449; Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 328, 
334; and the Hungarian documents published in this volume.
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Trade, seeking to increase foreign trade, came up against opposition from foreign 
policy departments and Party organs.31 
In Hungary, major Jewish matters were addressed by the Political Committee (the 
most important operational organ of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, HSWP) 
and by the Central Committee, the Party’s principal decision-making body. Major 
Jewish matters included the Eichmann affair, the crisis in the aftermath of the Six-Day 
War, and even antisemitic statements made by high-ranking Party functionaries.32 
Such matters, as well as other less significant ones, are constantly addressed in Party 
apparatus documents produced by departments dealing with agitprop, cultural, reli-
gious and scientific affairs, foreign affairs, and security affairs. These departments 
were in constant contact with relevant governmental institutions and personnel. As 
far as religious and denominational issues were concerned, the monitoring bodies 
were the State Office for Church Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Culture and Education, and last but not least, the security organs. In many cases, 
the same documents – for instance, papers referring to relations with international 
Jewish organizations – can be found among the papers of three organizations – the 
State Office for Church Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the foreign affairs 
department of the Party. Jewish organizations’ officials and the rabbis were briefed by 
state bodies on a regular basis, and whenever extraordinary matters arose. However, 
as the documents show, the security organs influenced the activities of religious con-
gregations not only by means of the state organizations that functioned as official 
points of contact, but also in an indirect way using agents, “social contacts”, and via 
the officials they were required to consult on a regular basis.
The documents in this volume offer an insight into the mechanisms that pro-
duced similarities in certain features that characterized the “Jewish policy” of each 
Party-state and its institutions. For instance, when important policy decisions were 
being weighed up, the likely Soviet reaction was always a consideration in every 
country. In many instances it was, of course, difficult to know for certain how the 
Soviet Union would react to a particular decision. Consequently, representatives of 
the Eastern Bloc countries (members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Israel, staff 
at bodies dealing with religious denominations, ministry personnel and Party depart-
ments responsible for relations with the Middle East) regularly consulted each other 
about their respective stances and policies. On the one hand, they sought precedents 
for decisions they were preparing to take. Secondly, they wished to avoid the risk of 
one of the “allies” drawing Soviet policy-makers’ attention to perceived deviations 
from the “common line”. The documents dealing with Israel and international Jewish 
31 On the conflict between the Ministry for Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Interior, see Labendz, 
Renegotiating Czechoslovakia, 383. On the conflict in Poland between the Ministry of Interior and foreign 
policy apparatus, see Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 375. On the conflicts between the political, eco-
nomic and foreign affairs apparatuses in Hungary, see several documents published in this volume.
32 See Kovács, Antisemitic Elements in Communist Discourse.
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organizations contain much information on this strategy. This meant that certain 
common features of “Jewish policy” in the East-Central European Communist Par-
ty-states were produced by processes of mutual accommodation, even in the absence 
of actual consultations on every concrete case between the various institutions, or 
clear signals from the Soviet leadership. Still, this political game, built on mutual 
suspicions but also a search for policy precedents, made it far easier for Soviet pol-
icy-makers to ensure – without directly intervening – that the countries in question 
pursued roughly the same policies towards the Middle East and towards their local 
Jewish communities. It should also be noted, however, that when it came to major 
political issues, such as the Eichmann affair and wars in the Middle East, the Party 
leaders were in direct contact with each other (see, for example, the papers on the 
Six-Day War in this volume). Moreover, on major issues, officials at each country’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs consulted with one other on the stance to be taken at inter-
national forums. Similarly, religious affairs bodies and departments of the security 
organs held lengthy and regular negotiations with one another on religious denomi-
nations and measures against “international Zionism”. 
Another common feature of “Jewish policy” in the Communist countries of 
East-Central Europe was a desire to maintain the semblance of legality, even in cases 
of blatant interference by the political leadership in religious denomination’s internal 
affairs. The documents published here, as well as similar documents produced by the 
Czechoslovak and Polish authorities, reveal the methods used by the religious affairs 
and security organs to manipulate religious congregations while taking care to avoid 
formal violations of the legal regulations.33 In almost all of the countries, this was 
made possible because the political and security organs used a large proportion of 
denominational leaders and rabbis as instruments of state policy, in various ways. 
Those individuals able to defy the authorities’ will were subjected to constant surveil-
lance and pressure.
About the collection
This introduction and the book do not seek to offer a systematic analysis of the “Jewish 
policy” of the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Rather, the aim is 
utilize the materials stored in former top secret archives, and provide access to docu-
ments which reveal the many features of “Jewish policy”. 
The documents selected for and commented upon in this volume are from the 
period 1957–1989. The main reason for this choice was that this period – referred 
to as the post-Stalinist era – marked the consolidation of the Communist regimes, 
and was four times longer than the Stalinist era itself (1949–1956), which may, from 
33 See Labendz, Renegotiating Czechoslovakia, 395, 503; and the Hungarian documents in this vol-
ume.
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this perspective, be regarded as an exceptional state of affairs. Documents from the 
post-Stalinist era provide deep insights into the institutional system, conceptual 
basis, ideology and language used by representatives of the Communist regime in 
relation to the Jewish population and the Jewish communities, and which aided the 
development of Communist policy in this field. 
Most of the volume consists of papers from the Hungarian archives. Documents 
from the Czechoslovak archives were only included in the volume where there was a 
direct link with matters documented in the Hungarian papers. This selection principle 
was applied due in part to space limitations, and in part to considerations of content. 
Research on “Jewish policy” in Communist Czechoslovakia and Poland is far 
ahead of that undertaken for Hungary. Whereas several collection of documents and 
monographs have been published on the two countries’ post-war policies towards the 
Jewish community and Israel,34 the studies published on Hungary have addressed 
only partial questions, and have usually covered the period 1945–1956. Yet among 
the three countries, Hungary had the highest share of Jewish Holocaust survivors, 
and during the period covered in the present volume – 1956–1989 – more Jews lived 
in Hungary than in the other two countries combined. Accordingly – and although 
most Jews in Hungary were secular – the number of Jewish congregations, their total 
membership, and the extent of their activities were far greater in Hungary than in 
Czechoslovakia or in Poland. Thus it was in Hungary that Communist “Jewish policy” 
had the greatest impact on the Jewish community in terms of the number of people 
and congregations affected.
After the post-Revolution repression, the post-1963 Communist regime in Hungary 
is usually portrayed as one of the most liberal and least repressive regimes. It also 
tends to be characterized as a regime that achieved substantial independence from 
Moscow. For this reason, we might regard the “Jewish policy” of the Hungarian lead-
ership as the most liberal policy possible during the period in the region. Similarly, 
the situation of the Hungarian Jewish community and the conditions within which 
Jewish institutions operated may be viewed as the “maximum” achievable in a Par-
ty-state. The documents published below reveal the characteristics and boundaries 
of this “maximum”. 
We have organized the documents in the volume around important cases, events 
and affairs. These papers, edited according to subject-matter and presented (mostly) in 
34 Among the many publications, the following are some of the most comprehensive: Marie Bulínová 
(ed.), Československo a Izrael v letech 1945–1956. Dokumenty, Ústav pro soudobé dejiny [Czechoslova-
kia and Israel in the Years 1945–1956. Documents at the Institute for Contemporary History] (Prague: 
AV CR, 1993); Labendz, Renegotiating Czechoslovakia; Alina Cała, Helena Datner-Spivak (eds), Dzie-
je Żydów w Polsce 1944–1968 [The History of Jews in Poland 1944–1968] (Warsaw: Teksty zdrólowe, 
1997); Szyman Rudnicki, Marcos Silber (eds.), Stosunki Polsko–Izraelskie (1945–1967). Wybór Doku-
mentów, Nczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Panstwowych [Polish–Israeli Relations (1945–1967). Selection of 
Documents, Head Office of State Archives] (Warsaw: Archiwum Panstwowe Izraela, 2009); Szaynok, 
Poland–Israel 1944–1968.
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chronological order, do not document all Jewish-related matters in the entire period; 
nor do they cover all the details of the various matters. Our primary aim was to reveal in 
detail Hungarian policy in matters that were on the agenda in each of the East-Central 
European countries. In doing so, we also sought to provide insights into the operation 
of the Party-state system in the country with the region’s largest Jewish community. The 
documents published in this volume were created by functionaries working for various 
institutions of the Party-state, and who used the Communist Party jargon characteristic 
of the era. This language cannot, in general, be reproduced in English translation. Still, 
the ambiguous or clumsy sentences in the English text reflect this stifled language. The 
published documents are texts that their authors dictated to typists. In consequence, 
they contain numerous typos, particularly with regard to foreign personal names, and 
the names of foreign institutions. We have not corrected such errors in the text but have 
marked them with [sic!]. Personal names are shown in their correct form in the list of 
names at the end of the volume. All documents in the volume were classified or marked 
as “top secret”. We omitted this label from the document headings. Further omissions 
in the documents are indicated by [...]. All emphases in the documents were made by 
the authors of the document. Emphases and explanatory comments added by the editor 
appear in [square brackets – AK].
The first chapter in the volume contains documents on policies concerning con-
flicts surrounding emigration to Israel, and the regulation of economic and cultural 
relations with Israel until 1967. These documents clearly show the intertwining of 
foreign and domestic policy aspects discussed above. 
The second chapter contains Hungarian documents relating to the Eichmann affair, 
as well as papers from the Czechoslovak archives that offer insights into differences of 
opinion between the two countries, and into the consultation mechanisms that arose. 
The third chapter reveals, by way of Hungarian documents on the Six-Day War, 
and Soviet sources that were shared with the Hungarian leadership, the modus ope-
randi of Eastern bloc leaders at a time of crisis, the means used by Soviet leaders 
to achieve their goals, and the on-going attempts to manage differences of opinion 
between the various countries. This chapter also contains documents that show the 
consequences of the crisis in the Middle East for Jewish policy in a “consolidated” 
country such as Hungary, where it did not lead to an antisemitic campaign (unlike in 
Poland), or to internal conflicts among the Communist leadership (unlike in Czecho-
slovakia). Also contained in this chapter are documents that show the path to the 
re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in the late 1980s.
The documents in the fourth chapter reveal the policies of the official Hungar-
ian state authority for religious affairs – the State Office for Church Affairs – towards 
Jewish organizations. Most of the documents relate to policy concerning international 
Jewish organizations. They clearly show the strategies employed by the major inter-
national Jewish organizations during the period, as well as the response of Hungarian 
Jewish institutions and the Hungarian state to such initiatives. 
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The fifth chapter contains mainly documents from the archives of the security 
services. These reveal which matters came under the radar of the security apparatus, 
the relative importance assigned to such matters, and the aims and means of the sur-
veillance and intimidation of Jewish communities and individuals. 
The documents in the collection originate from various periods and cover various 
matters and institutions. Viewed from today’s perspective, however, they are closely 
related. Overall, they display the conceptual and discursive frames, and the vocab-
ulary used to discuss “Jewish issues”. This language – based on old but recontex-
tualized historical stereotypes – was used to communicate on Jewish issues both 
internally and externally, and remained almost unchanged throughout the period in 
the region. It was even in Hungary, the most liberal Communist Party-state, a self-ev-
ident means of discussing and managing these issues. This was the soil that kept the 
“Jewish Question” alive during the decades of Communist rule until the very collapse 
of the system and which then enabled, after 1990, its new public reappearance.
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I Communist Policies and the Jewish State

Introduction
A combination of factors determined relations between East-Central European Com-
munist countries and Israel in the decades between the establishment of the Jewish 
state and the collapse of the Communist regimes. The role and relative significance of 
various political, economic and ideological factors changed over time, and the chang-
ing circumstances were reflected in these countries’ relations with Israel. 
During periods when Soviet power interests and an intensification of the Middle 
East conflict were the main determinants of the relationship, such as in the early 
1950s, or after the 1967 war, these countries’ policies converged more than they did 
between 1957 and 1967. Greater policy autonomy at the individual state level was later 
regained in the second half of the 1980s, when each country had more leeway to 
develop its own policy towards Israel in line with its particular interests. 
These similarities and differences became manifest in several fields: emigration 
policy, which particularly affected local Jewish communities; economic and cul-
tural relations; and positions taken at international forums. In this chapter we have 
selected documents that relate to the first two subject areas. 
Despite significant differences in numerical estimates, experts agree that the post-
1945 waves of emigration to Palestine/Israel from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
rose and subsided concurrently.1 Between 1945 and 1950, Palestine/Israel received 
around 20,000 Jewish migrants from Czechoslovakia, over 14,000 from Hungary, and 
about 100,000 from Poland. Over the next five years, the number of emigrants from 
these countries fell drastically for several reasons, including restrictions on emigration. 
In the following period however, the number of emigrants from Poland and Hungary 
increased once again: between 1956 and 1960, there were probably more than 40,000 
Jewish emigrants from Poland (30,000 of them left the country in 1957),2 and in 1956–
1957, more than 4,000 legal emigrants from Hungary. This last figure could be increased 
by around one-third of the 10–15,000 Jewish emigrants who left Hungary illegally in the 
aftermath of the 1956 Revolution. By the early 1960s, there had also been an increase 
in the number of migrants to Israel from Czechoslovakia, a country that had been rela-
tively hesitant to move on from the former Stalinist policies in the wake of 1956: between 
1962 and 1966, more than 1,000 persons left the country for Israel.3 
1 I am indebted to Professor Sergio DellaPergola at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem who shared 
the results of his research on aliyah, based on published and unpublished data of the Israel Central 
Bureau of Statistics. For a review of previous research on Jewish emigration from the various coun-
tries to Palestine/Israel, see Karády, Túlélők és újrakezdők, 125–133; for a comparative analysis of the 
data for Czechoslovakia, see Labendz, Renegotiating Czechoslovakia, 31, 104–105, 254–255; and for 
Poland, see Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 202, 297, 385. 
2 Ewa Węgrzyn,  L’émigration des Juifs de Pologne en Israël dans les années 1956–1959, Bulletin du 
Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem [En ligne], 22 | 2011, mis en ligne le 25 mars 2012, accessed on 
24 November 2016 at http://bcrfj.revues.org/6531
3 See Labendz, op. cit., 104–105.
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While the figures indicate certain similarities – a degree of liberalisation – in the 
policies of East-Central European Communist countries towards Jewish emigration 
at the beginning of the post-Stalinist era, significant differences came to the fore as 
the post-Stalinist regimes consolidated. It seems that at this time, the official policies 
of each country, as well as fluctuations in the number of emigrants, were influenced 
to a far greater degree by local crises which instrumentalised antisemitic sentiment, 
such as the antisemitic campaign that began in Poland in 1967, and the crushing of 
Czechoslovak reform attempts in 1968. After the initial waves of immediate post-crisis 
emigration, the number of emigrants to Israel soon plummeted, such as after 1957 
in Hungary and Poland, and after 1968 in Czechoslovakia. During this period, local 
circumstances and considerations were important factors. The documents presented 
in this chapter should enable a deeper understanding of the policies pursued during 
the first post-Stalinist decades. These policies were generally designed to maintain 
a delicate balance between external factors and expectations on the one hand, and 
local circumstances and interests on the other. 
After the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Israeli government was among the 
first to recognise Kádár’s internationally isolated regime, and to establish relations 
with the Hungarian government at ambassadorial level.
Even before the outbreak of the revolution, the Hungarian government had sought 
talks with Israel on trade expansion. After the revolution, the Hungarian government 
moved quickly to reestablish ties broken in 1956. Clearly, it was of great importance 
to the newly-established Kádár regime to break out of its international isolation. Most 
of the documents found among the foreign-affairs materials which relate to Israel 
indicate that the Hungarian government greatly appreciated Israel’s willingness to 
normalise diplomatic relations, and to develop bilateral economic relations. The doc-
uments help to explain why the Israeli authorities demonstrated flexibility towards 
Hungary’s Communist government, which was otherwise completely isolated inter-
nationally. It appears the Israelis believed that such flexibility, and the rapid expan-
sion of relations between the two countries, would facilitate the migration to Israel 
of Jews from what was one of Europe’s largest Jewish communities. Discussions had 
commenced in 1956, and were resumed in early 1957. On 12 January 1957, the Hun-
garian chargé d’affaires in Tel Aviv wrote the following to his superiors in Budapest: 
“[It] would be of great significance in our economic relations […] if the Hungarian 
government were to show a permissive attitude in the matter of Jewish emigration 
on a larger scale. With appropriate caution, the authorisation of Jewish emigration 
on a larger scale could be linked with some of our economic aims”.4 Hungarian poli-
cy-makers even outlined the first step towards what they hoped to achieve. As Deputy 
Foreign Trade Minister Jenő Baczoni wrote in an internal memo addressed to Deputy 
Foreign Minister Károly Szarka: “I suggest that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should 
raise with the Israeli government the question of a loan to Hungary in freely convert-
4 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 9.d. 15/1957 (12 January 1957).
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ible currency via some banking institution [...] the aim could be six to seven million 
dollars at an interest rate of 2.5–3 per cent, and repayable within five years”.5 
The view that Israel would be open to favourable economic deals in return for 
the liberalisation of emigration was not unrealistic. A note attached to the previous 
document, written on 30 July 1956 by a foreign-trade and banking expert negotiating 
in Paris, contains the following: 
During my most recent stay in Paris, Messrs Pachta and Ernest [these names reappear in docu-
ments relating to subsequent developments – AK], who own the Transcomin company, and who 
also have an interest in the Geneva-based Banque Suisse-Israël, raised the following matter: 
the Israelis would be very pleased if the Hungarian government authorised, within a certain 
period of time (roughly 12 months), the emigration of 10–12,000 Jews, those with relatives living 
in Israel. [...] If they were to receive a verbal promise from the Hungarian government, that this 
request would be considered, , the financial group with close links to the Israelis would be pre-
pared – even without the two matters being visibly connected – to offer certain economic bene-
fits. Indeed, they have offered five million dollars in a cash loan, which would be made available 
by either Banque Suisse-Israël or another European bank as indicated by them, for a period of 
several years and at the favourable interest rate of three per cent. 
The message relayed by Pachta and Ernest formulated what was to serve as the foun-
dation for discussions and deals in the ensuing years: Israel would offer economic 
advantages in return for a liberalisation of emigration, while the act of paying ransom 
for Jews – which neither side could publicly admit to – would never be made appar-
ent, either in official documents, or to the public.
The Israeli authorities thought that after the experiences of the first half of the 
1950s, and the suppression of the revolution, many of Hungary’s 150,000 to 200,000 
Jews would choose to make aliyah. Only rough estimates exist on the number of Jews 
who illegally left the country in the months following the revolution: the numbers 
fluctuate between 10,000 and 25,000. According to Israeli immigration statistics, 
about 8,000 of these Jewish emigrants went to Israel.6 The Israeli authorities calcu-
lated that if legal channels for emigration were opened, this trend would continue, 
and this assessment seemed to pay off in the first months after the revolution. Israeli 
Foreign Ministry data do indeed show an increase in legal migration: whereas just 223 
persons officially migrated from Hungary to Israel between January and November 
1956, the number of official migrants rose to 4,142 between December 1956 and the 
end of April 1957.7 
5 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 9.d. 1-00109/1957 (15 February 1957).
6 Mark Tolts, Population and Migration. Migration since World War I, The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews 
in Eastern Europe. Accessed on 28 September 2016 at http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/
Population_and_Migration/Migration_since_World_War_I#id0emxbi. 
7 See National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-l-j 1.d. 001632/1957 (20 May 1957). Citing an estimate of 
the Israeli legation in Budapest, the document indicates that between 14,000 and 15,000 “persons of 
Jewish religion” left the country illegally at the time of the revolution and thereafter. 
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Still, it was not long before this liberal migration policy came to an end. The main 
reason for this reversal was clearly the general political situation: the Kádár govern-
ment, installed and imposed upon the country after the Soviet invasion, could not 
afford to challenge Soviet policies in the Middle East. After the Suez Crisis, relations 
between the Soviet Union and the Jewish state reached a low point. The principal 
aim of Soviet policy in the region was to improve and expand relations with the Arab 
countries in order to achieve greater Soviet influence. After 1956, Hungarian foreign 
policy could not ignore this fact, particularly because, as Foreign Ministry documents 
show, the Arab countries had already criticised the improvement in Hungarian–
Israeli relations, exemplified by the enhancement of diplomatic relations and the 
dispatch of a legate to Israel in early 1957. Hungary’s Communist government feared 
that the country’s improving relations with Israel might exert a “negative influence” 
on its own Jewish population, and encourage the Jews to migrate, which was viewed 
as an undesirable development. The fundamental position of the Hungarian govern-
ment is reflected in a letter dated 4 May 1957 sent by Péter Kós, head of the Political 
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the legate Iván Kálló, in response 
to the latter’s report concerning the surprisingly warm welcome he had received on 
taking up his post: 
The demonstrative ovation on the part of the Israeli official bodies, made in response to the leg-
ate’s arrival, is a positive phenomenon only in an apparent sense, since it is, at the same time, 
a dangerous one for us with undesirable effects […]. An attempt is being made to overstate the 
cordiality of Hungarian–Israeli relations […]. But we have no need for such large-scale demon-
strations, because irrespective of the transmission of the letter of appointment of their legate 
during the most difficult period for us [during the complete foreign-policy isolation of the Kádár 
government – AK], to which we wished to respond by sending you, Comrade Legate, there, we 
still regard Israel as an aggressor […]. [Israel] is an obedient instrument of the Western imperial-
ist powers which actively cooperates with the Western powers in suppressing the independence 
ambitions of Arab countries in the Middle East.
By consenting last year to the exchange of legates between the two countries, we did not 
wish to establish particularly close relations, or to expand relations. For us, the emphasis placed 
by the Israeli bodies on relations is also unwelcome […], because this […] is sincere only as long 
as we refrain from preventing emigration to Israel by certain sections of the Jewish population 
living in Hungary […]. We wish to avoid, at all costs, our relationship with Israel giving rise to 
an undesirable and needless counter-effect among the Arab countries, of which there have been 
signs for some time. The General Secretariat of the Arab League has already addressed two diplo-
matic notes to us, once in connection with the emigration issue and, a second time, concerning 
the speech made by you, Comrade Legate, on the submission of the letter of appointment in Jeru-
salem. We ask you, Comrade Legate […] not to be misled by the apparent affinity shown toward 
us by the official bodies. At the same time, however, you should continue to seek […] to assist the 
expansion of our commercial trade by using your connections, in which field we are willing to 
expand our relations.8 
8 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-l-j 1.d. 001459/2 (4 May 1957).
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Against this background, an unexpected incident arose between the countries at just 
the right moment for the Hungarian authorities. The documents (2–7) below were 
created during this rather odd episode in Hungarian–Israeli relations, an episode 
which, however, well illustrates the political aspirations of both sides, and the politi-
cal mechanisms they used. 
In the spring of 1957, shortly after the Hungarian ambassador arrived in Tel Aviv, 
the Hungarian authorities learnt that a staff member at the Israeli legation in Buda-
pest was regularly receiving cash sums and property from individuals seeking to 
migrate to Israel. These individuals had been promised that their property and money 
would be returned to them after arrival in Israel. This was the beginning of what was 
called the “smuggling affair”. 
The first suspicions arose when Hungarian authorities noticed that the Israeli 
legation in Budapest had hardly exchanged any foreign currency for Hungarian 
forints at the National Bank of Hungary; the sum was certainly not enough to cover 
its expenditures (Document 2). Then, on 8 April 1957, the head of the Hungarian trade 
mission in Tel Aviv forwarded a memorandum to his superiors containing a complaint 
from a recently arrived migrant, who claimed that he had been unable to reclaim his 
assets deposited at the Israeli legation in Budapest, whereas others arriving in Israel 
at the same time had been able to reclaim their property.9 Based on such information, 
on 3 June 1957, the Hungarian authorities summoned the Israeli Ambassador Meir 
Tuval and, in a verbal note, they announced their decision to expel the Israeli com-
mercial attaché, whom they considered responsible for these unlawful transactions. 
The Hungarian authorities also demanded substantial damages, and announced the 
suspension of all further migration until compensation had been paid.10 
The government of Israel was embarrassed by the affair, as shown by Ambassa-
dor Iván Kálló’s report on a meeting with Israel’s Foreign Minister Golda Meir on 10 
June (Document 2). However, as a memorandum on a second meeting with Meir indi-
cates (Document 3), within a few weeks, the Israelis had established their position: 
the Israeli legation as an institution had played no part in the matter, but Israel was 
open to negotiations on compensation. This was music to the ears of the Hungarian 
authorities.
Hungarian policy-makers in foreign trade and finance (Document 6) first took a 
pragmatic approach. However, this was not supported by senior staff at the Hungar-
ian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had direct and day-to-day contacts with Soviet 
foreign-policy actors, and with the Soviet legation in Budapest. According to the Hun-
garian Foreign Ministry, an expansion of and improvement in relations with Israel 
would elicit a negative reaction in Arab countries where the Soviet Union was seeking 
to increase its influence. Even prior to the eruption of the “smuggling affair”, Péter 
Kós, head of the relevant department at the Ministry, and reacting to the above offer 
9 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 1.d. 001632/3 (8 April 1957).
10 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 1.d. 78/Sz-1957 (3 June 1957).
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transmitted by Deputy Minister Baczoni, had informed the Hungarian ambassador in 
Tel Aviv of the following: 
Subject: Conversation with Péter Veress, head of department at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, on 
Hungarian–Israeli trade problems. […] Veress inquired whether we could draw advantage from 
the fact that recently, a larger number of individuals of the Jewish religion have been allowed 
to move to Israel. In this context, he mentioned that during the discussions in Geneva, certain 
Israeli individuals had made an offer of a financial loan of around two million dollars, subject 
to the Hungarian government showing greater understanding for the migration of Jews to Israel. 
We have not reacted to the offer [...]. We do not wish to make use of a more liberal position on 
emigration in order to obtain a loan. Moreover, under current political circumstances, we do 
not intend to request credit from Israel, as this would weaken our positions in the Arab states.11 
The position of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not change subse-
quently. Indeed, on 4 July 1957, having discovered the “smuggling affair”, the head 
of the Fourth Political Department at the Ministry stated the following to the Ambas-
sador: 
[When] the note in question was submitted, our concern was not so much the financial damages 
suffered in consequence of the irregular administration of emigration, but rather political con-
siderations. In fact, the matter concerned putting a stop to steps taken by the Israeli government 
(in the aftermath of the exchange of diplomats) to improve relations in a manner that was not 
desired by us, and to return our relations to the level at which they had been a year previously. 
Thus, as far as we are concerned, forcing our demand for compensation is unnecessary, partic-
ularly because it is primarily in the interest of the Israeli government to settle the issue for its 
own sake. For them, a more important issue than fulfilling the damages demanded by us is that 
migration should proceed smoothly. If we were to urge the fulfillment of our claim for damages 
by the Israeli government, then we might give the appearance of having taken this step expressly 
because of the claim for damages [...] and that we want to utilise it to obtain dollars.12
Amid the unfavourable political and economic circumstances in the aftermath of 
post-1956 international isolation, and a dire lack of foreign currency, the hardliners 
did not prevail in the end. The Hungarian side was very keen to continue the talks on 
financial compensation, while the Israelis wanted the emigration process to resume. 
Consequently, both sides drove the talks noiselessly towards an agreement without 
loss of face for either side. Of course, the Israelis continued to insist that they had 
done nothing illegal, and thus did not owe any compensation. For their part, the Hun-
garians still claimed that they were not “selling” Jews, and had no intention of allow-
ing Jews to migrate in return for economic favours. In actual fact, however, both sides 
were thinking the opposite, and both were clearly aware that this was rather obvious 
to their counterpart. The task was to find a mode of negotiation and compromise that 
would preserve the two fictions, while also achieving the desired result. Given the 
11 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 10.d. 001488/1957 (5 March 1957).
12 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 1.d. 002149/2/1957 (4 July 1957).
 Introduction   27
likely reaction in Arab countries and the close Soviet control of foreign policy, discus-
sions through diplomatic channels were not suitable for this purpose. It was at this 
point that talks began to be directed by János Fekete, head of the foreign-currency 
department at the National Bank of Hungary. Fekete was contacted by acquaintances 
in the banking world, among them Ernest and Pachta, and asked to mediate.
The course of negotiations was summarised by Fekete in his report of 25 June 1958 
(Document 7). The bankers in Geneva wished to reach an agreement. Initially, they 
envisaged making a favourable loan to Hungary, with the Israelis having to make do 
with rather vague promises of a renewed authorisation of emigration. Shortly after 
the discussions in Geneva, on 3 September 1958, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs submitted a draft motion to the Political Committee of the Party, requesting 
its approval. Signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, the motion contains the 
following: 
If the Israeli side accepts […] the economic conditions, we authorise Comrade Fekete to adhere to 
the following negotiating tactics and to finally establish the following agreement concerning the 
emigration issue. a./ Verbally inform the Israeli side that prior to the completion of negotiations, 
a senior staff member of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will inform the Israeli legate in 
Budapest that in the event of the successful conclusion of Hungarian–Israeli financial and eco-
nomic talks, the competent Hungarian authorities will terminate the restriction on emigration to 
Israel that was announced in our note of 4 June 1957. If the Israeli side seeks further assurance, 
then they can be informed that the Hungarian authorities are willing to authorise, as a gesture, 
the commencement of emigration even before the agreement has been approved. (If the agree-
ment were not to be approved for any reason, emigration could be halted once again.) b./ If the 
Israeli side does not consider the verbal information to be sufficient assurance, Comrade Fekete 
should propose the acceptance of the joint statement appearing as an appendix to this motion, 
in which the oral statements proposed in Point 2 are set down in writing. [The motion envisages 
the making of a written guarantee in the form of an exchange of notes – AK.]13 
An agreement was soon reached. On 22 September 1958, the two sides agreed that 
Israel would transfer to the National Bank of Hungary the sum of 1.5 million dollars 
in four instalments. In return, the Hungarian government would resume its authori-
sation of emigration to Israel. The rather lax definitions of the Hungarian obligations 
led to the next dispute. The Israelis immediately transferred the first instalment 
(500,000 dollars) of the agreed sum. This amount, as the documents show, was put 
together by the Jewish Agency for Israel. The second and third instalments, however, 
did not reach the National Bank of Hungary by the dates contained in the agreement 
(30 April and 31 August 1959), because the Israeli side believed that the Hungarians 
were failing to keep their promise concerning emigration. It would seem the Hungar-
ian government sought to get around the part of the agreement relating to emigration 
by basing the number of permits on the small number of passports issued in the first 
six months of 1956, rather than on the number of authorisations in 1957. Thus, the 
13 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 2.d. 605/SE/1958 (3 September 1958).
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Hungarian authorities permitted the emigration of only eight to ten individuals each 
month.14 Meanwhile, they cynically gave the impression of being surprised that a con-
nection might be drawn between the two matters of “compensation” and emigration. 
They argued that: 
1/ the financial agreement has nothing to do with the issue of emigration; 2/ we undertook to 
stop discriminating and to provide an opportunity that is generally made available to every Hun-
garian citizen with regard to emigrating to any point in the world [...]. Therefore, we have fulfilled 
everything that we undertook and, indeed, we have gone further than this in terms of family 
unification and humane purposes; for a matter in progress is that of five children seeking to 
emigrate, whose parents live in Israel.15
By the summer of 1959, the emigration of Hungarians had come to a complete halt, 
and so Golda Meir personally contacted the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
with a view to “reviving” the matter of “compensation” and emigration. Thanks to 
her efforts, targetted financial talks were reopened between Fekete and Ernest in the 
autumn. After some haggling, a new agreement was reached by the end of the year: 
the Israelis agreed not only to the prompt transfer of the remaining instalments, but 
also to the payment of an additional sum equivalent to an annual rate of interest of 
five per cent for the duration of the delay. Thereafter, the authorisation of emigra-
tion gradually resumed, but the number of permits was far below the level envisaged 
by the Israelis. According to a memorandum of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, between 1 January and early May 1960, 165 individuals received emigration 
permits, of whom 55 per cent were between the ages of 20–60, 33 per cent were over 
60 years of age and 12 per cent were between the ages of five and 20.16 After further 
disputes and mutual reproaches, the Israelis finally transferred the last instalment on 
6 January 1961. In the ensuing years, the Hungarian authorities favourably appraised 
a relatively large proportion of emigration requests, but the percentage began to 
fall once again from 1964.17 However, even if Hungarian authorities had authorised 
all the emigration requests, the total number of migrants would still not have met 
Israeli expectations. Perhaps this partly explains why, in subsequent decades, the 
issue of emigration declined in significance as a factor determining relations between 
Hungary and Israel. 
14 Between October 1958 and April 1959, the Hungarian authorities permitted the emigration of 60 
persons, while around 160 applications were rejected. The Israelis were expecting 4–5,000 people to 
migrate to Israel. National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 2.d. 51/Sz-1959 (16 April 1959).
15 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 2.d. (25 February 1959).
16 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 2.d. 00354, 2.d. (11 May 1960). 
17 Authorized emigration from Hungary to Israel was as follows: 1962 – 202 permits from 275 applica-
tions; 1963 – 280 permits from 349 applications; 1964 – 201 permits from 396 applications; 1965 – 175 
permits from 364 applications. National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 2.d. 11/66 (14 January 1966). See 
Document 8.
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After 1961, the waves of the “smuggling affair” gradually subsided, although rela-
tions developed mostly in line with the aforementioned guiding principles. The Israeli 
government, sensing that the Hungarian side had a great interest in the maintenance 
and possible expansion of economic relations, and in the maximum utilisation of 
the advantages stemming from such relations, repeatedly attempted to expand rela-
tions in the fields of culture, academia and sport. By multiplying and diversifying ties 
between the two countries, the Israeli side hoped that Hungarian Jews would become 
closer to the Jewish state, and that more Hungarian Jews would consider making 
aliyah. These attempts, however, were consistently warded off by the Hungarian side, 
especially whenever the possibility of a bilateral agreement arose. On the other hand, 
the Hungarians did everything to utilise economic opportunities proffered by Israel, 
while being very careful to ensure that this was not made public, or brought to the 
attention of Arab governments.
This situation appears to have changed in the mid-1960s. The documents indi-
cate that some officials directing Hungarian foreign policy and foreign-trade policy 
believed that the time was right for an expansion of relations with Israel. Evidently, 
this development was not unrelated to the economic reform efforts that were under 
way at the time.
Documents (9–15) illustrate this change. They reveal the various factors that had 
to be considered by those seeking arguments legitimising an expansion of relations, 
as well as the importance of Hungarian policy not appearing out of step with other 
Communist governments. Policy-makers in favour of enhancing relations argued that 
as a consequence of the shift: “We can give assistance to the Israeli progressive forces 
and can, on occasion, influence the policy of the State of Israel” (Document 12, 15 Feb-
ruary 1967). The documents contain detailed information on diplomatic, economic 
and cultural relations between “Socialist countries” and Israel, indicating to the 
officials involved how far Hungary could go without upsetting “friendly countries”. 
Indeed, the papers include examples and precedents that Hungary’s diplomats could 
cite in the event of a further improvement in relations with Israel. For those working 
in the field of foreign relations and trade who supported such a cautious improve-
ment, a constant point of reference was the opinion of the Israeli Communist Party. 
Evidently, the latter benefitted whenever relations improved, for, as the documents 
show, the Israeli Communist Party’s enterprises oversaw a significant share of Israel’s 
cultural and trade relations with Hungary. In various legation reports and foreign-af-
fairs documents, the presence of a large number of Hungarian native speakers among 
the Israeli population was also often cited as an argument for expanding relations. 
For the authors of the reports, this was a factor that the Hungarian government and 
even the entire “Socialist camp” could exploit to increase political influence. “Even 
the Soviet ambassador has noted the failure to make use of this opportunity, as have 
the leaders of the ICP [Israeli Communist Party]”, stated a summary report dated 15 
February 1967. 
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Yet the documents also show how this policy encountered significant resistance 
“at home”, particularly among officials of the Ninth Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, responsible for relations with Arab countries. Critics of an expan-
sion of relations with Israel cited the likelihood of negative repercussions in Arab 
countries, and economic retaliatory measures. Supporters of improved relations with 
Israel countered such arguments by noting the lack of unity in the Arab world (see 
Document 10): “Within this Arab policy, a certain nuance has recently appeared, and 
today the position of Arab states (Tunisia, Lebanon and Jordan) is not a unified one”. 
Additionally, the pro-Israeli wing felt itself strong enough to use a political argument: 
“It would not be correct to treat our policy concerning this relationship merely as 
a function of our policy towards Arab countries. Those present agreed that if it is 
rational and necessary, the political efforts of Arab countries should be taken into 
account, but that this should not be to the detriment of Hungarian sovereignty”. At 
this point, the department responsible for relations with Israel went on the offensive: 
they suggested that if its proposed policy were to be rejected, the Israel desk should be 
given to members of staff responsible for relations with Arab countries. 
Finally, in early 1967, an expansion of relations seems to have become a real possi-
bility. The document issued on 19 February 1967 by the Sixth Department of the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs (responsible for relations with Israel) proposes a relatively broad 
opening, listing tactical and conceptual arguments. The document, tacitly accepting 
the Israeli suggestions, proposed to the upper Party organs that relations with Israel 
should be developed at several levels, and in fields such as transportation, culture, 
communication, media and tourism. 
The minutes of the meeting that relate to the document reveal, however, that 
this goal was rejected by some foreign policy-makers. In early 1967, opponents of the 
pro-Israeli wing seemed to be fighting an uphill battle, but the Six-Day War caused 
a reversal. After the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, the Ninth Depart-
ment launched a triumphal counter-offensive. In the document dated 3 November 
1967, it took a clear position: “We consider it necessary to review once again Hun-
garian–Israeli economic relations, so that they are in line with our political position. 
Currently, these relations are noticeably overplayed, and in our opinion, a significant 
reduction would be possible without detrimentally affecting our national economy”. 
Still, exploiting the political atmosphere that had emerged in the wake of Hungary’s 
economic reforms, several officials at the Ministry of Foreign Trade sought to resist 
any drastic changes in economic relations. In a craftily-worded document issued on 
17 September 1968, they stated: “We strive to ensure that our commercial trade with 
Israel should not exceed the level of commercial trade for 1966”. (Foreign trade rela-
tions had peaked that year.) They then added: “In view of our foreign-exchange situa-
tion, the repayment of these items [long-term debts – AK] was not considered desirable 
by our financial authorities”. The handwritten remark on the document, signed by 
Vencel Házi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, leaves no doubt that, in this case, 
political considerations had overwritten economic rationality: “In political terms, our 
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indebtedness is very unwelcome. I discussed [the matter – AK] with Comrade P. Veres 
at the MFT [Ministry of Foreign Trade] and with Comrade Fekete at the NB [National 
Bank]. We should endeavour to reduce significantly our debt to Israel”.
Thereafter, relations between the two countries deteriorated further, and it was 
only in the 1980s that relations began to improve once more.
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Documents
1 On Emigration
Tel Aviv, 8 February 1957
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-1/a-00/210-1957 (1.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium]
From: Legation of the Hungarian People’s Republic in Israel
Subject: reorganisation of the legation’s work
[....]
On the emigration issue
We would consider it appropriate for the government to make concessions in this 
area. This appears particularly justified if we consider the domestic housing shortage 
and the problems of unemployment. We are convinced that most of those wishing 
to emigrate are dispensable to our economy. Of course, we must also reckon on the 
departure of a few good experts. But such people, inasmuch as they wish to leave 
the country, would not like to work there anyway. It is certain that there would be an 
international response to this resolution.
On the other hand, we consider it essential to objectively inform those intend-
ing to emigrate, in order to prevent the unnecessary to-and-fro migration of people, 
and bitter disappointment on the part of the migrants. Administrative means can be 
used to achieve results (e.g. preventing the return [of migrants], etc.), but this will 
not resolve all the problems. (The Polish chargé d’affaires here, Comrade Slovikovski 
[sic! – AK], has said that police assistance had to be requested recently in order to 
deal with the crowds descending upon the legation with the intention of returning 
[to Poland]. The Poles do not permit the return of recent migrants.) We have to find a 
way of informing those wishing to emigrate about what awaits them in Israel. With a 
few individual exceptions (those with rich relatives here or some special connections 
– above all, a Zionist past), the masses face unemployment and a lack of housing, 
possibly as well as hard physical labour in the development zones. They have to 
understand that in Israel there is no need for officials, traders or academics without 
knowledge of Hebrew, etc. Here, people who work with their two hands are needed, 
especially cheap agricultural workers. We are of the view that such people are not so 
common among migrants – on the contrary. The need here is for young people, as 
soldiers. Unemployment in Israel is nearly catastrophic. Overt disturbances are an 
indication. The number of unemployed people is rising higher and higher, and this 
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is made even worse by increased immigration. Most migrants face a humiliating life, 
subsisting on relief aid.
It is not because we disagree with the facilitation of the emigration process that 
we note all of this. Still, we would like to draw attention to the problems that are likely 
to arise later on, for which we have no need. Preventing emigration will not solve the 
problem. But by informing those who are still Hungarian citizens, we can reduce it. In 
our view, the work of informing people should be the task of the Israeli side, too. They 
are the ones who know best the difficulties they have with immigrants.
In addition to informing people, there is also a need for administrative measures. 
It should be made impossible for people to return within a short period of time (or 
possibly to return at all).
Concerning the effect of facilitating emigration upon relations between the two 
states, our opinion is as follows. A facilitation of emigration possibilities would clearly 
have a significant impact on relations between the two states. Doubtless, it would also 
have some kind of economic impact. But a principle change in these relations is not to 
be expected. The present ruling circles here are fundamentally opposed to anything 
that is Communist; thus, we should hardly expect a principal change in their position 
with regard to our government. Clearly, in terms of outward appearances, there will 
be signs from the Israeli side of an improvement in relations, but we are sure that as 
time passes, they will perceive the facilitation of emigration as a sign of the weakness 
of the Socialist system, rather than as a humanitarian measure on the part of the 
Hungarian government. It is also to be expected that they will use it as a means for a 
renewed attack on our system. For the Israeli government, in addition to the general 
significance, there is particular value in attracting migrants from Socialist countries. 
First, they hope in this way to obtain productive workers forced to work in Socialist 
countries. Secondly, by pointing out this emigration, they can assert the non-viability 
of Socialist countries.
As well as proposing the facilitation of emigration, to the greatest possible degree, 
we consider it desirable to take the above into account with regard to this issue.
Róbert Garai
Temporary chargé d’affaires
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2 Meeting with Golda Meir
Tel Aviv, 10 June 1957
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-4/a-02127/1-1957 (2.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium]
From: Legation of the Hungarian People’s Republic in Israel
Subject: an hour-long meeting with Golda Meir
Completed in 3 copies
2 copies to the Centre
1 copy for the Legation
To Comrade Imre Horváth, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Budapest
As I have already reported by other means, Golda Meir summoned me to a meeting at 
3pm on the 7th. I guessed what she wanted to talk about, so I prepared myself to give 
appropriate answers to all her questions.
At first she assumed a prim and supercilious air, but then quickly retreated.
“I think,” she said, “you know why I summoned you. We have here this grave 
difficulty and, in this connection, the sudden action on the part of the Hungarian 
government. They have expelled Mr Korem with 72 hours’ notice. True, they have now 
extended it to a sixth day, but it is [punishment] for something that I do not believe 
happened and cannot even imagine. You know that the Israeli government has the 
right and opportunity to proceed in a similar manner”.
“I know,” I said, “but this will not solve the issue of emigration. It was Mr Korem 
who made the mistake, and that is the truth. I consider it impossible that something 
like this could have been done without the knowledge of the government and, above 
all, of the minister [of the legation – AK] or Mr Tuval”.
“As a minister [of the legation – AK] I know how much [money – AK] is being 
transferred by our ministry via the National Bank, I always know how much of that 
amount is in the bank in Tel Aviv, and whether it is enough or not. Without my signa-
ture, no one can withdraw even a pruta. It is needed by the legation. It is impossible 
not to know about it, and even the government knows how we cover the costs of the 
legation. It would raise suspicions if we did not ask for money for several years.”
She turned as red as paprika. Meir then said that perhaps their aim had been to 
help Jews that were emigrating. I stated: “The important thing is not why they did it, 
but that they did it”. Once again she made excuses for Tuval and said that they were 
waiting for Korem and would hold him to account and punish him severely if it were 
shown that he really did these things.
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“We know that it is true because people have come to the legation telling us that 
they gave 100,000 forints to Korem and received not even a tenth of this sum in Tel 
Aviv….” (We tried to get something in writing about this which we could send home 
but, unfortunately, we failed.)
Meir just stared at me and did not refute anything; rather, she said, “I am very 
sorry that you did not warn me about this, so that I might have stopped it immedi-
ately”.
I replied that my task is, of course, to inform my own government of such things. 
“True,” she said, “we would accept Mr Korem being sent home, but the fact that your 
government has simply stopped the emigration is a disaster for us. We think that this 
is all because the Arabs are exercising pressure on the Hungarians and that you were 
seeking to satisfy their wishes in this way”.
I replied that the Hungarian government has good relations with the Arab coun-
tries, as it seeks to have with any other country, but that we are not in any manner 
dependent upon them and they cannot exert pressure on us, particularly in view of 
the fact that migrants are also from Arab states. She agreed this was true, but then 
asked, “Why do you and the Soviet Union prefer to be in a good relationship with the 
Arabs rather than with us, and yet this is our wish?” I replied that I did not have to 
explain this.
“Alright, but it is dreadful that your government, in addition to expelling one of 
our diplomats, is also saying that there will be no more aliya and is demanding 3.5 
million dollars. You know that our entire budget is 12 million, and so it is impossible, 
it cannot be done.”
I replied: “If Mr Korem had done harm to the country for just one or two months 
rather than for years, then the situation would be different”.
“Yes,” she said, “but 3.5 million – we do not spend such an amount on all the 
Israeli foreign missions…”
I said: “It is not just that you harmed our country by not making transfers for 
years, but also that you smuggled out the forints paid there”.
Meir did not deny any of this, but then said: “Three and a half million dollars – if 
the Hungarian government had told us that it needed dollars and that the Israeli gov-
ernment should give it such and such an amount and then it would release so and so 
many Jews, then you could have understood it”.
I rejected this: “Our public finances require dollars and other hard currency as 
much as other countries, even Israel. One can read and hear quite a lot about the 
many dollars that are coming here from America. The aim of the Hungarian govern-
ment was not to make money out of emigration or to defraud the emigrants or Israel, 
but to provide an opportunity for family reunification. To enable emigration not only 
for Jews going to Israel, but also for emigration to other places – where such was 
justified. We did this with the knowledge that this is the correct course of action, and 
we thought that the Israeli government would also be pleased. What is the point of 
deflecting from Mr Korem’s incorrect actions by making such a statement?”
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She was silent for some minutes. “I shall wait,” she said, “for Mr Korem [to explain 
his actions – AK] and then I shall ask you once more to meet with me. It is my wish that 
the good friendship we have should be continued and, of course, the emigration too. 
I ask also for your assistance. We are pleased to accept the Hungarian government’s 
proposal not to make this matter public, and I hope that we can resolve all the diffi-
culties that have arisen”.
I said that in my view, the Israeli government should draw the necessary conclu-
sions and pay damages.
Meir said: “That will be very difficult because it would be the same as acknowl-
edging and admitting to the mistakes”.
Meir thanked me for meeting with her again and asked me once again to assist 
in resolving the matter and to go in again the following week if she summoned me.
Concerning the above, I note that it was good that the Centre informed me of 
developments in time; it was right to inform Meir of the legation’s other remarks con-
cerning the issue.
In my opinion, they will pay the 3.5 million. We were right not to force the loan 
they had suggested, which was intended merely as a bluff. It is better that we do not 
even give the impression of wanting to make money out of the matter of emigration 
– unlike them.
It is possible, and this is what I was informed by way of the Polish chargé d’af-
faires and the deputy head of department, Sattath, that the Israeli government is 
planning, in recognition of Tuval’s success in managing and promoting emigration 
in our country, to move him to a place where this is not the case at the moment: to 
Romania, Bulgaria or the Soviet Union.
A contributing factor is that now, in addition to Korem, he too is involved in the 
matter, and they will consider it better to remove him from Budapest.




Minister of the legation
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3 Second Meeting with Golda Meir
Tel Aviv, 3 July 1957
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-4/a-02127/2-1957 (2.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Legation of the Hungarian People’s Republic in Israel
Subject: another meeting with Golda Meir
Completed in 3 copies
2 copies to the Centre
1 copy for the Legation
To Comrade Imre Horváth, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Budapest
As Golda had indicated during our previous discussion, having received Korem’s 
report, she again summoned me; that is, she came here to Tel Aviv. She received me in 
the presence of Head of Department Eshel.
Golda now seemed much more confident than last time. One could feel that they 
had been thoroughly deliberating the issue and, possibly, that they had asked for 
and received counsel. This was clearly why Eshel was taking part in the discussion. 
He spoke on several occasions. He sometimes interrupted me and, more than once, 
Golda, especially when she said something untoward. Eshel also wrote down every 
word.
Both of them confirmed once again that Tuval was a very busy man, who even 
often works at night (just so that emigration can proceed?) and has no time to deal 
with economic and financial problems. Thus, it is certain that just as the Israeli gov-
ernment had no knowledge of Korem’s activities, so Tuval did not know about them 
either. They claimed that on several occasions, a large amount of pounds or dollars 
had been transferred for use by the legation, and that the many consular fees and visa 
fees had also been used. They emphasised that the one report and the few malicious 
people who had spoken about Korem did not constitute proof that Korem really had 
done these things.
Golda stated that she had instructed Tuval to stop these things, and it was certain 
that they would not be repeated.
I asked what had been stopped, if Korem had not done anything and the report 
and the words of indignant people were not proof.
As Tuval was in Budapest, and had received the report and resolution indicating 
that emigration would be possible only within limits and had been told why this was, 
in my view the best course of action was for the matter to be addressed there. Golda 
then said that in a day or two she would travel to Vienna, to the conference of the 
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Socialist International, and would then hold a conference with envoys serving in the 
surrounding countries. She would meet with Tuval and would give him appropriate 




Minister [of the legation]
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4 Negotiations on Compensation with Israel
2 September 1957
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-4/a-02127/3-1957 (2.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
To Deputy Minister Jenő Baczoni
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Budapest
Completed in 2 copies
With reference to the inter-ministerial discussion held under the leadership of 
Comrade Baczoni, Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Trade on the 24th of the 
above month and concerning the above issue, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs con-
siders it necessary to record its position in written form below on several issues con-
nected with the upcoming Hungarian–Israeli compensation negotiations.
Our note on the subject of smuggling undertaken by the Israeli legation in Buda-
pest in the course of emigration from Hungary to Israel clearly states that the activities 
of the Israeli official organs, representing a grave violation of international law and 
the laws of Hungary, caused damage to the Hungarian national economy to a value 
of 3.5 million US dollars. For this reason, the Hungarian government suspended emi-
gration until the above amount is refunded by Israel. The Israeli government could 
not refute the findings made in the note and, as the resumption of emigration is an 
important Israeli interest, it requested through diplomatic channels that an Israeli 
economic expert should negotiate with Hungarian economic experts on the issue of 
damages. The Hungarian government consented, again by diplomatic channels, to 
negotiations, subject to the talks being limited to determining the means of compen-
sating for the aforementioned amount of damages and would not deal in any manner 
with the issue of emigration.
Based on the above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agrees that the Hungarian 
negotiating delegation should comprise representatives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Finance under the leadership of Béla Szilágyi, head of department at said 
Ministry.
The direct participation of a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
delegation would enable the Israeli side to raise the issue of emigration, and so this 
would not be expedient. At the same time, it is, of course, necessary that the negotiat-
ing delegation should maintain a continuous and close relationship with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and discuss with it any issue that falls into its purview. If such an 
issue – for example, the extent of payable damages – is raised by the Israeli side, then 
the Hungarian delegation should state that it is not competent to discuss the matter 
and that, if they so wish, they should follow diplomatic channels.
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For the Comrade Deputy Minister’s information, I state that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs considers the resumption of emigration to be possible only after our claim to 
damages, amounting to the sum indicated, has been paid off in full by the Israeli 
side. We cannot grant any obligation with regard to the number of people who will be 
allowed to emigrate in the future, as this would give rise to accusations of “trading 
in people”. For this reason, the Israeli negotiating side should be made aware that it 
is in their interests to choose the quickest method for paying the damages caused in 
hard currency or commodities, or in some other way that the Hungarian government 
has accepted as suitable.
Concerning this matter, I will inform the Comrade Deputy Minister of any infor-




5 On the Israeli Legation in Budapest
12 December 1957
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-4/a-02127/6-1957 (2.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Ministry of Interior
Subject: the illegal financial aid payments of the Israeli legation
Report
The Israeli legation in Budapest has been involved for years in illegal financial aid 
payments. The people that they consider important receive regular monthly payments 
amounting to between 300 and 2,500 forints. Prior to the counter-revolution [the Hun-
garian revolution of 1956 – AK], the number of recipients was as high as 150 to 200. 
This financial aid programme resumed after the counter-revolution and is currently 
under way.
[…]
The activity described above is damaging from the perspective of the Hungarian Peo-
ple’s Republic. One should also consider the fact that this amount could only have got 
to the legation illegally because, as we mentioned in our previous memorandum and 
the official memorandum of the National Bank, the most recent exchange of forints 
took place on 2 September, a sum that clearly does not cover their expenditures.
[…]
We think the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should remind the legation of the 
aforementioned problems as described in the memorandum that is being drafted, and 
should demand from it the immediate termination of such detrimental actions. 
[Signature]
Colonel Jenő Hazai, police investigator
Head of Department
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6 Negotiations on Compensation with Israel
31 March 1958
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-4/a-00760/4-1958 (2.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Ministry of Foreign Trade
To Comrade Károly Szarka
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Budapest
With reference to file number RK 1143/1958 and by way of our legation in Tel Aviv, 
we wish to give the following answer to Comrade Szendrő, if the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs agrees in principle with the answer:
As before, it is desirable to present our position in the form of a private opinion. It 
is important in principle to insist on the compensatory nature throughout. Later, we 
can be conciliatory in how this is expressed in a formal sense.
We may possibly accept the offer [of credit – AK] of seven million dollars. In case 
of such a concession, however, we cannot relinquish our demand that we should 
receive the sum in dollars and completely free of interest. To facilitate discussions, 
we may possibly request a third of the sum in US dollars, while the remaining amount 
could be indicated in the following commodities: rubber; fine wool; wool fibre; syn-
thetic yarn and fibre; industrial diamonds; copper; copper sulphate; sheet metal, and 
pulpwood. We consider a solution to be possible where, in place of some of the indi-
cated commodities, the Israeli side agrees to finance our purchases, for instance by 
way of a Swiss bank.
Regarding the means of repayment, the guiding principle could be that we would 
repay using commodities according to the export structure traded in the Hungar-
ian–Israeli clearing system, but the composition of the commodities may, of course, 
change in the course of the next ten years. It is important, however, that the repay-
ment be made within a period fixed on expiry of the ten-year period: for example, over 
two to three years.
The opinion should be made known that if they see a possible solution based on 
our concession in accordance with the above, then it would be desirable for repre-
sentatives to meet in a third country, who would clarify the framework, that is, who 
would conduct negotiations of a non-diplomatic nature.
In the above, while maintaining our principles, we have sketched flexible possi-
ble solutions. Comrade Szendrő may make full use of these in accordance with our 
interests. In support of this private opinion, it is desirable that he avoid finalising a 
position with respect either to the amount or to the commodities. Rather, he should 
indicate that he considers it possible that we might agree on an amount that is less 
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than ten million. He should also list the articles, but [indicate that – AK] he considers 
it possible that these could be supplemented with other articles of similar value; and 
he should indicate only approximate estimates with regard to the ratios.
(Signature)
Gyula Karádi
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7 Negotiations on Compensation with Israel
4 July 1958
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-4/a-00760/6-1958 (2.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Ministry of Finance
To Comrade Károly Szarka
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Budapest








Subject: report on talks concerning the compensation claim against Israel
Based on instructions from Comrade Kardos, Deputy Finance Minister, my task was 
to contact the persons who, in February 1958 in Vienna, had contacted me with the 
purpose of channelling the diplomatic negotiations between Hungary and Israel 
towards economic issues. Concerning that meeting, I informed Comrade Minister 
Antos in a memorandum after my return home.
The persons with whom I held talks in February are: Monsieur Ernest, who was 
already known to me through previous banking business and who is the director of 
the Parisian bank Société Bancaire et Financière d’Orient; and an individual who 
introduced himself as Joshua Dan, and possesses an Israeli diplomatic passport. As 
a personal colleague of the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Dan claimed to have received 
a special assignment to channel the compensation talks conducted by diplomatic 
channels towards economic issues.
Concerning Joshua Dan, Szendrő, our commercial counsellor in Israel, has in the 
meantime obtained information according to which Dan’s claims are true. Based on 
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the information supplied by Commercial Counsellor Szendrő, I have further deter-
mined that Tuval, the Israeli minister of the legation in Budapest, is also aware of 
these separate talks.
With regard to the Parisian bank, of which Mr Ernest is a director, I have deter-
mined that 50 per cent of its share capital is owned by a bank called Banque pour le 
Commerce Suisse Israelién, while the other 50 per cent [is owned by – AK] Mr Ernest 
and a Parisian businessman called Pachta, who is also known to me by way of previ-
ous commercial business.
For its part, the Suisse Israelién Bank is 50 per-cent owned by the State of Israel 
and 50 per-cent by private capital.
My assignment was to seek to make contact with the aforementioned persons 
while attending the general meeting of the Bank for International Settlements, held 
in Basel on 7–10 June 1958. Prior to travelling, among the several means of commu-
nication (telephone, telegram, letter – each addressed to the bank in Paris), it was 
agreed that an intention to negotiate would not be communicated in advance, but 
that I would seek to come into contact with the aforementioned in an inconspicuous 
manner during my stay in Switzerland.
I departed for Basel on 7 June, travelling by way of Vienna and Zürich, and accom-
panied by Comrade Dénes Szántó. At Zürich Airport, we were required to wait around 
two and a half hours for the plane to Basel. While waiting at Zürich Airport I met with 
Mr Pachta, who was flying to Paris with his wife and two children and who happened, 
like us, to be waiting for his plane. Pachta greeted me with joy and, having remarked 
on some deals in Brazil, asked me whether I would be willing to continue the talks 
I had begun by way of his partner Mr Ernest in February. I replied that there was no 
point in my negotiating with them in this matter, and that to my knowledge talks 
were under way in Tel Aviv. He stated that if I were prepared to resume talks with 
him, Mr Dan would arrive in Switzerland within days, and he asked me to inform 
him of my schedule in Switzerland. I replied that at the start of the following week 
I would be busy with the general meeting of the Bank for International Settlements 
and would have no time for them; but that on the following weekend, I would spend 
a few days in Geneva, where I would only have a number of shorter bank meetings. I 
said that I did not believe that there was much point in resuming the talks begun in 
February, because as a banker I could only concern myself with talks on specific eco-
nomic issues. However, if, in their opinion, the Hungarian compensation claim could 
be solved through talks of a specific economic nature, I would be at their disposal. 
He [Pachta – AK] stated that he would phone me from Paris mid-week and tell me 
whether or not, under such circumstances, Dan saw any purpose in holding the talks 
– and, if he did, where and when we could meet.
On Thursday 12 June, Mr Ernest phoned me and, with reference to the conver-
sation with Pachta, he stated that on Saturday he and Dan would contact me at the 
Richmond Hotel in Geneva.
46   I Communist Policies and the Jewish State
[….]
At midday on Saturday, he contacted me at the Richmond Hotel in Geneva and, after 
making several Brazil switch proposals relating to commercial deals of little signifi-
cance, he said that he believed the negotiations in Israel would be fruitless, but that 
various members of the Israeli government and certain Israeli political circles would 
be pleased to see an agreement made. In his opinion, an agreement could be reached, 
as long as the demands were realistic. He stated that Dan would arrive shortly and 
then we could begin talks. 
Dan did indeed arrive a short time afterwards, and we held the first talks, attended 
by Dan, Ernest and myself. Dan asked whether, since our meeting in February, I had 
concerned myself with this matter and whether I had some kind of authorisation to 
negotiate. I replied that in February, after my return home, I had, of course, sought 
information about the matter and had concluded, based on concrete data, that after 
the counter-revolution, the Hungarian government had permitted, completely free of 
charge, the emigration of a significant number of Hungarian citizens, who had been 
allowed to take most of their belongings with them. In an abuse of the generosity of 
the Hungarian government and in violation of the law, the official Israeli bodies in 
Budapest had assisted the illegal smuggling of Hungarians’ assets out of the country. 
According to the Hungarian authorities, a great number of gold coins and other valu-
ables had thus been smuggled out. As a manager at the foreign-currency department 
of the National Bank of Hungary, I saw a substantial foreign currency loss in the fact 
that the emigrants, rather than offering their gold and foreign currency assets for pur-
chase by the National Bank, had smuggled those assets out of the country concealed 
on their person. Thus, in my view, leaving aside the other damages, they had caused 
a significant foreign-currency loss to the Hungarian People’s Republic. Having uncov-
ered such illegal manipulations, the Hungarian government had suspended emigra-
tion to Israel and announced its claim to compensation for the damages caused. 
Negotiations were under way in Tel Aviv between representatives of the Hungarian 
and Israeli governments.
The Hungarian government had thus appointed its representative in the matter. 
However, as Mr Dan claimed that the Israeli government was not seeking an agree-
ment at the negotiations in Tel Aviv, and wished to settle the matter through a repre-
sentative of the National Bank of Hungary, I would be willing to negotiate with them 
and if, on the basis of the talks, I saw an opportunity to reach an agreement, I would 
make a proposal to the competent Hungarian bodies concerning a settlement in this 
manner. However, prior to the commencement of substantive negotiations, I wished 
to inform them of the principles according to which I would be prepared to negotiate:
1. The Hungarian government has a legitimate claim to damages in view of the 
losses to its national economy stemming from the unlawful activities of the Israeli 
bodies.
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2. As a banker, I am only prepared to negotiate a damages claim settlement involv-
ing free-exchange payment, as I am not competent in commodity exchange.
3. In the event of an agreement, I do not promise anything other than that I will 
make a proposal for the termination of the discrimination with respect to emigra-
tion, which was introduced against them due to their own errors. That is, even 
in the event of an agreement, the emigrants to Israel would have no greater right 
than people seeking to migrate to any other country.
In his response, Dan stated, in connection with the first issue, that they were unwill-
ing to acknowledge openly the damages claim, because, for them, this would set a 
grave precedent. They were willing to make some compensation but only in such a 
form that the compensatory nature [of the payment – AK] did not become apparent. 
And this, however, could be achieved only on a commercial basis rather than through 
diplomatic channels, for their position regarding the negotiations in Tel Aviv was that 
discussions would carry on for years without a result being reached.
Concerning the second issue, his opinion was that they had always envisaged the 
matter being resolved in commodities and would like to retain this position.
Concerning the third issue, his response was that they would like to receive a 
specific promise, in the event of an agreement, concerning emigration.
Finally, he noted that he did not consider his responses to be final, and he would 
think about them one more time, and then give an answer the following day as to 
whether he accepted the principles outlined by me as the basis for negotiations. 
He assured me that the negotiations would be completely confidential in nature: in 
Israel, only the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and the competent persons at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would know, and he asked that we too should treat the 
negotiations confidentially. I agreed with him about this, and we came to an agree-
ment.
We agreed to resume the talks on Sunday morning.
On Sunday morning, I duly appeared once again and, returning to the debate of 
the previous day, Dan asked why I was insisting on a settlement in free exchange. I 
replied that I was not insisting on this, because in the course of talks in Tel Aviv there 
was discussion of payment in commodities, but inasmuch as they wish to resolve 
the issue by means of talks with the representative of the National Bank of Hungary, 
it was only natural that the agreement would primarily be one of free exchange. In 
any case, it was their wish that the matter be settled by the narrowest possible circle, 
and this would be almost impossible if various commodity deals were made involv-
ing a lot of companies. It is my feeling that this greatly aroused the attention of Dan, 
for he answered that they had not even considered how a settlement in commodities 
might come at the expense of confidentiality, and that for his part he accepted free-ex-
change payment as the basis for negotiations.
Concerning payment for damages, they still did not wish to acknowledge in 
writing that they were obliged to provide compensation and, in his view, some kind 
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of compromise solution had to be found. For if the compensation were to be made in 
the form of loan, for which there would be a minimal rate of interest, then on the one 
hand the interest saved would represent the compensation, while on the other hand, 
given that we were talking about a loan, an open acknowledgment of compensation 
could be avoided. I replied that inasmuch as we were to choose a form of credit, we 
would have to receive the loan completely without interest, because an interest-free 
loan would amount to acknowledgement of the compensation claim, and this would 
be the case even if they did not write it down. For our part, we insist that the agree-
ment would in some way make clear that we are not seeking to link the emigration of 
Hungarian citizens to some financial benefit, but that the Israeli side should, at least 
in part, provide compensation for the loss to our national economy. At this juncture, 
we agreed that if negotiations were continued, we would return to this point.
With regard to the resumption of emigration to Israel in the event of [the signing 
of – AK] an agreement, they acknowledged what I had told them, but Dan expressed 
hope that such an agreement would lead to a general improvement in Israeli–Hun-
garian relations.
In conclusion, Dan proposed that I should consent to the resumption of talks as 
soon as possible in some Western country. He had no authorisation to make a final 
agreement, as his task was to clarify the possibility of such an agreement. He was 
to return to Tel Aviv and he or others would seek to resume the negotiations, having 
received full authorisation to do so. I replied that I could not travel to and fro to con-
tinue the negotiations, as I was busy. If, however, I were to be informed by way of 
the Parisian Bank that they wished to continue negotiations on the basis of a serious 
offer, then I would propose to Budapest that I or another economic expert should 
continue the negotiations. I emphasised, however, that this would only be possible 
if they assured me that in the next negotiations, authorised persons would make a 
realistic offer because I considered the offers made known so far to be insubstantial. 
Dan promised that he would inform me by way of the Parisian bank, prior to 30 June, 
as to whether the Israeli side wished to continue negotiations under these conditions.
Dan departed on Sunday evening, and on Monday morning I met once more 
with Ernest, reminding him that if he attributed importance to banking commercial 
relations with Hungary, then with respect to the proposal for further talks which the 
Israeli side would make through him, he should first check the seriousness of the 
proposal, for if on the resumption of talks they were to present an insubstantial offer, 
I would hold him personally responsible. Ernest replied that it was clear to him that if 
his role in this were to appear incorrect to us, this would influence detrimentally his 
bank’s business relations in Hungary.
Finally, I inquired as to his opinion concerning how far the Israeli side was pre-
pared to go. I said that I considered the Israeli offers that had been made so far to be 
insubstantial and that I saw no guarantee that this route could lead to more fruitful 
negotiations.
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Ernest, while emphasising on several occasions that what he was saying did not 
imply an obligation, said that in his view an interest-free loan of three to four million 
dollars for three to four years might be obtained. This, however, was only his private 
opinion. He promised that if he were to be asked by the Israeli side to make a proposal 
concerning the resumption of negotiations, then he would first inform himself about 
the nature of the Israeli offer. If I had any further suggestions, he asked me to call him 
in Paris. If I had no such suggestions, then we agreed that he would contact me before 
the end of June.
[…]
During the conversation I obtained a few bits of information. According to Ernest, the 
Israeli side is insisting on negotiations with the National Bank of Hungary because 
they think that we will keep the promises made by the Bank, even if these promises 
are not made in writing. They base this on the fact that, so far, the National Bank 
of Hungary has always kept to its written and oral agreements. According to Ernest, 
there are problems with emigration in Romania too – it is important to the Israeli 
government that emigration from Hungary should resume, as they hope this would 
revitalise emigration from Romania. Concerning the Hungarian–Israeli negotiations, 
there are two positions in Israel. Some people are opposed to an agreement and the 
negotiations in Tel Aviv are being conducted in line with such an attitude, while some 
Israeli and other, principally international forces (Jewish Agency), give great empha-
sis to a resumption of emigration and they are calling for an agreement to be reached.
Summary:
Based on the negotiations and the conversation with Comrade Szendrő, in my view 
there do exist in Israel forces seeking the completion of the negotiations. Dan, who 
is conducting the negotiations, belongs to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s immediate 
circle. It is also evident that in the course of negotiations, they will try to avoid making 
a public acknowledgement of the damages claim, for they fear that the other People’s 
Democracies might then make similar claims on that basis. It seems that in general 
they are experiencing difficulties in connection with emigration, and they have a 
serious interest in the commencement of emigration from Hungary. For them, emigra-
tion results in a financial benefit, for they receive a certain amount of support from 
the international Jewish organisations, and in part it is also militarily significant. 
They know that we have data about their dealings in Hungary and they do not want 
such data to be made public. Thus, if an agreement is made between us, for the sake 
of their own interests they will not make it public.
Concerning the potential amount of damages, I think that the Israelis wish to 
come to an agreement on a loan worth approximately five million dollars.
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A realistic goal – in my opinion – is that the repayment of the loan be made in four 
or five years’ time, in part by supplying Hungarian commodities in the Israeli clearing 
system, whereby a part of the commodities will be soft articles.
If, by the end of the month, the Israeli side returns to the matter and proposes a 
resumption of negotiations by way of the Parisian bank, then in my opinion the nego-
tiations should be continued along this route, while at the same time, we should keep 
alive the negotiations being conducted through diplomatic channels, neither calling 
for them nor imposing obstacles.
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8 The Condition of Hungarian–Israeli Relations
7 September 1960
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-4/a-sz.n.-1960 (3.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Sixth Regional Department
Israeli desk





Subject: the condition of Hungarian–Israeli relations
The condition of Hungarian-Israeli relations has not changed essentially in relation 
to the situation in 1959. The Israeli government continues to assign the problem of 
emigration a central place in relations between the two countries, and its efforts are 
directed at increasing the number of migrants and at accelerating the process where 
possible. To encourage people to emigrate, the Israeli government is constantly 
making initiatives in the cultural field, a majority of which we seek to avoid.
The issue of emigration from Hungary to Israel:
Based on the amended agreement (December 1959) on the issue of compensation, 
we gave permission for the resumption of emigration to Israel as of January 1960. By 
1 May 1960, we had issued in total 165 emigration permits. The Israeli government 
met its obligation: it paid three instalments of the compensation claim at the end of 
January, March and June, amounting to 1,250,000 dollars.
The Israeli government, however, was still not satisfied with this rate of emigra-
tion, and by way of its diplomatic representative here, it has kept the issue on the 
agenda and has used every occasion to call for people to be allowed to emigrate. In 
April 1960, the Israeli minister of the legation submitted a list to the ministry, contain-
ing the names of 372 persons that they consider important. The competent authorities 
had already rejected, on several occasions, the emigration applications of persons on 
the list.
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Since the Israeli minister of the legation was unable to persuade the leaders of 
the ministry to increase significantly the number of people permitted to emigrate, on 
5 May, Mr J. Dan, a representative of the Jewish Agency, travelled to Hungary, where 
he and the minister of the legation contacted Deputy Minister Szarka. The aim of their 
visit was to express their government’s dissatisfaction with the rate of emigration and 
to request the liberalisation of emigration. They also made mention of the idea that 
we should make emigration to Israel subject to special considerations. Their proposal 
met with a negative response.
Thereafter, on 18 May 1960 Yaron, the Israeli minister of the legation, bearing a 
letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir, contacted Comrade Minister Sík. In 
her letter the Israeli Foreign Minister referred to a conversation held with Comrade 
Sík in New York on relations between the two countries, concluding that the rate of 
emigration (family unification) had caused them disappointment. We did not reply to 
the letter of Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda Meir. As the letter was being delivered, 
Comrade Sík told the Israeli minister of the legation that the number known to us (165 
persons) was considerably higher than the number Golda Meir had indicated in her 
letter (70 persons), and it significantly exceeded the number featured in the memo-
randum cited by Yaron (130 persons). At the same time, Comrade Sík reminded the 
minister of the legation of the information given to Golda Meir, according to which 
they should not expect mass emigration from Hungary.
According to the information available to us, between 1 January and 31 July 1960, 
in total 203 persons received emigration permits for the purpose of emigration to 
Israel. From this figure, 75 persons feature on the list submitted by the Israeli minis-
ter of the legation in April. Concerning the month of August, we have no data for the 
number of emigration permits granted. (Payment of the final instalment of the com-
pensation sum and the five per-cent interest on the 1,000,000 dollars must be made, 
according to the agreement, on 30 September.)
[…]
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9 Current Issues of Hungarian–Israeli Relations
14 January 1966
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-4/a-sz.n.-1966 (2.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Subject: information on current issues of Hungarian–Israeli relations
[…]
The State of Israel was formed at the end of May 1948 based on the 1947 Resolution of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. Hungary recognised the State of Israel 
in 1948, establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. We opened our first foreign 
mission in Tel Aviv in June 1950, and it was headed until the spring of 1957 by a per-
manent chargé d’affaires. Given that after the counter-revolution, Israel was the first 
to recognise the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government at the beginning of 1957, 
we exchanged – having regard for Hungarian foreign-policy interests – envoys, and 
our legation was headed by a minister of the legation from March 1957 until July 1958. 
There were two reasons why our minister was summoned home: first, an improve-
ment in our relations with the Arab countries; and second, the questionable actions 
of Israel in Hungary, which were prejudicial to our interests: the Israeli legation in 
Budapest engaged in serious economic misconduct in connection with the emigra-
tion of Hungarian Jews; to increase emigration, the Israeli side made use of the World 
Jewish Congress and the World Federation of Hungarian Jews, thereby causing con-
siderable confusion among the Jewish population in Hungary. Since then, our lega-
tion in Tel Aviv has been headed by a temporary chargé d’affaires.
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Emigration figures in recent years:
Authorised emigration in:
1962: 202 permits from 275 applications
1963: 280 permits from 349 applications
1964: 201 permits from 396 applications
1965: 175 permits from 364 applications
In our appraisal of applications, we take the position that we also take with respect to 
other Western countries.
At present, Israel is almost continuously calling for an exchange of ministers and 
for the upgrading of diplomatic relations; it also seeks closer relations in the eco-
nomic and cultural fields.
For political reasons, we are keeping relations between Hungary and Israel within 
a modest framework. Despite this, Arab concerns about Hungarian–Israeli relations 
have been raised by the UAR’s ambassador to Budapest and – most recently – by Jor-
dan’s chargé d’affaires in Moscow.
[…]
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10 Problems Concerning Relations with Israel
Not dated, probably July 1966 
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-Vietnam-1-sz.n.-1966 (62.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Handwritten note: It will be discussed with the participation of Comrades Szarka and 
Szilágyi
Sixth Regional Department Completed in 5 copies
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 Tibor Zádor, Comrades,
 Tel Aviv
For the Deputy Ministerial Conference
Memorandum
Subject: discussion with Comrade Csécsei on problems concerning relations with 
Israel
On the 15th of the above month, during the vacation of the heads of the foreign rep-
resentations, we held the normal discussion on relations [with Israel – AK] with 
Comrade Csécsei at Deputy Minister Szilágyi’s office […].
[....]
3.) Concerning Hungarian–Israeli relations, we concluded that our political and cul-
tural relations are falling behind our economic relations, and are also falling behind 
the relations maintained by other Socialist countries with Israel. The time has not 
yet come for the upgrading sought by the Israeli side, but filling the legate’s post 
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does seem necessary, although the practical realisation of this must be delayed until 
a more suitable time. (Soviet Union and Poland maintain relations at ambassadorial 
level, while Romania and Yugoslavia do so at legate level.)
The conference agreed with the department’s proposal that we should also pursue 
a principled policy with regard to Israel, and that it would not be correct to treat our 
policy concerning this relationship as merely a function of our policy towards the 
Arab countries. Those present agreed that, if it is rational and necessary, the political 
efforts of the Arab countries should be taken into account, but that this should not 
be to the detriment of Hungarian sovereignty. At present, in many cases, the Ninth 
Regional Department [responsible for the contacts with the Arab countries – AK] rather 
than the department responsible for relations [with Israel – AK] decides upon our 
measures and actions. Consequently, we are not utilising sufficiently the opportuni-
ties at hand, a fact often noted by the parties of the left there and both groups within 
the Communist Party.
If a change in this area is not possible, we consider it necessary to place relations 
with Israel under the direction of the Ninth Regional Department in the future.
In the development of our cultural relations we have, until now, held back to the 
extent that even the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv has noted the matter. The existence 
of a Hungarian-speaking population of about 200,000 justifies an improvement in 
our cultural relations. Comrade Szilágyi agreed with the proposal that we should keep 
Hungarian–Israeli relations in a suitable framework and under control. With this in 
view, we should expand our cultural relations based on a working plan that is to be 
implemented mainly on an impresario basis containing four to five events annually 
(soloists, smaller ensembles, etc.) but still controlled by us (ICR [Institute for Cultural 
Relations]) and is not to be regulated by any kind of signed document. In this way, we 
wish to achieve the monitoring of relations and a reduction in the number of “private 
trips”, and this would also help to ensure that our cultural life is represented in Israel 
only by such Hungarian cultural figures that have been found suitable by the bodies 
responsible.
An improvement in our informative work also seems necessary. We agreed with 
Comrade Csécsei’s proposal that one should permit the legation to hold at least two 
film presentations annually, and that the necessary films should be provided to it. In 
addition, an appropriate number of short and feature films should be made available 
to the legation for the purpose of presentation in Hungarian-speaking areas (Kibbut-
zim, factories, etc.).
It seems expedient to provide our legation in Tel Aviv with literature in Hungar-
ian, so that it can, from time to time, donate books to libraries operating in Hungari-
an-inhabited kibbutzim and plants.
Relations with the Israeli press are, generally speaking, satisfactory; in Comrade 
Csécsei’s opinion, there are occasional opportunities to place articles. However, the 
legate’s relations with the Hungarian-language daily Új Kelet [New East] have recently 
undergone a general deterioration, especially because of the articles by the chief 
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editor, Dezső Schőn [sic! – AK], on Comrade Kállai’s trips to Egypt and Kuwait. (We 
have placed Dezső Schőn on the blacklist and have denied him permission to enter 
Hungary in spite of his request.) Our legation does, however, maintain relations with 
other members of staff at Új Kelet.
[.....] 
The flight issue is an old problem. According to the verbal information received 
from MALÉV [Hungarian Airlines], the most advantageous solution would be a direct 
flight, which we would operate with charter planes in the tourist season and would 
not feature in the schedule. The idea that scheduled MALÉV planes should transport 
passengers between Budapest and Nicosia has already been realised. In connection, 
we shall ask for MALÉV’s official written opinion. In addition, IBUSZ [the Hungarian 
tourist agency] has signed an agreement – currently, for 1967 only – with SABENA, 
under the terms of which SABENA will spend 5,000 dollars per year in Israel on the 
promotion of tourism to Hungary, and will transport the tourists to Belgrade, from 
where they will be brought in MALÉV planes to Budapest. (For MALÉV, however, it 
would be more advantageous to bring the tourists from as far away as possible, if pos-
sible from the place of departure and without a stopover, because this would increase 
its foreign-exchange revenue.)
As regards setting up a boat service, the commercial department of MAHART 
[Hungarian Shipping Company] stated at a meeting that it would be economic to put 
on two or three ships, which would call at Israeli ports. A sufficient amount of goods 
seems assured. If the Arab countries were to put the boats and their personnel on 
the blacklist, the boats on this route could still be utilised in an economic manner, 
because they could, without hindrance, undertake trade with respect to Turkish, 
Greek, and Yugoslav ports. We shall request written information concerning the pos-
sibilities from MAHART as well.
The opinion arose that if it is economically advantageous for MALÉV and 
MAHART to establish contact with Israel, this should not be prevented by the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs.
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11 Relations Between Israel and the Socialist Countries in 1966
Tel Aviv, 5 January 1967
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-1/t.-00652-1967 (49.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium]
From: Legation of the Hungarian People’s Republic
Subject: development of relations between Israel and the Socialist countries in 1966
Completed: in 5 copies
4 for the Centre
1 for the Legation
In 1966, there was no essential change in cultural relations between Israel and the 
Eastern European Socialist countries. There was a certain amount of growth, relative 
to the previous year, in ensembles and solo artists performing in Israel. Experience 
shows that the domestic political situation in Israel and the border incidents between 
Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries influence only slightly the implementa-
tion of the cultural agenda with the Socialist countries.
The socialist countries with commercial relations with Israel are slowly increas-
ing their trade from year to year. With the exception of Yugoslavia, the Socialist coun-
tries do not generally deliver capital investment goods to Israel, for they do not want 
to jeopardise their political and economic relations with the Arab countries.
Socialist countries export primarily agricultural products, foodstuffs and raw 
materials to Israel. In its exports to Socialist countries, Israel is pressing for an 
increase in the export of citrus fruits, textiles, and small industrial finished products, 
in return for which it wishes to import foodstuffs and raw materials.
Below we present the number of ensembles and solo artists from the Eastern 
European Socialist countries performing in Israel in 1966, as well as the development 
of commercial trade in recent years.
From Bulgaria, in 1966, a circus and a solo violinist guest performed in Israel. The 
circus was here for more than half a year.
Commercial trade between Israel and Bulgaria, in thousands of dollars
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966, first half-
year
Exports to Israel 1,419 2,172 2,842 2,776 3,478 1,090
Imports from Israel 1,304 2,229 1,813 3,146 3,078 1,363
+115 –57 +1,029 –370 +400 –273
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Relations between Israel and Yugoslavia did not strengthen in 1966; indeed, they 
became cooler to a degree. This was largely because of President Tito’s discussions 
with Nasser and Indira Gandhi, leading to a joint statement criticising Israel. In 1966, 
two Yugoslav football teams played in Israel.
Commercial trade between Israel and Yugoslavia, in thousands of dollars
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966, first half-
year
Exports to Israel 7,974 6,280 8,627 7,688 6,665 3,659
Imports from Israel 5,721 8,769 6,337 8,739 8,867 6,138
+2,253 –2,489 +2,290 –1,051 –2,202 –2,479
Yugoslavia has substantial relations with Israel in the field of shipping. The Israeli 
shipping companies run ten to 12 boats monthly, and the Yugoslavs six boats monthly, 
between the Yugoslav ports on the Adriatic and the Israeli ports.
From Poland, in 1966, a pianist, a 120-member folk group, and two football teams 
performed in Israel. Relations between the two countries may be said to be the best of 
all the Socialist countries.
Commercial trade between Israel and Poland, in thousands of dollars
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966, first half-
year
Exports to Israel 1,069 3,007 5,867 6,116 5,541 2,950
Imports from Israel 795 980 2,525 3,151 5,296 2,856
+274 +2,027 +3,342 +2,965 +245 +94
Relations between Romania and Israel improved in 1966. At the beginning of the 
year, Romania sent a legate to Israel; for many years the legation had been led by a 
temporary chargé d’affaires. In 1966, an 80-member folk group and a football team 
performed in Israel. In addition, the Romanian legation in Tel Aviv is very active in 
pursuing cultural activities by way of the Romanian–Israeli Friendship Society.
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Commercial trade between Israel and Romania, in thousands of dollars
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966, first half-
year
Exports to Israel 957 1,255 600 1,203 2,727 1,061
Imports from Israel 2,275 2,202 846 2,425 1,948 1,564
–1,318 –947 –246 –1,222 +779 –505
It is Romania’s goal that about 50–60 per cent of the value of the raw and basic mate-
rials going to Israel should not be paid for through the clearing system, but in foreign 
exchange. So far, Israel has not shown a willingness to come to such an agreement.
Relations between the Soviet Union and Israel deteriorated markedly in 1966. 
The deterioration was caused primarily by Israel’s provocative conduct towards Syria. 
Owing to the Syrian problem, the Soviet Union cancelled the exchange of philhar-
monic orchestras that had been planned for the autumn of 1966. Despite this, the 
Soviet Union’s cultural programme in Israel was quite varied. In the spring of 1966, 
the writer Simonov visited Israel, and the violinist David Oistrakh and his student 
performed there. The Soviet circus performed in Israel for several months. In late 
1966, a Soviet cellist guest-performed in Israel. 
Commercial trade between Israel and the Soviet Union, in thousands of dollars
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966, first half-
year
Exports to Israel 263 163 277 76 358 74
Imports from Israel 406 337 609 506 590 1,165
–143 –174 –332 –430 –232 –1,091
In 1956, the Soviet Union broke off its trading relations with Israel because of the Suez 
aggression. Currently, the Soviet Union exports primarily books, magazines, records, 
and films to Israel in return for free foreign exchange. It is the Soviet Union’s goal 
to place greater amounts of cultural products in Israel; for this reason, it regularly 
participates in the International Book Exhibition in Jerusalem and holds book exhibi-
tions for a similar purpose in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Nazareth.
In 1964, an agreement was reached between the governments of the Soviet Union 
and Israel concerning the sale of various Soviet-owned properties in Israel. A part of 
the purchase price was paid by the Israeli government in free foreign exchange, and it 
also made deliveries of goods to the value of approx. two million dollars.
Israel’s relations with Czechoslovakia were, as they had been in previous years, 
cool in 1966. There were no major political or cultural events. The only event was 
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an appearance by a four-member folk group, organised by the Czechoslovak–Israeli 
Friendship Society.
Commercial trade between Israel and Czechoslovakia, in thousands of dollars
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966, first half-
year
Exports to Israel 171 34 209 252 196 67
Imports from Israel 3 5 117 199 115 78
+168 +29 +92 +53 +81 –11
In 1956, after the Suez aggression, Czechoslovakia severed direct trading relations 
with Israel. Since then, indirect trade has been made with the involvement of Austrian 
firms.
Commercial trade between Israel and the GDR, in thousands of dollars
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966, first half-
year
Exports to Israel – – 8 4 19 –
Imports from Israel 70 310 128 46 395 322
–70 –310 –120 –42 –376 –322
Since the formation of Israel, the GDR has had neither political nor trade relations 
with Israel, owing to the unsettled political relations. On occasion, with the involve-
ment of Austrian or West-German companies, goods of Israeli origin – principally 
oranges – have turned up in the GDR. By means of the same channels, a smaller 
amount of office equipment from the GDR has gone to Israel.
Israel has neither diplomatic nor trade relations with the GDR and with the peo-
ple’s democracies in the Far East.
Kálmán Csécsei
Temporary chargé d’affaires
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12 Principles of the Relations with Israel
15 February 1967
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-14-00784-1967 (48.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Completed: in 12 copies








István Beck (two copies)
Elek Tóth (two copies) 
For the Deputy Ministerial Conference:
Subject: proposal for a summarisation of the principled foundations of our relations 
with the State of Israel
Changes in the international situation and foreign policy of the State of Israel and in 
the policy of the Arab countries, as well an assessment of our own interests, render it 
necessary to summarise once more the conceptual foundations of our relations with 
the State of Israel.
[....]
III.
The interests of the Hungarian People’s Republic in the relations maintained with 
the State of Israel
In the political arena, it is necessary to increase the weight and influence of the Hun-
garian People’s Republic in the territory of the State of Israel. [...] With our politi-
cal presence, we can give assistance to the Israeli progressive forces and we can, on 
occasion, influence the policy of the State of Israel. The maintenance of our political 
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relations and a gradual improvement depending upon the circumstances, justify our 
efforts to improve our relations, without abandoning our principles, with all coun-
tries recognized by us.
In the economic field, despite the limited possibilities, there are favourable con-
ditions for obtaining raw materials, and for the export of Hungarian goods. In recent 
years, our foreign trade flow has gradually increased; in 1966, it reached seven million 
dollars on both sides; and, at the joint committee discussions held in Budapest in 
November 1966, 8.5 million dollars was scheduled for both sides in 1967. Changes 
in Israel’s economic situation are increasing the role of Socialist countries in Israeli 
export efforts. In this context, it should be noted that the rules of the Arab boycott 
office [the Central Boycott Office established by the Arab League Council and based in 
Damascus – AK] do not prohibit simple export-import deals with Israel.
From Israel we are importing irrigation equipment, poultry-farm equipment, 
electronic equipment, household refrigerators, copper cement, steel pipes, technical 
diamonds, office machinery, phosphate, other chemicals, raw cotton, tropical fruits 
etc.
The most important export items are: machine tools; mechanical equipment; 
electric engines and other electrical goods; tools; locks; steel goods; medicines and 
basic materials for medicines; confectionery, as well as meat and sugar.
A significant problem affecting our trade is the lack of direct transport by ship. At 
the moment, all our goods are delivered by rail and ship with reloading, but we utilise 
capacity on foreign ships. We could achieve a substantial saving by using our own 
ships. This, however, would entail an Arab boycott of the ships brought into service 
and their personnel, and placement on their blacklist. Such ships could no longer 
use Arab ports. For us, the use of capacity on foreign ships means an annual sum of 
8.3 million foreign-exchange forints in delivery plus associated costs. We also miss 
out on Austrian, Italian and West-German delivery orders, for which the countries in 
question have shown an interest.
The introduction of direct flights represents a similar problem, although this 
could be resolved via Cyprus, using a MALÉV flight.
Economically, the willingness of the Israeli National Bank to place a large amount 
of dollars at the National Bank of Hungary is important, primarily in terms of mitigat-
ing our lack of hard currency. In part, this has already taken place.
In the cultural field, a favourable but as yet unused opportunity for us is the 
circumstance that 200,000 people in Israel speak Hungarian. Many of these people 
are interested in Hungarian culture. Our cultural propaganda is received favourably 
above all by such people but also among the non-Hungarian-speaking population. 
Even the Soviet ambassador has noted the failure to make use of this opportunity, as 
have also the leaders of the ICP. Propagating the cultural achievements of Socialist 
Hungary would also strengthen our prestige and would assist the progressive forces 
operating in the country; indeed, in an indirect manner, it would also assist the pro-
gressive Arab forces.
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IV.
Connections between the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle of the Arab 
nations and the HPR’s relations with Israel
At the present stage of social development, the nature and role of the State of Israel 
violates progressive interests. Israeli policy towards the Arabs living in its territory 
has added to these violations. In consequence of all this, the State of Israel has found 
itself in opposition to the entire Arab world, whose declared aim has become the 
armed destruction of a state that they never recognised. Within this Arab policy, a 
certain nuance has recently appeared, and today the position of the Arab states is 
not a unified one. On this issue, Tunis has taken a different position from the Arab 
states; several years ago, it saw an opportunity for a more realistic appraisal of Israel’s 
situation. In recent years, Lebanon has pursued a tolerant policy in connection with 
Israel. Despite the border conflicts, Jordan’s position also differs from that of the Arab 
countries pursuing progressive policies.
The Soviet Union and the UAR – in part for domestic political reasons – endeav-
our to persuade the extremely militant Syria to exercise moderation. Socialist coun-
tries – including our country – support the Arab countries waging an anti-imperialist 
policy. The political and economic consolidation of the Socialist countries themselves 
increases the efficacy of such support. Therefore, it is also in the interests of the pro-
gressive Arab countries, if the Socialist countries develop their relations with Israel in 
accordance with their own interests.
Having regard for Israel’s foreign policy and international role, we cannot treat it 
equally with the Arab states; that is to say, we cannot raise our diplomatic relations 
with it to the same level as [our relations – AK] with the latter; in our economic rela-
tions, we can only take into consideration our own interests, while in our cultural 
relations we must also limit, above all, the State of Israel’s cultural propaganda pos-
sibilities. This also requires that we keep our own cultural activities within certain 
limits, lest we provide an opportunity for the application of reciprocity. Still, our cul-
tural propaganda – since it popularises the achievements of a Socialist country and 
provides support to progressive forces in Israel – does not infringe upon the interests 
of the anti-imperialist struggle of the Arab nations; rather, it assists them indirectly.
V.
Our tasks in the field of the continued formation of Hungarian–Israeli relations
1.) In order to increase our political weight and efficacy, we should, at a suitable point 
in time, fill the legate’s post in Tel Aviv. To prepare for this, we suggest the posting, in 
the course of the year, of a temporary chargé d’affaires of legate rank. If the Israelis 
wish to fill the legate post in Budapest, we should not object to this. In fact, the latter 
would be the ideal solution for us. This could be hinted [to them – AK].
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2.) Similarly to the practice in foreign trade, we must apply our own interests in other 
measures of an economic nature. Bearing in mind these interests, we do not object 
to the running of MALÉV charter services between Hungary and Israel. Similarly, we 
agree with the introduction of cargo-ship services, if the competent economic organs 
deem this to be in our interest.
3.) Our cultural activities should be pursued primarily on an impresario basis, but 
in order to keep them within appropriate limits and to ensure our control – having 
regard for the applicability of reciprocity – we should administer our cultural rela-
tions on the basis of a working plan containing four to five events annually and reg-
ulated either verbally or through the exchange of letters. With an agreement of such 
nature, we secure for ourselves the possibility of rejecting an Israeli role that exceeds 
the limits and we also ensure that the only Hungarian cultural figures able to repre-
sent our cultural life in Israel are those who are found suitable to do so by the bodies 
responsible.
4.) So that our conduct influences Israeli policy in the desired way, the competent 
leaders and staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the leader and staff of 
our legation in Tel Aviv – when holding discussions with the Israeli official figures 
and whenever relations between the two countries are mentioned – should make 
known our position and should refer to the reasons which, from the part of Israel, 
determine our conduct. In order to counter Zionist efforts, we propose that our emi-
gration policy be upheld.
5.) So that the application of our own interests is not made to the detriment of our 
relations with the progressive Arab countries but rather strengthens such relations, 
the head of the Ninth Regional Department, as well as the comrades in contact with 
the Arab diplomats, should make known our own interests – if such are mentioned 
– and the harmony of these with the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle in our 
policy towards Israel.
6.) It is necessary to appraise in advance the likely propaganda effect, from the Israeli 
side, of some of our – positive – measures. We have to examine whether and what 
steps we can take to prevent such.
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13 Hungarian–Israeli Economic Relations
4 November 1967
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-5/t-002999-1968 (49.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ninth Regional Department
Imre Helli
Completed: in …… copies.
Recipients:
Memorandum
Subject: Hungarian–Israeli economic relations
On 24 August 1967, the accredited heads of missions in Damascus of the Socialist 
countries were called into the Syrian Foreign Ministry and, on behalf of the Syrian 
Government, and accompanied by a brief verbal information session, they were given 
a circular note to be forwarded to the governments of the Socialist countries.
The circular note briefly recalls the Israeli aggression of 5 June and consequences 
of such, which necessitate a review of the relationship with Israel. It expresses “pro-
found gratitude and sincere thanks” to the Socialist countries on behalf of the Arab 
states for the resolutions passed at the Moscow and Budapest conferences, for the 
severance of diplomatic relations with Israel and for the efforts made towards the 
convening of an extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly, and it welcomes 
the Belgrade conference aimed at offering economic assistance to the Arab countries. 
At the same time, it also notes that, in addition to the direct economic assistance pro-
vided to the Arab states and to be provided to them, it would be of extraordinarily sig-
nificance and indirect assistance if the Socialist countries would also break off their 
economic relations with Israel. Finally, the Syrian government expresses its hope that 
the present request would be “studied in a positive spirit” by the Socialist countries 
at the Belgrade conference.
At the Belgrade conference of European Socialist countries [on economic aid to 
Middle-Eastern countries in August 1967 – AK], none of the delegations mentioned the 
request of the Syrian government, so it was not even discussed.
In connection with the reply to be given to the Syrian note, our embassy in 
Damascus informed that the Soviet Union was the only Socialist country involved to 
have replied to the note, which it did even before the Belgrade conference, stating that 
there had been no economic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel, and that 
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the Soviet Union had no intention of establishing relations of that nature in the future. 
The unanimous opinion of the heads of mission in Damascus of the other Socialist 
countries is that the note was closely related to the Belgrade conference which had 
already taken place, and so the response had lost its timeliness. The Yugoslav ambas-
sador in Damascus had officially informed the Syrian prime minister about the con-
ference, who made no reference to the effect on the conference of the Syrian note or 
even to whether the issue had been addressed at the conference. In consideration of 
this, even our embassy does not recommend making a written response to the note.
At the beginning of October, the issue was raised once again and almost concur-
rently by the Syrians and the Iraqis; Syria’s ambassador in Prague asked our ambassa-
dor there whether the Syrian government’s request had been discussed at the Belgrade 
conference. In response to our ambassador’s negative answer, the Syrian ambassador 
stated on behalf of the Syrian government that the Syrian government was repeating 
its request, in the hope that the Hungarian government would address it. He added 
that the Syrian ambassadors were, at the same time, approaching the governments of 
the other Socialist countries involved; the Iraqi Foreign Ministry verbally communi-
cated to the temporary chargé d’affaires of our Baghdad embassy the request of the 
Iraqi government that Hungary should sever its economic relations with Israel.
Based on what has been said, we propose:
1.) We should not reply to the circular note of the Syrian Foreign Ministry.
2.) At the behest of the Syrian ambassador in Prague – if necessary in response to the 
verbal communication of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry – we should make a verbal reply. 
The essence of our response: our position with regard to the Israeli aggression deter-
mines the future development of Hungarian–Israeli economic relations.
3.) We consider it necessary to review once again Hungarian–Israeli economic rela-
tions, so that they are in line with our political position. Currently, these relations are 
noticeably overplayed, and in our opinion a significant reduction would be possible 
without detrimentally affecting our national economy. (e.g., reductions in crate and 
sawn-timber exports as well as orange imports).
In the appendix, we briefly summarise the development of economic relations 
between Israel and the European Socialist countries. It shows that the economic 
relations of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the GDR with Israel were already 
insignificant. Bulgaria wound down all its economic relations after the Israeli aggres-
sion and even sold its commercial branch office building. They will review once more 
the future development of economic relations after the consequences of the aggres-
sion have been wound up. Between 1 January and 1 September 1967, Poland exported 
goods worth 1.34 million dollars to Israel and imported goods from there worth 3.9 
million dollars. After the aggression, commercial trade almost ceased or was sus-
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pended by the Polish side. For the time being, there are no concrete plans concerning 
the content of trade relations and their continuation. In the first eight months of 1967, 
Yugoslavia exported goods worth approx. five million dollars to Israel and it imported 
from there goods worth approx. eight million dollars. After the aggression, imports 
declined because the Yugoslavs ceased buying tropical fruit. Further steps towards a 
reduction in the trade flow:
a.) they are to convert from the clearing system to free foreign-exchange accounting;
b.) with reference to the unfavourable structure of trade, they will remove a series of 
goods from both exports and imports;
c.) based on the government’s decision – as well as winding up passenger ships – 
they will cease all types of cargo transport to Israel.
Examining the economic relations of the European Socialist countries with Israel 
since the aggression of 5 June, one can state that on our part the proposals made in 
Point Three are necessary, and that there is a real basis for their realisation.
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14 Summary of Hungarian–Israeli Relations 1967
Budapest, 19 March 1968
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From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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János Zagyi, secretary III. 




1.) Until 12 June 1967, Hungarian–Israeli relations had been essentially unchanged 
for years. A chargé d’affaires had been at the head of the Israeli legation in Budapest 
and a temporary chargé d’affaires at the head of the Hungarian legation in Tel Aviv. 
On several occasions, Israel had urged an upgrading in the exchange of legates, the 
development of economic and cultural relations, and a visit by Comrade Béla Szilágyi 
to Israel. We had evaded all of these, with reference to Israel’s pro-imperialist and 
anti-Arab policies.
In the final phase of its activities before the severance of diplomatic relations, the 
Israeli legation in Budapest increased its propaganda activity in support of the FRG 
[Federal Republic of Germany], as a part of which it slandered a third country which 
has amicable relations with us and is allied to us [the German Democratic Republic 
– AK], and it popularised the demand made by the FRG to represent exclusively the 
German people.
2.) We can hardly speak of Hungarian–Israeli cultural relations. There have been just 
one or two isolated actions such as, for instance, performances by a Hungarian circus 
group and trips by several artists on an impresario basis. In the same way, there could 
be no official cultural relations on the part of Israel; the official Hungarian bodies 
responsible provided the possibility to appear before a small audience to several 
artists coming as tourists or as visitors.
For 1967, there were no guest performances planned for Hungarian artists in 
Israel. Before the outbreak of the conflict, preparatory discussions were under way 
concerning performances by three Israeli artists later on; no contracts were signed or 
performances undertaken.
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[....]
Israel urged once again the initiation of technical and scientific co-operation. In eco-
nomic terms, they made a very favourable offer. We would have been willing to make 
the offer the subject of an examination, but events prevented this from happening.
[....]
4.) Hungarian–Israeli commercial trade is governed by the agreement signed in 1956 
and by the protocols signed in subsequent years. The agreement mutually provides 
for treatment according to the principle of most-favoured nation.
Payments are governed by the payments agreement of 1954. Payments are made 
by way of the clearing system. The overdraft is currently 1.5 million dollars. In addi-
tion, until August 1968, a low-interest credit of 1.5 million clearing dollars is available 
to Hungarian buyers for financing purposes.
Over the past several years, our commercial trade has increased relatively quickly. 
The reasons for this were favourable financing possibilities and the preferential treat-
ment provided by the Israeli government with respect to several Hungarian export 
articles.
In view of the fact that Israeli economic activity has recently undergone a slow-
down, exports are being given significant support by the state and they are not adverse 
to re-export; indeed, in many cases such initiatives are broached by them. Since the 
June war, they are even willing to make financial sacrifices in order to sustain trade 
with the Socialist countries.
When diplomatic relations were broken off, our commercial office in Tel Aviv was 
closed, but we did not apply changes in the composition and volume of our trade flow. 
We wish to pursue relations based on mutual advantages, but we shall refrain from 
supplying any export goods that might increase Israel’s military potential.
The Israeli market is an important market for several Hungarian export goods. 
These are: wooden crates and crate parts; sawn wooden and rolled goods; beef; 
sugar, and cables and machinery. Hungarian imports include numerous goods of 
importance to us. These are: carbon black; pneumatics; copper cement; bromides; 
synthetic fibres, etc.
Value of trade in millions of foreign-exchange forints
1965 1966 1967
Exports 57.3 83.1 64.4
Imports 69.3 75.2 87.9
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IV. The number of Israelis entering the country
After the severance of diplomatic relations and following a joint resolution on the 
part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministries affected, we introduced visa 
restrictions and set up a committee which will make a separate decision concerning 
each visa request. When making a decision, the committee will take into consider-
ation the pertinent resolutions of the Party, the interests of the national economy, 
and, on occasion, humanitarian aspects. We have reduced to a minimum the issuing 
of visitor, tourist, and transit visas.
Between 20 June and 30 December 1967, the committee examined 184 cases, 
doing so on the basis of petitions arriving from foreign representation bodies and the 
Hungarian authorities. Of these, it authorised 78 entry visas. Most of those entering 
the country travelled here in order to attend business meetings, while others could 
enter for specific family reasons and for fixed periods of time.
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15 Trade Relations with Israel
Budapest, 17 September 1968
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From: Ministry of Foreign Trade
Memorandum
Subject: the development of Hungarian–Israeli trade relations and our trade policy 
with Israel
I.
The main basic principles of our trade policy relating to Israel
Since the events of 1966 [sic! – AK] in the Middle East, we have been applying the 
following main basic principles in our trade with Israel:
We do not take steps to abrogate the trade treaty with Israel or cancel the agree-
ment on the exchange of goods and payments. At the same time, we are unwilling to 
consider signing a new agreement on the exchange of goods and payments, and we 
avoid any contact with the Israeli official bodies.
We strive to ensure that our commercial trade with Israel should not exceed the 
level of commercial trade for 1966. For this reason, we have made both exports and 
imports subject to individual authorisation.
We fully consider the boycott regulations of the Arab countries. We have only 
made ordinary export-import and re-export and re-import transactions. We have sus-
pended the previous discussions on co-operation. We also refrain from making highly 
visible export-import transactions.
In export and import, we are trading largely within the existing price structure. 
We give importance to selling goods in the Israeli market that could not be sold else-
where or which could be sold only at a substantial price loss. At the same time, in 
our imports, we wish to obtain primarily goods that are of a raw material nature and 
which, if they could not be acquired in Israel, could only be obtained for free foreign 
exchange.
We continue our re-export and re-import transactions to the same order of magni-
tude as in previous years, because they are economic.
We have upheld our significant debtor position vis-à-vis Israel (approx. three 
million dollars) for the sake of our balance of payments.
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We have given major assistance to the newly formed Israeli [Communist Party – 
AK] party enterprise, which is already playing a significant role in trade between the 
two countries.
II.
The development of Hungarian–Israeli commercial trade in the past several years
Our foreign trade relations with Israel have stagnated since 1966.
Value in millions of foreign-exchange forints
1963 1966 1967 1968. I–VI.
Exports 64.5 83.1 64.4 28.9
Imports 51.9 75.2 87.9 41.3
Total 116.4 158.3 152.3 70.2
In 1968, our total trade with Israel is not expected to exceed the level of 1967; accord-




Our balance account situation
In Israel we have an interest-free overdraft of 1,500,000 dollars and a special bank 
credit of 1.5 million dollars; the latter incurs annual interest of six per cent (in 1967 
and at the beginning of 1968 it was five per cent).
At present we are making full use of both the overdraft and the special bank 
credit.
In view of our foreign-exchange situation, the repayment of these items was not 
considered desirable by our financial authorities. We do not consider our indebted-
ness to be worrying in practical terms either.
We consider it unlikely that the Israeli authorities would abrogate our agreement 
on the exchange of goods and payments.
Recently, the special bank credit was extended for an additional year. The only 
change was the increase in the interest rate from five per cent to six per cent.
Our indebtedness corresponds to about half a year of our export trade. If the pay-
ments agreement were to be abrogated, there would be a loan repayment holiday of 
half a year.
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We are also able to achieve a price bonification of 8–8.5 per cent in the Israeli 
clearing system if payment is made in free dollars. (Our exit losses amount to around 
four per cent.)
In our view, the growth in credit is to be judged exclusively in financial terms. It 
is not in our foreign-trade policy interest to increase our indebtedness vis-à-vis Israel.
[Handwritten remark on the last page:]
In political terms, our indebtedness is very unwelcome. I discussed [the matter – 
AK] with Comrade P. Veres at the MFT [Ministry of Foreign Trade] and with Comrade 
Fekete at the NB [National Bank of Hungary]. We should endeavour to reduce signifi-






The capture of Adolf Eichmann on 11 May 1960 in Argentina embarrassed the lead-
erships of the European Communist countries: Eichmann had committed his crimes 
mainly on the territory of Soviet-bloc countries. Immediately after his arrest, the 
Israeli authorities signalled that they were counting on the assistance and co-oper-
ation of the Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments in the legal 
proceedings. 
The main political decision-making bodies of the concerned parties discussed 
the various issues arising from Eichmann’s capture, and consulted with each other 
and their Soviet superiors on several occasions. The documents below were drawn up 
in the course of these consultations and, much like a case study, they offer insights 
into the mechanisms that resulted in a uniform policy strategy towards Israel and 
Jewish-related issues, a strategy that was adapted to Soviet interests. Furthermore, 
the documents also reveal the extent and nature of policy differences between the 
various countries, the manner in which they sought to realise their own goals, and 
how far they were prepared to go in pursuit of such goals. 
Eichmann’s capture was first mentioned in the Soviet press in a brief report on 
25 May 1960.1 It was only a few days after the capture that reports began to appear 
in the Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslovak press. As the B’nai B’rith analysis in this 
volume (Document 11) shows, significant differences of emphasis existed. In the latter 
half of June, the UN Security Council – of which Poland was a member at the time, 
in addition to the Soviet Union – debated, following a request from Argentina, the 
breach of Argentinian sovereignty. During the debate, Soviet and Polish delegates, 
while strongly condemning the Western countries (above all, West-Germany) for 
giving refuge to war criminals, refrained from taking a clear position on the issue 
itself. Indeed, at the vote, representatives of both countries abstained, thus choosing 
not to condemn outright Israel’s actions. In response, the Israeli legate in Warsaw 
expressed special gratitude to the Polish government at a subsequent meeting.2 
Following preliminary discussions on 27 June 1960, the Israeli government offi-
cially requested the Soviet Union’s co-operation in the investigations preceding the 
trial.3 Similar requests were then made to the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish 
governments. Whereas the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia chose not to respond 
to this request,4 the Polish and Hungarian authorities did respond, albeit in a rather 
1 For a review of the material published in the Soviet press on the Eichmann case, see Nati Cantor-
ovich, Soviet Reactions to the Eichmann Trial: A Preliminary Investigation 1960–1965, Yad Vashem 
Studies 35:2 (2007), 103–141. See also the summary report by B’nai B’rith in this chapter (Document 11).
2 A note from the director of the 5th Department of MSZ, Z. Wolniak, on the conversation with envoy 
R. Amir on 24 June 1960. AMSZ z-12 w-38 t-936/314, in Rudnicki and Silber (eds), Stosunki Polsko–Izra-
elskie (1945–1967), 541–542.
3 See Cantorovich, op. cit., 123.
4 Ibid, 123; and Document 6, dated 12 August 1960 in this volume.
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sluggish fashion.5 Meanwhile, however, consultations were being held in rapid suc-
cession on what to do next. At a meeting on 19 July 1960, the foreign ministers of the 
European Communist countries discussed measures to be taken in connection with 
the Eichmann affair.6 The Communist Party leaders wished to avoid the accusation 
of non-co-operation in the prosecution of a major war criminal, nor did they want to 
compromise their general policies towards the Jewish state or, even more importantly, 
towards the Federal Republic of Germany by the co-operation the Israelis asked for. 
In the second half of the 1950s, after the West’s rejection of the proposal to estab-
lish a unified, neutral and demilitarised Germany, Soviet policy-makers reacted with 
growing alarm to West Germany’s increasingly close relationship with the Western 
economic and defence alliance. The unease of the Soviet leadership was heightened 
by the associated spectacular improvement in West Germany’s relations with Israel, 
an obvious sign of which was a meeting held in New York on 14 March 1960 between 
West-German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. In 
order to discredit the pro-Western West-German political leadership, Soviet propa-
ganda characterised West Germany as a post-Nazi, revanchist state that was harbour-
ing Nazi criminals in high positions. Propagandists in the other Communist countries 
readily repeated this line. The spectacular improvement in West-German relations 
with Israel seemed, however, to undermine the legitimacy of such rhetoric. It is no 
accident that barely five days after the initial report of Eichmann’s capture, Albert 
Norden, a leading functionary in the East-German Communist Party, the Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED], wrote in 
an internal memo addressed to Party leader Walter Ulbricht, that it was incumbent 
upon the Communist countries to exploit the affair as part of the campaign against 
West Germany.7 
Concerning Israel, since the beginning of the 1950s, Soviet propaganda had 
adhered to a strongly anti-Zionist line that was dismissive of the Jewish state’s right to 
represent Jews, or to intervene in Jewish matters outside its borders. The governments 
of the Soviet-bloc countries were required, therefore, to address Israeli demands for 
documents that would facilitate the conviction of Eichmann for crimes against Jews 
without compromising their anti-Fascist stance. Moreover, co-operation with Israel 
on this matter was not to give rise to the impression that there had been a change in 
the position on Israel. Four principal issues reflecting this dilemma are made mani-
fest in the documents: how to avoid recognising the authority of the Israeli court; 
5 See Rudnicki and Silber, op. cit., 18 July 1960, 542–543; and Document 317, dated 4 August 1960, 544.
6 The contents of East German documents on negotiations between the Communist countries con-
cerning the Eichmann affair are summarized in Meining, Kommunistische Judenpolitik, 267; and 
Ruth Bettina Birn, Fifty Years after: A Critical Look at the Eichmann Trial, Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law, 22 March 2011. Accessed on 10 April 2015 at http://www.thefreelibrary.
com/Fifty+years+after%3a+a+critical+look+at+the+Eichmann+trial.-a0296255592.
7 See Meining, op. cit., 267.
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whether or not to participate at an institutional level in the legal proceedings; how to 
provide inculpatory evidence for the prosecution without institutional involvement 
in the proceedings; and, finally, how to instrumentalize the trial for the purpose of 
denouncing West-German “neo-Fascism” and “revanchism”.
The Hungarian Party bodies began to address the case in early June 1960, and it 
was placed on the agenda of a meeting of the Political Committee on 28 June 1960. This 
took place before the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Communist countries, 
and prior to receipt of the official Israeli note requesting co-operation (21 July 1960). 
From the outset, the Hungarian leadership strove to play down the Jewish aspects of 
the case, and to stress the general anti-Fascist ones. As János Kádár, General Secre-
tary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, put it very clearly at the meeting (see 
Document 1):
It is not a good idea to turn these awful Fascist affairs into an exclusively Jewish matter. If we do 
act in this affair, the decisive thing should be that Eichmann murdered hundreds of thousands of 
Hungarian citizens. This is where the emphasis should be, rather than turning this affair into a 
Jewish question. Eichmann did not only murder Jews; others were there, too. This is not a Jewish 
question; this is a question of Fascism and anti-Fascism. 
Consultations on the issue went on until late autumn. Concerning recognition of 
the legitimacy of the Israeli court, a Hungarian Foreign Ministry proposal drafted in 
preparation for the foreign ministers’ meeting on 19 July indicates that the Hungari-
ans took a rather conciliatory position and were looking for a diplomatically accept-
able solution (Document 4). The documents stress that according to general princi-
ples, the prosecution and punishment of war criminals was viewed primarily as the 
prerogative of those states on whose territory and against whose citizens the crimes 
had been committed. Even so, the Hungarians were ready to accept the argument that 
the Israeli court had at least partial jurisdiction insofar as Eichmann’s crimes had 
affected people who subsequently became Israeli citizens or their relatives. Such a 
stance, it was argued, might offer a solution for several dilemmas facing the Commu-
nist countries:
If we accepted the partial jurisdiction of the Israeli court, we would retain legal grounds for 
requesting Eichmann’s extradition; at the same time, there would still be the possibility of pro-
viding data concerning specific crimes committed against Israeli citizens. In such a case, we 
could not be subjected to the propaganda accusation that we are rendering proceedings against 
a war criminal more difficult. 
It would seem that although the political line to be followed in the affair – the need to 
exploit the trial for a campaign against “West-German neo-Nazism”, Zionism and the 
Vatican – was decided upon at the foreign ministers’ meeting, there was no final deci-
sion on matters of detail. The Communist countries initially considered demanding 
the involvement of an international court, or the extradition of Eichmann. After the 
meeting, however, such ideas were dropped, anticipating objection from the Federal 
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Republic of Germany, and the likelihood of the latter making a “rival claim”. Hunga-
ry’s position concerning the legitimacy of the Israeli court also encountered opposi-
tion. As the Czechoslovak documents show (see Document 6), the Hungarian propo-
sition was not acceptable to the Czechoslovak Party leadership, which immediately 
turned to Moscow for guidance on the Soviet position. Having received such, they 
laid out their position clearly, arguing that explicit recognition of the Israeli court’s 
authority might be construed as acceptance of the idea – forcefully promoted by Israel 
– that the Jewish state had the right to act on behalf of all Jews regardless of their 
citizenship. After some hesitation, they rejected Hungary’s proposal that documents 
on Eichmann’s crimes should be made available to the Israeli court by semi-official 
organisations. Instead, they proposed the publication of the relevant material, which 
could then be used by the Israelis. 
The Soviet response to the Czechoslovak request, which supported the position 
of the Czechoslovak hardliners, is mentioned in the Hungarian Political Committee 
decision of 29 September 1960 (Document 7): 
As a result of consultation, one can state that all were in agreement with our political goals, 
while opinions differed on two other questions, which were summed up by the Soviet comrades 
as follows:
1. They do not consider it expedient to request Eichmann’s extradition from Israel, since the 
rejection of such a request would diminish the prestige of the Communist countries.
2. Avoiding the issue of the jurisdiction of the Israeli court, they favour the Czechoslovak 
position that documentary proof should be given to Israel by means of some civil organ. In prac-
tice, this would take place alongside the simultaneous publication of the submitted material, in 
order to prevent Israel from hushing up the material it had received.
In light of the Soviet reaction, the Hungarian political leadership immediately revised 
its earlier position, and annulled the previous resolution of the Political Committee. 
In the following period, functionaries focused on realising the main political aim of 
the propaganda campaign: to reveal links between Eichmann’s case and the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s alleged practice of concealing and supporting war criminals. 
One means to achieve this was to establish continuity between Zionist rescue opera-
tions of World War II (such as Rudolf Kasztner’s activities, which aimed to save lives 
through attempted bribery of Nazi officials, including Eichmann and his closest asso-
ciates), and contemporary Zionism and German “neo-Fascism”. It is no accident that 
this issue was strongly emphasised by István Szirmai, the head of the agitation and 
propaganda apparatus of the Hungarian Party, who had been imprisoned in the early 
1950s on the basis of accusations concerning his pre-war Zionist past. As the letter of 
S. Mikunis, the Secretary General of the Israeli Communist Party, to the Central Com-
mittee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party demonstrates (Document 10), the 
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Israeli Communists also wished to highlight this issue, since they saw it as a useful 
political tool to reveal collaboration between Zionists and the murderers of Jews.8 
By the autumn of 1960, the four countries whose co-operation the Israeli authori-
ties had officially requested – the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary 
– had reached a consensus on denying the Israeli investigative bodies permission to 
gather data in their countries. The Soviet authorities did not even respond to official 
Israeli requests,9 while the Czechoslovaks, instead of handing over the requested doc-
uments, held out the prospect of the publication of a volume of material relating to 
Eichmann’s activities on their territory. For their part, the Poles and Hungarians chose 
a different strategy: if not by way of state organs, they did show a willingness to make 
documents on Eichmann and his accomplices available to the Israeli state bodies 
through civil organisations such as the National Committee of Persons Persecuted 
by Nazism in Hungary [Nácizmus Magyarországi Üldözötteinek Országos Bizottsága] 
and the Main Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes [Glówna Komisja do 
Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich] in Poland.10 At the same time, however, the Hungar-
ian authorities attempted to compile the documents in such a way as to prove that the 
Zionists and Nazis had collaborated, and to demonstrate indirectly that a number of 
Zionists (e.g. Kasztner) had helped war criminals such as Kurt Becher evade justice, 
some of whom were able to live unpunished in West Germany. Having selected the 
documents in this tendentious fashion, they then published them in the form of a 
book under the pretext of preventing the suppression of the “truth” in the course of 
the trial. Entitled Eichmann in Hungary, the volume was compiled by Jenő Lévai, the 
best-known Hungarian historian of the Holocaust of the immediate post-war years. 
The book was published in English and German by a Hungarian publisher who had 
never published anything before or since. 
Policy differences among the various Communist countries arose not only with 
regard to the publication of documents pertinent to the trial, but also in the field of 
press reports. The last document in this chapter, a comparative report by B’nai B’rith 
on media coverage of the Eichmann affair (sent as a manuscript by the Hungarian 
embassy to the Foreign Ministry in Budapest), reveals significant differences in the 
media’s handling of the issue in the various Communist countries. These differences 
were already apparent in the run-up to the trial. The B’nai B’rith report judged Polish 
and the Hungarian media coverage to have been basically correct, while it viewed 
Soviet, Czechoslovak and Romanian coverage as highly biased. (The explanation for 
8 On a similar letter sent by the Israeli Communist Party to the Polish authorities and the Polish reac-
tion to the letter, see Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 316–317.
9 See Cantorovich, op. cit., 123.
10 See Rudnicki and Silber, op. cit., Document 320, dated 28 October 1960, 547. The Czechoslovak 
leadership had initially planned to make the documents available to the Israeli investigative bodies by 
way of the Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters in Czechoslovakia, but subsequently changed their minds. 
See Document 6 in this volume. 
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such differences given by the report’s author(s) seems to have been influenced, at 
least in part, by the political climate at the time. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that 
various perceptions of the danger of renewed German expansionism would have such 
a strong influence over how the media in the various countries addressed the case, as 
the author(s) of the report believed.)
Three Hungarian journalists received permission from the government to be 
present at the court in Jerusalem, while more than 20 others produced articles or 
reports. A content analysis of Hungarian media publications11 located 137 articles that 
dealt with the Eichmann affair, from capture to execution. According to the analysis, 
98 of the 137 published articles might be considered objective reports on Eichmann’s 
activities and the trial. The picture formed in the Hungarian press differed from the 
common position promoted by the Soviet Union: a relatively small proportion of the 
Hungarian articles addressed the propaganda themes identified during the consulta-
tions, and the overwhelming majority of press reports refrained from obscuring the 
antisemitic nature of Eichmann’s activities and general Jewish suffering during the 
Holocaust, despite Party leader János Kádár’s guidance to the contrary. 
In the end therefore, the common policy strategy formed under Soviet pressure 
and strongly supported by the Czechoslovak and East-German Parties was not carried 
out in full in the Hungarian and Polish press. In the late 1950s, Poland had begun 
a spectacular improvement in its relations with Israel. Evidently, it did not want 
the conflicts surrounding the Eichmann affair to hinder this process. Even while it 
supported the common line in its official statements, Poland adhered to a policy of 
detachment that was manifest both in its bilateral meetings with the Israeli side, and 
in its press coverage of the trial. Such efforts were not without result: in June 1961, the 
Director-General of the Foreign Ministry of Israel, Chaim Yahil, visited Poland, which 
caused a sensation at the time.12 
In Hungary, other factors lay behind the reluctance to adhere entirely to the 
common course of action. At the time of the Eichmann trial, there were at least 150,000 
Jews living in Hungary, a majority of whom were survivors of the persecution that had 
occurred barely 15 years earlier. Many held important posts in the press, state admin-
istration and Party institutions. Practically every Hungarian Jew was familiar with 
the name Eichmann, and knew of his activities in Hungary. In view of this societal 
background, and the government’s efforts to maintain social cohesion and nip poten-
tial conflicts in the bud in the wake of 1956, it doubtless seemed impossible to meet 
Soviet expectations in full. Indeed, there was an understanding on the part of the 
Hungarian authorities that any official measure that improved Eichmann’s chances 
11 Kata Bohus, Jews, Israelites, Zionists. The Hungarian State’s Policies on Jewish Issues in a Com-
parative Perspective (1956–1968). PhD thesis, Central European University, 2013, chapter 3. See also 
Kata Bohus, Not a Jewish Question? The Holocaust in Hungary in the Kádár Regime’s Propaganda 
During Adolf Eichmann’s Trial, Hungarian Historical Review 4:3 (2015), 737–772.
12 For Poland’s evolving policy on these issues, see Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 314–317.
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of defence and relativized his role in the persecution and murder of Hungary’s Jews – 
even if dressed up in general anti-Fascist rhetoric – would be damaging for domestic 
politics. They were also aware that an overly vehement anti-Zionist campaign could 
exacerbate antisemitism in the country, a development they evidently feared, given 
the historical links between antisemitism and anti-Communism.13 Thus, while they 
loyally adhered to the common position in their political statements and in the course 
of negotiations and communications with “friendly countries”, on issues where they 
believed that a separate course of action would not provoke a Soviet reaction, they 
endeavoured to tailor their measures to local conditions. 
13 The journalist Tibor Pethő recollected that before he left for Jerusalem to report on the trial, István 
Szirmai, in a shift from his earlier position outlined at the Political Committee meeting on 28 June 
1960, had instructed him and other journalists to take care not to provoke a serious conflict with West 
Germany, and to avoid inciting antisemitic sentiment among the Hungarian population. “The core 
of Szirmai’s instructions was […] that the issue is still a painful point in Hungary, since there were, 
and in a certain sense still are, many antisemites in the country. Consequently, we have to present 
case in such a way that it does not provoke antisemitic sentiments.” Interview with Tibor Pethő, in A 
“hatvanas évek” emlékezete [The Memory of “the Sixties”], ed. Adrienne Molnár (Budapest: 1956-os 
Intézet, 2004), 147. 
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Documents
1 Minutes of the Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party 
28 June 1960
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/5/204/ p. 15-18.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, Political Committee
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Politikai Bizottság] 
[...]
Comrade István Szirmai:
I should like to draw the attention of comrades to a circumstance that is not men-
tioned in the motion. In my view, the Israeli government has an interest in the capture 
and judgement of Eichmann in the sense that there are certain matters which severely 
compromise the Israeli government and the Zionist movement. Eichmann knows 
about these things, and the Israelis do not want them to come to light. Such factors 
also exist. There was the Kaszner [sic! – AK] affair, whom the Israeli government had 
shot in order to shut him up. This was also a disturbing matter, but the important thing 
is that even the head of the Israeli government has an interest in the matter, because 
he too had connections with the Gestapo. This is a very interesting matter. Eichmann 
was kidnapped from Argentina, and just three days after this fact was made public, 
the grand chamber, where such a public trial could be held, burnt down. This is not 
insignificant either.
I suggest the following: Our campaign should be directed not only at drawing 
benefit from the Eichmann case in order to expose the Fascists of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, but also at trying to ensure that the Israeli government is exposed too. So 
our campaign should have two directions. Our main demand – which must be voiced 
– should be that, internationally, the trial be given full publicity. I share the view that 
the realisation of the proposals must be begun and that all means should be used and 
tried out, and that international pressure should aim to ensure that we too participate 
in the trial.
Another logical matter has arisen, namely, that the Israelis want to blackmail the 
Federal Republic of Germany with this matter. This is possible, but I also suppose 
the reverse. There are, in the Federal Republic of Germany, a number of high-ranking 
former Nazis with trump cards for blackmail. The Israeli government captured Eich-
mann in order to shut him up.
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Comrade János Kádár:
I would say the following: I agree with the whole idea, but I have some reservations. 
It’s not a good idea to turn these awful Fascist affairs into an exclusively Jewish 
matter. If we do act in this affair, the decisive thing should be that Eichmann mur-
dered hundreds of thousands of Hungarian citizens. This is where the emphasis 
should be, rather than turning this affair into a Jewish question. Eichmann did not 
only murder Jews; others were there, too. This is not a Jewish question; this is a ques-
tion of Fascism and anti-Fascism. We recognise the right of the Israeli court in this 
matter. And that is as far it goes when it comes to the Jews. We must be careful about 
this. I would say the following: I would begin by saying that under the 1943 declara-
tion of the Allied powers, all war criminals, etc.... this should be the point of depar-
ture. Second, a person should be pursued as a war criminal and, under the present 
circumstances, brought to justice where he committed the crime. The following may 
be said here: Eichmann is a war criminal, a Fascist; it has come to our knowledge that 
he is a prisoner of the Israeli government. Then there would be the matter of what 
we want to do. It would also be correct to point out, first of all, that the Israeli court 
should hold a public trial, and that a representative could take part in the trial as an 
observer, rather than as an accusing party. In my view it is not possible, in a legal 
sense, at the court of one state, for the representative of another state to take action 
as an accusing party, commissioned by Hungary. We are aware that the war criminal 
Eichmann is being held by the Israeli authorities. We demand that a representative of 
the Hungarian body responsible take part in the trial.
Comrade Imre Hollai:
Ben-Gurion has already acknowledged that the trial will be public...
Comrade János Kádár:
Ben-Gurion just said it, that’s all. We just say that it has come to our knowledge that 
Eichmann is being held by the Israeli authorities and that they want to prosecute him. 
After that, we say, we demand, a public trial, at which – and we will have to name 
the person in question – the [Hungarian – AK] Public Prosecutor’s representative can 
take part.
Our second demand: we demand that after the trial, Eichmann be surrendered 
to the Hungarian authorities. And we’ll say that this is a legitimate demand, because 
Jewish people... etc. We should not say anything there. These are our two goals, our 
demands, but what we do to achieve them is another matter.
Let us negotiate with the friendly countries that have been named – this is appro-
priate. A second task is to collect together the appropriate documents, the publication 
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of certain material. It will not be expedient for the first four pages of every paper to be 
full of this. That shouldn’t be done. After that, there is the matter of what we should 
do with Argentina. This is a separate matter; it’s not compatible with the Eichmann 
case. It is a matter for consideration. To consider whether it is expedient or not. It 
requires a lot of consideration because our current position with them is that they 
have decided to buy locomotives from us. And if we overly concern ourselves with this 




The Poles will probably be the first to make the demand for extradition – officially too. 
He [Eichmann] committed most of his crimes there. The Allied powers made a state-
ment after the winding-up of the Nuremberg court that if a war criminal were found, 
then he should be brought to justice where he committed the crimes. Comrade Sobolev 
supported this view in the Security Council debate, as against Argentina’s proposal. 
We shall probably have to make a demand for extradition, too, because [otherwise] 
there will be two friendly countries, on whose territory he committed these crimes, 
making requests for extradition, but the third will remain silent. Besides, there will 
also be some propaganda benefit, because when publishing the material relating to 
him, it will be good to apply a gradual approach; material should initially be made 
public which refers exclusively to crimes he committed in Hungary, and then gradu-
ally move on to material that relates to American or West-German figures.
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2 Tasks after the Decision of the Political Committee
28 June 1961
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-Izrael-30/c-00850-1960 (11.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
At its meeting of 28 June 1960, the Political Committee of the Hungarian Social-
ist Workers’ Party decided, in a resolution concerning the Eichmann case, that the 
motion of Foreign Affairs Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be 
revised, taking into account the comments made at the meeting.
Based on the motion and the comments made, the Political Committee consents 
to the following measures:
1./ We should issue notes to the Israeli government, in which:
a./ We express the demand that the Israeli government hold legal proceedings against 
Eichmann in a public trial and that it permit the representative of the Supreme State 
Prosecutor of the Hungarian People’s Republic to take part in the trial as an observer;
b./ We state our demand that after the conclusion of the Eichmann case at the Israeli 
court, the Israeli authorities surrender Eichmann to the authorities of the Hungar-
ian People’s Republic, so that he may be brought to justice for crimes committed in 
Hungary.
2./ We base the aforementioned demands of the Hungarian People’s Republic on the 
following:
a./ Under the 1943 Moscow Declaration of the Allied powers, all war criminals that 
are responsible for atrocities “shall be pursued to the furthest corners of the earth” so 
that they do not escape punishment. Under the same declaration, all war criminals 
that are not brought before an international court must be extradited to the countries 
where they committed their deeds, so that the liberated peoples may pass judgement 
over them on the basis of their own laws. This is what was stated by the participating 
powers at the conclusion of the Nuremberg international court’s work, thereby con-
cluding that war criminals that had not been brought to justice by the international 
court must be brought to justice in the country in which they committed their crimes.
b./ Since Eichmann committed a series of war crimes and crimes against the people in 
the territory of Hungary in 1944, the justice bodies of the Hungarian People’s Republic 
are competent to pass judgement on Eichmann’s crimes in Hungary.
3./ By means of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consultative negotiations must be held 
with the competent authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland and the Czechoslo-
vak Republic, concerning the measures to be taken with respect to the Israeli govern-
ment in the Eichmann case.
4./ Regarding the crimes committed by Eichmann in Hungary, the Supreme State 
Prosecutor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take charge of the collection and 
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documentation of data, diplomatic measures and the processing of such, in a form 
that can be used in any legal proceedings.
5./ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall compile material suitable for publication.
6./ The press shall cover the Eichmann case in accordance with the aforementioned 
plans.
7./ When dealing with the Eichmann case, the following concepts must be applied: in 
view of neo-Fascist symptoms visible in the life of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Zionist nature of the Israeli government’s foreign and domestic policy, [the 
case – AK] must be used to strengthen the anti-Fascist front against Fascist efforts. For 
this reason, when condemning the guilt of Eichmann and his accomplices, in addi-
tion to crimes against Jews, the other crimes of Fascism against various progressive 
movements and individuals must also be exposed.
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3 Tasks in Connection with the Eichmann Case
8 July 1960
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-30/c-00850-1960 (11.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: 2nd Political Department
Lajos Kiss, Third Secretary
Sík, Minister Comrade
Péter, First Deputy Min.
Puja, Deputy Min.
Szarka, Deputy Min.
István Varga, Head of Dep.
Z. Széphelyi, Acting Head of Dep.
Memorandum
Subject: tasks in connection with the Eichmann case
Based on our motion, the Political Committee has adopted a resolution concerning 
the diplomatic measures to be taken in the Eichmann case, and it marked out the 
main policy governing our conduct in this matter. Thus the following measures have 
become necessary:
1./ Consultation with friendly countries with an interest in the matter
The Political Committee has charged the Foreign Minister with consulting with 
the governments of friendly countries on the Eichmann case and with co-ordinating 
our measures. The consultation has become increasingly urgent, as the Israeli gov-
ernment has taken official steps, both here and – as far as we know – in Prague, to 
have us provide it with data on Eichmann and to permit its official representative to 
enter [the country – AK] for the purpose of gathering information and data. Thus:
a./ We should inform the Czechoslovak government, which has already made such an 
inquiry to us in this matter, that we are prepared to take part in consultative discus-
sions, and that we suggest that other friendly countries with an interest in the matter 
also take part in such discussions (Soviet Union, GDR and Poland).
b./ During consultations, based on the Political Committee’s resolution, we should 
say what our conduct is and announce our measures.
c./ The consultative discussions will be an opportunity for us to request, from the 
Czech and Polish governments, additional data that are essential to the task of col-
lecting data. The Czech comrades are in possession of Wisliczeny’s [sic! – AK] interro-
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gation report, while the Polish comrades are in possession of the memoirs and memo-
randum of Höss, camp commander at Auschwitz. Both men took an active part at the 
side of Eichmann while he was operating in Hungary.
According to reports we have received, it is expected that the consultative discus-
sions will raise the idea of an international-type court comprising representatives of 
those countries in which Eichmann committed his deeds. In this regard, our represen-
tatives at the discussions should prepare to take an appropriate position. We suggest 
that if our partners insist on a joint stand, then we should not oppose it. The idea is 
unlikely to be realised in practice, but it does provide us with a good opportunity in 
our propaganda to take joint action for the sake of anti-Fascism and to demonstrate 
that Western [governments] do not want to take joint action even against Fascist mass 
murderers such as Eichmann. We, on the other hand, are prepared to do so, as inter-
ested countries.
2./ Memorandum to the Argentine government
According to the policy line of the Political Committee, the circumstances of the 
Eichmann case must be used to strengthen the anti-Fascist front and, in addition to 
crimes against Jews, attention must also be given to other crimes of Fascism, while 
exposing its current supporters. For this reason, we suggest that we request the Argen-
tine government in a note to extradite Fascists who are known by it to be residing in 
the country. For this purpose:
a./ Data must be collected about known Hungarian Fascists reported by the embassy 
in Buenos Aires and residing in Argentina. […] The State Prosecutor should issue 
arrest warrants against them.
b./ Based on that data, we should request their extradition in a note, without referring 
to the Eichmann Case. As part of this measure, we suggest that we should not ask 
for persons under consideration for extradition in a summary note, but one by one, 
which may provide us with an opportunity to manoeuvre.
3./ Note to the Israeli government
This measure should take place in accordance with the tactical principle that is 
jointly accepted at the consultative discussions. In the note
a./ We should make our demand that Eichmann’s case be held in public
b./ We should ask for permission for the Supreme State Prosecutor of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic to take part in the trial as an observer
c./ We should serve notice that we are considering a demand that after his trial in 
Israel is over, Eichmann should be surrendered to the Hungarian People’s Republic, 
so that he may be brought to justice for crimes committed in Hungary.
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We base our demand on the following:
a./ The 1943 Moscow Declaration of the Allied powers, according to which those who 
committed atrocities will be pursued to the furthest corners of the earth, so that they 
may receive proper punishment – and further, the statement forming part of the dec-
laration, according to which all war criminals who are not brought before an interna-
tional court must be extradited to the countries where they committed their deeds, so 
that the liberated peoples may pass judgement over them.
b./ Since Eichmann committed some of his atrocities and war crimes in Hungary, the 
Hungarian People’s Republic considers itself competent to pass judgement over him.
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4 Consultation Issues in Respect of the Eichmann Case
19 July 1960
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-Izrael-30/c-00850-1960 (11.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
Completed in 4 copies
Consultation issues in respect of the Eichmann case to the foreign ministries of the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Romania
1./ The policy line issue
When publishing documents concerning Eichmann and his associates, the 
anti-Fascist front should be used to attack:
a./ West-German neo-Fascism
b./ Zionism
c./ The Vatican (Eichmann reached Argentina with the assistance of the Vatican)
For this reason, when exposing the crimes of Eichmann and his accomplices, atten-
tion should also be given – alongside crimes against Jews – to acts committed against 
various other progressive individuals, movements and patriots.
Since by far most of his crimes were committed in Poland against Polish citizens, 
it would seem right for Polish comrades to be at the forefront of our campaign.
2./ The problem of the jurisdiction of the Israeli court
In this regard, the following issues require clarification:
a./ If we recognise the jurisdiction of the Israeli court with regard to all aspects of 
Eichmann’s crimes, then the following negative consequences may arise:
aa./ We might give the impression that we recognise the legitimacy of efforts on the 
part of the government of Israel to regard itself as the general representative of Jews.
ab./ We would come into conflict with the 1943 Declaration of the Allied and associ-
ated powers, according to which war criminals are responsible for their deeds where 
they committed them.
ac./ We would place ourselves in the position of being unable to refuse to supply data 
relating to Eichmann.
ad./ Thereby, we would assist the government of Israel in using the Eichmann case for 
its own political purposes.
ae./ Finally, we would jeopardise our right to request the extradition of Eichmann.
b./ If we refuse to recognise the authority of the Israeli court in any respect, then the 
following negative consequences arise:
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We shall have to refuse the provision of data – in both its official and private 
forms – relating to Eichmann.
By doing so, we would provide an opportunity, on the one hand, for the Israeli 
court to narrow the scope of the crimes and, on the other, for them to state in their 
propaganda attacks that the Communist countries are not assisting in exposing the 
crimes of a Fascist war criminal. If this happens, we will find it difficult to criticise the 
proceedings of the Israeli court, which are likely to be conducted unfairly.
c./ The question arises: would it be possible to recognise the partial jurisdiction of the 
Israeli court. The grounds for such partial recognition could be as follows:
The 1943 Moscow Declaration of the Allied and associated powers stated that 
persons are responsible for their crimes where they committed them. But it said this on 
the theoretical ground that the people who suffered the crimes should make judgement.
Large numbers of people who used to live in the territories of the Soviet Union, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary are now living in the – subsequently 
established – State of Israel, as its citizens. Most of these people are individuals 
against whom personally, or against whose relatives Eichmann committed crimes.
Partial jurisdiction would apply to crimes committed against such Israeli citizens.
If we accepted the partial jurisdiction of the Israeli court, we would retain legal 
grounds for requesting Eichmann’s extradition; at the same time, there would still be 
the possibility of providing data concerning specific crimes committed against Israeli 
citizens. In such a case, we could not be subjected to the propaganda accusation that 
we are rendering proceedings against a war criminal more difficult.
3./ Possible extradition proceedings would probably have merely propaganda signifi-
cance, for it is unlikely that the Israeli authorities would accept an extradition claim. 
By extraditing him, they would reduce their own possibilities of exploiting the Eich-
mann case politically and economically vis-à-vis both West Germany and the Arab 
countries. Moreover, extradition would result in Eichmann inevitably giving informa-
tion about Zionism and his removal from Argentina to the authorities of the Com-
munist countries, and this would not be desirable as far as the Israeli government is 
concerned.
Nevertheless, there are advantages to launching extradition proceedings. After a 
rejection of such a request, possibilities would arise for us to gradually publish Eich-
mann’s crimes, thereby permitting criticism of the policies of the Israeli government, 
or indeed for the continuation of the trial without the accused – on the lines of the 
Oberländer case.
It would not, however, be right to make the extradition request now. The disadvan-
tage of an early announcement would be to push Israeli preparations for the case in an 
unfavourable direction and to add to the Israeli government’s opportunities for con-
tinuing the bartering with the West-German government in connection with the case.
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Extradition should be requested just prior to, or during, the lawsuit, with the demand 
that – after the trial and the announcement of the judgement – Eichmann should first be 
surrendered to the People’s Republic of Poland, subject to a pledge that after judgement 
has been served or implemented, we give Eichmann back to the Israeli authorities.
4./ Provision of data to the Israeli authorities
If the Israeli authorities approach individual citizens of our countries with 
requests for information and data, their response should be that they can only give 
information to the authorities of their own countries.
Where Israeli requests are made to our own authorities, we shall surrender the 
type and amount of material that can serve, by documenting crimes committed 
against a significant share of current Israeli citizens, as procedural enforceable evi-
dence, with a view to implementing capital punishment.
5./ The problem of responding to previous Israeli requests
In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Israeli foreign representations have 
expressed an interest in whether or not the competent authorities can offer assistance 
to the Israeli state prosecutor in collecting documentary evidence. Having regard to 
the above, the following official response may be given to such requests, which have 
not yet been made official in the literal sense.
As far as Eichmann is concerned, the Declaration of the Allied and associated 
powers is valid, according to which war criminals are responsible for the crimes where 
they committed them. Since, however, there are many people currently living in Israel 
as Israeli citizens, against whom Eichmann directly or indirectly committed capital 
crimes, the partial jurisdiction of the Israeli justice bodies should be recognised for 
those of Eichmann’s crimes that were committed, directly or indirectly, against current 
Israeli citizens. Thus, our justice authorities will be prepared to surrender documentary 
evidence pertaining to the jurisdiction, if they receive official requests in such a matter. 
Official requests must state the questions of the Israeli justice bodies, concerning which 
they wish to present an indictment. Knowing the specific questions, we shall provide 
the information and documentary evidence as we are able to and to the best of our 
knowledge. After this has been submitted and the indictment has been made, we shall 
ask that our justice bodies be informed of the bill of indictment so that, if necessary, we 
can provide further possible evidence. Meanwhile, we shall ask that the lawsuit be held 
in public, so that the state prosecutor’s observer can be present at the trial.
6./ Agreement on our procedure
Once we have clarified the aforementioned basic issues and reached an agree-
ment, we should draw up plans for diplomatic measures on the one hand and gradual 
propaganda activities on the other. We should then make these known to each other 
and, within a consultative framework that is to be established later, we should try to 
achieve full co-ordination.
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5 Official Request of the Legation of Israel
21 July 1960
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-3-1-j-Izrael-30/c-005022-1960
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
[Original English-language document reproduced here without amendment – AK.]
Legation d’Israel
4326/60
The Legation of Israel presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
the Hungarian People’s Republic and – upon the instructions received from its Gov-
ernment – has the honour to make application for the kind assistance and co-opera-
tion of the Hungarian authorities in the following matter: 
The judicial authorities of the State of Israel are instituting criminal prosecution 
against the notorious war criminal Adolf EICHMANN, who is at present detained in 
custody in Israel. Adolf EICHMANN has been charged under the laws of the State 
of Israel and has been remanded by order of a Magistrate’s Court, pending his trial 
under the provisions of the 
Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 5710 (1950). 
A Special Bureau of the Israel Police Force has been established to investigate and 
prepare the case for trial. This Bureau is now engaged in gathering, recording, perus-
ing, analysing and classifying all available and obtainable evidence, relevant to the 
charges brought. 
The war criminal Adolf EICHMANN, over a period of several months during the 
war years 1944/45, conducted his activities, aimed at what was called the “Final Solu-
tion of the Jewish Problem” in Hungary. He was personally responsible for initiat-
ing, organising and carrying out the deportation of several hundreds of thousands 
of Jews from Hungary and for their subsequent brutal and bestial annihilation in the 
notorious “extermination camps”. Hence, it must be presumed that a considerable 
amount of important direct and factual evidence – testimonies and documents – may 
be obtained in this country, evidence which would support the case against one of the 
greatest war criminals in history.
The Government of Israel is, therefore, most anxious to enlist the support and 
co-operation of the Hungarian authorities in its quest to secure all available informa-
tion, testimonies of witnesses and material documentary evidence, such as: originals 
or authenticated copies of documents issued, at the time, by EICHMANN, his Special 
Department or his accomplices and representatives who acted on his orders; proto-
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cols, records and copies of judgments delivered by Hungarian Courts, which implicate 
EICHMANN or his accomplices; photographs, photostatic copies, documentary films 
and, generally, any such relevant material which could be gathered or recorded in 
Hungary.
With a view to advancing and facilitating the ramified process of investigation of 
this unique criminal case, it is also proposed that the head of the Special Bureau of the 
Israel Police Force, or his representative, should be permitted to come to Hungary, so 
as to enable him – with the co-operation and aid of the competent Hungarian authori-
ties – to examine on the spot the available information and documents bearing on this 
case and decide on its value for use in evidence at the impending trial of EICHMANN. 
The Government of Israel feels confident that the Revolutionary Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic will accede to this request 
and that it will authorise the respective Hungarian authorities to place all the avail-
able information and evidence pertaining to the criminal case against Adolf EICH-
MANN at the disposal of the Police and judicial authorities of the State of Israel. The 
Government of Israel should, furthermore, deem it a favour if a representative of the 
Israel Police Force would be allowed to visit Hungary in connection with the investi-
gations in progress, and if all possible facilities and co-operation in this matter would 
be extended to him. 
The Legation of Israel seizes this opportunity to reiterate to the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People’s Republic the assurances of its highest con-
sideration.
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6 Position of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of the Case of 
Eichmann
12 August 1960
National Archives of the Czech Republic, Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia (Národní Archiv, Ústřední Výbor Komunistické Strany Československa)
Collection: Antonín Novotný II, carton 109, Nr. 210–212
From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to Antonín Novotný, first Secretary of the CPCz and the President of the ČSSR, annexe 1
Dear Comrade,
Lately the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been intensively dealing with the case of 
the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann who has been recently captured by the Israeli 
espionage in Argentina, where he hid from justice. The ČSSR is naturally inter-
ested that Eichmann did not escape punishment and that his case was an impetus 
for further actions against still unpunished war criminals. It is common knowledge 
that Eichmann also committed his crimes in the territory of Czechoslovakia and a 
great number of Czechoslovak citizens fell prey to his homicidal activity. Some of the 
allied countries where Eichmann administered mass extermination of Jews, e.g. the 
Polish People’s Republic, Hungarian People’s Republic, the Soviet Union, German 
Democratic Republic and Rumanian People’s Republic, have a similar interest as the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 
The Eichmann case has aroused a considerable response on the part of world 
public and brought forth the issue of pursuit of war criminals and fulfilment of the 
Alliance treaties about their punishment. According to the Alliance treaties from the 
Second World War, particularly in accordance with the Moscow Declaration of the 
three major Allied powers from 1st November 1943, Nazi war criminals should be “sent 
back to the countries in which they committed their outrageous acts to be judged and 
punished there according to the law of these liberated countries”. It is evident that, 
according to the principles of punishment of war criminals, primarily the countries on 
whose territory and against whose citizens Eichmann committed his crimes have the 
right of criminal prosecution and punishment of this war criminal. 
In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been meticulously dealing with 
the question of what position the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic should take on the 
fact that Eichmann is actually in the hands of the Israeli organs and is to be tried by an 
Israeli court. From legal point of view, an Israeli court cannot be authorised to judge 
Eichmann’s crimes. An explicit recognition of Israeli court’s authority on the part of 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and other Socialist states might be considered as 
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sanctioning the concept that Israel has been systematically exercising, i.e., that Israel 
as a Jewish state has the right to act in the name of all Jews regardless of their citizen-
ship. [Highlighted in the original by Novotný – AK.]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs works on the assumption that the basic political 
directive for the procedure of the ČSSR in the Eichmann case should be, on the one 
hand, the quest for consistent revelation of Eichmann’s crimes and their punishment, 
as well as the revelation of links between the Eichmann case and the politics of hiding 
and support of war criminals exercised by the ruling circles of the German Federal 
Republic; on the other, the principle that the ČSSR should not take any action, which 
would mean our recognition of Israel’s claim to try Eichmann for the crimes on Euro-
pean Jews. [Highlighted in the original by Novotný – AK.]
Working on this assumption, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so far has not 
answered Israel’s request that the chairman of the Israeli committee for investigation 
of Eichmann’s crimes be sent to the ČSSR and that the Czechoslovak official places 
provide the Israeli organs with co-operation when collecting evidential material 
against this criminal. In a similar vein, as we know, the Hungarian People’s Republic 
and the Polish People’s Republic responded to the Israeli claim. 
In order to ensure concordant procedure of the Socialist states in the Eichmann 
case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow 
has inquired about the position of the Soviet organs on the possible actions that 
would be taken by the Socialist states. In this context we primarily pointed to two 
basic alternatives that present themselves in determining our position:
a) To work on the actual fact that Eichmann is in the effective possession of the 
Israeli organs and most probably will also be tried in Israel, and to avoid any kind 
of steps that would mean explicit recognition of Israel’s right to judge him. At 
the same time, however, to allow that selected evidential documents about Eich-
mann’s crimes, available in the ČSSR, reach the Israeli court through unofficial 
means, e.g. through the Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters. Thereby, we would give 
weight to accusations against Eichmann and by a simultaneous release of the 
documents, we would withstand possible attempts at their concealment, distor-
tion and suppression at the trial. 
b) To ask Israel for Eichmann’s extradition to try him in the ČSSR or another Social-
ist country. It is, of course, necessary to reckon that Israel would not extradite 
Eichmann. Even if our claim would not be satisfied by Israel, we would thereby 
prove our determination to pursue war criminals from the period of the Second 
World War and consistently actualise the Allies’ agreements about their punish-
ment. This way would, however, bring certain danger and disadvantages. By our 
claim, we would, in fact, support Eichmann’s defence, which will probably be 
based particularly on a plea to the Israeli jurisdiction, furthermore, we might 
provoke a similar claim from the German Federal Republic or another capitalist 
state and thus allow Israel to manoeuvre for the purpose of winning advantages. 
Besides, after rejection of our extradition claim, we would logically be obliged to 
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take the position that Eichmann’s condemnation is illegal, which would be com-
pletely inappropriate. 
During the time when the Czechoslovak Embassy was sounding out the Soviet posi-
tion, a number of bearings were not yet known and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was inclined to the second alternative, i.e., to the claim of Eichmann’s extradition. 
The Soviet comrades promised to promptly study our considerations and inform us 
of their opinion. 
In the meantime, the MFA has been informed about the position of the govern-
ments of the Polish Socialist Republic and the Hungarian People’s Republic on the 
Eichmann case. 
According to the Polish comrades, the PPR does not intend to ask for Eichmann’s 
extradition as there is not the slightest prospect of success, also because such a pro-
cedure would mean taking part in the conflict between Argentina and Israel – and 
because such a claim might currently stimulate a competitive claim by the German 
Federal Republic, which is undesirable. Nevertheless, the Polish Socialist Republic 
has been collecting documents on Eichmann and his crimes, especially his fellow 
workers nowadays active in the German Federal Republic. The PSR is, however, 
avoiding any steps in the Eichmann case that would be binding in the future. Later 
on, the PSR intends to hand the collected materials over to Israel, while publishing 
them simultaneously, and at the same time informing the Israeli government that the 
PPR stipulates to undertake every necessary step against Eichmann in relation to his 
crimes against Polish citizens. 
Recently, the Ambassador of the Hungarian People’s Republic in Prague informed 
us that the Hungarian organs have also been dealing with the question of what posi-
tion to adopt on the fact that Eichmann is going to be tried in Israel. At the same time, 
he submitted a document, from which the considerations of the Hungarian comrades 
are evident (a translation is enclosed). The Hungarian comrades have been dealing 
with the question of a possible request for Eichmann’s extradition. They see political 
advantages in the extradition request, although at present they do not consider sub-
mitting such a request to be appropriate. They think the extradition claim should not 
be submitted to Israel before examination of this criminal is finished. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs finds disadvantages in such a procedure, as it does not entirely appro-
priately solve the question of what position to take on the repeated Israeli requests for 
providing documents until the time when Eichmann would potentially be claimed. 
Similarly, the Hungarian comrades point to the impropriety of recognising the legiti-
macy of the Israeli court and, at the same time, they mention the danger that might 
arise from our negative position on Israeli requests for material on Eichmann. They 
find a way out of the situation in the concept of admitting the partial authority of the 
Israeli court as far as concerns Eichmann’s crimes committed on people who became 
Israeli citizens, or on their relatives. As for providing the Israeli organs with docu-
ments, the Hungarian comrades do not have any objections to the Israeli court receiv-
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ing from Hungary such evidential means that are necessary for proving the Eich-
mann’s guilt for crimes against the present-day Israeli citizens. Therefore, they plan to 
answer the Israeli government’s request for documents applying to Eichmann and the 
Allied conventions on judging war criminals. Here, a partial legitimacy of the Israeli 
court can be acknowledged and therefore the Hungarian organs are willing to deliver 
such material which does not fall out of the remit of this partial legitimacy. In return, 
the Hungarian organs are going to stipulate that the Israeli investigation bodies hand 
over to the Hungarian People’s Republic the prosecution file against Eichmann and 
allow the presence of the Hungarian prosecutor’s office observer during the trial. 
The Hungarian concept of the partial legitimacy of the Israeli court does not have, 
according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opinion, a legal justification. Regardless 
of the legal side of the matter, this conception is running into difficulties in the sense 
that Eichmann’s crimes are virtually impossible to divide along the citizenship of his 
victims, because Eichmann’s major responsibility lies in his directive role =in the 
extermination of the European Jewish population as a whole. The MFA concludes 
that it is not so necessary to go into the negotiations with the Israeli government as 
far as the document of the HPR suggests, and that it is sufficient to unofficially deliver 
evidential material to the Israeli court without taking an explicit position on its legiti-
macy. This does not mean that in individual cases it is not possible to provide the 
ordinary co-operation of the state organs (e.g. courts when questioning the witnesses, 
authenticating various documents), although in principle it would be appropriate to 
stick to delivering material in an unofficial way, e.g. by the means of social organisa-
tions and the like. 
Finally, the Hungarian comrades suggest that all steps of the Socialist countries 
in the Eichmann case should be coordinated with collective consultation. 
The MFA agrees with the above objections, and with the HPR’s proposals, and 
finds it particularly useful to actualise consultations with the Socialist countries, 
where all aspects of the matter would be considered and other possible solutions 
also taken into consideration; therefore the MFA is going to respond positively to the 
HPR’s proposal to organise a joint session of the Socialist countries. At the session or 
at other bilateral consultations, the MFA intends to move the focus of its considera-
tions to the alternative, which, for the time being, does not involve the request for 
Eichmann’s extradition. This would allow for such a form of unofficial involvement of 
the ČSSR in Eichmann’s trial in Israel that would not imply explicit recognition of the 
Israeli court’s legitimacy on the part of the Czechoslovak government, but would une-
quivocally attest to our readiness to contribute in a due measure to the revelation of 
Eichmann’s crimes and his appropriate punishment. Nevertheless, we do not exclude 
bestowal of evidential material and testimonies by request at the Czechoslovak courts 
and participation of an unofficial Czechoslovak observer at the Eichmann’s trial. This 
position corresponds, according to the MFA’s opinion, to the current state of affairs 
and probably to the future procedure of all Socialist countries as well. Therefore, the 
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MFA is going to employ this position at further consultations with befriended coun-
tries.




Comrade Dr Antonín Grygar, First Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
10.9.1960
Dear Comrade,
Regarding the proposed procedure in submitting evidential material on Eichmann 
that you mentioned in your letter of 7th September, I recommend to keep the original 
directive and, on principle, not to consider handing documents on Eichmann over to 
Israel, not even unofficially through the Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters. 
However, it would be purposeful to prepare photocopies of the documents which 
would then be published at a press conference, so that they were available for press 
representatives as well as anyone else, hence possibly also for the Israeli organs if 
they show their interest.
With comradely regards,
Koucký
102   II The Eichmann Affair
7 On Co-Operation with Israel
29 September 1960
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-Izrael-30/c-00850-1960 (11.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
Completed in 24 copies
Copy no. 000001
From: HSWP CC Foreign Affairs Department and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Motion
To the Political Committee of the HSWP CC
Subject: Eichmann Case
I
Based on the resolution of the Political Committee of the HSWP CC, adopted on 28 
June 1960 and concerning the Eichmann case, we consulted with the friendly coun-
tries involved and requested clarification of the following matters:
1. Development of a uniform position on the jurisdiction of the Israeli court
2. Shall we accept the Israeli request that we should provide them with material for 
the lawsuit to be commenced against Eichmann?
3. In order to further our political goal – to attack from an anti-Fascist perspective 
West-German neo-Fascism, Zionism and the Vatican (since Eichmann reached 
Argentina with the latter’s assistance) – we must consider whether we can 
achieve all this most effectively by requesting Eichmann’s extradition and by 
taking a united stand.
The basic idea of our entire campaign is that when exposing the crimes of Eichmann 
and his accomplices, attention must also be given – alongside crimes against Jews – 
to crimes committed against the movement of progressive individuals and patriots, 
thereby ensuring the anti-Fascist basis of our campaign.
As a result of consultation, we can state that all were in agreement with our polit-
ical goals, while opinions differed on two other questions, summed up by the Soviet 
comrades as follows:
1. They do not consider it expedient to request Eichmann’s extradition from Israel, 
since its rejection of such a request would diminish the prestige of the Communist 
countries.
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2. Avoiding the issue of the jurisdiction of the Israeli court, they favour the Czecho-
slovak position that documentary proof should be given to Israel by means of 
some social organ. In practice, this would take place alongside the simultaneous 
publication of the submitted material, in order to prevent Israel from hushing up 
the material it had received.
II
We have already begun collecting together the material. Based on what we have seen 
so far, the material at our disposal does not ensure, as is necessary, that our goals be 
reached; in terms of both quantity and quality, it is restricted in the main to the depor-
tations of 1944. This circumstance gives rise to a further task, namely that we should 
look for additional means of ensuring that the material can be used.
III
After preliminary semi-official inquiries, the Israeli government has now diverted 
the whole issue to the official route, and has requested in a note the submission of 
documentary evidence for the lawsuit to be launched against Eichmann. They have 
requested permission for the representative of its special investigative body to enter 
the country, for support for its operations, as well as for permission to summon Hun-
garian witnesses and to have them appear at the trial.
IV
As a consequence of these new developments, we request that the Political Commit-
tee cancel its resolution of 28 June 1960 concerning the Eichmann case. Bearing in 
mind the new situation, we suggest the following:
1. We decline to request Eichmann’s extradition, we should not mention this in any 
form.
2. We should not recognise the jurisdiction of the Israeli court; this should not be 
stated openly – we should avoid the issue. We should not acquiesce to the Israeli 
request that we permit the representative of its investigative body to enter the 
country, and we inform them that if they have any requests or questions, then our 
competent bodies will examine them.
3. If the Israelis urge us once again to submit the material, we shall inform them that 
as far as we know, a social body called the National Committee of the Hungarian 
Victims of Nazism is responsible for collecting the material and that they will 
receive the material from this body.
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4. We should maintain on-going contacts with other friendly countries in the future 
and inform them of our various measures. We should obtain further information 
about several issues that still have to be clarified – relating to the quality and 
quantity of the material that is at our disposal and to be submitted.
5. In the field of press propaganda and taking into consideration the ideas of the 
friendly countries, the following must be done:
a./ Prior to and during the lawsuit, we should ensure the appropriate publicity in 
the daily press;
b./ The social organ mentioned above should organise a press conference for 
foreign and domestic press representatives;
c./ We should publish a book under their publication, which should contain the 
material that has already been submitted;
d./ […] We should publish a brochure of documentary evidence, if possible in 
Israel, under the name of a publisher there;
e./ Finally, in a publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we should publish 
documents exposing the above-mentioned connections [of the case with FRG, 
Zionism and the Vatican – AK], and this should also take the form of a book.
6. We should continue collecting material, in view of the one-sidedness of existing 
material. For this purpose
a./ We should ask to view the material of friendly countries in our search for sup-
plementary material relating to Hungary. The Polish comrades have already 
responded positively;
b./ With the help of the Ministry of Interior, we should continue collecting mate-
rial in respect of material incriminating Arrow Cross members and military 
exiles classed in the same group; this area would allow us to resolve the 
one-sidedness of the material, and we could thus get closer to our goal of 
exposing West-German neo-Fascism, in light of the close connections exist-
ing among the émigré population.
7. If our work aimed at resolving the one-sidedness of the material fails, then we 
shall revise our propaganda plan as follows:
a./ We will not hold a press conference;
b./ Articles appearing in the daily press should be limited in number;
c./ We should not publish the planned documentation as a publication of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
d./ We should still publish a book, with a social body as publisher and, if possi-
ble, we should also publish a brochure in Israel, thereby ensuring the publi-
cation of the documentary evidence.
8. Using the methods below we should exert our influence to ensure that the Israeli 
bodies do not hush up the documentary proof received in the course of the lawsuit 
and that, in possession of this material, they take a stand against the current 
German leadership.
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a./ We should allow properly prepared witnesses to appear at the trial, who can 
influence the course of the trial though their statements and their questions.
b./ When the social organisation mentioned above submits the material 
demanded by the Israelis, it should ask to take part as an observer in the 
public trial to be held in the Eichmann case.
Draft resolution
The Political Committee of the HSWP CC revokes its resolution of 28 June 1960 con-
cerning the Eichmann case.
The Political Committee of the HSWP CC approves the procedure planned in con-
nection with the Eichmann case and described in the motion.
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8 On Measures to be Taken in the Eichmann Case
8 February 1961
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/2-1961 (13.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
From: 2nd Regional Department
Ferenc Esztergályos
Deputy Head of Department
To: Péter, First Deputy Min.
Puja, Deputy Minister
Várkonyi, Head of Department
Katona, Head of Department
Memorandum
On measures to be taken in the Eichmann Case
1./ To organise press conferences in the first half of March both here in Hungary and 
at our major embassies. We should organise the conference in Hungary by means of 
the National Committee of the Hungarian Victims of Nazism. We shall make material 
received from the Ministry of Interior available to the press department, as they are in 
charge of its preparation. […]
2./ At the end of March, the book by Jenő Lévai will be published in three languages 
(German, English and French) on the Eichmann case. We are already examining how 
to distribute it, and the embassies have received instructions to this effect.
3./ If the Israelis should attack us in any way, e.g. that the Communist countries are 
making a political issue out of the Eichmann case or the German question, and are 
using it to discredit the FRG – since we can count on such attacks, if this does happen, 
then we shall make public the Kasztner material, which exposes the Zionist bargain-
ing over human lives. Incidentally, we can use this for manipulation even during the 
lawsuit, depending on how the trial develops. Moreover, we have in our possession 
the original letter of the Israeli police, in which it asks the Israeli Foreign Ministry 
which material it should obtain from us, and it is full of requests concerning German 
material. We could, under certain circumstances, publish this letter, in order to prove 
that they were those who raised the understandable and logical German question. 
4./ As a more distant perspective, at the end of the lawsuit, publication of a collection 
of documents which would contain all the important documents.
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5./ An extremely urgent task is the selection, by the legation, of the person to travel 
out to the trial; due to the lack of time and space, the Israeli legation has once again 
urged the general secretary of the legation to address this tasks. 
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9 On the Kasztner Issue
10 February 1961
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/3-1961 (13.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 





Returning to the issues mentioned in your January letter, I wish to inform you that, 
for technical reasons and a consequent shortage of time, the planned book will not be 
published. There is, however, an important issue which arose during conversations 
with comrades there and which deserves serious attention in our view. The issue is 
the Kastner [sic! – AK] affair. In the course of the Eichmann lawsuit, this issue will 
arise in some form or other, and in our judgement this is the point where we will 
be able to address the contacts that existed between Eichmann – and the Nazis in 
general – and the Zionist leaders.
Some Western newspapers covering the case have recently questioned whether 
the district court in Jerusalem is in fact qualified to administer the trial. The president 
of the court is Dr Hahlevi, who has already been a judge in a case in which Eichmann 
was one of the accused. The case was a lawsuit between Dr Kasztner and a Jerusalem 
hotel owner by the name of Grünwald, during which much was said about contacts 
between Hungarian Jewish leaders and the Nazis, including Eichmann himself. At 
the time Dr Hahlevi expressed critical and morally disparaging opinions about the 
co-operation between the Jewish leaders and the Nazis, thereby causing quite a stir 
throughout Israel at the time.
These current news reports and a piece of information telling us that one of Dr 
Kasztner’s closest colleagues in Hungary, Joel Brand, is to appear in the trial as a 
defence witness, compels us to supplement our material proving Kasztner’s activities, 
so that we can react to the question in the right manner and at the right time.
We therefore ask you to promptly obtain important supplementary material; the 
comrades there will certainly be able to help you, since they mentioned this question 
in connection with the brochure, calling our attention to its importance. We require 
the following:
1./ The judgement brought in the aforementioned lawsuit, and possibly that 
somebody should view the documents for several important and characteristic 
details. Press articles and commentaries published in connection with the lawsuit. 
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(If possible, we are thinking of original newspaper issues in Hungarian or other lan-
guages; if this is not possible, then at least photocopies.)
2./ The press’s reaction to, and its commentaries on, the attempt on Dr Kasztner’s 
life. Our requirements here are similar to those indicated above. Of course, if we could 
receive reliable and publishable information about the background to the attempt on 
his life, this would increase its weight.
I request you, Comrade Chargé d’affaires, to proceed as soon as possible in this 
matter and, despite the circumstances but given the shortage of time, to send the 
material urgently.
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10 Letter of S. Mikunis, General Secretary of the Communist Party 
of Israel
Tel Aviv, 24 April 1961
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/32/1961/4
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, Foreign Affairs Department
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Politikai Bizottság]
From: HSWP CC Foreign Affairs Department [forwarded – AK]
To: The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, Central Committee
Budapest
Dear Comrades,
Concerning the Eichmann lawsuit that is just getting under way in Jerusalem, we wish 
to make the following request:
Under the special law adopted by the Israeli parliament prior to the Eichmann 
lawsuit, civil claims cannot be enforced during the trial. As a consequence, the entire 
court proceedings and the questioning of Eichmann is in the hands of Servatius, the 
West-German pro-Nazi lawyer, on the one hand, and the state prosecutor of Ben-Gu-
rion’s government on the other, especially considering the Anglo-Saxon legal proce-
dure, which restricts the court’s influence over the trial.
Although it is possible that the use of this legal practice will not prevent some 
important political issues from coming to light, it does almost without doubt exclude 
the possibility that contacts maintained with the Nazis during World War II by the 
World Zionist Movement (which now clusters round Ben-Gurion’s government), the 
Jewish Agency for Palestine and other Zionist bodies will be lambasted.
In the past, and especially in the course of the so-called Kastner [sic! – AK] trial, 
important facts came to light concerning the contacts maintained by Rudolf Kastner, 
head of the Budapest Zionist Relief Committee, with Eichmann, Becher and other 
Nazis during the final years of World War II, as well as with other criminal contacts.
There is now a possibility that a well known Israeli lawyer, who represented one 
of the participants in the Kastner trial, will succeed in achieving a renewal of the trial 
in order for Eichmann to be summoned for questioning as a witness. If this lawyer, 
incidentally a supporter of bourgeois ideology but nevertheless strongly against 
Ben-Gurion and Mapai, is able to question Eichmann as a witness in connection with 
the Kastner affair, this would be of great political significance for us, and could possi-
bly be of historical significance.
The success of the request for a renewal of the trial depends on whether we are 
able to present further documents to the Supreme Court and we have determined, at 
the request of the lawyer, to try and help him in this respect.
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We therefore ask for your fraternal assistance. As far as we know, important doc-
uments were left in Budapest after the defeat of the Nazis.
Material related to the following would be particularly interesting to us:
1./ The participation of Zionist and other reactionary Jewish organisations or 
persons in Nazi attempts to sign a separate peace with the Western powers.
2./ Negotiations held by Zionist and other reactionary Jewish organisations or 
persons with the Nazis concerning the rescue of Jewish individuals in return for 
money or automobiles that could only be used on the Eastern Front.
3./ Other relations of Zionist and other reactionary Jewish organisations or 
persons with Nazis working for Western spy agencies.
Dear Comrades, we are quite aware that the Institute does not usually send docu-
ments (or photocopies) that are still unpublished in your country to foreign countries, 
but the importance of the Eichmann case seems to be so great that an exceptional 




On behalf of the Central Committee,
Communist Party of Israel
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11 B’nai B’rith Report on Media Coverage of the Eichmann Case in 
Communist Countries
June 1961
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-30/c-0081/3-1961 (13.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium]
[Original English-language document reproduced here without amendment – AK.]
The Eichmann Case in the Mass Media of Communist Bloc Countries
The historic trial proceedings now unfolding in a Jerusalem courtroom have as their 
major purpose the demonstration to the world that prejudice towards Jews is “danger-
ous” for it can lead to the gas chambers and to genocide. Premier David Ben-Gurion 
described the object lesson of the Eichmann trial in the following way:
“We want the nations of the world to know that there was an intention to exterminate a people. 
That intention had its roots in anti-Semitism. They should know that anti-Semitism is dangerous 
and they should be ashamed of it. I believe that through this trial all thinking people will come 
to realize that in our day the gas chamber and the soap factory are what anti-Semitism may lead 
to. And they will do what they can about it.”
The largest segment of the trial proceedings focuses on the activities of the Nazi 
juggernaut in what are now the Communist countries of East Europe – on Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Soviet Union. Is the Eichmann 
case being handled in these countries in the way Israelis hoped it would be handled? 
How much attention in the mass media is being given to the case in these countries? 
How much emphasis is being placed in the mass media on the ultimate effect of 
anti-Semitism – the martyrdom of Jews?
The most immediate impression reached by a study of the mass media treatment 
of the Eichmann case in Communist bloc countries is the great variation in the cover-
age. There is, to be sure, one parallel line followed in all these countries and which 
can be expressed in this way: Eichmann symbolizes not only the Hitler era but also 
many of the present leading elements in the Federal Republic of Germany. But, aside 
from this common approach, each Communist bloc country handles the Eichmann 
case quite differently with reference to both the extent and the character of its cover-
age. Indeed, the common line itself is considerably affected by the different approach 
used by each country.
The Soviet Union
The press treatment of the Eichmann case in the Soviet Union prior to the opening of 
the trial on April 11 was marked by 1) relative paucity; 2) an emphasis upon an alleged 
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relationship between Eichmann’s crimes and present-day rulers of West Germany; 
and 3) a general minimization of Eichmann’s crimes against Jews as compared with 
his crimes against people generally. These features continued after the trial began.
On May 25, 1960, the Soviet journal SOVETSKAIA ROSSIIA – the day after the 
announcement of the capture of Eichmann – carried a brief news item of the event. 
Then for a period of an entire week, while the Eichmann case was the principal topic 
of discussion in the international press, Soviet newspapers maintained a black-out of 
news on the matter.
The silence was finally broken on June 1 by PRAVDA in a short news dispatch 
from Athens quoting sources in Bonn to the effect that the West German Government 
was worried that Israel’s determination to try Eichmann would increase anti-German 
feelings and that Konrad Adenauer had written to Ben-Gurion requesting him not to 
give wide publicity to the case. The PRAVDA article established the official Soviet line 
on the Eichmann case.
Six days later, the Moscow evening newspaper, VECHERNAIA MOSKVA, published 
the first substantial Soviet account on Eichmann. A lengthy description of Eichmann 
as “one of the most blood-thirsty hangmen of fascist Germany” was accompanied by 
an accusation that Adenauer was sympathetic to Nazism and permitted “yesterday’s 
assistants of Hitler, Himmler and Kaltenbrunner” to occupy leading posts in the Gov-
ernment, Army, and judiciary of West Germany.
On June 14, a long article in LITERATURNAIA GAZETA used the Eichmann case to 
attack West Germany as a place where “quite a number of war criminals are hiding” 
and where “the ruling circles of the Western Powers” were “encouraging” fascist 
political activity. The article charged that West Germany was fearful of the revela-
tions that might flow from the Eichmann trial and that Adenauer had sought to obtain 
Eichmann’s extradition both by appealing to Ben-Gurion and by seeking intervention 
in Washington.
In none of the above accounts was there more than passing reference to Eich-
mann’s crimes against specifically Jews. In the lengthy VECHERNAIA MOSKVA 
article, for example, no mention was made of Jews. Instead it spoke of “six million 
shot, burned in gas chambers.” The article did give Eichmann’s official title as “Head 
of the Bureau for the Solution of the Jewish Question.”
A brief spurt of press attention to the Eichmann case came in the latter part of 
June, 1960, during the course of the United Nations Security Council discussions of 
the Argentine complaint against Israel. PRAVDA on June 24 and TRUD on June 25 gave 
prominence to the speeches of both its Delegate to the Security Council and Golda 
Meir, Israel’s Foreign Minister. The press made it clear that the Soviet Union was in 
favour of the right of Israel to try Eichmann and criticized Argentina for failing to 
arrest and extradite war criminals.
In August, 1960, one Soviet organ appeared to depart to some extent from the pre-
vious line insofar as references to Jews were concerned. NEW TIMES, a semi-official 
foreign affairs publication, carried a lengthy story on Eichmann describing in some 
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detail his “butchery” of Jews. While genocide of Jews was the major object of descrip-
tion and criticism, and Israel’s capture of Eichmann was sympathetically portrayed, 
the article also took the occasion to attack West Germany. It expressed the view that 
the trial “could bring disclosures that would compromise many big-wigs in Bonn” 
and, for that reason, West Germany’s politicians were “very much perturbed by it.”
NEW TIMES is, however, not a mass circulation journal and its article did not 
signal a new approach to the Eichmann case. Earlier issues of NEW TIMES had sug-
gested that Israeli authorities, under the pressure of West Germany and the United 
States, were attempting “to go easy” and “to play down” the Eichmann trial. West 
Germany – it was argued – was fearful of incriminating evidence against some of its 
leading politicians; and the United States was fearful of the same thing, as well as 
concerned that revelations about Eichmann’s passport would hurt the Vatican. After 
the summer of 1960, references to the Eichmann case did not appear in the Soviet 
press.
Two weeks prior to the opening of the Eichmann trial PRAVDA reported upon 
the publication in Russia of a new 7-volume edition of the Nuremberg Trials which 
the reviewer described as revealing the “ghastly, unheard-of, thoroughly planned 
and meticulously executed felonies aimed at the enslavement and extermination of 
peoples....” Those who may have regarded the publication of the massive work on 
Nuremberg as an indication of a fulsome press treatment of the Eichmann case were 
to be sadly disappointed. The political line of the Soviet Government to play down 
Jewish martyrdom and to play up current West German fascism was transcendent [sic! 
– transparent – AK]. In keeping with this objective, PRAVDA on April 8 – three days 
before the opening of the trial – used the Eichmann case as a peg for a wide-ranging 
attack upon West Germany’s leaders and particularly the newly appointed Inspec-
tor-General of the Army, Friedrich Foertsch, whom PRAVDA called a “war criminal.” 
From the point of view of the Communist organ, some Bonn leaders are “feeling a 
chill” because “maybe Eichmann will say too much.” It went on:
“After all, there is abundant evidence indicating a direct connection between Eichmann’s past 
actions and the occupations of Hans Globke, the Federal Chancellor’s present State Secretary ... 
Eichmann probably could tell something as well about other Nazis for whom Bonn has found 
comfortable jobs.”
In the course of this lengthy article, not once did the word “Jew” appear. Eichmann 
is identified as the “killer of millions” or as one “who exterminated millions of men, 
women, and children in the furnaces of ...Hitlerite death camps.”
The opening of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem on April 11 was marked in the 
Soviet press by a black-out of news. Neither PRAVDA nor IZVESTIA on that day 
carried any reference to the historic occasion. (The day before, PRAVDA carried a 
short item from Tel-Aviv reporting that a group of “fighters against Fascism” in Israel 
had demanded that the “Eichmann trial must become a trial of Nazism” and that the 
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group had carried placards reading: “Bring to trial the collaborators of Eichmann-
Globke and Oberlaender.”) On April 12, IZVESTIA had an item, almost completely 
buried, announcing that the trial had begun.
If the press was silent, Radio Moscow began developing a new line, the basic ele-
ments of which had but been only hinted at earlier. The line suggested that a conspir-
acy existed to prevent disclosure of the true facts about Nazism in new West Germany. 
In a broadcast on April 11, Radio Moscow noted the presence at the trial of a large 
West German press and observer delegation. It also noted that Eichmann’s defense 
attorney is Robert Servatius, whose “political complexion” is shown by his zealous 
defense at Nuremberg of Fritz Sauckel, “the chief of Nazi concentration camps.” The 
broadcast stated that Servatius and the Bonn delegation were in Jerusalem “to fulfil 
the assignment of the West German Government to prevent the Eichmann trial from 
turning into a trial of Nazism and to prevent the publication of testimony on the past 
of a number of Nazi criminals, such as Globke, who now hold high Government posts 
in the Bonn Republic.” A radio commentator darkly hinted that there existed some 
kind of “secret understanding” between Bonn and Tel Aviv, the precise nature of 
which was not disclosed.
During the next two and one-half weeks, PRAVDA carried no reference to the 
Eichmann trial while IZVESTIA had one short item quoting an Italian newspaper ref-
erence to a “deal” between Bonn and Israel. No doubt Soviet leaders were waiting to 
see whether the Israeli prosecutors would provide the hoped-for disclosures of con-
nections between Eichmann and Bonn leaders. When none appeared, the press was 
prepared to reveal the details of the “secret understanding.” On April 28, PRAVDA 
charged that “the Israeli Government, to satisfy West Germany’s ruling circles, have 
made a deal with the revanchist circles of the F.G.R. and is trying to protect other 
Hitlerite criminals from exposure.” PRAVDA contended that as far back as July 1960, 
Ben-Gurion, after meeting with a representative of the Bonn Government in Brus-
sels, “issued a directive to abridge the publication of the investigation materials in 
the Eichmann case and to acquaint the F.G.R. Government ahead of time with these 
materials.” PRAVDA criticized Israel for making possible the appointment as Defense 
Attorney of Servatius, who is “virtually an official representative of numerous fas-
cists” living in West Germany.
According to PRAVDA, Servatius is being used by “the ruling circles of Bonn ... 
to exert pressure simultaneously on Eichmann himself and on the court agencies of 
Israel ... to conceal instances of criminal activity by former Nazis.” The Communist 
organ reproved the Israel prosecution for the “noticeable silence... about the past 
and present” of Eichmann’s “partners in crime” – Oberlander, Schroeder (Minister of 
Interior in the Bonn Government), Foertsch, General Hans Speidel, and even Defense 
Minister F. Strauss. But if PRAVDA expressed “concern” about the “marked tendency 
on the part of Israel’s ruling circles” to avoid a “genuine exposure of the bloody crimes 
of the Hitlerite butchers,” the Party organ expressed the hope that the masses within 
and without Israel would compel the prosecution to make “a proper exposure of all 
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those Nazi war criminals” so that the trial does not become “a simple farce in the 
interest of the dark forces of revanchism.”
Following the PRAVDA blast, Soviet newspapers retreated to the black-out tech-
nique. Since April 28, not a single line about the trial has appeared in PRAVDA. 
(IZVESTIA has carried one brief story.) Radio Moscow has not been completely 
silent, however. On a few occasions, in early May, it reiterated the charge of collu-
sion between Israel and Bonn to prevent revelations concerning other Nazi criminals. 
A significant departure came on May 3, when Radio Moscow carried a rather long 
passage from a France-Presse dispatch concerning accounts of witnesses describing 
Nazi atrocities in Poland.
During the third week in May, Radio Moscow shifted to a more favourable 
approach to the trial proceedings – a shift that may shortly be reflected in the press 
treatment. A commentator noted that “six million human lives are on the conscience 
of the former head of the Jewish Department of the Gestapo to Hitlerite Germany.” 
More significantly, the commentator averred that while Bonn and Israel had initially 
arranged a “deal” to prevent exposure of “former Nazis now in power,” this arrange-
ment has proved to be “very difficult” to implement. The commentator noted that 
Israelis understand that Eichmann “could not operate alone” and that he needed 
such accomplices as Globke, “the interpreter of the notorious Nuremberg Laws ... 
the theoretical basis of the mass extermination of Jews.” And if the “deal” was ini-
tially meant to shield Globke, reference to him had to be brought out and was, in fact, 
brought out in the trial proceedings.
Obviously delighted by the reference to Globke in the trial (on May 12, Globke’s 
name was mentioned in one of the documents submitted by the Prosecution), the 
Radio Moscow commentator went on to say that “the crimes being revealed at the trial 
are arousing the wrath and indignation of the world public.”
Radio Moscow also displayed a strong interest in the “revelations” of Dr Grego-
rio Topolevsky, former Argentine Ambassador to Israel. His “disclosures” about the 
hiding of Martin Bormann and Dr. Joseph Mengele in Latin American countries were 
carried on May 19 in a special half-hour telephone interview over Radio Moscow. Dr 
Topolevsky was also asked to come to Moscow next month to give his impressions of 
the Eichmann trial.
It is clear that the “intention” of the Israelis to have the trial of Eichmann become 
an object lesson demonstrating what the ultimate results of anti-Semitism can be, 
has been, for the time being, frustrated in the Soviet Union by limited treatment and 
by an emphasis placed upon Nazi “big shots” in high places. The one gratification 
that Israel may derive from the progress of the trial is that she now no longer is being 
charged with perpetrating a “deal” with Bonn to shield Nazis in high positions.
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Poland
Press treatment of the Eichmann case in Poland stands in striking contrast to that in 
the USSR. In Poland, the trial and its preliminaries have received extensive documen-
tary reporting. Eichmann’s organization of the deportation and extermination of Jews 
was elaborated upon in considerable detail even though attention is also paid to the 
mass annihilation of non-Jewish Poles. While criticism of the current West German 
Government and its alleged links to Eichmann is to be found in press coverage, Jewish 
martyrdom is the dominant theme.
Immediately after the Eichmann capture, scores of articles and biographies of 
Eichmann as the murderer of millions of Jews appeared in the Polish press. TRYBUNA 
LUDU, the leading Party newspaper, called his capture “historic justice.” KURIER 
POLSKI carried lengthy presentations which attempted to justify, from a legal point of 
view, Israel’s right to prosecute Eichmann. The Catholic bi-weekly TYGODNIK POW-
SCHECHNE (correctly: Powszechny – AK) made this characteristic comment:
“The young State of Israel has every right to appear in the name of the whole Jewish people 
throughout the world. It is right and proper that Eichmann, who was responsible for the greatest 
crime in history, the crime against the Jewish people, should stand trial before a court of law in 
Israel.”
 In December, 1960, and January, 1961, TRYBUNA LUDU carried five lengthy stories, 
based upon original historical documentation, of the crimes of Eichmann against 
Jews and Poles. Written by Zofia Krzyzanowska, the articles blinked no facts to place 
the full horrors of the “final solution” before the Polish people. A key section read:
“Polish territories have a special place in the history of the extermination of Jews. The very first 
acts of extermination were committed on Polish Jews. In the first phase of the criminal plan the 
persecutions were directed against both the non-Jewish and Jewish population of Poland.”
Aside from a passing reference in the articles to Globke as one who “provided the 
necessary legal grounds” for Hitler’s extermination program, the overt political anti-
Bonn elements were absent. In keeping with a general program to provide the Poles 
with object lessons of anti-Semitism, the TRYBUNA LUDU stories stress Jewish mar-
tyrdom.
A modification in the approach of Poland came two weeks prior to the opening of 
the Eichmann trial in two official Polish Communist Party organs. The modification 
took the form of a greater stress upon German fascism and revanchism accompanied 
by a growing criticism of Israel and its handling of the trial. The change brought the 
Polish attitude somewhat closer to the Soviet attitude (although significant differ-
ences still remained).
POLITYKA, the Party weekly, on April 1 carried a lengthy article entitled “Process 
or Alibi”, which contended that the Eichmann trial “must be dealt with in ... broader 
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aspects, which means ... [it] must be treated, above all, within social and political 
categories.” The article argued that the crimes of Eichmann, like those of other war 
criminals, cannot be handled in the usual “courtroom” method because “no contem-
porary society has a law providing adequate sanctions against crimes of such magni-
tude as those committed by Eichmann.”
The article then pointed to the Nuremberg Trials as an illustration of how the 
crimes of an Eichmann ought to be handled. At that trial, POLITYKA stated, not only 
were individual criminals tried, but a whole system – the Nazi Party, Hitlerite organi-
zations, German militarism, the fascist ideology, German revanchism – was put on 
trial and then “condemned and sentenced.”
What the Poles wanted to see placed on trial in the Eichmann case was then sug-
gested:
“ ... the German Federal Republic where thousands of former Hitlerites today hold responsible 
positions in the State apparatus and Hitler’s former Generals command the Bundeswehr. Such 
things as glorification of the SS, conventions of war veterans, anti-Semitic incidents, and arma-
ment indicate that the ruling circles of the German Federal Republic adopt the policy of milita-
rism and revenge.”
POLITYKA, after criticizing Israel for supporting “the political line of the Bonn Gov-
ernment” and for “its great sympathy for the German Federal Republic,” went on to 
attack strongly the “sensationist” manner in which Israel and the Western press were 
treating the Eichmann case – e.g., “thriller” stories about the way Eichmann was cap-
tured, the bullet-proof cubicle in the court for Eichmann, the underground corridor 
through which Eichmann will be led from prison to the courtroom. POLITYKA spec-
ulated “whether the embellishments of such publicity are not intended to black out 
the fundamental social and political meaning of the Eichmann case” and whether 
Eichmann as a person was not “being used as a cover-screen for all those collabo-
rators and accomplices of his who should be appearing with him in the prisoner’s 
dock.” The article concluded with the strongly expressed view that the trial should 
“not become an alibi for Adenauer, Globke and Company.”
On April 2, the bi-weekly organ of the Polish Lawyers Association, PRAWO I 
ZYCIE, appeared, carrying an article accusing Israel of being a party to a secret agree-
ment with Bonn, which had as its objective the twisting of the Eichmann trial from its 
initial purpose and course. The Polish Lawyers Association’s organ first noted that 
“war criminals” occupied “high posts” in the Bonn Government and that “if the trial 
of the arch-criminal Eichmann were conducted according to its merits, it would lead 
to the incrimination of all that which now represents the more or less open continu-
ation of that kind of fascism and militarism which gave birth to such monsters as 
Eichmann.”
The article then went on to contend that Bonn circles were placing intense pres-
sures upon Israel to prevent those “former followers of Hitler who now occupy high 
posts” from being “compromised.” According to the organ of the Polish Lawyers Asso-
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ciation, these pressures have been successful: “The Israeli authorities are preparing 
Eichmann’s proceedings according to suggestions from Bonn. For instance … it was 
decided ... to expose several second-rank war criminals and to leave in peace the crim-
inals of higher calibre who occupy official posts in the German Federal Republic.”
The new approach did not alter the earlier decision to give the Eichmann trial 
extensive public attention and to emphasize Jewish martyrdom. Once the trial began, 
unlike the Soviet press, the Polish press carried almost daily and frequently lengthy 
accounts of the proceedings. Moreover, in the main, these accounts have been factual 
summaries of the arguments and testimony. However, the factual summaries have 
been at times accompanied by an editorial commentary which incorporates part of 
the new emphasis developed by the Party organs in early April. For example, the 
opening day of the trial was given a full half-page in TRYBUNA LUDU with this edito-
rial comment:
“Eichmann’s defender Servatius here assumes the added role of defender of the German Federal 
Republic. The intention of such is clear: at any cost whatsoever, Eichmann’s trial must be pre-
vented from becoming a trial of Hitlerism (and which Eichmann’s defense tries to present as 
‘something which exists no more and has disappeared from the arena of history’); and the names 
of such Hitlerite criminals such as Globke, who occupy high positions in the Bonn Government, 
must not be mentioned in the courtroom .... .”
Yet, specific criticism of Israel’s handling of the trial has not been strongly apparent 
in the newspaper accounts. Indeed, on April 14, the Polish correspondent in Jerusa-
lem reported the following:
“In spite of various machinations of Bonn people, the Eichmann proceedings may reveal the 
names of criminals who still haven’t been punished and who finally should be reached by the 
hand of justice.”
Only on April 29 did open criticism appear. TRYBUNA LUDU, in addition to its regular 
factual summary, carried a brief item quoting the East German observer at the trial, 
Dr Friedrich Kaul, who criticized the “peculiar limitations” of the presentation that 
allegedly prevented the name of Globke from being mentioned. It also carried a short 
summary of the April 28 PRAVDA article that had blasted a so-called Bonn–Ben-Gu-
rion “deal.”
Hungary
Hungarian press and radio treatment of the Eichmann case has been as impressive as 
the Polish coverage. Frequent and lengthy stories on Jewish martyrdom are character-
istic. As early as June 3 and June 5, 1960, the Communist newspaper NEPSZABADSAG 
carried long lead stories on Eichmann’s activities in Budapest, and the trade union 
journal NEPSZAVA put out a series of articles on his role in exterminating Jews.
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Beginning on January 11, 1961, and for a number of months thereafter, the Hun-
garian illustrated popular weekly magazine, ORSZAG-VILAG, ran a consecutive series 
of articles on Eichmann. Each article occupied an entire page and carried much data 
and numerous references to Eichmann’s extermination of Jews. A similar series was 
carried over Radio Kossuth in Budapest. Beginning on March 29, the station broadcast 
a daily program entitled “His Name is Adolph Eichmann.”
On March 25, the Hungarian historian, George Ranski [sic! – AK], presented to 
a press conference a detailed, comprehensive account of Eichmann’s activities and 
illustrated his lecture with photographs of original documents. He asserted that 
Eichmann was responsible for the deportation of 550,000 Hungarian Jews, of whom 
400,000 died in concentration camps. NEPSZABADSAG carried the details of the 
lecture the following day.
Hungarian press treatment of Eichmann also served the political function of pre-
senting West Germany as a haven for Eichmann’s accomplices. It played up the fear in 
West German circles that the Eichmann case may cast West Germany in an unfavour-
able light. More attention was, however, given to Austria, Hungary’s historic enemy, 
as a hiding place of war criminals. For example, the Budapest daily MAGYAR NEMZET 
on February 21 published an article on Georg Wilhelm Hoettl, whose extradition 
from Austria had been asked for by Hungary. Hoettl, the article observed, had been 
an accomplice of Eichmann in the deportation of Hungarian Jews and is currently 
shielded by Austria. A special crack was directed against Allen Dulles:
“While Dr Hoettl was described by Winkelmann as excessively ferocious in his dealings in 
Hungary, this did not prevent him from building up relations with Allen Dulles, the American 
espionage boss, then staying in Switzerland. This shows not only Hoettl’s foresight but A. Dulles’ 
flexibility.”
Since the opening of the trial, NEPSZABADSAG has, like the Polish press, carried 
daily, often lengthy, factual accounts of the proceedings. Unlike the Polish press, 
the Hungarian Communist organ has engaged in objective reporting with virtually 
no editorializing. Reference to the alleged Bonn–Israeli “deal” to hush up supposed 
interconnections between Eichmann and some Bonn leaders has not appeared. Radio 
Budapest, on the other hand, during the opening days of the trial, carried on a con-
tinuous attack on West Germany, insisting that it harbored Eichmann’s “comrades” 
in “important posts.” One radio broadcast insisted that the Eichmann trial “was at 
the same time a trial against the Bonn Government...” Notwithstanding the attacks 
upon West Germany, it is clear that in Hungary, as in Poland, the purposes of Israel in 
holding the trial are, in large measure, being realized.
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Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovak press coverage of the Eichmann case, while extensive and revealing (in 
the sense of providing additional documentation of Eichmann’s crimes against both 
Jews and Czechs) has focused principally upon alleged interconnections between 
Eichmann and high West German officials. Also singled out for charges by the press 
are alleged connections between the Vatican and war criminals.
On May 28, 1960, the Czechoslovak Communist organ, RUDE PRAVO, reporting 
on Eichmann’s arrest, charged that Bonn authorities had tried to suppress evidence 
of Eichmann’s crimes as well as the crimes of other former Nazi leaders who alleg-
edly occupy high positions in the Bonn Government. Three days later, the newspa-
per accused Eichmann of murdering five million German, Austrian, Polish, Czech, 
Slovak, and Hungarian Jews, and added that many leading Bonn officials will prob-
ably be involved in the Eichmann trial.
On June 3, 1960, RUDE PRAVO, taking note of the fact that Eichmann had obtained 
a Vatican passport before fleeing to Argentina, contended that the Catholic hierarchy 
had been influenced by “Adenauer’s and Franco’s regimes” and that it feared that 
Eichmann’s revelations might “disclose the World War II collaboration between the 
Catholic clergy and anti-Jewish Nazi and Fascist authorities.”
In November, the Communist newspaper described an exposition of documents 
on Eichmann’s crimes in Czechoslovakia which attempted to show that he was per-
sonally responsible for the extermination of 360,000 Czechoslovak citizens, includ-
ing 200,000 Jews. The February 1, 1961, issue published documentary evidence of the 
deportation by Eichmann of children from Lidice to Poland, and on February 20, it 
described, with photographs, the details of Eichmann’s crimes against Jewish inmates 
of concentration camps. The latter article also took the occasion to note that “there 
are many Eichmanns, Globkes, and Oberlaenders in present-day West Germany” who 
deserve punishment.
One week before the trial opened, the Czech Party organ adopted the line toward 
Israel that the Polish Party organs had taken a little earlier. RUDE PRAVO on April 
4 criticized Ben-Gurion’s statement that Eichmann’s trial would not impair Israeli–
West German relations and concluded from it that “efforts aimed at preventing the 
unmasking of former Nazi criminals who occupy responsible posts in Adenauer’s 
Government are now becoming more transparent.” The Czech organ insisted that 
“Bonn’s State apparatus is more than saturated with Nazis of Globke’s kind.”
On the day the trial opened, RUDE PRAVO returned to a violent attack on West 
Germany, and contended that Eichmann’s trial must bring evidence “incriminating 
accomplices in Eichmann’s crimes, many of whom ... occupy prominent posts in the 
German Federal Republic.” An Israel–Bonn “deal” was hinted at: “But some facts 
indicate that another course has been set for the trial.” The hint was not further devel-
oped in the later reporting of the trial.
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The Czech Communist press, like the Polish and Hungarian press, gave the trial 
frequent and considerable coverage. However, unlike the press in the latter coun-
tries, both RUDE PRAVO and the organ of the Slovak Communist Party in Bratislava, 
PRAVDA, provided little factual reporting and, instead, carried on a running editorial 
campaign against Servatius as the “defender of Nazism,” and against Globke and the 
West German Government. If anything, PRAVDA was even more violent in its castiga-
tions than RUDE PRAVO. Radio Prague and Radio Bratislava treated the trial in the 
same tendentious manner.
Bulgaria
The news media of Bulgaria have maintained an almost complete silence on the 
Eichmann case. Prior to the trial, two very brief references to Eichmann appeared 
in RABOTNICHESKO DELO, the Party organ. On February 3, a short dispatch from 
London reported that Eichmann would be tried in Israel for the mass killings of Jews 
in 21 European countries. The March 11 issue of the newspaper reported on the uneas-
iness felt by Adenauer concerning the possible negative effects of Eichmann’s trial 
upon the attitude of world opinion towards Bonn.
Reportage of the trial itself by the Bulgarian Communist press has been incon-
sequential. On April 12, RABOTNICHESKO DELO carried a short factual report on 
the trial’s opening. A second report came on April 24 which, while mainly factual, 
concluded with a complaint against the Israel press and not, significantly, against 
the Israeli Government. The Israeli press was accused of abstaining “from the slight-
est reference to a subject undoubtedly related to the trial, namely to the bonds con-
necting Adenauer’s policy with that of his predecessor Hitler.” Three days later, the 
Bulgarian organ carried a largely editorial attack upon West Germany for harboring 
former Nazi criminals in high positions.
Rumania
Like Bulgaria, Rumania has given the Eichmann case little attention. Whatever treat-
ment she has given has been much more anti-German and anti-Israel than Bulgaria. 
Prior to the trial, the Rumanian News Service mentioned the Eichmann case but once, 
and this took the form of a violent attack upon the Israel Government. On March 22, 
Radio Bucharest broadcast a news item from Tel Aviv citing an Israeli newspaper as 
saying that “the Israeli Government has advised Chancellor Adenauer that it wants to 
prevent the trial of the war criminal Eichmann from influencing adversely relations 
between Israel and the German Federal Republic.” The broadcast commented: “Cov-
ering up Hitlerite murderers who exterminated millions of Jews – that is what preoc-
cupies the mind of influential circles in Israel and in the German Federal Republic.”
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The limited Rumania mass media treatment was continued after the trial an had 
begun. For the first few days of the trial, no stories on the proceedings appeared in 
the main Rumanian Communist organ, SCINTEIA. However, Radio Bucharest on April 
11, did carry a short broadcast attacking West Germany and charged that Globke had 
made available a “special fund” to pay for the services of Servatius. Again on the 13th, 
it returned to an attack on West Germany, this time alleging that Servatius “acting 
under the influence of the Western German leading circles, has tried to convince Eich-
mann not to reveal his accomplices ... .” Lesser newspapers in the capital – MUNCA, 
the organ of the trade unions, and ROMINIA LIBERA, the organ of the People’s Coun-
cils – carried similar comments.
SCINTEIA, on April 15, finally carried a short factual account of the trial and a 
week later carried another one – a strongly opinionated report emphasizing that 
Globke and “many other war criminals who occupy high posts in West Germany” 
should be tried with Eichmann.
The theme of a Bonn–Israel “deal” to suppress testimony on high German offi-
cials was played by ROMINIA LIBERA on April 16, and was the subject of broadcasts 
by Radio Bucharest on April 25 and May 2.
***
It is apparent that the objective which the Israel Government set for itself in placing 
Eichmann on trial is being achieved in only Poland and Hungary and, to a much 
lesser extent, in Czechoslovakia. In Rumania and Bulgaria, the Israeli objective is 
hardly being realized at all. The objective is but partly being realized in the USSR. 
Why? How are the differences in the mass media treatment of the Eichmann case by 
the Communist bloc countries to be explained?
Certainly, such internal factors as the size of the Jewish population in each 
country has no consequential effect upon the extent and character of the press cover-
age (as it probably does in the West). Poland has a relatively small Jewish population 
– approximately 30,000. Yet its mass media provides extensive coverage and high-
lights Jewish martyrdom. Rumania has a relatively large Jewish population – approxi-
mately 150,000. Its coverage is extremely limited and plays down Jewish martyrdom. 
The Soviet Union embraces some 3 million Jews and is the second largest Jewish com-
munity in the world. The extent of its coverage is much less than that of either Poland 
or Hungary or Czechoslovakia, but much greater than either Rumania or Bulgaria.
The particular attitude of the Government of each individual Communist bloc 
country toward its own Jewish community also does not appear to affect the extent 
and character of its coverage. Bulgaria, for example, practices a relatively high degree 
of tolerance toward its small Jewish minority of six thousand, permitting it 1) a cen-
tralized religious structure; 2) opportunities to use Yiddish as a medium of its culture; 
and 3) the right to emigrate to Israel. Yet, Bulgaria’s treatment of the Eichmann case 
is minimal. The Soviet Union does not permit its Jewish minorities any of the above 
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rights (and, in that respect, is unique in the European Communist world). However, 
its coverage of the Eichmann case is far greater than that of Bulgaria.
Analysis suggests that external considerations are controlling factors in the deci-
sion of each Communist bloc country in handling the Eichmann case.14 One consid-
eration that is immediately apparent is the degree of concern felt by each toward West 
Germany’s potential expansionist objectives. Poland and Czechoslovakia are imme-
diately and directly concerned with West German revanchism. Poland has fears of the 
pronounced aim of Bonn leaders to retake the former Prussian area east of the Oder-
Neisse line and Czechoslovakia fears the ambitions of German emigré groups from 
Sudetenland. In their press coverage of the Eichmann case, both link evidences of the 
recrudescence of German Nazism with militarism and revanchism.
Hungary, too, must be concerned with the possibility of West German revanchism 
for future efforts to recoup former German territory in East Europe would directly 
affect the security of Hungarian Communist rule in Central Europe. At the same time, 
Hungarian Communist leaders look upon its old historic enemy, Austria, as a possible 
spearhead of a rejuvenated German expansionist program. Thus, unlike any of the 
other Communist bloc countries, Hungary in its mass media coverage attempts to link 
Eichmann to fascist elements living in Austria and “protected” by Austrian rulers.
The foreign policy of both Rumania and Bulgaria is, of course, much less con-
cerned with the distant West German state, The orbit of their foreign policy concerns 
lies in southeast Europe. Thus, their interest in the Eichmann trial is much less.
The USSR is, of course, vitally concerned with the possibility of West German 
revanchism. There is the need to protect the former German territory of Koenigsberg, 
acquired after the war. More importantly, the entire structure of the satellite system 
built up so meticulously after the war as a security belt for the Soviet Union would 
come tumbling down if successful thrusts toward Polish or Czech territory were ever 
made by West Germany. Thus, the Soviet Union does deal with the Eichmann case to 
a far greater degree than either Bulgaria or Rumania. Yet, the extent of its treatment 
is much less than that provided by the mass media of Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Why?
The answer to that question is to be found in a second consideration which oper-
ates as a controlling factor in affecting the decision of Communist bloc countries on 
how to treat the Eichmann case. This consideration involves the degree of hostility 
(or, conversely, the degree of friendliness) to Israel on the part of each Communist 
bloc country. It is clear that any extensive treatment of the Eichmann case and, par-
ticularly, any treatment which stressed the martyrdom of Jews is apt to foster sympa-
thy for the Israeli state.
14 The exception, perhaps, is one aspect of the Czech press treatment. The stress given in the Czech 
press to the „collusion” between Eichmann and the Vatican is principally a reflection of the internal 
war being waged by the Czech Communist rulers against the local Catholic hierarchy which they hope 
to separate from the Vatican.
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How the consideration of the foreign policy attitude to Israel operates as a con-
trolling factor is particularly apparent in examining the character of the mass media 
treatment of the satellite countries (excluding the USSR). Neither Poland nor Hungary 
are openly hostile to Israel. Indeed, to some extent, friendly relations between these 
two countries and Israel exist. Consequently, one finds emphasis in their press treat-
ment on the martyrdom of Jews for neither are vigorously opposed to fostering a sym-
pathetic attitude toward Israel. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia’s attitude toward 
Israel is a negative one and the former, in part, reflects that attitude by playing down 
the martyrdom of Jews, emphasizing instead the racism, revanchism and militarism 
of the present West German regime. The mass media of Czechoslovakia also tends 
to give emphasis to the thesis of a secret “deal” between Bonn and Israel in order to 
“suppress” information on German fascism.
The above consideration is even apparent in the much more limited treatment of 
the Eichmann case by Bulgaria and Rumania. Rumania, far more hostile to Israel than 
is Bulgaria, minimizes to an even greater degree than does the latter the martyrdom 
of Jews and, instead, stresses to a much greater degree the so-called secret “deal” 
between Israel and Bonn.
The Soviet Union is the most militantly hostile of all the Communist countries 
to Israel. The provincial press and, to a lesser extent, the national press of the USSR 
have, for the past four years, been conducting an intense anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist cam-
paign. This campaign is partly a consequence of the Kremlin’s assumption of the role 
of champion of the Arab cause, an assumption which could hardly be attempted by 
the other Communist bloc countries. To give extensive treatment to the Eichmann trial 
and, particularly, to underscore Jewish martyrdom implicit in it would run counter to 
a basic line in its foreign policy. For that reason, Soviet mass media treatment of the 
Eichmann case is much less than that of Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and this 
treatment stresses much less than does Poland or Hungary the martyrdom of Jews.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union is obliged to weigh its anti-Israeli considera-
tion against the consideration of West German revanchism. Because the latter consid-
eration plays a more decisive role in its foreign policy determination than the former, 
some attention will be given to the Eichmann trial. Indeed, so vital is the West German 
question in the total structure of Soviet foreign policy that it is probable that the 
Soviet mass media would give the Eichmann trial more extensive coverage, includ-
ing emphasis on Jewish martyrdom, if the disclosures of the trial were to provide the 
bases for an indictment of the present West German regime. A published report last 
fall of the comments made by TASS’ chief correspondent in Israel to Jerusalem offi-
cials support this conclusion.
The representative of the official news-gathering agency of the USSR was reported 
to have told Israeli officials that Soviet coverage of the Eichmann trial was depend-
ent upon the kind of headlines that would emerge from the trial. “Small headlines, 
small coverage; big headlines, big coverage,” he was quoted as saying. He further 
explained – it was reported – that were the Israeli prosecution to stress the complicity 
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of present-day officials of Adenauer’s Government in Nazi genocide, it would be “big 
headline stuff” in the Soviet press.
Additional indirect substantiation of this thesis is provided by the manner in 
which the USSR press – both local and national organs – handled four trials last 
March of local Soviet citizens who had been Nazi collaborators. The singling out of 
Jews as the victims of the Nazi collaborators was high-lighted rather than suppressed. 
One trial was held in Tallinn, Estonia, where three defendants (one in absentia) were 
charged with the crime of killing Jews in Kalevy-Livy and Kaluga. LITERATURNAIA 
GAZETA commented on March 3 that the accused were responsible for the shooting of 
“men whose only guilt was to have been born Jews....”
A second trial was held in Latvia and involved a group of Latvian and Belorussian 
collaborators charged with killing Jews among others. SOVETSKAIA LATVIA com-
mented on one of the charges: “Old men, women, infants were first driven into the 
local synagogue, then taken to the wood and bestially killed.”
A third trial took place in Lithuania. According to a report in TRUD (March 1), the 
Lithuanian collaborators were charged with torture of Jews in Alituis and the extermi-
nation of 2,000 Jewish citizens. A fourth trial, that of a Nazi collaborator in Stavropol, 
was reported in SOVETSKAIA ROSSIIA on March 23.
It is perhaps less than coincidental that suddenly four separate trials of Nazi col-
laborators took place in the USSR but a few weeks before the curtain was raised on 
the Jerusalem courtroom. Was it only now, sixteen years after the War’s end, that the 
otherwise efficient Soviet security police was able to uncover in its midst, former Nazi 
collaborators?
The answer to this curious anomaly perhaps lies in the fact that most of the March 
cases provided the USSR with an opportunity to attack the West for harboring “war 
criminals.” In the Estonian case, the defendant in absentia was one, Mere, now resid-
ing in England. England was bitterly criticized in the Soviet press for refusing to extra-
dite a “war criminal.” In the Latvian case, the West was censured for giving asylum to 
two individuals identified in the trial as “war criminals” – Riblis and Ertsams. With 
reference to Lithuanian Nazi collaborators, the United States was singled out for con-
demnation because it protects one, Pashkavichius, now living in Chicago, charged by 
USSR as a “war criminal” responsible for the murder of Jews and others.
The handling of the four cases indicates that the Soviet press would not be unwill-
ing to focus attention on specifically the Nazi murder of Jews if this could be exploited 
as part of the USSR’s campaign against the West. The prosecution of the cases just a 
few weeks before the Eichmann trial facilitated the Soviet objective of charging the 
West, specifically West Germany, as a haven for war criminals.
Since the disclosure of Hans Globke’s name in one of the documents submitted 
by the prosecution, Moscow Radio has begun to take a more favorable view of the trial 
proceedings. Were further disclosures to be made, the Soviet mass media handling of 
the Eichmann case may develop along lines not basically divergent from the objective 
which the Israeli Government set for itself in putting Adolph Eichmann in the dock.

III The Six-Day War and its Aftermath

Introduction
Based on the large number of publications on the 1967 Six-Day war, we now have a 
more or less accurate picture both of the war itself, and of the global political context 
in which it occurred. Archival sources published in recent decades document the 
central role of Soviet policy in the events leading up to the Six-Day War, its unfold-
ing, and subsequent developments.1 Since the opening of the Communist archives, 
however, few documents have been published on Eastern-European Soviet-bloc 
leaders’ reactions to the war and the accompanying political crisis, the information 
the Soviet leadership shared with them during the crisis, their perceptions of the Arab 
world and Israel, and how events influenced their policies towards the Jews in their 
countries. Moreover, the great majority of the documents published to date were not 
created during the war or its immediate aftermath; rather, they stem from subsequent 
periods when there was no need for immediate reaction to daily events, when it was 
easier to make policy adjustments. Strikingly, however, Hungarian records are barely 
to be found even among such documents.2 
Although the documents presented below provide some novel insights on Soviet 
Middle-Eastern policy, their primary purpose here is to facilitate an understanding 
of the issues mentioned above, particularly in the context of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party (HSWP). The documents reveal the immediate reactions of Commu-
nist politicians to events, how their stance evolved during the conflict, and how they 
1 See, for example, Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the Six-Day War in Light of Archival Materials, 
Journal of Cold War Studies 8:1 (2005), 3–19; Yaacov Ro’i, Boris Morozov (eds), The Soviet Union and the 
June 1967 Six-Day War. (Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Stanford University Press, 2008). 
See also the relevant US State Department documents at Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–
1968, Volume XVIII, Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1964–67, Office of the Historian. Accessed on 27 September 
2016 at  https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v18/comp1; and Lyndon Johnson Ad-
ministration: State Department Documents from the 1967 War, Jewish Virtual Library. Accessed on 27 
September 2016 at https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/1967war7.html.
2 One Bulgarian document and one Polish document are published in Ro’i and Morozov, op. cit., 
294–301 and 336–339. For the contemporary Bulgarian policy, see Jordan Baev, Eastern Europe and 
the Six-Day War: The Case of Bulgaria. In ibid., 172–196. One important collection of documents 
from the former Warsaw Pact countries’ archives does not contain material directly relating to the 
1967 war: Vojtech Mastny, Malcolm Byrne (eds), A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the War-
saw Pact, 1955–1991 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005). The documents online 
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center’s Cold War International History Project only contain 
material from the period after 20 June 1967, some of which has already been published by Ro’i and 
Morozov. See also James G. Hershberg, The Soviet Bloc and the Aftermath of the 1967 War, Cold 
War International History Project, e-Dossier No. 13. Woodrow Wilson Center. Accessed on 26 Sep-
tember 2016 at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-soviet-bloc-and-the-aftermath-the-
june-1967-war; and Uri Bar-Noi. The Soviet Union and the Six-Day War: Revelations from the Polish 
Archives. Cold War International History Project, e-Dossier No. 8. Woodrow Wilson Center. Accessed 
on 28 September 2016 at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-soviet-union-and-the-six-
day-war-revelations-the-polish-archives.
DOI 10.1515/9783110411591-004
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sought to determine the scope for action in line with the interests of their own coun-
tries. 
The most comprehensive published document on Soviet policy at the time of the 
Six-Day War is Soviet Party leader Brezhnev’s account of events, given in a speech 
at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 20 June 1967.3 In his 
speech, Brezhnev summarised and evaluated the Soviet view of events, and then 
explained Soviet policy on the Middle East. He also mentioned that during the crisis, 
he had kept in daily telephone contact with the Party leaders of the Soviet-bloc coun-
tries. Hungarian documents stemming from the file of collected papers of the Sec-
retariat of János Kádár, the Hungarian Party leader, verify such contacts. The first 
group of documents presented here (Documents 1–7) is a selection of written records 
of Kádár’s conversations with the Soviet Party leader, and with other Soviet officials 
in the days and immediate aftermath of the war.4 
“Since six o’clock this morning, reports of combat operations in the Middle East 
have been reaching us.” János Kádár, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
HSWP, wrote this laconic comment by hand at the top of the first in a series of docu-
ments that summarise a telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev on the 
afternoon of 5 June 1967 (see Document 1). In the ensuing days and weeks, a large 
number of memoranda, reports and other papers followed: records of Brezhnev’s 
daily telephone conversations with Kádár between 5 June and 12 June; and notes on 
the conversations with F. Y. Titov, Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, who also briefed 
Kádár daily in order to inform the Hungarian Party leadership of the latest military, 
diplomatic and political developments.
The Kádár documents essentially confirm what we already knew from other 
sources: the Soviet Union, despite having contributed to increased tension in the Middle 
East in order to expand its influence, had no wish for war between Arab countries and 
Israel, and had no knowledge of the unilateral Arab actions that had contributed to 
the outbreak of war, including the demand for the withdrawal of UN troops, and the 
closure of the Straits of Tiran. The Soviet Union advised Egyptian and Syrian leaders 
to avoid becoming embroiled in a war; Nasser pledged to heed this advice. Both before 
and after the war, the Soviet leadership opposed radical Arab propaganda calling for 
Israel’s destruction. During the war, it gave no credence to the provocative reports 
issued by senior military circles in Egypt, which accused the United States of direct 
intervention. And throughout the period, the Soviet leadership kept the “hotline” to the 
American president open; indeed, it believed initially that, acting together, the Soviet 
Union and the United States might be able to persuade the Israelis to accept a cease-
fire, and to withdraw to their antebellum positions. Brezhnev also informed Kádár of 
each diplomatic success. This included French President De Gaulle’s acceptance of a 
3 See Ro’i and Morozov, op. cit., 302–335.
4 For all the documents of Kádár’s secretariat, see Kádár János Titkársága [János Kádár’s Secretariat], 
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47.
 Introduction   131
Soviet ceasefire proposal that required a full Israeli withdrawal, Nasser’s withdrawal 
of his resignation, and the apparently successful attempts to bolster Nasser’s regime 
as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement rather than as a Soviet ally, a possibility 
raised by Nasser himself during Supreme Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny’s visit to 
Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the war.5 This last endeavour shows that the Soviet 
leadership was quick to recognise that despite its errors in the lead-up to the war, and a 
significant decline in its prestige as a result, the USSR could still benefit politically from 
Arab military defeat, which opened up new possibilities for increasing its influence and 
military presence in the Middle East.
The Kádár documents provide new information about the relationship between 
the Soviet Union and the dependent satellite states, the positions taken by various 
Warsaw-Pact countries, and the differences and tensions that arose among them. The 
first striking observation is that the Soviet leadership clearly decided to provide regular 
information to the satellite states’ leaders, information that acknowledged political 
failures, as well as the risks entailed in various courses of action. Moreover, the Soviet 
leadership also asked for opinions from the other leaders on a host of issues. Thus, at 
the height of the crisis on 9 June, Communist Party and government leaders attended 
a summit in Moscow that had been convened at a day’s notice. Subsequently, after 
the first wave of military strife and diplomatic friction, they met again at a confer-
ence in Budapest on 11–12 July. According to some analyses, the Soviet leadership’s 
aim in holding such talks was to persuade the “fraternal countries” to shoulder a 
greater burden when it came to re-arming the Soviet Union’s Arab allies, and offering 
them economic assistance.6 This is a possibility, but the gesture may also have been 
indicative of Moscow’s fear that a manifest weakening of Soviet superpower influ-
ence would strengthen those forces within the “fraternal Parties” that sought greater 
independence and autonomy in foreign-policy making, and perhaps other fields too.
Among the selected documents, the summary of the Moscow conference, urgently 
convened on 9 June, is most revealing of the reactions of the Warsaw-Pact countries 
to the new situation and to Soviet policy (Document 8). As the document shows, 
Gomułka, Novotný and Zhivkov (the Polish, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Party 
leaders respectively) gave immediate support to the Soviet stance, and endorsed Bre-
zhnev’s proposal that a statement be issued condemning “Israeli aggression” and 
offering unreserved support to the Arab countries. A slightly different tone was struck 
by Walter Ulbricht, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, who 
was one of the initiators of the meeting. Although Ulbricht favoured a joint declara-
tion, he urged nevertheless for additional – presumably military – steps to “prevent 
5 A Hungarian version of an account of Podgorny’s visit to Egypt on June 21–24 is included among 
the Kádár papers. It has not been included in this selection because an almost identical document 
dispatched by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to ambassadors in the Soviet-bloc countries has already 
been published in English. See Ro’i and Morozov, op. cit., 340–347.
6 See Yaacov Ro’i and Dima P. Adamsky, Conclusions. In ibid, 271.
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aggression,” over and above diplomatic efforts. He also insinuated – in an implicit 
criticism of the Soviet leadership – that a lack of co-operation between the Socialist 
countries had contributed to the crisis. In his response, Brezhnev rejected such criti-
cism. Ulbricht’s radical stance in the conflict probably played a part in his subsequent 
fall from grace, and the loss of his position as Party Secretary in 1971.
Of the various speeches made in Moscow, it was the Romanian Party Leader 
Ceauṣescu’s contribution that provoked the greatest debate. Although Ceauṣescu 
agreed in principle that the post-war situation needed to be achieved by peaceful 
means and to the benefit of the Arab states, nevertheless he did not think that Israel 
alone should be blamed for the outbreak of war. In his view, the Arab countries had 
set out to destroy Israel, and this had placed them in opposition to world public 
opinion, including that of Western Communist Parties and “the many branches of the 
progressive movement”. For this reason, Romania could not support the Arab coun-
tries unconditionally. Ceauṣescu also expressed opposition to the issuing of a joint 
declaration.
The Hungarian Party Leader, János Kádár, attempted to strike a balance between 
the various positions. In his record of the meeting, he wrote the following by hand 
next to Ceauṣescu’s words: “At present, the important thing is not the issuing of a 
declaration. It would be enough to publish a communiqué stating that a meeting 
was held between representatives of our Parties and countries on the situation in the 
Middle East”. It is difficult to decide whether Kádár wrote this comment in order to 
have a more accurate record of the Romanian leader’s words, or as an expression 
of his own thoughts. At any rate, in his speech he proposed a compromise solution, 
that a statement or communiqué be issued, rather than a joint declaration; such a 
statement would indicate that the meeting’s aim had been to reconcile the various 
positions, and that the participants agreed on the major issues and wished to take 
joint action. As we know, this proposal was not accepted.
From today’s perspective, the most important speech at the meeting was that of 
Josip Tito, President of Yugoslavia. Since the Yugoslav Communist leadership gener-
ally kept its distance from joint actions organised by the Soviet-dominated Warsaw 
Pact, Tito’s participation in the meeting was, in itself, an important sign of change, 
a fact noted with satisfaction in internal memos on preparatory consultations for the 
meeting (Document 7). The speech reveals that Tito, who maintained close relations 
with Nasser, the other major leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, knew all those 
things of which the Soviet leadership, by its own admittance, was ignorant – such as 
Egypt’s intention to close the Gulf of Aqaba – and supported such action. The most 
important part of Tito’s speech was the general strategic conclusions he drew from 
the Six-Day War. In effect, the Yugoslav leader proposed that the Communist coun-
tries should review their strategy on local wars. In his opinion, nuclear weapons had 
substantially reduced the risk of local wars becoming global wars. If the Communist 
countries continued to eschew involvement in local wars in order to avoid a global 
nuclear conflict, then this erroneous evaluation of the situation would create favour-
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able conditions for the “imperialists”, who were extending their spheres of influence 
by means of a whole series of local wars.7 
With this line of thought, Tito appears to have touched on a subject that may have 
divided the Soviet leadership itself. The documents on the Six-Day War show that 
Brezhnev and his colleagues took the view that the Chinese (and the Cubans) were 
encouraging Egyptian and Syrian leaderships to intensify the Middle-East conflict 
until a war broke out. Indeed, it is Chinese influence which may explain why the Arab 
leaders took such provocative steps without first discussing their actions with the 
Soviet Union. Apart from one section of the Egyptian and Syrian military leaderships, 
the main regional spokesman for the Chinese position was Houari Boumediène, Pres-
ident of Algeria, whom the Soviet leadership welcomed in Moscow only after some 
hesitation (see Documents 9 and 15) and who, even then, attempted to persuade the 
Soviet leadership that the war must be continued in the spirit of Che Guevara, and 
by creating a “second Vietnam”.8 Until the Six-Day War, the Soviet leadership had 
considered the Chinese strategy to be a provocation aimed at bringing about a war 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, enabling China, as the third power, 
to emerge as the winner. Now, however, Tito – who could not be accused of sym-
pathising with the Chinese Party or with Chinese policy – was proposing the same 
thing as the Chinese, and was doing so in a context that might also have been dis-
cussed by the Soviet leadership: local wars had to be undertaken, since they could be 
won without risking a global conflict. Tito’s stance may have enhanced the influence 
of those within the Soviet leadership who held similar views. At any rate, this is one 
of the possible conclusions that can be drawn from Brezhnev’s speech at the plenary 
session of the Central Committee on 20 June, at which he said the following:
We rightfully thought and continue to think that our main protagonist is the United States and 
also, of course, the FRG. Whenever we discuss questions of war and peace, this principally is 
what we have in mind, and therefore, the possibility of a “major” world war. But life has shown 
that there can also be small, so-called local, wars. […] Consequently, we must have strategic mil-
itary and tactical plans regarding wars that have a local character. Our political, diplomatic and 
military people have to study all sides of the question where such wars may arise, and prepare 
their positions for such an event (Cries: Correct!) […] In a word, our military doctrines, our mili-
tary plans and calculations, as well as our concrete actions in the sphere of military policy, have 
to bear in mind all these new factors, and to anticipate in good time the possible course of events, 
not only in direct relation to the defence of the Soviet Union, but also regarding questions per-
taining to the support of friendly states.9 
7 According to Tito, Greece (after the Generals’ Coup in April 1967) and Italy were preparing for such 
a local war against Yugoslavia.
8 See Brezhnev’s Speech of 20 June 1967, in Ro’i and Morozov, op. cit., 332–333, and Todor Zhivkov’s 
Account at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on 14 June 
1967. In ibid, 295. Strikingly, the parts of Brezhnev’s speech relating to China’s policies are absent from 
the text. 
9 Ibid, 333. 
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It seems, therefore, that Tito contributed to the change in strategy, which resulted in 
the Soviet Union’s involvement from the mid-1970s onwards in a series of conflicts 
with catastrophic consequences, including civil wars in Africa and Afghanistan.10
Neither the summary of the Moscow meeting on 9 June, nor the other documents, 
indicate whether the participating countries decided collectively to break off relations 
with Israel. In his speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee, Brezhnev 
stated the following: “We did not ask the other Socialist countries to sever diplo-
matic relations with Israel. But our common understanding of the situation […] and 
the atmosphere of unity led to […] severing relations with Israel”.11 On 10 June, the 
second day of the conference, the Soviet Union announced the severance of diplo-
matic relations, and a similar announcement was made by Czechoslovakia several 
hours later, by Bulgaria the next day, and finally by Hungary and Poland on 12 June. 
Kádár informed Brezhnev of Hungary’s decision on the same day. According to the 
records, Brezhnev replied that: “This is in line with the common position elaborated 
in Moscow. He [Brezhnev – AK] is pleased that everything is in order here and we 
can take this step”12 (see Document 9). All of this indicates that although the Soviet 
leadership expected the other countries to break off relations, it also left a loophole 
open: countries could delay or avoid taking this decision by citing serious political 
difficulties, including intra-Party conflicts or social tensions. Kádár decided against 
such a course.
Based on the Kádár papers and the other Hungarian documents, it is possible 
to reconstruct the goals of Hungarian policy at the time of the Six-Day War, and in 
its immediate aftermath. Kádár set the tone at a meeting of the Political Committee 
10 These strategic ideas on local wars outlined by Tito and embraced by Brezhnev were strongly criti-
cized in a March 1968 internal memo by Otakar Rytíř , Chief of General Staff of the Czechoslovak army, 
who argued that the Warsaw Pact’s military doctrine against the Western Alliance should continue 
to be based on the nuclear deterrent, because if this were to be replaced by a strategy of local wars, 
then the Western countries would necessarily win, given that they had a better qualified workforce, 
more advanced technology, and a stronger economic base. See Mastny and Byrne, op. cit., Document 
47, Remarks by the Czechoslovak Chief of Staff on the Theory of Local Wars, 13 March 1968, 257–260.
11 Ro’i and Morozov, op. cit., 321.
12 Concerning the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Commu-
nist Party on the very same day, see Document 11 in this chapter. The Political Committee of the PUWP 
met on 10 June, and on 12 June, the wider leadership of the Polish Party had a meeting mostly on the 
situation in the Middle East; see Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 406–407. According to Polish 
documents quoted and analyzed by Szaynok, the Political Committee decided at a meeting on 19 
June that Poland would sever diplomatic relations with Israel, but this decision was suspended in 
the evening hours of the same day, as Israel seemed to have accepted the decision of the Security 
Council, and was ready to halt military actions. The Polish diplomats (and, based on the documents, 
the Bulgarian diplomats too) thought that the Soviet Union, as a superpower, could not revoke its de-
cision to sever diplomatic relations, for it needed to keep up the pressure on Israel. Yet, under the new 
circumstances, the other Eastern European countries did not have to abide by the Soviet decision. See 
ibid, 403–405. 
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that took place the day after the outbreak of war. He told those in attendance that the 
Middle-East conflict needed to be treated first and foremost as a foreign-policy issue. 
He did not deviate from this basic position until his speech to the Political Committee 
a week later, on 13 June (Document 10). In the second part of his speech, and without 
uttering the word Jew, Kádár left no doubt that he regarded Jews as a covert, clannish 
and influential group within the Party. According to him, although they appeared 
otherwise to support Party policy, in the crisis they were behaving in an “unreliable” 
fashion: 
A small section of the Party membership – and I hope I shall not be misunderstood [emphasis 
added – AK] – but a section that exists and is rather influential in a certain area, behaved in a 
non-Communist manner. And I don’t want to make a racial thing out of this, and I understand 
that it is not sufficiently clear to everyone who the aggressor, the attacker is; it is possible to 
understand a certain anxiety, but this does not mean permission to challenge the position of the 
Party. […] I would not allow this to pass without a response. […] And if we then have fewer Party 
members, this is the lesser evil than if they were to waver. We must not tolerate or allow that. […] 
If these trends spread, we shall have to adopt new measures. Because to fatten up people in good 
jobs who then behave like this in critical situations, this cannot be permitted!13
At that time, Kádár was obviously well aware that various groups in society and 
among the country’s intellectuals, including Party members, opposed the pro-Arab 
policy, and sympathised with Israel. Two documents in this chapter (Document 16, 
compiled by an unknown informer, and Document 17, compiled by leaders of the State 
Office for Church Affairs) about the views and opinions of members of the Jewish 
community prove that the official position on the war was strongly opposed both by 
community officials and by Jewish Party members and activists. Therefore, having 
given an account of the Moscow conference, Kádár obviously decided to announce 
in a rather harsh tone the introduction of measures against those deviating from the 
Party line. Documents published below in Chapter Five indicate that, at this time, 
state and security organs intensified their activities within the Jewish community, 
with a view to preventing the emergence and spreading of any form of views oppos-
ing Hungarian policy (see Chapter 5, Documents 1–4).14 Kádár’s announcement may 
also explain the purges that took place subsequently, and which primarily affected 
officials of Jewish ancestry working at the Foreign and Interior ministries, and in the 
military apparatus. 
In general, Kádár and the Hungarian Party leadership had two main objectives. 
The first was to meet Soviet expectations in full, but to interpret them flexibly, or at 
least to avoid being the first country to fulfill them. The second was to keep the con-
sequences of the conflict out of domestic politics. As the various documents show, 
13 Ibid., 276–277. 
14 In the aftermath of the war and the severance of diplomatic relations, the authorities in Czecho-
slovakia and Poland intensified the pressure on the Jewish institutions. See Labendz, Renegotiating 
Czechoslovakia, 460, and Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 420–423.
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Kádár had a profound disdain for the Arabs, and believed that their poor military 
performance was due to the backward nature of their civilisation and culture. (Other 
Communist leaders, such as the Bulgarians, gave similar explanations for the humil-
iating defeat of the Arab armies despite being equipped with modern Soviet weap-
onry.) At the same time, Kádár’s speech also contains common stereotypes of Jews 
as exclusively urban and highly educated people. Listing the reasons for the cata-
strophic defeat of the Arab forces, he declared the following: “And another factor was 
the difference in quality of available personnel […] to go back to the roots […] people 
with primary education were set against university graduates, and this represented 
a decisive superiority in all respects” (see Document 10). Kádár mistrusted the Arab 
leaders, even those pursuing pro-Soviet and anti-Western policies. As the record of his 
conversation with Egyptian Ambassador Fouad shows (Document 10), he was con-
vinced that power in the Arab countries actually lay in the hands of soldiers, and thus 
it was impossible to have confidence in the intentions or promises of politicians. On 
the other hand, he considered the military leadership as incalculable and unreliable, 
as experience had shown. Kádár also feared that radical Arab political leaders such 
as Boumediène, or extremist elements in the Syrian or Egyptian military leaderships, 
might provoke further conflicts, thereby dragging in the Soviet Union and its allies. 
He raised this issue in the context of economic and military aid to the Arab countries 
at the Budapest meeting of Party leaders in July: 
In our public opinion, and I think that in other countries it is similar, the question looks like this: 
we were giving to Ghana – it failed; we gave to Indonesia – it failed; we gave to the Arab coun-
tries – that failed too. Therefore, the question raises doubts. Of course, the Socialist countries 
cannot have the same attitude as capitalist countries toward assistance to other countries, but 
the Socialist countries should have a minimal guarantee that assistance rendered by them will 
not be wasted. 
Since Brezhnev had also criticised the Arab radicals at the conference,15 Kádár took the 
opportunity at the ensuing meeting of the Political Committee to urge those respon-
sible within the Party for information and propaganda to inform the membership of 
such dangers. The same meeting saw a discussion of how Hungary might fulfill Arab 
requests for assistance (Document 14). The document clearly indicates that the Arab 
countries sent the same list of needs to all the Socialist countries. The words of Prime 
Minister Jenő Fock and First Secretary János Kádár show that the Hungarian polit-
ical leadership sought to make the smallest possible number of commitments, and 
to ensure that any obligations undertaken would impose a minimal burden on the 
15 Polish Record of Meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders (and Tito) in Budapest (excerpts). 11 July 1967. 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, KC PZPR, XI A/13, AAN, Warsaw; document ob-
tained by James G. Hershberg and Wanda Jarzabek; translation for CWIHP by Jan Chowaniec . Wilson 
Center Digital Archive. Accessed on 28 September 2016 at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/doc-
ument/113622. 
 Introduction   137
country’s economy. They strove to minimise the amount of assistance, and to supply 
items that were either plentiful or in stock. They also attempted to make sure that 
goods requested by Egypt or Syria were subsequently supplied to these countries as 
part of a financial transaction.
The final group of documents in this Chapter (Documents 18–20) present the 
process leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Hungary and 
Israel. During the 26 years following the severance of diplomatic relations, relations 
between the two countries barely existed. The Swedish embassy represented Hungar-
ian interests in Israel, and the Swiss embassy represented Israeli interests in Hungary. 
Trade between the two countries slumped. Indeed, trade worth more than 100 million 
dollars a year in the first half of the 1960s decreased to around ten million dollars by 
the early 1980s (Document 19, Annexe 1).
In the early 1980s, the Hungarian economy faced an increasingly severe crisis: 
in 1980, the country’s debt to the West was ten times what it had been in 1970. For-
eign-trade earnings were insufficient even to pay the interest on foreign loans. In 1982, 
the country evaded bankruptcy only by joining the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. Under these circumstances, the political leadership was prepared to 
use all means to increase foreign-currency earnings. On 20 December 1983, the Politi-
cal Committee adopted a resolution on the revitalisation of relations between Hungary 
and Israel in the hope that this would help to solve the debt crisis (Document 18). 
The text of the resolution reveals the anticipated economic benefits: “Recently, Israeli 
business people have proposed the mutually beneficial expansion of our economic 
relations and co-operation in third markets. According to the calculations of the Hun-
garian economic bodies, trade volumes could be doubled without endangering, in 
the first place, our economic and trade interests with the Arab countries”. Hungarian 
Party leaders believed that if they managed to limit the improvement in relation to the 
economic sphere, then under the given circumstances – following the Israeli–Egyp-
tian peace agreement, and during the Soviet Union’s domestic political struggles after 
the death of Brezhnev – they might be able to adopt such measures without incurring 
major political risk. They also expected an improvement in relations to exert a posi-
tive impact on economic relations with the West, and this expectation indicates the 
extent to which the stereotype of “international Jewish economic power” pervaded 
Hungarian Communist circles: “We should seek the support of the Israeli partners 
towards accomplishing greater financial co-operation with our country in the United 
States and in the Western European countries”.
In the ensuing years, trade relations between the two countries developed spec-
tacularly, albeit at a far lower level than in the pre-1967 period. Moreover, the number 
of visitors to Hungary from Israel increased significantly. The Hungarian authorities 
failed, however, in their attempt to limit relations to the economic sphere. Indeed, it 
seems that in 1985, after Gorbachev came to power, there was a real breakthrough in 
relations in other fields. For instance, the 9th Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs which was still noticeably opposed to an improvement in relations with Israel 
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on account of the perceived threat to relations with the Arab countries and the risk 
of economic blowback, drafted a negative report listing instances of Hungarians par-
ticipating in cultural and sport events in Israel, without having first requested the 
Department’s consent. Clearly, this kind of behaviour would not have occurred in 
earlier decades (Document 19, Annexe 3). 
In the spring of 1987, Hungarian diplomacy began secret talks with the Israeli 
government on expanding relations, during which the possibility of restoring dip-
lomatic relations was not ruled out, although the general view was that such a step 
would not be feasible until a later date. In Berne on 14 September 1987, the heads of 
delegation exchanged notes concerning the opening of interest representation offices 
in each other’s country for the purpose of enhancing economic, trade, cultural and 
humanitarian relations. Meanwhile, Hungarian politicians were closely watching the 
reactions of the Soviet Union and the “fraternal countries”. According to the recollec-
tions of János Görög, the Hungarian diplomat who led the negotiations and who later 
became the first Hungarian ambassador to Israel, the Hungarian political leadership 
requested the opinion of the Soviet leaders prior to the commencement of the negotia-
tions in 1987. The Soviet leaders “acquiesced to our holding discussions, on condition 
that there should be no mention of the restoration of diplomatic relations, of consular 
relations or of an embassy. They did not want us to set a precedent in this regard”.16 
Thereafter, according to Görög, the Hungarians chose not to request the Soviet posi-
tion. Rather, they waited to see whether there would be any reaction to Hungary’s 
measures, and also took care to ensure that they never went much further than, for 
instance, Poland, in their relations with Israel. 
Supporters of the restoration of diplomatic relations, or at least of measures 
leading to such, were required to put forth arguments against their opponents in the 
Party and the government. Typically, such arguments centred on pragmatic and eco-
nomic factors, including the stereotype concerning the influence of “international 
Jewish capital”, a stereotype that the remarks of the Israeli negotiating partner tended 
to confirm: “The involvement of international Jewish capital has given rise to busi-
ness opportunities, including the realisation of an investment programme worth 300 
million dollars, in which – at the initiative of Shimon Peres – 20 American-Jewish 
businessmen are engaged” (Document 20). The supporters of renewed diplomatic 
relations averted fears over the likely reaction in the Arab countries – fears often cited 
by their opponents in the Party and government – by referring to the absence of unity 
among Arab states, and by repeating statements concerning the strictly pragmatic 
nature of the planned measures, and the consistent application of practical aspects. 
“For this reason, when the Central Committee decides on the proposal, it would be 
necessary to declare its wish that our competent economic-financial bodies should 
16 Titkos kiegyezés a padlásszobában. Interjú Görög János volt izraeli magyar nagykövettel [A Secret 
Compromise in the Attic Room: An Interview with János Görög, Former Hungarian Ambassador to 
Israel], Hetek 4:20 (13 May 2000), 2–3.
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elaborate, in a specific and detailed fashion, the conditions whose fulfillment would 
justify Hungary taking this decision – the restoration of diplomatic relations – which 
is so crucial for Israel” (Document 20). Although trade with Israel and the Israe-
li-assisted import of capital to Hungary failed to meet expectations, the reactions of 
the Arab countries were not as dramatic as had been predicted by the functionaries 
responsible for relations with those states. According to the memoirs of János Görög, 
by 1989, Israeli–Hungarian trade had returned to the level seen in the first half of the 
1960s, and there had been no decline in trade with the Arab countries: 
The most interesting thing was the reaction of the Arabs. The pessimists had said that the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations [with Israel] would result in a decline of at least 50 per cent in 
trade with the Arab countries. In contrast, since the Arabs believed that the Jews had paid us off 
or induced us in some fashion, and that the way to win us back was to order another freight train 
and 250 extra buses; in the year following the opening [to Israel – AK], total trade with the Arab 
countries increased by 15 per cent. 
Finally, on 14 September 1989, only a few months before the collapse of Communism, 
Hungary and Israel signed an agreement on the restoration of diplomatic relations.
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Documents
1 Telephone Conversation between János Kádár and Leonid 
Brezhnev
5 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/740/1967/ p. 193.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Completed in 1 copy
At 3 p.m. on 5 June 1967, Comrade Brezhnev telephoned Comrade Kádár to inform him 
of the situation in the Middle East.
Currently, even the CPSU does not know exactly how the conflict erupted; the 
most important thing now is to do everything to achieve the immediate cessation of 
combat operations. Therefore, the Soviet comrades have contacted Nasser to request 
information and advice about what they might do to restore peace. There is no answer 
as of yet.
Comrade Kosygin contacted President Johnson by means of the hotline. He 
responded that he had appealed to the governments in the region and was trying to 
exert all his influence to bring about a settlement.
Nasser told the Soviet ambassador this morning that they are asking for aircrafts 
to make up for those that have been lost. He said that British and American aircraft 
carriers were stationed near Israel, and that planes had taken off from these ships, 
but in Comrade Brezhnev’s opinion, this was “dramatising the situation”.
 [...]
Comrade Brezhnev has promised that as soon as he has something more to say, he 
will contact us immediately, either in person or – if it is too late – by way of the ambas-
sador.
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2 Soviet Ambassador’s Meeting with János Kádár
6 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 195.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Translated from Russian
Completed in 3 copies
[…]
On 6 June 1967, Comrade F.Y. Titov, the Soviet ambassador, visited Comrade János 
Kádár, and on behalf of the CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU and informed him of 
the following:
The Soviet government has taken the following measures in connection with the 
acts of war commenced between Israel and the United Arab Republic:
1. The Soviet Union’s representative at the UN has been instructed to consult with 
the representatives of the U.A.R. and Syria and to immediately raise the issue of 
an urgent convening of the Security Council with a view to achieving the cessa-
tion of the acts of war.
2. The Soviet ambassador in Cairo has been instructed to immediately visit Pres-
ident Nasser, or Amer, and ask for information about the state of affairs, with 
reference to the communiqués that have been made public concerning clashes 
between the armed forces of the U.A.R. and Israel. It is imperative that Nasser 
is told that our point of departure is that the U.A.R. must do its utmost to avoid 
giving the aggressor a reason for a devastating armed conflict. 
The Soviet ambassador in Damascus has received similar instructions.
3. The Soviet government has appealed to Johnson, the U.S. President. The appeal 
emphasises that it is the obligation of all the major powers to strive for the imme-
diate cessation of the military conflict between Israel and the U.A.R. The Soviet 
government calls on the United States to exert the appropriate influence on the 
government of Israel, particularly because the American side has every opportu-
nity to do so. 
A corresponding appeal has also been made to the Prime Minister of Great 
Britain.
4. The Soviet government has appealed to De Gaulle, the French president. The 
hope has been expressed that France – and the President personally – will assist 
in bringing an immediate end to the military conflict…
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3 Telephone Conversation between János Kádár and Leonid 
Brezhnev
6 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 196-197.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Completed in 4 copies
Memorandum
For Comrade János Kádár
At 4 p.m. on 6 June 1967, Comrade Brezhnev telephoned Comrade Kádár and stated 
the following:
Today the leading Soviet comrades listened to the heads of the intelligence services 
and the army, who established that the armed conflict came as a surprise to our Arab 
friends. Additionally, because discipline is poor in their army, they are suffering great 
losses even without a struggle. Most of the airfields and aircraft have been destroyed 
without a fight. It is still difficult to give a full evaluation, but it is already clear that 
the unexpectedness of events had not benefitted the Arab countries. There are big 
losses in land forces, as well as in territories.
In reply to yesterday’s Soviet letter, Nasser stated that he has no advice at present 
concerning what the Soviet government could do to end the conflict. His sole request 
is that as many aircrafts as possible be sent. It was suggested that these planes be 
flown by way of Yugoslavia and the Mediterranean (because Nasser requested that 
they come by air), but this is dangerous. The Soviet comrades think that Algeria 
should provide the planes, and the Soviet Union will then send some by ship or on 
civilian aircraft – in a dismantled state. At any rate, the Soviet comrades are seeking 
opportunities to help for as long as the fight continues in the Security Council. 
At the UN, as we know, two positions and two draft resolutions are in conflict with 
each other. With reference to Johnson’s message of yesterday, the Soviet government 
has today contacted the American president once again. Since he stated yesterday 
that he would do everything to resolve the conflict, the Soviet government hopes that 
the Soviet draft resolution will be adopted.
Soviet comrades working at the UN have indicated that the Americans are inclined 
to make some changes to their draft, but it is not known what they will be.
Yesterday Comrade Brezhnev spoke again with Comrade Ceausescu, informing 
him that he had spoken to the first secretaries of the other fraternal Parties, who all 
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agreed with the idea of a collective letter that would be addressed to the Chinese. 
Comrade Ceausescu replied that they had discussed the matter and had concluded 
that the sending of a collective letter was not the right approach; rather, each Party 
should write to the CPC; they too might write. Comrade Brezhnev said that in this area 
viewpoints differ, but our goals are the same; those that are in agreement will write 
the letter.
With this, the “Romanian” part of the matter was closed, and Comrade Brezhnev 
himself has today signed the letter.
 [...]
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4 Soviet Ambassador’s Meeting with Zoltán Komócsin
7 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 207-208.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Completed in 2 copies
[…]
On 7 June 1967, Comrade F.Y. Titov visited Comrade Komócsin and, on behalf of the CC 
[Central Committee] of the CPSU, gave the following information:
“As we already informed you on 5 June, the Soviet government sent a message to 
Johnson, De Gaulle and Wilson.
We received replies from Johnson and De Gaulle.
1. In his reply, Johnson expresses agreement with our statement that every major 
power is obliged to seek an end to the conflict between Israel and the U.A.R. 
Johnson is in favour of the Security Council taking firms steps in this direction. 
Johnson assures us that the United States will exert all its influence to achieve the 
cessation of the acts of war.
2. De Gaulle, in his response, states that the French government wants the four major 
powers, as permanent members of the Security Council, to attempt to achieve 
an end to hostilities, co-ordinating their efforts for this purpose. De Gaulle sug-
gests that direct contact be maintained on this issue between the governments of 
France and the Soviet Union.
On June 6, the Soviet government sent further messages to President Johnson, Presi-
dent De Gaulle, and Prime Minister Wilson.
In these messages, the Soviet government expresses its conviction that its firm 
demand for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops to behind the demar-
cation line accords with the interests of upholding peace. We expressed our hope that 
the government(s) of the United States (France, Great Britain) will support the afore-
mentioned demand in the Security Council. The Soviet government supports this.
The message calls upon the governments to do their utmost to ensure the Security 
Council adopts a positive resolution on this issue today.
Furthermore, in the message sent to President De Gaulle, we expressed our satis-
faction with the regular consultations between the French and Soviet governments, 
and with the fact that the Soviet and French representatives are actively cooperating 
in the Security Council”.
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5 Information from Leonid Brezhnev’s Personal Secretary
7 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 209.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Completed in 2 copies
Memorandum
For Comrade János Kádár
At 4 p.m. on 7 June 1967, Comrade A.M. Alexandrov, Comrade Brezhnev’s personal 
secretary, gave by telephone and on behalf of Comrade Brezhnev, the following infor-
mation on the situation in the Middle East:
1. The Soviet comrades have received various pieces of information that despite the 
Security Council’s resolution, Israel is continuing the acts of war on many fronts. 
In this regard, the Soviet government has instructed its representative at the UN 
to demand the immediate convening of the Security Council to examine whether 
the resolution of the Security Council has not been fulfilled. The Soviet represen-
tative shall raise the idea that the hour of the beginning of the ceasefire has to be 
confirmed and Israel must be forced to implement the resolution. 
The Soviet government has informed Johnson, De Gaulle and Wilson of the 
measure by way of the direct lines.
2. The Soviet government has sent a message to the government of Israel warning 
it that if it continues the acts of war, the Soviet Union will implement the appro-
priate consequences: for instance, it will re-examine the issue of diplomatic rela-
tions between itself and Israel and will conceive other measures. The tone of the 
message is firm and sharp. As soon as the Soviet ambassador to Tel Aviv submit-
ted the message, it was made public and published in the Soviet press and on the 
radio.
3. The Soviet leadership is sending a message to Nasser and the leaders of other 
Arab countries. The message is encouraging in nature, and the Soviet comrades 
call upon their Arab friends not to lose their presence of mind, to defend their 
interests using all means, and to make efforts toward the implementation of the 
ceasefire resolution.
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6 Soviet Ambassador’s Meeting with János Kádár
8 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 211-221.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Translated from Russian
Completed in 4 copies
[…]
On 8 June 1967, Comrade F.Y. Titov visited Comrade János Kádár and gave the follow-
ing information on behalf of the CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU:
Supplementing the information sent previously, we wish to inform you of further 
developments in the Middle East and about the measures that we have taken on 6 
and 7 June.
As we have already informed you, on 6 June, acting on behalf of the Soviet gov-
ernment, we sent messages to Johnson, De Gaulle and Wilson, in which we expressed 
our conviction that a firm demand for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of 
troops would serve to restore peace.
In his response, Johnson noted that the United States will agree to accept a res-
olution at the Security Council that calls on both warring parties to implement an 
immediate ceasefire and withdraw their armed personnel without delay to behind 
the ceasefire line; to implement other suitable measures with a view to separating the 
forces, to renouncing violent acts and to decreasing tension in the region.
In his reply, De Gaulle emphasised that the French government, like the Soviet 
government, is in favour of the Security Council giving its support to an immediate 
ceasefire. This resolution – in De Gaulle’s view – should be accompanied by a resolu-
tion on the withdrawal of troops. Concerning the line behind which the troops need to 
be taken, the French are of the view that this should be a ceasefire line which should 
accord with the positions taken by the two sides since the beginning of the acts of war.
We have not yet received an answer to our second message from Wilson. In reply 
to the message of 5 June, Wilson stated that the British government will do its utmost 
to end the military conflict, and to this end will aim for the adoption of a consensus 
resolution in the Security Council, calling for a ceasefire.
Throughout the day on 6 June and the night of 7 June, we contacted Cairo several 
times in order to clarify the situation. They informed us that the situation at the front 
was grave and so serious that – as Amer had stated – it is necessary to achieve a 
ceasefire by 5 a.m. on 7 June. Amer explained that the Israeli Air Force is beginning 
combat operations against the land troops of the U.A.R. on the Sinai Peninsula. In his 
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opinion, this will result in even greater sacrifices and great losses, and will make it 
more difficult to withdraw troops from the peninsula.
From these reports, it was evident that the leaders of the U.A.R., who originally 
demanded the ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops, feared that, in view of the 
changed situation and the worsening situation, urgent steps needed to be taken via 
the Security Council in order to achieve an immediate ceasefire.
Our representative in the Security Council received suitable instructions to accept 
immediately a suitable resolution.
As you know, at 2.10 a.m. (Moscow time) on 7 June, the Security Council adopted 
a unanimous resolution, calling upon the governments involved as a first step to take 
all measures towards an immediate ceasefire and a cessation of all acts of war in the 
region. The U.A.R.’s representative stated that the U.A.R. agreed with the resolution.
The Security Council adopted a resolution for a ceasefire without any conditions.
However, reports coming in suggest that Israel is not fulfilling the Security Coun-
cil’s resolution for an immediate ceasefire and the cessation of all acts of war, and is 
continuing to wage war against the Arab states.
In this connection, the Soviet Union’s UN representative has been instructed to 
demand the immediate convening of the Security Council to hear from both sides 
about the implementation of the SC’s resolution and to adopt a resolution concerning 
a cessation of acts of war by 4 p.m. (GMT) on 7 June.
In addition, on 7 June, A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
Soviet Union, sent a message to Johnson, Wilson and De Gaulle, reminding them that 
Israel is not complying with the Security Council’s resolution and making our sugges-
tion that the Security Council be convened immediately. 
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Record
For Comrade János Kádár
At 3 p.m. on 8 June 1967, Comrade K.V. Rusakov, Deputy Head of the Foreign Affairs 
Department of the CPSU, telephoned from Moscow and stated the following on behalf 
of Comrade Brezhnev:
Comrade Brezhnev has spoken to all the comrades and everyone agrees that the first 
secretaries and the chairmen of the councils of ministers should meet in Moscow at 11 
a.m. tomorrow. Comrade Ceausescu agrees, too, and is coming. On the advice of some 
comrades, a preliminary conversation was held with Comrade Tito, who replied that 
he will discuss the issue and may possibly come.
Comrade Brezhnev awaits Comrade Kádár’s answer, concerning whether the 
arrangement is convenient (above all the time of the meeting). 
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8 On the Moscow Meeting
9 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 219-230.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Memorandum
For Comrade János Kádár
From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
[Compiled by] Károly Erdélyi
[…]
II. The Moscow meeting:
1. List of known participants: 
 – 9 June, Friday afternoon, 3.30 until midnight
 – Atmosphere: meeting with news coming in again and again
 – Amer’s report
 – Nasser’s resignation
 – Effect of Nasser’s speech
2. Brezhnev’s information:
 – The purpose of the meeting:
 – to announce and analyse facts
 – to draw consequences and decide on action
Task: – to restore Arab positions
– to prevent the conflict from spreading
The course of events:
In mid-May, based on the data of military intelligence, the Soviet side informed the 
leaders of the United Arab Republic and Syria that Israel was preparing to attack the 
progressive system in Syria. They replied that they also had such reports, but were 
calm because they were prepared [for such an attack].
The Soviet Union was then surprised by the steps taken by the United Arab Repub-
lic – the demand for the withdrawal of UN troops, the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba – 
steps which Nasser did not discuss in advance. The Arab leaders stated that their goal 
was not the outbreak of war, but to restore the situation that had prevailed prior to the 
Suez aggression in 1956. In order to strengthen their defence forces, on 25 May they 
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again requested military supplies from the Soviet Union, which they then received. 
Although in the final days of May there were increasing signs of an intensification of 
Israeli war preparations (even one of the advisors at the U.S. embassy in Cairo spoke 
of the danger of an Israeli attack), Nasser kept emphasising that the military factor 
had lost its significance, and that a political solution had to be found. Such ideas 
halted attempts by officers of the Egyptian army to achieve a first strike against Israel.
All of this shows that Nasser and his staff did not recognise the extent of the 
danger, they misjudged their own and the enemy’s military abilities, and they did not 
take the necessary military measures.
Discussions with Syrian leaders in May showed that they were even more opti-
mistic in terms of their judgement of the situation and the military chances. They 
thought that conditions were right for the military destruction of Israel. The Soviet 
Union called on them to demonstrate sobriety, moderation and realism.
At the end of May and in early June, the Soviet Union warned Israel several times, 
underlining that a peaceful way out of the complicated situation had to be found. The 
Israelis also misled the Soviet Union when Prime Minister Eshkol assured the Soviet 
ambassador that they had no aggressive plans or aims.
Until the outbreak of the military conflict, the Soviet Union focused its strength 
on the UN deflecting the pressure on the United Arab Republic in connection with 
the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, and on preventing a military demonstration by the 
imperialist countries.
From the first hour of the Israeli aggression on 5 June, a crisis arose. In the first 
hours of combat operations, the United Arab Republic lost most of its military forces 
(air force and tanks). Organised resistance was completely absent, and the army of 
the United Arab Republic disintegrated at the first strike. Although Nasser gave an 
optimistic statement even on the morning of 6 June, it was clear from the words of 
Marshal Amer, who had better knowledge of the military situation, that for the Soviet 
Union the most important tasks were to save what could be saved, to preserve Nasser’s 
regime even at the cost of compromises and concessions, and to achieve the cessation 
of armed hostilities. At the same time, in order to assist the Egyptians, they began to 
supply 200 fighter planes and 200 tanks via an air bridge to Egypt. In the Security 
Council, Comrade Fedorenko first demanded the condemnation of the aggressor, the 
guaranteeing of a ceasefire, and the withdrawal of troops to their starting positions. 
However, owing to the constant deterioration in the military situation, from 7 June, at 
the request of the United Arab Republic, the main tasks became the guaranteeing of a 
ceasefire and the prevention by political means of a further advance of Israeli troops. 
At the same time, in order to halt the aggression, the Soviet Union held out the pros-
pect of breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel.
Analysing the events that have occurred, one must see the reasons why the situ-
ation developed in this way. Israel is not an independent country, but a satellite and 
pawn of American imperialism. The war against Israel is being fought against imperi-
alism. The balance of power is not favourable for those in the Arab world. Imperialism 
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has prevailed there for decades, while Socialism arrived just two decades ago, and 
so our possibilities are limited. Until 5 June, Nasser had achieved political successes 
and, as a consequence, he overestimated his strength and underestimated the extent 
of the military threat.
In the current situation and in the coming period, the goals must be the preserva-
tion of the progressive Arab regimes, the cessation of armed hostilities and then, in a 
lengthy diplomatic struggle, the withdrawal of the Israeli aggressor’s troops.
It would seem worth publishing a statement on our consultations.
3. Comrade Grechko’s report:
Israel has been prepared for aggressive action for some time. Since April of this year, 
it has increased the number of its troops from 70,000 to 200,000.
Regarding the quantitative data, the military situation prior to 5 June showed that 
the Arab countries had superiority.
In recent years, the Soviet Union has supplied many weapons to the United Arab 
Republic, worth 1.6 billion roubles (Rb.) in total. These weapons include:
570 combat aircrafts
820 tanks
2000 artillery and guns
160 air defence missiles
The military assistance of similar composition given to Syria has a value of 700 million 
Rb. The Soviet Union has trained more than 6,000 Arab officers at Soviet military 
institutions. At the time of the outbreak of combat operations, almost 500 Soviet mil-
itary advisors were residing in the United Arab Republic.
Prior to combat operations, with regard to infantry, the air force, tank units and 
artillery, the United Arab Republic had, in general, 1.5 times the strength of Israel. 
Examining this same data, the warring Arab countries had a superiority of 2.5 over 
Israel.
Owing to the poor preparedness, disorganisation and lack of discipline of the mil-
itary forces of the United Arab Republic – as well as the unexpectedness of the attack 
on the very first morning of hostilities – 50 per cent of the Egyptian Air Force was 
destroyed, as were most of the tank units and artillery. By the end of the first day, the 
uniform leadership of the Egyptian Army had ceased, the units were dispersed and 
the enemy had seized the military equipment.
According to data from Soviet military intelligence, American units did not 
directly participate in combat operations.
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4. Comrade Novotny’s statement:
The Egyptian and Syrian leaders acted irresponsibly and overestimated their own 
power and Arab unity. They thought they could easily defeat Israel.
Czechoslovakia has already given a lot of assistance: it has offered major military 
assistance and has sent military advisors. After 5 June, the Political Committee voted 
to send further military aid.
Under the current circumstances, Nasser has to be kept in power by all means.
The publication of a consensual statement is the correct measure.
5. Comrade Tito’s statement:
Yugoslavia has been in contact with Nasser from the outset, and has supported his 
political steps: the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba and the restoration of the pre-1956 sit-
uation. At that time, Nasser had stated that he would not give a reason for the aggres-
sion, but if attacked, [Egypt] would fulfil its obligation.
Nasser was wrong: he did not know that announcing the desire for the destruc-
tion of Israel meant confronting the united front of imperialism. If someone wants to 
destroy Israel, he finds himself confronted not only by NATO but also by the European 
social democrats.
Yugoslavia has already supplied weapons and 50,000 tons of grain, and it has 
allowed the transfer of Soviet weapons. In the current situation, the main need is 
for political assistance. Now we have to take a stand against those seeking to topple 
Nasser, because he is more than a statesman. In the same manner, anti-Soviet pro-
paganda as well as hostile slander discrediting the Soviet Union, which is arising in 
several regions in the Arab world, has to be repelled.
At the same time, it appears that the reality of some of our publicly represented 
positions is being revised amid the present circumstances. We have been saying for 
years now that local wars have to be avoided, because they can grow into world wars. 
We still think this, but the imperialists are acting in the opposite way: they are provok-
ing an increasing number of local conflicts and are slowly pushing us back. It seems 
that the accumulation of nuclear weapons is leading to a proportionate decrease in 
the danger of local wars becoming global conflicts, and so we must be more steadfast; 
we should not allow them to use local wars to their advantage.
The coup in Greece should also be examined from this perspective for this, too, is 
part of the general plan to gradually destroy progressive forces and systems. Greece 
is not the last in the series: in collaboration with the Italians, the Americans want to 
destroy Yugoslavia, too.
This complicated situation requires us to meet more often in order to improve our 
relations. The imperialists must be shown that we are prepared to do anything, and 
that we will even go as far as war if our interests and our allies are at stake.
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The Italian, French, Belgian and Scandinavian Communists who blame, in addi-
tion to Israel, the Arabs for this conflict, are not right. On this issue, support has to be 
given to the Arabs, because they are fighting against the imperialists. It is right for us 
to adopt a joint declaration, in which we condemn the aggressor and assure Nasser 
and the Arab people of our solidarity.
6. Comrade Zhivkov’s statement:
He greeted those attending the meeting. The Bulgarian Party had also thought about 
proposing such a meeting.
From the first moment of combat operations, it was clear that the Arab soldiers 
are not capable of standing up to the Israelis. The Israelis had studied how to use 
weapons. The Americans and the British know that Israel, which they have supplied 
and trained, will win in the war, and this is why they have employed clever political 
tricks to announce their neutrality.
The Soviet Union has proceeded wisely; it has prevented the broadening of the 
conflict. At the same time, it has to consider that after the ending of combat opera-
tions there will be some fundamental questions, and our strengths should be concen-
trated on these questions.
They are:
a. The withdrawal of the aggressor to the starting point. The Israelis will try to sabo-
tage this, but we still have to achieve this with the international organisations by 
mobilising public opinion.
b. We have to confront agitation against the Soviet Union and against Socialism; 
events have to be portrayed in an accurate way.
c. Doubtless, further economic support must be given to the United Arab Republic 
and to Syria.
He agrees with Comrade Tito that we have to be tougher. If we do not hit back at the 
aggressor, then they will grow bolder, and this will also affect our political prestige.
He agrees with the publication of a joint statement.
7. Comrade Ceausescu’s statement:
The situation is grave. The question now is not, “how did we get here?”, although it 
would be worth talking about this in greater detail at some point.
It would have been better to hold this meeting prior to the onset of combat oper-
ations.
The Romanian Communist Party had analysed the situation on several occasions 
and concluded that everything had to be done to pre-empt war. They knew in advance 
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that the war could not end with an Arab victory and so, on behalf of the government, 
they called for the two parties to avoid war.
The Arabs thought they could destroy Israel. Their appeal in this respect did not 
serve to mobilise world opinion. Romania could not have supported such a position. 
Several Communist Parties in Western countries also faced a similar situation, as did 
the many parts of the progressive movement. The disputes in the region have to be 
resolved on the basis of the acceptance of the very existence of Israel and the Arab 
countries.
It would be worth studying what happened to the Egyptian Army, so that the nec-
essary lessons can be drawn. The Egyptians knew everything two weeks in advance; 
the army was well equipped, but did not fight. Doubtless there are internal and exter-
nal factors, and identifying them would offer important insights for a better under-
standing of the picture.
He agrees with Tito that we do not have well elaborated ideas for dealing with 
imperialism’s strategy of local wars.
In the Arab situation, there is at present no military solution that could change 
the situation. For this reason, strong political and diplomatic pressure must be com-
menced, so that we compel the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories. The 
balance of power must be altered using peaceful means in favour of the Arabs, so that 
Israel also survives.
Given that the Romanian Communist Party cannot give its approval to a statement 
that condemns Israel alone for the outbreak of war, Comrade Ceausescu opposed the 
publication of a statement.
8. Comrade Gomulka’s statement:
If we had met two or three days earlier it would not have changed the picture.
Nasser’s fundamental mistake was first that he did not consult with his friends 
and allies, and second that he and many of our comrades underestimated Israel’s 
capabilities. Nasser’s action pre-determined the outbreak of war. 
Aqaba was not a reason but a pretext. Nasser wanted to push back Israeli posi-
tions, to increase his prestige and achieve Jordan and Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement 
with the United Arab Republic. This led the United States and Britain to conclude that 
Nasser had to be dealt with and toppled, because otherwise the Arab world would 
soon be completely lost to the West.
The military outcome of the struggle was largely determined by the fact that 
modern military equipment was placed in the hands of unskilled, undisciplined and 
illiterate Egyptian soldiers, who were unable to make it function. In terms of educa-
tion, the Israeli army is far ahead of the Arabs. By threatening Israel’s destruction, 
Nasser assured the fluctuating solidarity of the countries of the Arab world, but he 
denied himself the support of global public opinion. This is why the Israelis did not 
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need American intervention, but if things had gone badly, the Americans would have 
immediately launched the Sixth Fleet.
The task now is to save Nasser. To this end, measures are needed that strengthen 
his internal positions among the people, while also showing the historical respon-
sibility of Israel and American imperialism for three outbreaks of aggression in two 
decades. At present, a ceasefire seems to be the next important step. Then prepara-
tions are needed for further diplomatic measures: for the withdrawal of the aggressor 
and the realisation of the rights of the Arabs.
He supports the publication of a joint statement.
9. Comrade Ulbricht’s statement:
The events in the Middle East are due to the aggression not only of Israel, but also of 
NATO. According to NATO, first the balance of power has to be changed in this region, 
and then the German Democratic Republic can be liquidated.
Nasser’s actions were correct. If we had taken a stance together and in an organ-
ised manner, and if we had used other instruments in addition to diplomatic chan-
nels, the aggression could have been prevented.
Nasser should have consulted with the Soviet Union, but the relationship was not 
of that kind – and not only the United Arab Republic was at fault. Unfortunately, even 
among ourselves, we cannot always agree even on economic issues. 
The manner in which the Soviet Union has proceeded was right, because it pre-
vented the spread of the conflict. At the same time, we have to confront the United 
States’ global strategy with our own strategy; we cannot concede to their blackmail.
He agrees with the publication of a joint statement.
10. Comrade Kádár’s statement:
 – Greetings to the participants in the meeting.
 – Thank you for the information, it had illuminated certain issues.
 – Antecedent: Israel threatened Syria. The oil conflict.
 – The dissatisfactory nature of Arab political and military measures against Israel.
 – The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries had done what they needed to do.
 – The situation that has arisen is a defeat for progressive Arabs, and thus for us, 
too.
 – The task: to fight for and assist the retaking of Arab positions – both politically 
and militarily.
 – Politically: in propaganda – against Israel, particularly at the UN.
 – Public opinion: [partly – AK] correct, [partly – AK] disturbed, the ceasefire agree-
ment, us!
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 – On the basic issues, the same stance – or a joint stand – should be taken, [for 
example – AK] these talks, public statement.
11. Comrade Brezhnev’s closing words:
Thank you for attending. The ideas and analyses raised were beneficial.
Loss awaits us wherever nationalism raises its head and all other aspects are 
ignored.
The Soviet Union has done everything to rescue the United Arab Republic and its 
achievements. They have been, and are, in daily contact with all the Socialist coun-
tries. 
The Soviet Union cautioned Nasser, but others influenced him as well, including 
the Chinese.
The picture shows that the struggle continues between progress and the forces 
of imperialism. Now, owing to political and economic factors, the United States has a 
strong advantage in the region.
Today’s experiences also prove the necessity of meeting more often.
He recommends the drafting of a joint statement.
III. The adoption of a joint declaration:
The Romanians’ position – only a factual communiqué.
IV. Events since Saturday afternoon:
a. The Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations.
b. Afternoon – Czechoslovakia.
c. Consultation between Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. Warning to the Israeli gov-
ernment.
d. Sunday – Bulgaria broke off relations.
e. Monday – in agreement with the Poles, we did too.
 – grave act of aggression;
 – repeated violation of the Security Council’s ceasefire resolutions;
 – territorial claims made by leading Israeli politicians;
 – ignoring the [need for] withdrawal of troops.
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Memorandum
On 12 June 1967, Comrade János Kádár telephoned Comrade Brezhnev, who gave him 
the latest news regarding the situation in the Middle East. There is quiet on all fronts, 
although Syria complained both today and yesterday that the Israelis were sneaking 
forward even without a struggle. But overall the situation has stabilised.
Comrade Kádár informed Comrade Brezhnev about our action that had been agreed 
upon with the Polish comrades – the severing of diplomatic relations with Israel. 
Comrade Brezhnev replied that this is in line with the common position elaborated in 
Moscow. He is pleased that everything is in order here, and that we can take this step. 
This also applies to Comrade Gomulka and his fellows.
In Moscow there is credible data that the ambassadors of the Arab countries are 
speaking indignantly of the Romanians’ conduct, and according to reports, their 
countries are even pondering whether to break off diplomatic relations with Romania.
President Boumediène has just arrived in Moscow, and he unexpectedly stated 
this intent this morning. He is now coming with Comrade Kosygin and other Soviet 
leaders from the airport towards Moscow.
Today the Political Committee of the CPSU convened, and it elaborated on further 
measures. They are awaiting the discussion with Boumediène, and then in all likeli-
hood they will decide to demand the immediate convening of the UN General Assembly.
Finally, Comrade Brezhnev has promised to inform Comrade Kádár about the 
talks with the Algerians, and will do so this evening if it is urgent.
P.S. Comrade Kádár suggested that our foreign ministers should consider which 
country should represent the interests of the Socialist countries in Israel: Romania, 
Yugoslavia, or Finland, perhaps? Comrade Brezhnev’s preference was also for the 
latter solution. Comrade Kádár also stated that it should be suggested to the Algerians 
that they ask Romania for its opinion on diplomatic relations, given that five Socialist 
countries have already broken off relations. Comrade Brezhnev will consider this.
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10 Minutes of the Meeting of the Political Committee
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[….]
Comrade JÁNOS KÁDÁR:
I would like to add to what Comrade Komócsin has stated, in part by mentioning 
several issues arising at the international conference and in part by repeating things 
so that we understand the factors requiring our consideration in the course of the 
work ahead.
I would also begin by mentioning what we have done already. The four members 
of the group have co-operated with each other, sometimes meeting several times every 
day. In addition, we have also worked in close co-operation with the Foreign Affairs 
Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the agit-prop group – above all the press 
section, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defence. We have also maintained 
contact at the international level, informing each other and co-ordinating measures. 
In fact, the conference in Moscow should be seen as an integral part of these inter-
national consultations and negotiations, because this was what it was. I should add 
that, concerning important measures, the group has always striven to consult with 
members of the Political Committee and even with members of the Council of Minis-
ters. We ask that this should be acknowledged and approved.
Concerning the measures, I think the Political Committee can see that we were 
right – despite the reality of war – to organise, on the domestic front, merely a state of 
alert in the top positions, while generally instructing the Party, state and civil bodies 
to continue their work normally.
At the same time, diplomatic steps were being taken – as well as several mili-
tary activities. Let us examine the diplomatic steps, because we shall need this later, 
when reviewing. First of all, the Hungarian government issued a statement. We then 
examined the note sent to us by the Israeli prime minister and responded to it. Then 
a statement was made at the Moscow conference in the form of a joint communiqué; 
then on Saturday, a kind of warning was made to the Israeli government, and finally 
diplomatic relations were broken off. Under the circumstances, these measures were 
correct.
On the military front, the Ministry of Defence undertook a number of observation 
functions. In addition, another measure was taken: namely, on behalf of Hungary, we 
consented to the establishment of an airlift, which was directed across Hungary for 
the duration of the war. The Political Committee should know this. The route of the 
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airlift was: the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Yugoslavia; the other half ran above the 
Mediterranean Sea. This was in operation, and is still operating now. I mention this 
because, under certain rules, this is automatically possible, but in such cases it is a 
matter for negotiation. In this regard, Yugoslavia responded immediately and agreed 
with it. These are the major aspects of the measures requiring approval. These mea-
sures must be registered, and this policy must be continued in the future too.
Comrade Komócsin has described the events leading up to the conference in 
Moscow. It was certainly organised remarkably quickly. Consultations began at two 
o’clock and by four o’clock everyone’s response had already arrived and the decision 
was taken to hold discussions. The discussions were actually proposed by the Polit-
ical Committee of the GDR, but their proposal fell on sympathetic ears, because all 
parties were aware of the need for a meeting. We didn’t ponder over it for long either: 
we decided at four o’clock to depart at eight o’clock.
We took part in the joint efforts there. When we decided at four o’clock to travel, 
we already knew that the Romanians and Tito were coming too – and it should be said 
that it was they who announced their participation.
The real work – I just mention this for other reasons – began on Friday at 3.30 
p.m. Moscow time and ended at 2 a.m. under very poor working conditions that were 
a consequence of the situation. The Soviets held a kind of information session, then 
we consulted; all delegations voiced their opinions, and the “fruit” of our labours was 
a brief statement of five, six or eight sentences. But even this was extremely difficult 
to put together. On Friday afternoon and evening, the situation on the front became 
critical; information was constantly being brought in for discussion, and the situation 
was changing every half an hour, so that whatever we had been discussing just an 
hour before lost its significance. Moreover, it was the usual collective wording, which 
is not always a good thing.
Concerning the whole conference, I would like to say – with a view to the Political 
Committee approving our attendance at the conference, in the knowledge of these 
facts – that in our judgement it was necessary and extremely useful for a variety 
of reasons. First, we received answers to issues that were/are troubling us and our 
leadership; second, it was really just a consultative exchange of views, the statement 
made there was, under the given political circumstances, of significance to world pol-
itics, surprised the enemy, was drawn up immediately, a significant collective force 
emerged, and this had the right effect both on the Arabs and the enemy.
I would like to speak about several aspects of the consultative conference and 
then, at the end, I shall return to the joint agreement about what has to be done.
First of all, a few words about the issues that we received information about, 
which then helped us to understand some things. For us too, it was an important 
question, because we didn’t understand what had happened on the front – had 
preparations been poor or had there been a lack of force? And also the issue of the 
UN Security Council resolution, which referred merely to a ceasefire – which had 
been immediately denounced by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and a stand had also 
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been taken by various other Arab countries. Perhaps comrades will remember that 
the Soviet Union’s stance was met in the capitals of various Socialist countries with 
astonishment – frankly, we too were surprised – because the framework of informa-
tion and consultation had always included the need to gain approval for a double 
resolution, that is, a ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops to behind the demarcation 
lines. This was the reason the Soviet Union was struggling against the Americans – in 
the end, it came as a surprise that such a resolution was formulated. We could find no 
explanation for this.
I will cover several important and major issues, although I don’t want to repeat 
myself. We were given exact and detailed information there about political matters as 
well as military matters.
Regarding political matters, perhaps the most important aspect is that, concern-
ing the two measures by Egypt – namely, the withdrawal of UN troops and the closure 
of the Gulf of Aqaba – the Arabs failed to consult with the Soviet comrades; thus, the 
Soviet comrades were met by a fait accompli. Regarding the ceasefire resolution, I 
would like to emphasise that the fact is that this happened at the request of the Arabs 
– of the Egyptians. On Thursday evening, a situation developed in which Amer – who, 
at the time, was legally and formally commander-in-chief of the armed forces – was in 
contact with the Soviet Union and, as such, negotiated with the Soviet comrades. On 
Thursday afternoon or evening, Amer stated that a resolution on a ceasefire was very 
much requested and hoped for, because such a situation had developed. And follow-
ing this there was no time to confer with anyone, they simply voted on the ceasefire.
The military situation is a different matter, and generally concerns the military 
part of the issue. The Soviet data are more exact than are ours, but they are roughly 
the same as the ones that we received. The comrades demonstrated what had been 
the military situation in the period prior to the Israeli surprise attack. They described 
it and backed it up with data, facts and maps. This showed that the Arab armed forces 
had been numerically superior in terms of men as well as the major military tech-
nical means like military aircraft, tanks and artillery. Furthermore – and this is just 
as important – the Soviet Union had exact knowledge of the position of the Israeli 
armed forces even before the attack and informed the leadership of the Egyptian 
armed forces accordingly. This is almost as important as the proceeding issue. And 
the Soviet comrades then provided us with exact information, revealing that the great 
majority of this military technology was Soviet military technology, which had been 
given to the United Arab Republic and Syria in a proportionate manner for years – 
worth in total two and a half billion Roubles non-repayable. These were up-to-date 
modern armaments, aircraft, tanks etc. and even rockets. So this is the situation as far 
as armaments are concerned.
In reality, of course, when talking about the balance of power we shouldn’t just 
refer to numbers. If I say that on the Arab side this was the extent of their forces, 
men, military technology, armed power etc., then one should also remember that we 
are talking about five or so Arab countries – although it is true that a whole series of 
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Arab countries placed their armed forces under Egyptian command, but people who 
are intricately involved with such things know what this means. It means that there 
is no unified command. And another factor was the difference in quality of available 
personnel and the difference in quality between the various armies. To go back to the 
roots, it is a known fact that 80 per cent of Egypt’s population cannot read or write, 
while Israel has more highly qualified and skilled human resources. That is to say, 
people with primary education were set against university graduates, and this repre-
sented a decisive superiority in all respects. This means that the level of organisation 
and discipline of the units of the Arab army, the Egyptian and Syrian Armies, was 
extraordinarily low, which casts a revealing light on the story of this blitzkrieg. As 
we have just heard, by launching a surprise attack with a small number of military 
aircraft, the Israelis were able to destroy approx. 270 military aircraft in the first three 
hours of the war, 14 aircraft on the second day and 12 on the third day. This means 
that, of the 270 aircraft destroyed on the first day, just one was destroyed in the air 
– and Arab loss of life on the first two days was 12 men in two sorties. Incidentally, 
exactly the same thing happened to the tank divisions as well as air defence. Most of 
the Egyptian armed forces were destroyed without combat. As a result, the situation 
was such that there was really no organised resistance after the first day, and this is 
how the first day looked.
I would like to mention something from a propaganda point of view. Nasser and 
his group say that there was a heroic fight and this is subjectively and individually 
true of many thousands of Arabs. This is not mere propaganda. The truth is that the 
army and most of the leadership failed to stand the test. [I would say] just one thing, 
in this connection. Everyone knows what is order during military practice manoeu-
vres and what is order in war. At six o’clock on Monday morning, the pilots of the 
battle aircraft were asleep at home with their families. Nothing more need be said. 
At such times it is rule no. 1 that they should not be permitted to leave the garrison 
or the airfield. Of course, none of this may ever be talked about, but we can say a 
couple of words about this – just between ourselves, and we must consider amongst 
the reasons for the events what the Egyptian leadership really represents. For their 
base is a world Communist movement, or Socialist camp, the Soviet Union and in part 
Czechoslovakia, which also sends personnel there every year, but at the same time 
the matter is extremely complicated, because these people were Muslims, anti-Com-
munists, and we cannot say what was left of this in the minds of the officer corps. It 
is a fact, however, that in recent years the Israelis could rely fully and 100 per cent 
on the great powers supporting them and on their specialists and experts – whereas 
in Egypt, this was not the case. This does not apply to Nasser individually, but it is 
a point to consider. Comrade Novotny, for example, stated at a joint conference that 
they, too, have people and experts there, but that they were always in an abnormal 
situation and could not do anything worthwhile. This was the situation that unfolded 
before us, and thus there was no surprise that events on the battlefield developed as 
they did. I am no expert in strategy, but it is worth noting that this was a war fought 
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over a relatively small area, and given how things looked on the Arab side, a small 
area was simply not enough. There is a difference between Israel and the Arab coun-
tries in terms of degree of mobilisation. If events had turned into a drawn-out war, the 
balance of power might have been reversed in three to six weeks....
[I shall now mention] two statements made at the conference – and perhaps I 
shall mention our own one too, so that comrades might see how we view our own 
situation.
Comrade Tito’s speech – of course, simply the fact that they came and took part 
– was, in our judgement, extremely positive in a whole manner of respects. There 
was even an element of self-criticism from Comrade Tito in this matter, which is sig-
nificant. I have already mentioned that the Arabs did not consult with the Soviet 
Union about the withdrawal of UN troops and the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, or 
about another very important issue, namely the restoration of the pre-1956 position. 
Comrade Tito said that they had consulted with them and that they had supported 
these measures. At least he did say that this had happened, and this was a positive 
thing, because he didn’t have to say it. That they had consulted with them, and this 
is indeed understandable since they have an old and close relationship with Egypt, a 
relationship that is older and more permanent than the Soviet Union’s relationship. 
Comrade Tito also told us that they too had helped Egypt, by donating substantial 
quantities of food and technical military aid. By way of conclusion, he mentioned that 
they had immediately consented to the establishment of the airlift.
Comrade Tito raised several very important issues – of course there was little 
analysis; generally, we spoke very briefly, discussing just several aspects of the sit-
uation. He too did this – but he also mentioned an issue of great significance, and 
it was particularly important that he mentioned it – on behalf of the Yugoslav Party, 
the Yugoslav Communists and the Yugoslav regime. His first such remark was that 
we should meet more frequently, to discuss developments and our responses, and to 
agree upon measures, so that we should put forward the same position and, if neces-
sary, might act together. This was an important statement and, by personally attend-
ing the conference, he showed that he thinks it is, too.
Another matter: he said that we have an old precept that we should review – that 
in the present era, with the degree of development of military technology and in the 
era of atomic weapons, there are no local wars, because all local wars can develop 
into world wars. Thus we are against all local wars, and consider our sole task to 
localise and stub out local wars. He said that in their opinion, this precept was incor-
rect and that experience had demonstrated otherwise. Experience had shown that the 
more atomic weapons were accumulated, the more this acted against world war and 
against local wars developing into world wars, but that the imperialists were organ-
ising a whole series of local wars and attacks against us and other progressive forces, 
and that for this reason we should view local wars in a different light, and that we 
must formulate plans and concepts in this respect.
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The third thing is partly related to this. He said that we the Socialist countries 
should have a concept and a plan against the imperialist concepts and the NATO 
plans. He referred to the Greek coup and said that, at present, they think the imperial-
ists are seriously considering a plan to topple the Yugoslav regime by forging together 
the Greek and Italian bodies. In this connection, he said that we should meet several 
times, and given these developments we should have plans and concepts to bring an 
end to this process. In this regard, he even said that we should show the imperialists 
that we are prepared to do anything and that we would even go to war if our vital 
interests were at stake. This is a necessity in their opinion. These are matters worth 
thinking about.
[I shall mention] briefly, the Romanian statement. The Romanian speech was 
extremely generalised and was more concerned with assessing the situation rather 
than asking questions. That is to say, there was no word about what we should do 
then and there – on Friday afternoon or evening. Instead, their whole speech urged 
analysis. They pointed out that we had still not analysed what the Brazilian Party 
and the Indonesian Party had done what and when. That is, they called for analysis, 
and said that we should meet again and that we should have already met. Comrade 
Ceausescu said that if we had met around 20 May, we could have prevented the war. 
Several people reacted to this. Moreover, in addition to the statement that if we had 
met around 20–26 May we could have prevented war, he also seemed to infer that if – 
instead of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic – we and perhaps Romania 
had together taken the matter in hand, we could have prevented events unfolding; 
whereas, the fact that war took place showed the weakness or ineptitude of the 
Soviet Union and the Arab Republic. None of this was openly expressed, but this was 
somehow the meaning of what he said – at least this was what I made of his words.
He then criticised those Arabs – who really are to be criticised – who had said 
that they would destroy Israel. And he said that such statements had not served to 
mobilise the world’s progressive forces etc. He then suggested we should study what 
had happened to the Egyptian Army, because this would provide us with valuable and 
important experience. And – let us not forget that this was stated on Friday evening 
– it was stated that, in the current situation, there was no military solution; instead 
there was a need for a political war.
Finally, [I should like to say] a few words about the communiqué. What happened 
was that there was a draft declaration, which was handed out to everyone. The Roma-
nians stood up and said that they did not agree with the draft and that they suggested 
we should simply issue a factual communiqué stating that we had come together and 
had discussed the Middle-Eastern issue. The conference was being led at that stage 
by Comrade Brezhnev who said, in his reasons, that during the break the Romanians 
had told him they would not sign a communiqué calling Israel an aggressor. And that 
they had said they could not sign it, because all Parties and countries had their own 
opinions on this issue. At that point, the Romanians became irritated and interrupted 
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him, saying that was not the point but that they did have a proposal and that Comrade 
Brezhnev should talk about that.
The Romanian proposal was received in a very interesting manner at the con-
ference. Afterwards Comrade Tito asked to speak and he said that the sentence on 
the fourth page should be reworded in such and such a manner etc. Then everyone 
started to correct the text – the Romanians just sat there. Then Comrade Tito said that 
here in the text it reads Israel and the imperialist powers behind Israel, America... and 
let us write Britain too. Then he said, and let us also state that Israel is an aggressor, 
because, unless we do, I won’t be able to go home, for we have told the whole of Yugo-
slavia who the aggressor is.
At the end of that debate, the Romanians again asked to speak, suggesting that 
there should be two communiqués, because if they didn’t sign the disputed commu-
niqué, it might seem as if they had not even been there. This is how the two commu-
niqués came about. And they even suggested that the first communiqué should refer 
to the fact that some parties were issuing a statement while others were not. This 
suggestion was rejected, since it was going to be apparent anyway, because the two 
communiqués were to be made public side by side.
And concerning our impressions. The impression of those of us who were there 
was that the Romanian comrades wanted to come and to take part in the discussion, 
but that they had come with a determination not to call Israel an aggressor and to take 
a stand against this being done. Of course, we do not know what they were thinking, 
but perhaps they thought they could win over Yugoslavia to their position – although 
this is not certain. What could be felt much more strongly was that they wanted to be 
there and to take a stand, but that they would not accept any declaration calling Israel 
an aggressor.
Moreover, it also seemed to us that they really could not be bothered to explain 
their position. One could feel their commitment, but they did not mention a single 
reason for a neutral position.
In the end the view arose that the Romanians had somehow committed them-
selves somewhere. I don’t want to go any further than this, because I do not mean 
that they had decided to sell out the Socialist Republic of Romania, but the kind of 
behaviour we had experienced at the time of their establishing diplomatic relations 
with the FRG re-emerged – but now under the graver circumstances of war.
I must also mention our own response. I will tell all of this so that you see and 
understand our position. Generally, most of the contributions were very short, just a 
sentence or so about the issues. Prior to this, however, I should like to return to what 
went before, and we spoke of such things there.
The affair began when Israel threatened Syria that it would topple the regime. 
However, one should also mention the oil conflict, which took place there some time 
ago – for this is also a starting point. We said that the Arab statements made against 
Israel were wrong. Then the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries – above all 
the Czechs, because of their armaments, and others, who collaborated in a specific 
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manner, had done what they could. It had to be seen that the Soviet Union and other 
Socialist countries had done what they could in terms of military supplies and other 
assistance and at the level of diplomacy. It had to be stated that the situation that had 
arisen was a failure and a defeat for the Arabs, for the anti-imperialist and progressive 
Arab regimes – and for us too in a direct manner. This must also be accounted for. In 
this situation, for us the task is to fight and to assist the Arabs in winning back their 
positions on a political level, and, where there is war, at a military level too. Politically 
in the United Nations Organisation and in domestic and international propaganda, 
which is of great significance now. At that point I mentioned – because several speak-
ers had mentioned the disquiet amongst fellow Parties in Western Europe – that there 
was disquiet in the Socialist countries too, but that public opinion had basically taken 
the right course and had correctly assessed the matter and was against the imperial-
ists, but that in certain parts of public opinion, and even within the Party member-
ship, there was disquiet. There was disquiet concerning the issue of aggressor and 
also concerning the issue of the judgement of the Arabs and other major issues. For 
this reason we support negotiated joint action and support such a continuation of 
the war, and we shall play our part in the political and every other respect, where 
necessary.
The whole conference – one can say this because even the Romanians did not 
protest (who sat there until two in the morning because the conference had not been 
wound up, even though it was clear by then that they would not sign the commu-
niqué) – agreed that the battle to win back and keep Arab positions must be con-
tinued, that we should fight to maintain the progressive Arab regimes, because this 
was extraordinarily important, and thus, accordingly, some measures had been taken 
even in the meantime. We agreed with this.
I mention this because it is important that there was no mention, at the joint 
conference or within the framework of a separate discussion, of who should break off 
diplomatic relations, nor when and with whom – all were to decide that themselves. 
At that time, only the preliminary Soviet statement was known. I think this was the 
right way to proceed. That’s all I have to say about the conference.
I must say something more about the whole matter. First of all, [I’d like to say] 
something about preliminary events. I would like to go over this again, and this is 
important because we will be dealing with these issues a lot in the future.
The official point of departure is that Israel threatened Syria on about 20th May 
that it would attack the country and topple the regime. The next development was that 
the United Arab Republic stated immediately that it would not allow this to happen. 
I think this Arab position is the right one. The next step – and this is very important 
and I should like to draw attention to it – was that on 26 May the United Arab Repub-
lic informed the Soviet Union that it was determined to restore, by any means, the 
pre-1956 position, and that nothing would deter it. This meant the Gulf of Aqaba and 
Lord knows what. Thus, here are the three essential issues upon which they failed to 
consult the Soviet Union or us, although they did tell the Yugoslavs. They did consult 
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with us on their standing up for the Syrians, and we supported them in doing so. But 
they did not consult with us, in any manner whatsoever, upon restoring the pre-1956 
position, and thus – in part as a consequence of this – they did not consult with us 
upon the withdrawal of UN troops or the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba. Moreover, they 
were also resolved to closing the Suez Canal. And they didn’t consult upon that either. 
This, too, is of significance, of political significance, because all countries of the world 
involved in trade use the Suez Canal. To close the canal would amount to a measure 
against all countries involved in commercial shipping. Immediately 75 Soviet ships 
carrying vital supplies would be stuck there. This is also part of the course of events.
Another point: the Soviet Union opposed the four-power conference because the 
Arabs told them that they were against it.
Something more about Nasser, his resignation or his staying in power. These were 
dramatic hours then at the time, and just a few bits can be made known. And, by the 
way, Nasser did not consult with the Soviet Union about this either – or with anyone 
else. What happened was that at the right time Amer asked to see the Soviet ambas-
sador and told him that they – that is, he and Nasser – were about to make their last 
announcement, then resign, hand over power to someone else, and be done with it. 
He didn’t say anything else. Comrade Tito was pleased about the successor, because 
it roughly meant the continuation of the regime, but then it transpired that this was 
not the case, for the man in question had fought against Nasser, then co-operated 
with him, and then fought against him again. And again this happened, by the way, 
just as Comrade Gomulka had been expressing his thoughts for a half an hour on the 
need to save Nasser – and then came news of his resignation. Thereafter there was an 
on-the-record and off-the-record discussion of what could now be done. I said that 
whatever happens an effort must be made to place Nasser and Amer in safety – this 
is the first step! Tito immediately told Nasser to revoke his resignation – and this did 
have some effect upon him. Reading Nasser’s speech after the events, we should dis-
pense with one hypothesis. I have heard voices coming from a multitude of directions 
saying that Nasser wanted to blackmail the Soviet Union, and that his resignation was 
a clever tactical ploy. However, as I recall the situation, this was neither blackmail nor 
a tactical move, but rather an act that was to be expected. What he said in his speech, 
was, by the way, a right and proper matter. I think he was right to raise the issue of 
his own responsibility. I think what happened was that Comrade Tito sent a message 
and then probably the Soviet comrades sent a message too, and he then said he would 
delay his resignation until the next day, and then the mood of the public developed 
in the way that we already know about. And it is just as well that it did so, because as 
long as he is there, they won’t go right.
Another aspect is that the Algerians are extremely irritated and dissatisfied with 
everyone, with Nasser and with the Soviet Union, because they are permeated with 
Arab nationalism. It has to be said that theirs is the only army capable of something, 
an army built on trained cadres that has fought tough wars over many years. They 
are full of rage and are saying that unfortunately they have no border with Israel, 
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but that they will show how they can fight in a different way. My impression is that 
the Syrians too have slightly more earnest military procedures: the daily norm for 
armoured troops, particularly under such circumstances, is not an advance of 20 kilo-
metres – that is, there was combat and resistance. Syria’s society is more stable too; it 
has a workers’ movement, industry, a working class, and even if the government is as 
weak as dew, it is still more stable.
I apologise for going over these things, but it is extraordinarily important to run 
through them, because the upcoming tasks will not be easy. I am saying this for our 
own benefit. Many things may not be said outwardly: for instance, we cannot say that 
80 per cent of the Arab army is illiterate.
Regarding combat in the future, they have not directly requested us for anything. 
They did request military machinery even during combat from the Czechs, but in such 
a manner that it was impossible for them to say yes, because they asked for manned 
air units, which would have resulted in Czech units becoming involved in the war. 
They said they would provide weapons; furthermore, political assistance must be 
given at all levels, wherever possible.
Currently, an important event is the extraordinary general meeting of the UN, the 
exposure of the aggressor, its condemnation as such, and the exposure of the powers 
behind it. We have sent word to Moscow that if they do convene the UN general assem-
bly, then the delegations to the assembly should be led by the foreign ministers. More-
over, it is very important that we deal with the issues in an appropriate manner in 
domestic propaganda and in the press etc. And, in my view, we also face a task within 
the Party itself, and I should like to draw attention to this.
Generalised propaganda must, of course, go to the roots of the matter and form 
a clear picture. What is at stake is nothing less than approx. 60 per cent of total oil 
trade commercially in the world. This oil plays an enormous role in the supply of oil 
to Western Europe and – as Nasser has said – the Sixth Fleet also operates on Arab 
oil. So we have to go back to the roots. The imperialists have been on the rampage 
in these areas for centuries, and now the region is falling out of their hands, and 
they will not accept this, and are fighting to retain it. For centuries they have been 
there, have left their marks there, have had means of influencing there, and these 
countries have had their own difficulties since independence. The Socialist countries 
have been present in the region for roughly just ten years or even more recently, and 
thus have not yet acquired any real influence, the world’s two main political camps 
have been competing on unequal terms. And although we won’t probably write it 
in the newspapers, nevertheless it must be stated clearly in Party debates that the 
Socialist countries have never supported the Arab propaganda formulation that Israel 
must be destroyed. This would contravene the principles of our foreign policy; we do 
not support it, and it would weaken our anti-imperialist struggle, if we were now to 
debate using such formulations. We must, however, be clear on the aggressor issue.
By the way, another aspect of the affair is that Western governments have acted 
in a much smarter manner than they did in 1956. At that time, two great imperialist 
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powers – Britain and France – entered the war quite openly, and this permitted a 
quite different response from the Socialist countries, for it was far clearer who was 
the aggressor, and there was nothing like Israel with its population of three million 
beating an Arab force of 80 million. Moreover, the United States did not intervene 
in the battles and nor did anyone else. By the way, we received further information, 
which the Council of Ministers and we should know about. The Soviet fleet followed 
this Sixth Fleet visually at a distance of one kilometre – the aim was to ensure that 
they could see that the Soviets were following them. They passed alongside each 
other time and again. By the way, another aspect of this was that both fleets were 
armed with atomic weapons. So they were running alongside each other and a plane 
took off from the Sixth Fleet mother ship on one occasion for a trial flight and on 
another occasion to see how a torpedo had hit the American warship. There were no 
other sorties. This is the truth! This does not diminish their villainy, and there may be 
something in the Israeli bragging that they probably did have more tanks than we are 
aware of. This is possible, too.
By the way, everybody was operating there. Most Israeli airpower is French, and 
although the French government was neutral, it continued supplying spare parts. 
That is to say, they also participated in preparations, although they had no part in 
the combat itself – probably they thought that if the strike failed and Israel’s very 
existence was threatened, they could intervene immediately, and would do so from 
a very favourable position, given that they were physically there. These things must 
be known, and the public must be told whatever it needs to know, while we shall 
respond to whatever is not for public consumption at an internal conference.
Probably many people in Hungary will ask why the Romanians didn’t sign the 
communiqué. There are more people asking themselves this than there are people 
noting the presence of the Yugoslavs. And I don’t want to draw any far-reaching con-
clusions from this one-off case, but I think the two things are not of equal weight. The 
fact that the Yugoslavs accepted the communiqué is far more important than the fact 
that the Romanians were there but failed to accept it. Moreover, the whole basic posi-
tion is very interesting in the current situation. We shouldn’t go in zigzags, because 
if calmer waters approach we may find that the position of the Yugoslavs differs from 
ours, but this was how it was manifested at this point. It is possible that the Yugoslav 
position on these issues may further improve and may become even closer to our own, 
because the situation that has arisen may be considered from very many aspects. And 
the Romanians will continue having to explain their behaviour for some time to come, 
unless they are no longer interested in anything but Western opinion. Of course, this 
is certainly not the case! Look at their statement. They left out the bit about Israel 
being the aggressor, but said all sorts of other things – they could have done nothing 
else. And, in connection with the Yugoslavs, there is another aspect worth examining. 
Apart from the great assembly of 1957, this was the first time they took part in discus-
sions since 1948. And I would have liked to turn to Comrade Ceausescu and ask: why 
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don’t you look another five metres? The Yugoslavs went off for a while, but here they 
are now, with us once more.
Lastly, I would like to say something about what can be done inside the Party. I 
cannot say anything about this, but I do recommend firmness and consistency, and I 
ask that the PMO, the Agit-Prop Department or the Secretariat deal with the situation 
that has developed within the Party. I do not want anybody to panic, but we shouldn’t 
close our eyes to what is happening. This is a matter like the Berlin or Caribbean Sea 
crisis, or the shock that accompanied Khrushchev’s dismissal, and such things are 
always a lesson for the Party in general and particularly for the Party leadership. It is 
right here in front of our eyes that people’s real nature is revealed. Generally speak-
ing, such things are not manifest in day-to-day life. I am convinced that we are not 
talking about a mass and vast phenomenon, because the conduct of 500,000 Com-
munist Party members and several hundreds of thousands of young Communists in 
the country is basically in order. A smaller part of the Party membership, and I hope 
nobody will misunderstand me here, a part with considerable influence in certain 
areas, has behaved in a non-Communist manner. And I don’t want to draw some kind 
of conclusion based on race, and I understand that it is not clear to everyone who is 
the aggressor and attacker. A certain amount of anxiety is understandable, but this 
does not permit them to debate the position of the Party and the government on such 
a decisive issue as that of whom we should support and against whom we should 
fight. I cannot ignore this. This is a vital question for our system that the Party should 
be intact and stable. And if, as a result, Party membership were to decline, the danger 
would be a lesser one than a fluctuating membership. This may not be tolerated or 
permitted. Just think of the various relationships Party members and Hungarian cit-
izens have beyond the borders – just as many as they do here at home. And does 
this mean we should divide up the Party into an Israeli section, an Upper Hungary 
section, a Transylvanian section, and the Soviet Union left just with the men who 
have married Russian college girls? 
And there is another aspect. I recommend clear and consistent leadership in all 
areas rather than a fluster, but if such tendencies were to spread, then rules would 
have to be drawn up. Because to fatten people up in good jobs, who then take such 
positions in critical situations – this kind of thing cannot be permitted! So we must 
think about these things and do something too.
And I am thinking of minor matters as well. The agit-prop group did a good job 
in keeping things under control, but I didn’t like the fact that they didn’t give us 
anything from Comrade Szirmai’s speech on what he said about the situation in the 
Middle East. And yet, in his speech, Comrade Szirmai certainly said something else 
and not merely that the ‘central’ question was that students should criticise more cou-
rageously. And then the radio informs people that this and that happened during the 
week, and then the news is over and someone starts singing in English or whatever. 
I am sure that if the United States were to issue a statement on the Cuban issue, they 
would not then broadcast on the radio a Cuban jambo record. The various positions 
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taken by us must be better synchronised. Last week there was a war, and the fact that 
we were not involved in it is thanks to the good political stance taken. And if I meet 
any people who feel sorry for Israel, I will give them a sound beating! I hear that Illyés 
has said that he will go as a volunteer!
Today I saw an Izvestiya article explaining that people should not take positions 
based on whether they are Russian, Chinese, Arab or Jewish. This is a fundamental 
issue of contemporary world politics, and an appropriate position must be taken.
Comrade BÉLA BISZKU:
I recommend that the Political Committee should accept and acknowledge the infor-
mation received and the measures taken.
I have spoken with Comrade Pullai about how we should deal with these issues 
in the coming days in the course of political action, in part to expound and explain 
our position within the Party. Comrade Pullai is to make a proposal concerning this. 
A primary task is to inform the county Party committees; moreover, consideration 
should also be given to the fact that Party meetings are being held on international 
issues, and that these should be used to orient the Party membership correctly. The 
speakers are even now relying on the joint statement.
I suggest that, under the circumstances, a minimum state of alert should be main-
tained, because this matter will continue to drag on; there will be long diplomatic 
battles, and there may also be other types of clashes.
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Minutes of 36th session or the Presidium of the Central Committee, 13 June 1967 
[….]
Comrade David (Minister of Foreign Affairs): […] Pointed to various phenomena in 
our propaganda before and in the course of the Israeli–Arab conflict. He alerted to the 
preparations of celebration of the millennial existence of the Prague Jewish commu-
nity and to the activity developed in relation to it. Also he informed about the mea-
sures taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this connection, and asked paying 
more attention to this issue. Further he asked drawing relevant conclusions against 
the radio and television, where the situation is not good and apparently there are 
people, who are trying to produce at least ambiguities around Israel. This is indicated, 
on the one hand, the course of comrade Pudlák’s press conference, and on the other 
the character of information and journalist programmes in the radio and television 
during the Israeli aggression.
Also he pointed to anonymous letters supporting Israel, which the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has been receiving.
Comrade Novotný: […] We have to instruct the Ministry of the Interior to act far 
more strictly against the elements which use the situation for anti-state and anti-Party 
demonstrations. Also in this respect it is necessary to take these measures.
As far as the cadre measures are concerned, particularly in connection with 
the press conference of comrade Pudlák, we will draw conclusions, because this is 
extremely incorrect movement. 
The information shows that there are no pro-Israeli sentiments in our country, 
except for a few individuals. Our people soberly consider development of the situa-
tion. The worse thing is that there are antisemitic moods. This is not right. It is nec-
essary that our newspapers, our propaganda, acted, in this respect, far more sharply 
and harshly, although reasonably. From the Ostrava region and Slovakia very serious 
warnings of chauvinistic sentiments are coming. This is extremely wrong. If we would 
concede this, we would get to the other extreme. Also racist sentiments, which we 
must combat, remained here.
Once again I point out that in press we should come back to Vilner’s declaration, 
this is a fundamental and class position. This way we will give orientation to the sen-
timents, which has arisen here. 
Resolution drafted at the 37th Session of the Presidium of the CC CPČz, 20 June 
1967.
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Reasons Account
Based on the discussion and conclusions of the CC CPČz’s Presidium session on 13th 
June 1967 about consultation of the First Secretaries of the Communist and Workers’ 
Parties, and prime ministers of European Socialist countries in Moscow, the commit-
tee established by the Presidium submits assessment of the situation resulting from 
Israel’s aggression against the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries, with 
the aim to draw some basic findings and definitely confirm conclusions for our own 
and joint procedure with other Socialist countries in the immediate future. Another 
aim of the proposals is to give an impulse to a fundamental study and elaboration 
of the momentous questions of anti-imperialistic, anti-colonial and national-liber-
ation movement and its attitude to the Socialist system and workers’ revolutionary 
movement in capitalist countries. The material (without passages of purely internal 
character) would be delivered to the Central Committee of the CPSU with a request 
for opinion and comment on the situation assessment and a request for consider-
ing appropriate forms of how to secure a joint procedure of the Socialist countries in 
important questions – in this case how to coordinate actions of political and material 
help to the United Arab Republic, Syria and possibly also Algeria. 
[….]
Basic instruction from the aggression and proposals for further procedure
The armed combat at the Near and Middle East has shown that world imperialism, in 
the lead with the USA, is making use of all opportunities, wherever these turn up in 
the world, to attempt to stop the progression of nations’ fight for freedom and inde-
pendence, and to reinforce its position. It utilises the fact that the countries of the 
Socialist system exercise politics of peaceful coexistence spend enormous efforts to 
keep peace in the world and liquidate centres of war danger. Imperialism is trying, 
by means of subversion and coups, to debilitate and discredit them in the eyes of the 
non-Communist progressive world public and especially the developing countries, 
which hesitate before decision which way their further development will turn.
The Socialist countries, hobbled in their possibilities by the subversive activity 
of the Chinese leadership, which is extremely harmful to the international Commu-
nist and workers’ movement, have found themselves, facing the imperialistic powers’ 
policy, on certain defensive, which reflects primarily the fact that they, including the 
ČSSR, do not have an elaborate and thus effective conception that would prevent the 
imperialistic states’ policy from obstruction of progressive development in the world. 
It is necessary to consider the Arab countries’ failure to oppose the Israeli aggres-
sion a failure of the world powers of progress, the Socialist countries including. It is 
therefore indispensable to draw appropriate conclusions from the experience and in 
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the next phase of this fight to strive for limitation of negative impact of the military 
failure, and create prerequisites for gradual abrogation of successes, which Israel 
achieved by means of armed power. The ground on which it is possible to build is 
the fact that imperialism did not succeed to subvert the progressive regimes in the 
UAR and Syria by this attack, and, on the contrary, in the UAR, in case the reaction is 
successfully prevented from seizing the power, can reach faster development consid-
ering that the UAR leadership, as the first information show, learned from the military 
failure, and counter-revolutionary forces have been removed from responsible places 
and replaced by more progressive ones. 
The situation that has arisen places us under necessity to strive for reduction 
of the impacts of the Israeli military success to minimum. It assumes fight for with-
drawal of its army from the occupied territories and comeback to the status quo before 
aggression, i.e. behind ceasefire line of 4 June 1967.
The basis for reconciliation of the situation must be a gradual and long-lasting 
solution of the overall situation at the Near and Middle East on equitable basis, which 
would secure the rights of the Palestinian refugees and solution of the disputed ter-
ritorial problems in accord with the Charter and resolutions of the General Assembly 
of the UNO.
At the same time it is necessary to affect the Arab countries so that these exer-
cised responsible and realistic politics, especially in the spheres of economic and 
social development, and abandoned the slogans about Israel’s liquidation, which 
give a strong weapon in the hands of Israel’s protectors and confuse the world public 
opinion, and that they took into consideration the real situation and recognised Isra-
el’s existence after the agreement about compensation of damage, which the Israeli 
aggression caused, is reached.
[…]
The current state of affairs requires a resolute procedure of the Socialist countries on 
the international field in support of the Arab claims. With the interest to settle the 
situation in the Near and Middle East the Czechoslovak government expressed its 
approval of the Soviet initiative for convening special session of the General Assembly 
of the UNO and supports it completely. At the convention the Czechoslovak delega-
tion will proceed co-coordinately with Socialist countries and other states in order 
to enforce condemnation of Israel as an aggressor and so that terms of Israel’s with-
drawal to the ceasefire line were prepared, while realisation of the second claim does 
not require unconditional realisation of the first one. Also it will be necessary to claim 
Israel’s guarantees that it would cease being the center of turbulence and aggression 
in this part of the world.
Support for the Arab countries will also be expressed at the bilateral contacts 
between the ČSSR and countries of the third world, and some European and Asian 
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capitalist states, especially within the framework of the UNO and other international 
governmental and non-governmental organisations.
As the first political measure it is suggested to sent, in the immediate days, a per-
sonal plenipotentiary of the president of the ČSSR to President Nasir. This plan will 
be materialised in case the negotiations of Nasir’s plenipotentiary Ahmed Fuad, who 
is to come to Prague these days, vindicate its purposefulness. 
The task of the plenipotentiary of the President of the ČSSR is:
To elicit Nasir’s intentions in solving the conflict with Israel, internal political 
and economic problems of the country and its international relations.
To express our position on the situation and its solution. To emphasise that 
according to our opinion Israel must not be allowed to stay on the territories, which 
it conquered by aggression. For enforcing this claim the UAR and Arab countries can 
expect our full support. At the same time (we have) to explain why we have never 
agreed and would not agree to some Arabic countries’ demands of liquidation of the 
State of Israel.
We are willing to extend our help in the interest of sustaining progressive devel-
opment of the country. However, we need to have guarantees of its effective utilisa-
tion. Therefore we require an open statement on how would Nasir and his colleagues 
counter anti-Soviet and anti-Socialist sentiments and whether they restrict the influ-
ence of and remove reactionary officials from important places of the economic and 
political life, and the army.
During the negotiations with Nasir to emphasise the necessity of a most serious 
consideration and learning lesson from the past faults, necessity of a consistent adopt-
ing of realistic positions on the solution of the major questions and the importance 
of consultations with the befriended countries before he undertakes any important 
actions, above all those in the field of international politics.
To emphasise the importance of unity of the revolutionary powers in the country, 
and anti-imperialistic unity of the Arab countries, and to ask what steps is the UAR 
going to take in this respect in the immediate and more distant future, on the basis of 
the lesson learned from the course of the war conflict with Israel. 
After discussing the political issues, basic questions connected to our help, and 
economic and business relations of both countries would be debated.
[…]
In the interest of preserving the centres of progressive development in the Arab world 
it is necessary to provide primarily the UAR and Syria with comprehensive help. While 
providing the help it is necessary to consistently monitor guarantees of its maximal 
effectiveness.
As a result of the destruction of a great deal of military technique of the Arab 
states and as a result of the Western states’ position, above all the USA and England, 
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in the military sphere, a situation has arisen, which is creates favourable conditions 
for supplies of military technique from the Socialist countries to the Arab world. 
When keeping effective procedure, Czechoslovakia could use this situation for 
at least partial compensation of the losses and unfavourable impacts, which must 
be reckoned with. In order to achieve this goal it is suitable to keep the following 
principles:
1. To target our help primarily to accelerating supplies of the already contracted 
materials and to try to secure accelerated restoration of effectiveness of the tech-
nology, which has left in the Arab states, by supplies of spare parts, munitions, 
and possible assistance in repairs.
2. To convey to the UAR and Syria the fundamental willingness of the ČSSR to keep 
helping in building the economy and defence, however, the Czechoslovak possi-
bilities of supplies of the special material, based on the requirements of the UAR 
and Syria, will be communicated after consideration of requirements of all Arab 
countries in accord with possibilities of the Czechoslovak national economy.
3. The questions of gratuitous or only partially paid help, whether it be by supplies 
of military technology or sending out experts, will be consistently considered in 
accord with the economic possibilities of the Czechoslovak national economy 
and attendant expenses , which arise with such a help, will be taken into account.
4. The prospective gratuitous help will be limited only to the UAR, possibly to Syria 
on smaller scale, while with the other states regular terms of payment will be 
asserted. 
5. To utilise the fact that the Western Powers lent their help to Israel and sought to 
place supplies of special technology also in the Arab countries, which had so far 
been in a special sector the sole domain of the Western counties.
6. To consider the possibilities of direct negotiations with some Arab countries 
(Kuwait and Libya) about possibilities of settlement of the special technology 
supplies to the Arab countries, which are in a bad economic and financial situa-
tion. 
[…]
The task of out economic organs is to explore and materialise the possibilities of our 
active utilisation of the newly emerged situation in the Middle East for the benefit of 
our economic interests; among others for example to negotiate with the Arab coun-
tries about the possibility to deposit part of the foreign currency drawn from the 
Western banks in the Czechoslovak State Bank.
In the organs of the Council of Mutual Economic Help to actively support propos-
als for a thorough and instant co-ordination of economic help to the Arab countries.
The Israeli aggression against the progressive Arab countries and the complex sit-
uation, into which their progressive powers and European Socialist countries got, the 
impact of this conflict on the position of the Communist Parties on capitalist countries 
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and on the situation in the international Communist movement, once again under-
lined the urgency of a world consultation of the Communist and Workers’ Parties rep-
resentatives. 
Consultation of the issue of developing countries and national liberation move-
ment in relation to the International Communist movement should be one of the 
major questions of the next international consultation, which should consider the 
international situation and its development over the last years, and draw conclusions 
that would be abided by the whole movement in the questions of fight against impe-
rialism, liquidation of all forms of colonialism, sustaining progressive development 
in the world against the imperialistic strategy of export of counter-revolution by local 
wars and other means (reactionary putsches) and obstruction of our support to the 
progressive powers by the threat of nuclear war.
In this respect it will be necessary to discuss also the joint procedure of the Com-
munist and Workers’ Parties towards the national democratic parties in power, and 
other progressive parties and organisations. 
During negotiations with Comradely Parties’ representatives about the urgency of 
consultation and its programme, we will emphasise the importance of discussion of 
the above-mentioned questions and exchange opinion on their solution.
We are primarily concerned about the basic question of how to confront the impe-
rialistic attacks against the emerging centres of progressive development in various 
parts of the world. Within this framework it is necessary to elaborate a number of 
important questions, as e.g. the concept of reinforcing of the alliance of the Socialist 
system and national liberation movement, the concept of the political, military and 
scientific-technical help to the developing countries, etc.
The material covering positions and proposals of our side would then serve as a 
basis for elaboration of a joint assessment and procedure of at least those comradely 
parties and Socialist countries, which signed the Moscow declaration of 9 June 1967.
It is recommended to assign the International Department (of the CC CPČz) to 
immediately start elaboration on these questions in co-operation with relevant 
departments and institutions, and submit them for discussion by 15 September 1967.
Considering our relatively rich contacts with the progressive Arab countries (Party 
political, diplomatic, economic and technical relations) we had a relatively good 
picture of the situation in the countries and their weak points and flaws in various 
sectors. However, our co-operation lacked the aspect of an intensive, active effort to 
eliminate defective opinions and practice.
Only rarely we respond to incorrect tendencies and damaging opinions, for which 
we account by the principle of non-involvement in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries and Parties.
In the interest of supporting the progressive powers it will be necessary in our 
contacts to oppose, in a suitable way, incorrect opinions as well as practice, which 
would debilitate efficiency of our help, and actively intervene in discussion especially 
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in questions dealing with relations of the Socialist camp and the Third World as well 
as with the liberation movements. 
The course of events in the territory of the Arab East, which developed into the 
Israeli aggression, revealed defects and weak points in the activity of some authorities 
and insufficient political as well as moral preparedness of part of our workers abroad. 
It is also necessary to mention that the crises at the Near and Middle East have 
shown certain imperfections primarily in the intelligence work of all departments of 
the representative organs in the territory of the Near and Middle East. Also certain 
imprudence and unwariness has turned up in taking necessary emergency measures.
It is recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of National Trade and the Interior Ministry made analysis of the causes of 
these defects and weak points and took measures, which would preclude their recur-
rence both in the Arab and other countries.
Reflection of the events in the near East in our country has also revealed some of 
our weak points in influencing the public opinion. While some magazines (Literární 
Listy) systematically propagated the state of Israel as a peaceful, economically suc-
cessful, democratic and progressive, our public was not sufficiently informed about 
developments in the UAR and Syria. Similarly, in the beginning of the Israeli aggres-
sion, under the veil of “objectivity” and necessity to oppose the Western propaganda, 
information appeared in primarily the radio and television, which raised doubts 
about our assessment of the conflict’s character as an Israeli aggression. This fact 
is, in some measure, related to the cadre situation in the media of mass propaganda.
It is recommended to assign the Ideological Department of the CC CPČz with anal-
ysis of these flaws and suggest necessary measures.
Nowadays the content of our propaganda must be targetted primarily at strength-
ening of the ideas of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity of the 
progressive powers. Explain the core of the conflict in the Near East, reveal the real 
nature of the State of Israel by concrete facts. Oppose the Zionist propaganda, but at 
the same time antisemitism. For this purpose use the analysis of positions of both 
groups of the Communist Party of Israel. Oppose the danger of defeatism and feel-
ings of helplessness among the progressive citizens and contempt for the developing 
countries and their importance in the anti-imperialistic fight. 
In the intra-Party life consistently pay attention that the reports at the members’ 
meetings of the CPČz cells expressed solely opinions, which are in accord with the 
position of the CC CPČz to all questions discussed. For this purpose the organization-
al-political department of the CC CPČz will see that in the cells of the CPČz only the 
referees sent by higher Party organs are presented. 
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12 Message from Deputy Head of the Foreign Affairs Department 
of the CPSU
19 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 231.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Completed in 2 copies
Record
For Comrade János Kádár
At noon today, Comrade K.V. Rusakov telephoned from Moscow and, on behalf of 
Comrade Brezhnev, stated the following:
The Political Committee of the CPSU is now in session, and so Comrade Brezhnev 
apologizes to Comrade Kádár for not contacting him in person. However, the follow-
ing information is urgent.
Tomorrow the Central Committee of the CPSU will hold a meeting at which 
Comrade Brezhnev will report on the situation in the Middle East. The resolution 
adopted at the meeting will be published, but not the speech.
Nasser has strongly requested that the Soviet comrades send a senior Soviet 
leader – either Brezhnev or Kosygin or Podgorny – to Cairo in the days ahead on an 
unofficial visit. The aim of the visit would be exchanging views on important issues. 
As Comrade Brezhnev is holding a plenary meeting and giving a speech there, and 
Comrade Kosygin is in New York, the Political Committee has decided that Comrade 
Podgorny will travel to Cairo.
Comrade Podgorny will depart tomorrow morning shortly after the plenary 
session has begun (probably after the speech). He will fly via Belgrade, where there 
will be a technical stopover during which Comrade Podgorny will probably meet with 
Tito. During the conversation with Tito – if, indeed, such a conversation takes place – 
they will not think about agreeing on issues.
The Comrades will inform us regularly about Comrade Podgorny’s discussions in 
Cairo. For the time being, the press will not report anything about the visit; the above 
information is for Comrade Kádár and a narrow group of leaders. The same informa-
tion is being received by our fraternal Parties in the other Socialist countries, apart 
from Romania.
Comrade Rusakov has requested that we tell him whether Comrade Kádár has any 
questions in this respect or has something to say.
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13 Information from the Soviet Embassy to János Kádár
20 June 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 233.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Completed in 1 copy
Record
For Comrade János Kádár
At noon today, N.N. Sikachev, counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, at the behest of 
Comrade Kudryashov, informed Comrade Kádár of the following:
“Yesterday Comrade Kádár was told in a message from Comrade Brezhnev of Comrade Pod-
gorny’s trip to Cairo, and of the secret nature of the trip. Today Comrade Podgorny travelled to 
Cairo.
Immediately prior to his departure, Nasser let it be known that – apparently for some reason 
beneficial to him – he is to make public Comrade Podgorny’s visit and hold a major reception for 
him. Thus, we are making the visit public.”
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14 Leonid Brezhnev’s Telegram to János Kádár
17 July 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/47/ p. 244.
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Translated from Russian
Completed in 2 copies
Translated by Mrs Barta
On 17 July 1967, Comrade F.Y. Titov, the Soviet Ambassador, brought in a telegram 
transmitted by the secret channel, which Comrade Brezhnev sent to Comrade Kádár. 
The text of the telegram is as follows:
To Comrade János Kádár
Budapest
Dear Comrade Kádár,
We wish to inform you that early this morning we received the following “oral message 
from all those attending the conference of Arab heads of state in Cairo” from our 
ambassador in Cairo:
“The Arab heads of state, who have come to the conference in Cairo, decided at their closing 
session on the evening of 16 July that at 10 a.m. on 17 July Presidents Boumediène and Aref shall 
travel to Moscow. The presidents will inform the Soviet leaders of the results of the conference 
and will consult with them about the situation in the Middle East.
Boumediène and Aref will travel on a special Algerian plane.”
The Arabs did not confer with us about this decision in advance. We shall not refuse 
to receive them. We shall negotiate.




15 Minutes of the Meeting of the Political Committee on 18 July 
1967
18 July 1967
National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/5/430/1967
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, János Kádár’s Secretariat 
[Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Kádár János Titkársága]
Completed in 2 copies
1. Report 
On the Budapest conference of Party and government leaders of the Socialist coun-
tries
Comrade JÁNOS KÁDÁR:
The essence can be gathered from the written report, which – from the aspect of expe-
rience – I wish to supplement with several things that are worth mentioning.
[…]
Regarding the situation in the Middle East, I wish to mention that the Soviet Union is 
supplying a significant amount of arms after the war, primarily to Egypt. The supplies 
are so large that they have replaced all the combat aircraft that were lost – indeed, 
a somewhat greater number than what Egypt lost have been supplied. Of course, in 
terms of combat value, this is not the same amount because Egypt does not have the 
necessary number of qualified personnel – and it is worth thinking about this in two 
ways.
The manner in which the debate arose at the UN is known to everyone from the 
reports. I mention here that, according to the CPSU’s assessment, a two-thirds major-
ity could not be reached for two reasons. First, due to the great pressure of the U.S., 
which was exerted on various Latin American and other countries. This was also a 
factor in the case of African countries that were formerly under French influence, 
which now, under pressure from the United States, did not adhere to the French posi-
tion, but adopted the position taken by Latin-American countries. The other reason, 
according to the – I think, correct – evaluation of the Soviet Comrades, was the exces-
sive inflexibility of the Arab position, which rendered it impossible to establish some 
kind of sensible and measured compromise.
Concerning the Arab leaders, they seem to have been divided since the end of the 
war. We generally keep a record of progressive Arab countries with whom we must 
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work, such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq – but there are also other Arab countries. 
Even among the progressive countries, a typical feature is the lack of a uniform posi-
tion. Thus, a distinct and sharply different position is taken by the Algerian leaders, 
who are almost in agreement with the Syrian leaders. These leaders take a combative 
position; they argue for a continuation of the war and that the resolution of the issue 
must be sought by military means. Their position is so extreme on the need to con-
tinue the war that it does not matter [to them] if Cairo or Damascus falls. On the other 
side, Nasser takes an obviously different and somewhat more realistic position, and 
the Iraqi stance is not as extreme as the Algerian one.
I shall repeat the important findings of the conference, because they are deci-
sive. At our conference, we took the view that under the present circumstances the 
only realistic and correct path to a resolution of the Middle-East issue is a struggle for 
a political solution. And this is contrary to the Algerian and Syrian position, which 
rejects this and emphasises a military solution.
Another important finding of the conference concerned the nature of assistance. 
Theoretically, we really have to help the three countries directly affected by the war: 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The conference concluded that Jordan can be left out of 
direct assistance, for it did not even request such help. Thus we have to concentrate 
on Egypt and Syria – and primarily on Egypt. There are two means through which 
their powers of defence have to be strengthened: 1. the supply of military technology; 
2. the provision of military advisors. One can see that Nasser intends to reorganise the 
armed forces, and for this process he wishes to make use of advisors, primarily Soviet 
advisors.
One should mention here that Nasser even wishes to partially abandon his non-
aligned stance and sign a treaty with the Soviet Union, or with another Socialist 
country. He further wishes that the Soviet Union or the Socialist countries would take 
control of Egyptian air defences. The Soviet Union does not consider this to be the 
right course of action, and the conference uniformly took the position that this could 
not be done, because this would lead to a very undesirable situation.
Regarding economic assistance, a major point of emphasis at the conference 
was that, in addition to prompt assistance – which is necessary, in view of the war 
losses and the situation with consumer goods – great emphasis should be laid on 
assistance. The assistance should specifically be aimed at restoring industrial and 
agricultural production, because this is very significant to society within the given 
country, and especially for the workers. If there is no production then there is no basic 
livelihood for workers, which can have extremely detrimental political consequences.
A resolution was also adopted on informing the Arabs – by internal means – of 
the positions taken at this conference. There were various suggestions. We proposed 
that the CPSU be asked to complete this task. They accepted. The next day the Soviet 
Comrades suggested that instead, the HSWP – as the host of the conference – should 
inform the Arabs. We did not agree with this, but subsequently, and as a substitute, 
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we voted in favour of the Arabs being informed by two parties: the CPSU and the 
HSWP.
The information was compiled, with everyone’s agreement, and on Sunday 
evening this internal information was submitted in writing in Cairo, without a signa-
ture, and in the form of a verbal note, or whatever it is called.
This information sheet highlights elements where we support a political solution, 
they receive combat technology and advisors, and as far as economic assistance is 
concerned, the goal is restoring production.
Here, one should note that the conference of Arab leaders was now under way, 
and that Malik, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, stayed there until the end. The expe-
riences there show that Boumediène and the Syrian leader stated that they supported 
a military solution. They could not accept the formula that we offered, which is to 
accept a UN resolution that would declare the end of the state of war, because that 
would mean less than the granting of recognition to Israel – although indirectly it 
would mean this, as well. Boumediène stated that they could not accept this.
Yesterday morning we were informed by the Soviet Comrades that they had been 
unilaterally told that Boumediène and the Iraqi president were to travel to Moscow, 
and that they would receive them. They arrived there in the late evening. We shall 
receive information from the Soviet Comrades.
Thus, at present, things are not looking too good. It is difficult to fight in this 
way, because our position and the Arab position do not coincide. At our conference 
we said that if we managed to establish a resolution – by adding to the existing ones 
– in which we established a cessation of the state of war, the restoration of shipping 
freedom to the level of 4 June and the opening of Suez – but Israeli ships were not 
allowed to go there even prior to this – that is, if some such action is achieved (regard-
less of whether a two-thirds majority can be assured, at least the political initiative 
would be in the Arabs’ hands), it would then be easier to fight at the political level 
within the UN and in terms of propaganda too. This was our proposition, but it did not 
gain favour with the Arabs.
2. Report on the assistance (material and technical) to be offered to the Arab 
countries
Comrade JENŐ FOCK
[…] Originally, the Comrades expected to deal with military aid – and such a spe-
cific request has been received. In the meantime there was the Budapest conference, 
where in accordance with the conference the emphasis shifted to the need to ensure 
the continuance of production, and such assistance must be given.
[…]
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I suggest that the Political Committee accept a sum of 200 million forints for mili-
tary defence assistance. Within this framework, there should be an effort made in 
the upcoming days to list articles in this that do not have to be replaced in domestic 
defence. During the consultation this must be carefully addressed, and if others can 
give such things then we should not give them. If the Political Committee accepts this 
allocation, we can then negotiate on this matter and on the basis of such an amount.
I think it would be of tangible assistance to Egypt for us to confirm that we con-
sider the credit of 15 million Egyptian pounds to be valid. And let us negotiate on the 
extent to which they want to make use of this.
Perhaps authorisation would also be needed for transforming the five to sev-
en-year credit into a seven to ten-year credit. And if the issue of a moratorium arises, 
we could provide this. Finally, the issue of skilled workers could possibly be formu-
lated in such a manner that not only do we undertake to train 100–150 experts for 
a year, but for an equivalent amount, we could send technicians and engineers in 
order to guarantee production. Finally, I suggest that we include medicines in the 
food products worth three million forints.
We have a normal barter agreement for this year and for next year. Egypt may ask 
to cancel some important things in view of the current situation. Instead, a long-term 
credit should be given, but we must insist on delivery.
The matter of further assistance should be viewed in terms of the extent to which 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, show a real eagerness to divert some of their 
trade to the Socialist countries, including Hungary. So far, only baseless statements 
have been made, but no real action has been taken. We can provide assistance to the 
extent that they divert their trade. Just now we heard about some banking measures. 
So far little concrete action has been taken. We have arranged with the National Bank 
of Hungary that if they find that attempts are being made to place major sums here, 
we can offer as much interest – or even more interest – than the Bank of England.
To sum up: we cannot decide about everything now, and so a general authorisa-
tion needs to be given to the Government.
Comrade JÁNOS KÁDÁR
I support Comrade Fock’s proposal, but I wish to make some comments.
The first, and this must be taken into account when giving assistance, is that in 
such a situation the problems and difficulties experienced by the countries affected 
stem from the fact that they are unable to assess precisely their technical and other 
needs. This explains the “circular” request, in which they send a list of items to the 
various countries, and not knowing the situation, they ask everything from everyone. 
One cannot see how this will become effective assistance. At the conference I sug-
gested that we should primarily assist in enabling them to assess their needs in an 
exact manner, and if they are incapable of doing this, then perhaps the Soviet Union 
should help them. They alone can better see what they need.
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Another observation of mine: I always recommend – based on certain experience 
– that we should never exhaust our possibilities completely. Firstly, in the case of the 
countries under discussion there is a likelihood that in a month’s time, when they 
can better assess what they need, that they will come up with a new list. For this 
reason, we need to keep a reserve of the material and financial means to be used. 
Especially since if there will be fights against the imperialists in other places we will 
have to assist there as well. Thus, we need to assess our realistic possibilities, that 
is, assess what we can release without upsetting the material state of the country, 
thereby endangering the normal functioning of our own countries – and we should 
not exhaust [our resources] completely. Giving less than what they expect now is 
better than saying later on that we agree with their request but cannot fulfil it.
Concerning the implementation, I have the following comment: I do not know 
whether they are urging us to respond now, but I would say that if they are doing so 
and are seeking an answer, then we should respond. However, if there are things that 
are not urgent, then we should wait. At any rate, I would wait before providing mili-
tary equipment support.
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National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288/22/9/1967
Collection: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Central Bodies, Agitation and Propaganda 
Department [Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) Központi Szervei, Agitációs és Propaganda 
Osztály]
From: Agitation and Propaganda Department
Memorandum
I report as follows on the frame of mind of Hungarian Jewry concerning the Mid-
dle-Eastern conflict:
As regards the general frame of mind, it may be stated that although the Middle-East-
ern question concerns issues of significance to the fate of the Israeli people, gener-
ally speaking the loyalty of Hungarian Jewry to our Socialist country has not been 
undermined. Understandably, many of them nurture sentimentalist feelings towards 
the Israeli people. Many of them have relatives in Israel with whom they correspond 
constantly. Although most of them emphasise that they believe in the Socialist social 
order and do not desire a capitalist system or support for imperialism, nevertheless 
with respect to that part of the Middle-Eastern conflict that concerns Israel, many of 
them do not agree with the position of the Soviet Union – particularly with regard to 
Israel’s being an aggressor. In their opinion, Israel took defensive action.
As regards the various personal conversations, I briefly note them as follows:
Dr M. M.: The Jews are frightened; they fear antisemitism. Unidentified individ-
uals have thrown dirt at the windows of the grammar school. Jews have feelings of 
community with the Israeli people.
J. S.: I have spoken to people outside Budapest, too. They are afraid of antisemi-
tism; this is a big problem. One should be quiet and cautious, because, in their hearts, 
Jews support Israel.
Dr V. L.: This is a very difficult and complicated issue. We are Hungarian citizens, 
and the policy of the Hungarian government should be continued; still, we are unable 
to feel animosity towards the Israeli people. We are a religious organisation; politics 
is not our concern.
Dr L. S.: It is time to keep quiet and be smart. For Israel is very close to our hearts. 
By sticking up for the Arabs, the Soviet Union has suffered severe damage to its pres-
tige. And this has harmed us as well. Here in Hungary, the number of tourists has 
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sunk. The rooms are empty at Lake Balaton, whereas all the tourist accommodation 
is full in Romania.
J. H.: Jewish and non-Jewish people all support Israel. They do not accept that 
Israel was the aggressor. It took defensive action. Hungarian Jewish Communists also 
support Israel, even though they continue to regard themselves as good Communists. 
In their judgement, truth is on the side of Israel rather than of the Arabs. Hungarian 
Jews are frightened; they fear antisemitism, and they do not feel themselves secure, 
because many non-Jews identify Israel with Jews. People regard Arabs as well-known 
as antisemites.
A Party secretary at a tailors’ co-operative: As Communists of Jewish descent, 
we do not agree with the Soviet Union on this issue, because the Arabs have always 
been antisemites and anti-Communists. One cannot believe that they have changed 
and that they now have progressive ideas. The Israeli people are far more progressive, 
because three Communist Parties are operating there. Communists have never been 
persecuted in Israel, as they have been in Syria and Egypt, for instance. As people 
that otherwise support the Soviet Union, we fear for the prestige of the Soviet Union 
on this issue.
F. R.: Radio Free Europe stated that Hungarian Jewry was not supportive of Israel. 
The Polish Jewish newspaper, Volkstymme, has spoken in support of Israel.
J. Á.: The people to whom I have spoken are generally supportive of Israel – even 
high-ranking Party members. I am extremely anxious, because everyone is afraid of 
antisemitism. A Jewish person cannot say that he is a friend of Nasser, the antisemitic 
leader, or an enemy of the long-suffering Israeli people. This is a very odd situation.
Dr I. B.: The situation is difficult, because we cannot say the Arabs are our broth-
ers and the Israeli people our enemy.
S. Á.: Israel was not an aggressor. Why don’t people talk about Nasser’s aggres-
sion in closing off the Gulf of Aqaba and by concentrating troops along the border? 
The UN troops were withdrawn, and a united Arab force of over 100 million men faced 
Israel. Nasser wanted to annihilate Israel, and Israel acted out of self-defence. The 
Soviet Union equipped the Arabs with arms and armoured vehicles, and its officers 
even trained Arab soldiers. A foreign broadcaster stated that the Soviet officers were 
unable to train the Arabs, because most of them could not even read or write. What 
would have happened if an Arab mass of over 100 million men had actually destroyed 
little Israel? What would they have said then? Israel’s sin is to have defended its ter-
ritory out of self-defence, and that it failed to give Nasser advance warning of where 
and when it would attack.
Népszabadság [daily newspaper – AK] did not report Komócsin’s television 
address faithfully, for in his speech Komócsin also spoke of the ‘Jewish question’ – 
but this was absent from Népszabadság’s account. People in Hungary have not talked 
about the Jewish question ever since Hitler. J. Á. asked who would have thought that 
23 years after the Liberation, the Jewish question would again be talked about in 
Hungary.
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B. P.: Jews fear antisemitism. The Arabs are incredibly antisemitic. Nasser’s 
hatred of Jews and Communists is well known. And Bumedian drove out 300,000 
Jews from Algeria. For some years, letters have been arriving from Israel describing 
the aggression of Syria and Egypt that has been going on for decades, as well as the 
effect on Israel of a whole series of border incidents. People can only work on the land 
in Israel if they have a weapon at their side. They are forced to defend themselves from 
the Syrians and the Egyptians, and all Jewish people with relatives in Israel know this.
Mr F. (Dohány Street Synagogue leader): I am an old person, and the Nazis incin-
erated my children. I can no longer find much joy in life. I am over 85 years old, and 
yet I still fret for Israel, because U Thant withdrew the defence troops, thereby provid-
ing the Arab masses with an opportunity to destroy Israel. Nasser is just like Hitler. 
May God grant that Israel will not be harmed.
Mr B. (Dohány Street Synagogue leader): Israel took defensive action. At the start 
of hostilities, it seemed that the large Arab mass would sweep Israel aside. It was a 
divine miracle that little Israel did not want to conquer territory, but wants borders 
that ensure its defence, so that people won’t have to go to work bearing arms, nor fear 
attacks along the border.
Mr S. (Dohány Street Synagogue leader): Israel was not an aggressor, but merely 
acted to defend itself. This was the aim of the Palestinian Liberation Front – as Hun-
garian news also reported – when, on the Jordanian front and with the aim of liberat-
ing Palestine, the troops set off to destroy Israel.
K. H.: I have many very good Communist friends and acquaintances. All of them 
are saying just how disappointed they are. The Arabs cannot be more progressive 
than the Israelis. They think that the issue of Soviet antisemitism is in part behind 
the anti-Israeli position. Antisemites will be encouraged here in Hungary, too. These 
Communist friends of mine fear for the ideals of Communism. They have sunk into 
themselves as a result of events. All of them see – said K. H. – that the facts and pro-
paganda of hostility towards Israel are not aimed at exposing the real facts and that 
Israel is the subject of a baseless campaign of slander.
Rabbi E. D.: Israel’s success in combat was a divine miracle. It is to be feared that 
there will be antisemitism in the country, because the propaganda is anti-Jewish.
Dr P. H., a Budapest lawyer: He criticised the article by János Nemes published in 
the Népszabadság, which dealt with the Izvestiya article. He thought the article might 
incite antisemitism, owing to its content and the use of the word ‘Jew’. He sarcastically 
remarked that ‘we have received orders to worship Nasser, the second Hitler’. Dr P. H. 
said he also found it interesting that Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with 
Israel because Israel was an aggressor. Whereas America really had been perpetrating 
aggression against Vietnam for many years now, and yet neither the Soviet Union nor 
Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with America. This also shows that the 
Soviet Union was driven by antisemitism when it broke off diplomatic relations with 
Israel – but not with America despite years of American aggression in Vietnam – and 
that they were just fixing the blame on Israel.
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M. S.: Yesterday I was with four top-level ministerial staff members. All of them 
are old and trustworthy Communists – some Jews, some non-Jews. They were filled 
with despair at the harm the affair has done to the Soviet Union and the cause of Com-
munism. They said it really did seem as if there were a strong antisemitic tendency in 
the Soviet Union and that what the foreign newspapers have been writing about the 
Soviet Union with regard to antisemitism may not be fiction after all. M. S. said that 
these people were devastated by events.
Dr P. B.: Today I got a letter from my relatives in Israel. Israel is not an aggressor. 
People here are very afraid of antisemitism; Komócsin’s speech did a lot of harm. 
Hungarian Jews are afraid that if Soviet policy continues to be marked by the lack of 
success, this could also strike hard against Jews living outside of Israel.
Dr M. B.: I received a telegram from my brother in Israel, saying that he’s fine. 
It’s awful what is happening around Israel. I have always been left-wing and I shall 
always remain so. My brother in Israel is an old Communist Party member. I don’t 
think, however, that Israel is an aggressor; most people in this country don’t think it 
is.
Dr Gy. F. (lawyer): In two of its editions in late May, Magyar Nemzet [daily news-
paper – AK], writing about the Middle-Eastern crisis, published Nasser’s speech on 
the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, in which he said that he would destroy the whole of 
Israel if Israel took action over this or behaved like an aggressor. The second edition 
referred to Syria’s repeated acts of terror against Israel, mentioning the acts of terror 
committed in May against Israel by a Syrian organisation called Hurricane. He asked: 
under such circumstances how can Israel be an aggressor? He then remarked sarcas-
tically: ‘Long Live Brother Nasser’.
Mr B. (museum employee): He also disputed that Israel was an aggressor and 
spoke, in connection with this, of Magyar Nemzet’s reports of late May. He said that 
these reports clearly showed that Nasser, rather than Israel, had begun the aggres-
sion.
There were many people who did not comment on the events.
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Memorandum
on the mood observable within the Hungarian Jewish Religious Denomination regard-
ing the situation in the Middle East
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.
The mood among the leaders and members of the denomination concerning the sit-
uation in the Middle East is today – after the initial panic – characterised by a more 
moderate judgment and a more realistic evaluation of the situation.
At the time of the Arab–Israeli wars, the great majority of Hungarian religious 
Jews sided emotionally with Israel. This emotional outpouring was motivated – and 
strengthened for many – by various familial, religious traditional relations and the 
feeling of community, based on a shared fate. This resulted in a situation where even 
the denominational leaders found it difficult – doing so only some time later – to dis-
tinguish between the Israeli people, the land of Israel, and the interests of the impe-
rialist Israeli government.
Alongside the sympathy felt by various groups for the “rapid victory” of the Israeli 
troops, it caused concern among a majority of believers, for they feared that it could 
elicit a wave of antisemitism.
In the opinion of the leaders and priests of the religious denomination, Hungar-
ian religious Jews cannot accept Israel being branded an aggressor, and they assert 
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that the reason for the outbreak of armed conflict were the Arab threats and specifi-
cally the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba. 
On the issue of aggression, even those denominational leaders that are closest to 
us were not completely clear; they were uncertain about supporting such a position 
of our government.
At the same time, they sought, to a greater extent than before, to prevent their 
emotional stance relating to Israel from influencing their loyalty and adherence to 
the Hungarian homeland and to Socialism. Rabbi Dr Hochberger expressed this as 
follows: “Hungarian Jewry will never forget that it was this system that removed the 
yellow stars and returned their freedom”.
Those who are emotionally close to Israel and who sympathised with Zionism 
earlier on, seek openly to defend Israel.
For instance, Dr Sándor Scheiber, director of the rabbinical seminary, asked “why 
is Egypt [considered] a more democratic regime than Israel when in Egypt Commu-
nists are still being held in prisons, whereas in Israel they have their own political 
party and even now can go to Moscow to hold talks, and can make statements against 
the government, etc. Production co-operatives existed in Israel even before they were 
formed in Hungary,” said Scheiber. Regarding the sympathy of religious Jews towards 
Israel, Sándor Scheiber asks for understanding from the state. He said “Jewry had 
been subjected to such suffering and persecution in the course of history that Jews 
need to know of a land, a country which would receive them at any time, if anywhere 
in the world new Auschwitzes were to arise. Even so, a Jewish person can be a very 
good Hungarian, Englishman, Frenchman or Russian – as indeed they are.”
According to Dr Géza Seifert, chairman of the denomination, the emergence of 
the Arab–Israeli situation had impacted negatively, among religious Jews who are 
close to our state, on their relationship with the Soviet Union. They speak of a loss of 
prestige for the Soviet Union and draw a comparison between the result of American 
support for Israel and that of Soviet support for the Arabs.
In terms of resolving the conflict, various circles are hoping that differences of 
view among the Arab countries may lead to the break-up of Arab unity against Israel, 
which might result in the fixing of the present situation.
The more sensible and politically realistic majority are, however, convinced that 
Israel must return the Arab territories and commence peaceful negotiations with the 
Arabs.
In this regard, Deputy Chief Rabbi Dr Imre Benoschofsky stated the following:
“Israel’s territorial conquests have led to very mixed feelings among my congregation. They are 
saying that the situation is now even more alarming than it was on the outbreak of the conflict. It 
is impossible that Israel wants to retain the occupied part of Jerusalem or the Sinai territory, for 
it is quite a lot bigger than the country itself.
Israel is currently reluctant to return the occupied territories because it wants to negotiate 
from an advantageous position.”
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Even the director Sándor Scheiber himself stated that it cannot be envisaged, from 
a political, economic or military perspective, that Israel should retain the occupied 
territories. At the same time, he considers it just that Jerusalem should remain fully 
in Israeli hands.
For religious Jewish circles, it has been extremely sobering that, under the influ-
ence of Israeli “successes”, persons formerly known as reactionary and antisemitic 
have become, overnight, “philosemites” and have rooted for an Israeli victory.
In the unanimous opinion of the leaders and rabbis of the denomination, the 
supreme desire of members of the Hungarian Jewish Religious Denomination is that 
the Arab–Israeli conflict be settled through peaceful negotiations.
II.
The Board of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites published an edito-
rial article in this year’s 1 August issue of the denominational publication Új Élet [New 
Life, weekly newspaper of the NRHI – AK] which was entitled “Our National Assembly 
and the Matter of Peace” and deals, among other things, extensively with the Mid-
dle-Eastern conflict.
In the course of prior negotiations concerning the article, we purposely did not 
make maximalist demands on the leadership of the denomination. We did not push 
them to use the expression “aggression”, and we sought to ensure that the article – 
with its progressive content – would be acceptable, having regard for the real mood of 
Hungarian religious Jews, to them, while also influencing public opinion in the right 
direction.
The leading article firmly condemns Israeli government circles, which are acting 
with the support of the Western imperialists. Together with the entire Hungarian 
people, it approves the position taken by our government and our parliament.
It states that the use of violence will not resolve the Arab–Israeli situation and 
expresses the desire that the conflict will be settled by way of peaceful negotiations.
Based on the experience of the leaders of the Religious Denomination, as well as 
our own experiences, it may be stated that religious Jews received the article favour-
ably and consider it to be realistic in its content and appropriate in tone.
According to our intelligence, the foreign press also received the article favour-
ably and judged it to be moderate in terms of both content and tone.
We attach the report of Dr Géza Seifert, chairman of the National Representation 
of Hungarian Israelites, which reflects the opinion of various leaders of the Religious 
Denomination with regard to the published article.
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18 The Political Committee’s Resolution on Hungarian–Israeli 
Relations
20 December 1983
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Secretariat of the Ministry
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The Political Committee’s resolution of 20 December 1983 on the state of Hungarian–
Israeli relations and timely tasks:
After Israel’s aggression against its Arab neighbours of 5 June 1967, the govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of Hungary, proceeding in a manner that was agreed 
upon in close co-operation with the Socialist countries, severed diplomatic relations 
with the State of Israel on 12 June 1967. No position was taken by the body on relations 
of a different character, while the resolutions of the Political Committee adopted on 
26 September 1967 and thereafter concerned various specific issues pertaining to the 
relationship.
In addition to breaking off official relations, we also reduced our contacts in the 
fields of economics, trade, culture and sport, and we severely restricted the opportu-
nities for Hungarian citizens to travel to Israel and for Israelis to come to Hungary. We 
stopped inviting Israeli personalities to Hungarian events but we did allow them to 
participate in international meetings held in Hungary.
During the 18 years since the severance of diplomatic relations, we have, at 
various points in time and for different reasons, alleviated some of the restrictions, 
but a comprehensive review of relations and an evaluation of the possibilities of, and 
limits to, their enhancement, has not taken place to date. Developments in recent 
years, Israel’s overt and covert attempts to expand relations, which have been made 
with increasing frequency and are mostly of a political and economic nature, as well 
as their proposals relating to the alleviation or lifting of our restrictions, have ren-
dered it necessary to define in more concrete terms our conduct and our tasks. In this 
process, the fact that Israeli measures are primarily driven by political interests must 
be taken into consideration.
I.
Political relations between our country and Israel have been suspended since 1967. 
Since that time, Sweden has represented the interests of our country in Israel, while 
Switzerland has represented Israel’s interests in Hungary. We have warded off Israeli 
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initiatives aimed at establishing official political contacts. At the same time, our social 
organisations have maintained – and do maintain – relations with the progressive 
left-wing organisations. Recently, further organisations and persons opposed to the 
policy of aggression have sought contacts with organisations and persons in Hungary, 
above all by way of the peace movement.
Co-operation between the HSWP and the Israeli Communist Party is close.
Our trade has been administered since 1973 in free currency exchange and on 
the basis of an agreement that was signed in 1956 and is extended annually. The 
level of trade is low: USD 7.2 million in 1980; USD 9.5 million in 1981; and USD 12 
million in 1982. Major Hungarian exports are: steel and rolled products, illuminants, 
photographic products, and seeds; our main imports are: synthetic yarn, organic 
basic chemicals, oranges and other citrus fruits. Israeli Communist Party enterprises 
account for 15–20 per cent of total trade.
Recently, Israeli business people have proposed the mutually beneficial expan-
sion of our economic relations and co-operation in third markets. According to the 
calculations of the Hungarian economic bodies, trade volumes could be doubled 
without endangering, in the first place, our economic and trade interests with the 
Arab countries.
Banking relations between the National Bank of Hungary and the Bank of Israel 
have been vitalised. An agreement was made on mutual assurances for a USD 15 
million + 15 million trade development credit framework. So far Israeli banks have 
provided a short-term credit of USD 18 million and have placed a USD 15 million short-
term deposit at the National Bank of Hungary.
Representatives of the Israeli banks see an opportunity for offering trade credits 
promoting the financing of Hungarian imports. They show an interest in opportuni-
ties to supply goods for Hungarian investment projects financed from World Bank 
loans. They have signalled that Israeli banks are ready to proceed, with regard to their 
clients, in such a way as to develop financial co-operation with Hungary.
In 1981, at the behest of the Israeli Communist Party and with the participation 
of its enterprise, Israeli tourism to our country began. We gave our approval to the 
admission into Hungary of 2,000 persons per year in group tours. We did not autho-
rise tourist travel from Hungary either for groups or individuals. The demand from 
Israel exceeded the quota. In 1983, with our consent, 3,000 tourists are anticipated 
to arrive in our country. Tourism from Israel is a good business for us; this year the 
foreign-exchange revenue will be one million dollars. In view of the demand, other 
Israeli and foreign – Austrian, West-German and Yugoslav – travel agencies have also 
sought to get involved in organising travel for Israeli tourists.
There is growing demand for the facilitation of individual visits by relatives. At 
present, we deal with such issues on an individual basis.
The practice of the Socialist countries with regard to authorising the admission of 
Israeli citizens differs. The Soviet Union generally refrains from issuing entry permits, 
or does so only in exceptional cases and for international conferences. Czechoslo-
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vakia only authorises visits to relatives, while Bulgaria and the German Democratic 
Republic make no distinction between Israeli citizens and those of other capitalist 
countries; thus, the general practice regarding visas applies to Israeli citizens too.
The World Federation of Hungarians has contacts with the organisations of Jews 
with Hungarian roots, including the World Federation of Hungarian Jews, the Public 
Life Committee, and the Association for the Development of Israeli-Hungarian Rela-
tions, which was established several months ago. There is an opportunity for the 
World Federation of Hungarians to establish relations with Israeli institutions and 
for the promotion of the Hungarian language and culture. The number of Jews with 
Hungarian roots living in Israel is estimated to be 200,000.
Relations in the academic, cultural and sport fields are sporadic. Based on indi-
vidual assessments, we send experts and academic researchers to events in Israel 
and cultural forums. It is a problem that most of these are held in Jerusalem. In recent 
years, we have, on occasion, invited Israeli personalities to Hungarian events. There 
appears to be a mutual interest in enhancing academic relations – primarily in the 
fields of natural science and history – relations in the field of health care, and cultural 
exchanges on a commercial basis. Sport relations are limited to programmes arising 
from international sport obligations.
We must also take into consideration the fact that the Arab countries react sensi-
tively to even the slightest change in Hungarian–Israeli relations. Owing to the strat-
egies of the Arab countries, their political significance, their international economic 
and financial weight, and their geographical proximity, we give particular attention 
to developing multi-faceted co-operation with them. Our economic co-operation with 
the Arab countries is wide-ranging. In 1982, our exports to the region amounted to 
USD 729.8 million, of which the foreign-exchange revenue was USD 689.2 million.
Favourable and potentially promising credit and banking relations have been 
established with the oil-producing countries. In 1982, 5,128 Hungarian experts were 
working in Arab countries. They evaluate positively our position on the Middle-East 
crisis, on the basis of which they expect us not to have relations with Israel. This also 
justifies our proceeding in a careful and considered fashion when transforming our 
relations with Israel in the future, too.
II.
The Political Committee – as an internal document – accepts the submission on the 
state of Hungarian–Israeli relations and on the timely tasks, and it draws attention to 
the following:
1. Our position on a settlement of the Middle-East Crisis is unchanged; in the future 
too, we should stick to the line agreed upon with the Socialist countries which are 
working in close co-operation. Our political and economic interests continue to 
justify the further development of co-operation with the Arab countries in every 
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possible way. At the same time, we should avoid unfounded demands, made in 
regard to our policy towards Israel. Let us not rule out relations that serve our 
interests when such relations do not negatively affect our co-operation with the 
Arab countries.
2. With a view to exploiting the economic advantages, our trade relations with Israel 
can be vitalised. This activity should be undertaken at a business and enterprise 
level, avoiding the involvement of Israeli State bodies. Care should be taken that 
this activity does not negatively impact on our commercial and trade interests 
with other countries, above all the Arab countries. For this reason, co-operation 
in third markets as proposed by the Israeli side should take place only through 
neutral companies. We should strive to exploit the relations between the cham-
bers of commerce in a non-official form. Financial, banking and credit relations 
at the expert level are also possible. We should seek the support of the Israeli 
partners towards accomplishing greater financial co-operation with our country 
in the United States and in the Western European countries. If justified by our 
economic, scientific-technical, cultural and sport interests, we should make it 
possible for our citizens to travel to Israel for such purposes. We should take care 
to ensure that their participation is not portrayed as support for Israeli policies 
(recognition of Jerusalem as the capital city). Having regard for our interests, we 
should invite to Hungarian events Israeli personalities who may contribute to the 
enhancement of our scientific and technical accomplishments.
3. While avoiding the establishment of relations at state level, tourism can be devel-
oped, especially group tourism. With this in mind, let us abandon the quotas for 
organised Israeli tourism targetting Hungary. We should continue to provide for 
the participation in tourism of the enterprise of our fraternal Party in Israel. The 
Interior Ministry should elaborate the economic and organisational conditions 
for the expansion, including tourism via third countries. Without announcing 
this, in the future we should handle the visa requests of Israeli individual travel-
lers and those visiting relatives according to our general rules, and the technical 
conditions for the visa should be approximated to our general practice. In 1984–
85, in connection with the remembrance events for the deportations and the com-
memoration of the 40th anniversary of our liberation, the appraisal of visa appli-
cations should be performed in this way. We should continue to restrict tourist 
travel from Hungary to Israel. In justified cases, we should appraise in a humane 
fashion petitions for travel for the purpose of visiting relatives and family.
4. Social organisations should continue to be in contact with their progressive part-
ners and should react positively to initiatives of new organisations and personali-
ties that serve our political interests. At the same time, we should be circumspect 
in ensuring that the endeavours of the State of Israel in the field of social relations 
are not given ground.
5. Avoiding spectacular actions, the World Federation of Hungarians should main-
tain contact with the World Federation of Hungarian Jews or with other Hungar-
 Documents   197
ian Jewish organisations which can be used to promote Hungarian identity and 
Hungarian language and culture. Working in co-operation with the Hungarian 
League of Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists and the National Centre of Hun-
garian Jews, it should take part in organising the major historical anniversaries of 
Jews in Hungary, in accordance with action plans that have been elaborated and 
approved in an ad-hoc fashion.
6. The political co-ordination of the work of the Hungarian institutions, organisa-
tions and enterprises that are in contact with Israeli partners will be undertaken 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in co-operation with the Ministry of Trade or 
with the competent supervisory bodies.
Our press and propaganda organs should not alter their tone with respect to Israel 
and should avoid reporting on Hungarian–Israeli relations.
Resolution to be received by:
 – members of the Political Committee and the Secretariat, Chairman of the Central 
Control Commission
 – Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers
 – heads of department of the Central Committee
 – Interior Minister
 – Minister for Internal Trade
 – Minister of Foreign Affairs
 – Minister for Foreign Trade
 – Finance Minister
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19 Proposal on Hungarian–Israeli Relations
26 August 1986
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-14-002223/6-1986 (73.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
9th Regional Department
Completed in 15 copies












for the Ministerial Meeting
Subject: experiences made in implementing the PC’s resolution on the situation and 
timely tasks of Hungarian–Israeli relations, proposals for action
On 20 December 1983, the Political Committee adopted – as an internal document – a 
proposal on the situation of Hungarian–Israeli relations and on timely tasks. Under 
the resolution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts the political co-ordination of 
the institutions, organisations and enterprises that have contacts with Israeli part-
ners, doing so in co-operation with the Ministry for Foreign Trade and with the com-
petent supervisory bodies.
In what follows – juxtaposing with the various points contained in the Political 
Committee’s proposal – we summarise the development of Hungarian–Israeli rela-
tions in the period since the adoption of the resolution, having special regard for the 
execution of the political coordination tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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1./ International relations, political relations
Both in bilateral talks and at international forums we have regularly and consistently 
stated our position on a settlement of the Middle-East crisis. At a press conference 
held in London last year, Comrade János Kádár stated our position on the restoration 
of Hungarian–Israeli diplomatic relations as follows:
“… there is no theoretical obstacle to the restoration of diplomatic relations and the issue may 
become the subject of consideration if Israel conducts itself in accordance with the accepted 
norms of international life, that is to say, if the reasons that led to the severance of diplomatic 
relations cease to apply”.
In September 1985, at the UN General Assembly, Comrade Péter Várkonyi met, at 
the behest of the Israeli side, with Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, and 
explained directly our position on the restoration of diplomatic relations.
In recent years, the Israeli government has consistently sought an improvement 
in relations between the two states, making use of diplomatic, social and mass organ-
isational, commercial and cultural channels. The main directions of Israeli attempts 
at building relations are:
a./ Initiating demonstrative political relations: inviting official Hungarian del-
egations to the celebrations held in Jerusalem to mark the 40th anniversary of the 
“Victory over Fascist Germany” under the patronage of the President of Israel, initi-
ating a meeting between Losonczi and Peres at the jubilee meeting of the UN General 
Assembly in 1985.
b./ Although, having been made aware of our position, the Israeli government 
is not calling directly for the restoration of diplomatic relations, it is proposing some 
minor steps in this direction:
 – It is urging the establishment of lower-level representations and the exchange of 
covert diplomatic representatives (Polish solution). Such a proposal was made 
at the Stockholm Conference, in a message forwarded by the Swiss Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Aubert to Comrade Várkonyi on 19 January 1984.
 – On 19 February 1986, the counsellor of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, under 
central instructions, sought out a member of staff of our embassy and proposed 
the commencement of a regular political dialogue on the development of our bilat-
eral relations, the situation in the Middle East and other international issues. He 
suggested the dispatch of unofficial commercial representatives to each other’s 
capitals.
We have, in each case, dodged the proposals for, and initiatives towards, establish-
ing official political and economic relations at the level of the state, but we have not 
excluded listening to such proposals. At the same time, concurrent with their [Israel’s 
– AK] initiatives, there regularly arise, in the international press and often from Israeli 
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sources, rumours that the two countries are on the verge of settling their diplomatic 
relations and that low-level representations are to be established.
c./ The Israeli side has endeavoured to form wide-ranging cultural, scientific, 
economic, sport and tourist relations, as if to prove that the two countries are in 
contact in many important areas, despite the absence of diplomatic relations and de 
jure state relations.
The diplomacy and press of the Arab countries have been attentively following 
the development of Hungarian–Israeli relations, the rumours about a settlement 
of diplomatic relations, and they sometimes voice their concerns at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or, on occasion, they demand an explanation from our ambassadors 
in various Arab countries.
2./ Economic, financial, scientific-technical, cultural and sporting relations
a./ Economic and trade relations have developed to a modest degree in the past two 
years, but in terms of foreign-trade volumes they are at the level of preceding years. 
(For data on trade volumes, see Appendix I.)
When the Political Committee took the decision, the economic bodies consid-
ered a doubling of volumes to be possible. This did not take place; indeed, despite an 
increase in commercial trips to Israel and more frequent visits to Hungary by Israeli 
businessmen last year, our foreign-trade volume decreased.
[…]
In the judgement of the Ministry for Foreign Trade, in the foreign trade between the 
two countries, there are potential opportunities above all in the fields of agriculture 
and electronics, and in the recent past there have been trial orders. Overall, however, 
the real possibilities contained in the Israeli proposals are often far less modest than 
they appear at first sight. For example, the issue of kosher beef cuts would be resolv-
able, but we cannot compete with the South American countries.
[…]
b./ Financial, interbank and credit relations
Relative to the revival of two years ago, our relations in this area have declined. 
The financial difficulties of Israel and of Israeli banks are the main reason for this. 
The USD 15–15 million credit line for trade development has been used reciprocally 
since 1983. The National Bank of Hungary will not take on further loans from Israel, 
because the conditions of such are currently far more disadvantageous than those of 
banks in the capitalist world.
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[…]
c./ Scientific-technical, cultural and sporting relations
During the period under examination and particularly since 1985, our relations in 
this area have expanded to the greatest extent. As part of this, the most spectacular 
development has occurred in the field of cultural contacts.
During the past two years, a significant number of Hungarian actors, singers 
and musicians have made guest appearances in Israel on a commercial impresario 
basis. Hungarian films have been shown regularly in Israel (between 1981 and 1985, 
18 feature films were shown in commercial distribution and won great popularity). 
On occasion, the film directors and main actors are invited to the premieres. There 
have been advances in the field of book publication too (e.g. two books by Ephraim 
Kishont, who lives in Israel and has Hungarian ancestry, have been published by a 
Hungarian publisher).
In the future, there will be greater demand – both from the Israeli side and from 
Hungarian artists – for expanded cultural and artistic relations. Concerning the latter, 
alongside the friend/relative relations and Israel’s cultural historical attraction, 
another factor is that the financial conditions for performances by Hungarian artists 
are very favourable. A problem is that the Israeli bodies seek, increasingly often, the 
staging of spectacular cultural events (e.g. a performance by the Hungarian State 
Opera company in Jerusalem). From the Israeli side, demands for reciprocity have 
also grown (e.g. performances in Hungary by the National Theatre, Tel Aviv, and the 
display of Israeli artistic works in our country).
Our scientific and technical relations are limited to mutual participation in inter-
national conferences and visits to scientific institutions. Under the terms of the cir-
cular letter no. 001031/1981 issued by the State Secretary, Hungarian participants are 
not permitted to attend international conferences held in Israel if they are to be held 
on territories illegally occupied by Israel (e.g. Jerusalem). In the past two years, the 
relevant part of the State Secretary’s circular letter has not been implemented, and 
in line with a more nuanced notion of the Political Committee’s resolution, we gave 
permission for 37 experts to travel to Jerusalem.
[…]
Strict adherence to the rules contained in the circular letter would have been dele-
terious to our scientific interests. At the same time, we sought to gain the support of 
the professional bodies for visits to Israel where such visits are justified (e.g. leading 
officials of a given non-government organisation, international authorities giving lec-
tures and presentations, etc.).
Our sport relations are limited basically to fulfillment of the international obliga-
tions. There is a more active relationship between the football associations.
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[…]
3./ Tourism relations
The appraisal of visa applications for Israeli individual tourists and for relative visits 
is today identical to general practice; the quotas on organised tourism have been 
lifted. As a consequence, the number of visitors from Israel has grown significantly 
(see Annexe 4).
[…]
Israel views as possible the opening of offices in Israel by all of the Hungarian tourism 
enterprises (e.g. IBUSZ, MALÉV). They have inquired whether Hungarian diplomats 
might work too in such offices. They even mentioned that, in the event of the res-
toration of diplomatic relations, tourism might increase, for it would significantly 
reduce the obligatory exit tax payable by Israeli citizens.
In connection with tourism growth, the Israeli side has urged the launching of a 
direct flight from Budapest to Tel Aviv, and there have spread reports on talks being 
held by representatives of the two airlines. To date we have refuted this initiative for 
political and security reasons and in view of the absence of an agreement between the 
two countries. For economic-financial considerations, MALÉV would, in fact, have an 
interest in the launching of a route, with two flights per week.
4–5./ Social and mass organisation relations, émigré political and church relations
a./ There are regular and high-level contacts between the HSWP and the Israeli Com-
munist Party (ICP). A Party delegation took part in the 20th Congress of the ICP, held 
on 4–7 December 1985. From 15–21 May 1986, a Party worker delegation visited Israel 
headed by Comrade József Györke, Deputy Head of the International Affairs Depart-
ment of the Central Committee. Recently, an ICP delegation led by Meir Vilner visited 
our country.
On several occasions the leaders of the ICP have raised with concern the issue of 
the restoration of Hungarian–Israeli diplomatic relations, although they have also 
indicated that statements by Comrades Kádár and Szűrös have helped to put aside 
misunderstandings. They have also expressed concern over the fact that, in their view, 
the development of Hungarian–Israeli cultural relations is being monopolised by a 
right-wing group operating with the covert control of the government (led by Moshe 
Sanbar, András Rónai, Ottó Rappaport, Yehuda Lahav). They consider it incompre-
hensible that Hungarian artists visiting Israel mostly take part in events staged by the 
right-wing organisations of Jewish-inhabited towns.
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The trade volume of the Party enterprise (EXIMIS) with Hungary has fallen from 
a level of several million dollars in earlier years to 600,000 dollars in 1985, because, 
after the lifting of Hungarian measures restricting Hungarian–Israeli relations, the 
enterprise lost its privileged status in several areas (e.g. tourism).
[…]
h./ In the field of church relations there is a conflict of interest because, in Hungary, 
the organisation representing Jewry – the National Representation of Hungarian Jews 
(MIOK) – functions as a national religious denomination (religious organisation), 
whereas its Israeli partners are basically secular organisations (and Zionist in terms 
of their ideology). Further, the work of the organisations in Israel is directed in no 
small part at establishing in Israel the centre of the intellectual and material values of 
Hungarian Jewry. In its relations, MIOK tends to place the emphasis on upholding and 
preserving Jewish values in Hungary (memorials, cemeteries, etc.).
[…]
Political Co-ordination
We have undertaken the political co-ordination in accordance with the directives in 
the Political Committee’s proposal and we have sought to apply the following consid-
erations:
 – We have warded off Israeli initiatives aimed at establishing political and eco-
nomic relations between the two states.
 – We have supported travel stemming from our international obligations in the sci-
entific, cultural and sports fields and that promotes a strengthening of our inter-
national relations.
 – We have supported travel aimed at forging trading links, contacts at the level 
of the enterprises, and contacts between scientists and various experts. At the 
same time, we have sought to avoid the establishment of institutional and official 
relations between scientific institutions, universities, theatres and other cultural 
institutions.
 – We have not supported relations that are spectacular and high-profile, that can 
be used against us in propaganda, and that could be used to demonstrate the 
state level [of contacts] (e.g. the Losonczi–Peres meeting, an official Hungarian 
delegation at Israeli state celebrations, etc.).
 – In accordance with the Political Committee’s resolution, we are seeking to ensure 
that Hungarian–Israeli relations do not receive greater publicity in the Hungarian 
mass media than the desirable level.
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 – We are monitoring the official and press reaction of Arab countries, giving them 
information about the true situation; we have criticised information and value 
judgements that do not accord with the facts.
 – Since the outrage at Vienna Airport [attack of Arab terrorists on 27 December 1985 
– AK] we have emphatically reminded travellers to Israel about the security con-
siderations to be followed.
 – We attempted to schedule the travel of people to Israel in such a fashion that a 
large number of Hungarian artists and scientists were not in Israel at the same 
time.
 – Real co-ordination is realised primarily with respect to the partner bodies and 
authorities that request the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Enforcing 
the co-ordination requirement has run into numerous practical difficulties.
Journeys [to Israel] with a commercial aim fall under the jurisdiction of the Minis-
try for Foreign Trade, with whom we have regular working relations. It does happen, 
however, that the Ministry learns of some action only after it has taken place. They 
are informed of an event related to Hungarian–Israeli relations only retrospectively 
or from the press.
[…]
The Regional Department co-operates closely and consults regularly with the Depart-
ment of International Affairs of the Central Committee of the HSWP. In particularly 
controversial or marginal issues, it submits its decision-making proposals to the 
heads of the Ministry.
II.
Conclusions
In summary it may be concluded that Hungarian–Israeli relations have developed 
fundamentally in line with the Political Committee’s resolution of 20 December 1983. 
Contacts between Hungary and Israel in the non-state sector have been vitalised, 
above all relations in such fields as culture, science and sport, as well as tourism. Our 
relations with the population in Israel with a Hungarian background have strength-
ened. Commercial and economic and scientific and technical relations have not 
expanded to the extent considered possible in the resolution.
The recovery in Hungarian–Israeli relations is a consequence primarily of action 
by Israel. Thus, Israel has a greater possibility of moulding these relations in accor-
dance with its interests and of making sure that its political, propaganda and eco-
nomic interests are served. The Israeli government seeks to utilise the facilitation of 
travel for the purpose of restoring inter-state relations; meanwhile the propaganda 
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organs, often exaggerating what is going on in terms of relations, seek to create the 
impression that a restoration of diplomatic relations is imminent.
Overall, the recovery of non-official Hungarian–Israeli relations did not cause a 
detectible disturbance in our relations with the Arab countries. At the same time, the 
tendentious Israeli propaganda did, on occasion, lead to a detectible lack of trust in 
Arab government circles with regard to our intentions concerning diplomatic rela-
tions.
Based on the experience of the nearly three years since the adoption of the Politi-
cal Committee’s resolution, it can be stated that the guidelines relating to Hungari an–
Israeli relations are adequate, although in the future their uniform interpretation 
must be ensured, as must also their most consistent implementation and possible 
advance in, primarily, the economic and consular fields.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts its co-ordination tasks in line with the 
resolution of the Political Committee. The task is made more difficult by the fact that, 
in matters concerning Hungarian–Israeli relations, decisions are often taken outside 
the ministry – this is natural, but they are not always known to us in time – and we 
don’t have sufficient resources to enforce the co-ordination and information require-
ments. With a view to the development of Hungarian–Israeli relations and the appli-
cation of our interests, more efforts are needed to make complete the co-ordinating 




Bearing in mind our position on the Middle-East crisis, which was elaborated with 
other members of the Warsaw Treaty, and the broad-based relations with the majority 
of the Arab states, there must be an attempt in the future to ensure that the recovery 
in Hungarian–Israeli relations should not harm co-operation with the Arab states or 
our foreign policy and foreign-trade interest. At the same time, we shall reject any 
unfounded demands made on our policies with regard to Israel.
We should continue to ward off Israeli initiatives aimed at a restoration of diplo-
matic relations.
For the sake of diplomatic contacts with the Israeli government, we should make 
use of the foreign representations covering our interest representation [in other coun-
tries – AK] and the UN missions, as well as occasional meetings.
Our other foreign representations should listen to the proposals and initiatives of 
the Israeli diplomats, but they should seek central approval before holding serious 
meetings with them. They should continue to refrain from inviting Israeli diplomats 
to Hungarian receptions and they should not attend events held by Israeli foreign 
representations.
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2./ 
The Consular Department should elaborate a proposal for the establishment of direct 
consular relations, with the setting-up of a consular representation (consulate or 
consulate-general based in Tel Aviv), which would undertake tasks connected with 
the defence of the interests of Hungarian citizens and the development of economic, 
trade, cultural, scientific, technical and tourism relations between the two countries, 
also having regard for the 200,000–250,000 Israeli citizens who speak Hungarian.
3./
The Israeli relations of Hungarian social and mass organisations and those of the 
interest-representation organs have developed in line with the Political Committee’s 
resolution of 20 December 1983. These relations – now under formation – make it pos-
sible for a dialogue between the two countries to be maintained or commenced in the 
political, economic and cultural fields, even in the absence of diplomatic relations. By 
way of social relations, a possibility arises for the exchange of accurate information. 
Meanwhile, the development of economic, cultural and tourism relations – strength-
ening the ties of Jews with a Hungarian background – may enhance trust between the 
two countries, which, in turn, may create favourable conditions for the bilateral and 
international search for compromises. Based on all of this, we consider it justified, 
in the spirit of the Political Committee’s resolution, to further broaden Hungarian–
Israeli social relations.
4./
We continue to support the development of economic and scientific-technical rela-
tions at the level of enterprises serving our interests. Israeli firms should not attend 
our major trade fairs, but we should not rule out organised, closed presentations of 
products to a professional audience. Similarly, we should permit Hungarian enter-
prises to hold product presentations in Israel, as long as this does not infringe on our 
interests in another field. Such events should not be of a character that implies an 
official Hungarian presence, and so we should avoid the holding of product presenta-
tions by several companies at one time, etc.
We suggest to the competent economic organs that, where there is a demonstra-
ble Hungarian interest, they should permit the foundation of representative offices in 
Budapest by companies with origins in Israel that are registered in a third country. It 
is expedient to wait with regard to the granting of permission for the establishment of 
representative offices in Budapest by firms based in Israel.
Although the Ministry for Foreign Trade does not consider it to be necessary at 
present to establish in Israel a Hungarian enterprise representative office, if several 
Hungarian enterprises have an interest and the funding is available, we suggest a 
review of the issue on its merits, with a view to expanding our trade and economic 
relations and to increasing Hungarian exports.
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We should avoid higher-level forms of economic co-operation (e.g. joint ventures, 
the import of Israeli capital, etc.).
We suggest that the Ministry for Foreign Trade and the tourism bodies should take 
steps to promote the activities in Hungary of the Israeli Communist Party’s enterprise 
(Eximis).
Through its work, the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce should promote the 
development of relations at company level; it should give orientation to its members 
as they make deals by acquiring useful information.
5./
We should support the fostering and strengthening of cultural relations in line with 
the criteria elaborated by the Ministry of Culture (see Annexe 5). We must endeavour, 
while satisfying in unaltered fashion the needs of Hungarian speakers, to present to a 
greater extent in Israel the high-standard representative values of Socialist Hungarian 
culture, doing so on a business impresario basis. Cultural initiatives at the level of the 
state, however, must be avoided.
6./
An amendment should be made to circular letter no. 001031/81, issued by the State 
Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and prohibiting Hungarian participation 
in scientific-technical conferences held in Jerusalem by non-governmental organisa-
tions.
We should permit – on an individual basis – Hungarian artists and artistic groups 
to make appearances in Jerusalem as long as this happens at non-official Israeli fes-
tivals.
7./
In view of the security issues, it is not the right time, in our view, to launch direct 
flights between the two countries.
8./
In order to improve co-ordination between state organs, we should make better use 
of the state secretaries’ co-ordination conference, and the ministries affected should 
be kept informed about the condition of Hungarian–Israeli relations by way of an 
information booklet that is soon to be published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or, 
if necessary, by way of circular letters.
9./
The World Federation of Hungarians should continue to keep in contact with the 
World Federation of Hungarian Jews and give particular attention to such Israeli-Hun-
garian organisations, or Hungarian-Jewish organisations operating in addition to the 
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latter, which can be used to promote the preservation of Hungarian identity and the 
fostering of the Hungarian language and culture.
10./
Senior staff in the mass media should receive information and guidance about our 
policy relating to Israel and the foreign-policy criteria concerning the mass media.
11./
The Press Department, in co-operation with the 9th Department and the APO [Agita-
tion and Propaganda Department] should evaluate, on a regular basis, the approach 
of the Israeli mass media towards our country.
12./
All of our foreign representations should receive information on our policy relating 
to Israel, on the tasks at hand, and the demeanour to be shown towards Israeli dip-
lomats.
Annexe no. 1
Hungarian–Israeli foreign trade volumes (M USD)
1964 1980 1983 1984 1985 Jan-July 1986
Exports 57.3 3.7 6.3 8.0 7.1 4.05
Imports 69.3 3.4 9.2 10.8 5.8 6.82
Total 126.8 7.1 15.5 18.8 12.9 10.87
[…]








In 1985, the number of trips to Israel agreed by the 9th Regional Department
Cultural Sport Scientific Total
Israel 29 28 16 73
Jerusalem 15 1 22 38
Total 44 29 38 111
[…]
Matters not granted authorisation (1985):
 – Establishment of contacts between the Habima National Theatre in Tel Aviv and 
the Thália Theatre.
 – The showing in Hungary of the “official” Israeli art exhibition material in Europe.
 – Official exhibition exchange of the Israel Museum in Jerusalem with the exchange 
of ethnographic and/or archeological material. […]. 
 – Participation of State Puppet Theatre in the Jerusalem Festival in July 1986
 – Exhibition exchange between the Israeli Artistic League and ARTEX [Hungarian 
foreign-trade company dealing in works of art – AK]. (Israeli material in Hungary 
and an exhibition in the foyer of the National Theatre in Tel Aviv and in the Shalon 
department store.)
 – Guest appearance in Israel of the national football team.
Annexe no. 4
Tourism, no. of departures to and arrivals from Israel
[…]
2.) Total number of Hungarian visitors to Israel:
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
307 359 368 318 699 900
3.) Total number of Israeli visitors to Hungary:
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1,079 1,564 2,726 3,902 11,177 13,200
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Of the 13,200 persons in 1985, 12,200 came for the purpose of tourism. Last year the 
average length of stay of the Israeli tourists was 7.4 days (by way of comparison: tour-
ists from West Germany: 9.1 days, and from France: 8.3 days).
In 1985, 37,000 citizens from Arab countries travelled to Hungary.
Annexe no. 5
Recommendations and proposals accepted by the Department of International Rela-
tions of the Ministry of Culture and Education for the shaping of Hungarian–Israeli 
cultural relations
1.) We should continue to avoid a situation in which our cultural relations receive an 
official bilateral tone.
[…]
6.)  In the case of a series of Hungarian artistic, literary, etc. events to be held in Israel, 
there must be greater co-ordination to prevent an excessive number of events being 
held simultaneously […].
[…]
8.) Attempts by the Israeli side aimed at reciprocity must be stalled, especially in the 
case of actions of a more spectacular nature.
9.) The Ministry of Culture and Education requests the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
monitor the reception in the domestic press of Hungarian–Israeli cultural relations 
and ensure that it is the most modest possible.
10.) The department of the Ministry of Culture and Education responsible for inter-
national relations, and its other departments should assist the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in vetting planned journeys to Israel by providing more well-founded informa-
tion than it has done to date.
Our position:
The above proposals are in accordance with the ordinances of the Political Committee 
and will enable the development of Hungarian–Israeli cultural relations in a direction 
and to an extent that is in our interests, while they also formulate the limits to such 
relations. 
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20 Appraisal of Draft CC Proposal on Restoring Hungarian–Israeli 
Diplomatic Relations
2 November 1988
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j-Izrael-113-004390-1988 (50.d.)
Collection: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Külügyminisztérium] 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
7th Regional Department
9th Regional Department
Completed: in 1 copy
Validity: until revoked
Memorandum
Subject: appraisal of draft CC [Central Committee] proposal on restoring Hungarian–
Israeli diplomatic relations
Comrade Dr József Györke, Deputy Head of the Department of International Affairs 
of the HSWP CC, forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the material on the 
restoration of Hungarian–Israeli diplomatic relations that is to be submitted to the 
Central Committee, and requested the 7th and 9th Regional Departments appraise 
the material. The Department of International Affairs considers the attached material 
to represent merely preliminary ideas; it wishes to submit its finalised proposal at the 
meeting of the Central Committee on 22 November.
The 7th and 9th Regional Departments are of the opinion that the ideas, which 
are truly preliminary ones, need to be made more specific and precise, and could be 
supplemented with arguments that strengthen the topicality of the proposal.
Given that the significance of the proposal – if it were to be adopted – goes beyond 
the subject-matter of Hungarian–Israeli relations and that the realisation of the res-
olution would also impose substantial tasks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
future, we suggest that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should assist the work of the 
Department for International Affairs in this area by drafting its own proposal.
We attach the proposal of the 7th and 9th Regional Departments. In the event of 
agreement, we shall send it to the Department for International Affairs of the HSWP 
CC.
P r o p o s a l
For the draft submission on restoring Hungarian–Israeli diplomatic relations
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On 12 June 1967, the government of the People’s Republic of Hungary – in agree-
ment with several European Socialist countries – broke off diplomatic relations with 
the State of Israel. Our response to Israel’s aggression against the Arab countries, 
a response that was an expression of solidarity with the countries that had been 
attacked and with the Palestinian people, was received favourably by the Arab coun-
tries. At the same time, it did not impact on the policies of the Israeli government; 
the measure did not enable us to exert the kind of pressure on Israel that would have 
resulted in an evacuation of the occupied territories. Meanwhile, the severance of dip-
lomatic relations precluded any possibility of exerting a direct influence.
Since the Arab–Israeli war of 1967, there have been major changes in the Middle 
East. With Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and then the signing of the Camp David agree-
ments, the United States and Israel succeeded in undermining the unity of the front-
line Arab countries. In 1980, Egypt established diplomatic relations with Israel. Since 
then, the views and actions of the Arab countries with regard to a resolution of the 
crisis in the Middle East have become more polarised, and there has been a strength-
ening of acceptance of, and support for, the necessity of a settlement within an inter-
national framework.
Changes in the Middle East and our interest in utilising developments in Hungar-
ian–Israeli relations and the opportunities arising therefrom, have made it necessary 
for the Political Committee of the HSWP to concern itself with the issue of Hungarian–
Israeli relations and to consent to the lifting of some of the restrictions.
On 10 March 1987, the Political Committee, giving consideration to the develop-
ment of Hungarian–Israeli relations, decided that we should initiate negotiations 
with Israel on the reciprocal establishment of interest representation offices in Tel 
Aviv and Budapest. The resolution drew attention to the importance of ensuring that 
the results of Hungarian–Israeli relations should not impact negatively on co-opera-
tion with the Arab countries.
Since the commencement of negotiations on the creation of interest-representa-
tion offices, we have sought consistently to achieve an understanding in the Arab 
countries for the reasons for our initiative and for our aims in developing Hungar-
ian–Israeli relations, as well as reduce the chance of counter-measures on their part. 
However, our endeavours in this regard have been only partially successful.
The overall moderate reaction of the Arab countries conceals a different stance at 
the level of individual countries. Those Arab countries that are particularly sensitive to 
Israel and to Zionist ideology (Algeria, Libya, Syria and the PLO) reacted vehemently 
to the creation of the interest-representation offices, to developments in Hungarian–
Israeli relations, in some cases voicing their reservations on multiple occasions. This 
was manifested in such demonstrative measures as the cancellation of the visit to 
Algeria of the Chairman of the Presidential Council [of Hungary – AK] and of Arafat’s 
visit to Budapest, a refusal to receive Hungarian delegations or to arrange visits to 
Hungary (e.g. the visit to the Emirates of Comrade Zoltán Juhár, the visit to Libya of 
the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the submission of a message at the highest 
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level, the cancellation of a visit by the Secretary General of the Arab League, and a 
statement on behalf of the Arab League condemning and criticising our policy).
In addition to the detrimental effects on our political relations, our economic 
losses (due to the failure of contracts under negotiation) are estimated to be USD 
30–40 million. The planned visit of Palestinian businessmen has not taken place, and 
a delegation headed by Comrade Tamás Beck of the Chamber of Commerce did not 
receive entry visas to several of the Gulf States. However, of even greater significance 
than these losses are the foregone business opportunities, with potential Hungarian 
partners not even being invited to negotiate [such deals].
The overall poor reception in the Arab countries of the development of Hungar-
ian–Israeli relations is linked with the fact that they suspect that Hungarian – and, 
prior to this, Polish – measures signify a change in the Middle-Eastern policies of 
the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries, and that they seek, by implementing 
measures against us, to put a brake on this process and discourage other Socialist 
countries.
The creation of interest-representation offices, the development of Hungarian–
Israeli relations and the establishment of unofficial contacts at a high level have been 
unanimously welcomed by government and business/financial circles in our major 
Western partners. The economic benefits of this, however, are difficult to calculate. Its 
significance is to be seen primarily in a more favourable judgment of our country and 
an increased willingness to co-operate on the part of these partners. Several ideas 
were raised about new business opportunities by the involvement of international 
Jewish capital, including the realisation of an investment programme worth USD 300 
million, in which – at the initiative of Shimon Peres – 20 American-Jewish business-
men were supposed to be engaged. According to Israeli figures, Hungarian exports to 
Israel amounted to USD 27 million in the first eight months of 1988.
The improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
has made it possible for them to carry on a regular dialogue on the means of address-
ing regional crisis points, including the Middle-East crisis. As the consultations have 
become more worthwhile, one can also observe how both superpowers are endeavour-
ing to improve relations with the affected parties. Within this framework, the Soviet 
Union is also seeking ways of gradually mending Soviet–Israeli relations. The Soviet 
Union – on account of its more complicated situation – has chosen another form of 
building relations; through the exchange of consular delegations, it has viewed the 
establishment of consular relations of a temporary nature as of benefit.
Reacting in no small measure to the creation of Polish and Hungarian inter-
est-representation offices, to the swift development of Hungarian–Israeli relations 
and to the Soviet measures, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are also considering the 
creation of interest-representation offices, while the GDR is examining opportunities 
for enhancing relations with international Jewry. 
Hungary’s intent to assist in the resolution of the Middle-East crisis, as well 
as our endeavours to establish the external conditions necessary for developing 
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the economy, require an examination of how, while retaining and deepening Hun-
garian–Arab political and economic relations and co-operation, we can utilise the 
opportunities inherent in the development of Hungarian–Israeli relations and in the 
international sphere of interests that is linked with Israel for the expansion of our 
international political, economic and financial relations. For this reason, it is justi-
fied to place the restoration of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of 
Hungary and the State of Israel on the agenda.
Official Soviet statements indicate that the convening of an international con-
ference on the Middle East is a condition for the restoration of diplomatic relations 
between the Soviet Union and Israel. Thus, if Hungary were to be the first Socialist 
country – among the countries that agreed to break off relations in 1967 – to renew 
diplomatic relations with Israel, then one must count on even greater retaliation from 
those Arab countries that oppose relations with Israel, including measures that they 
will not take against the Soviet Union in view of its superpower status and role.
Another consideration is that the restoration of diplomatic relations would take 
place at a time when – based on the election results – it is likely that a government 
will be formed led by the Likud party, which demand a harder and more forceful 
stand against the Palestinians. Restoration of diplomatic relations would translate 
into huge political capital for Likud; it would mitigate Israel’s tight spot, and exert 
pressure on the other Socialist countries to swiftly improve their relations with Israel.
We must also bear in mind that our total exports to Israel – even despite the 
improvement seen since the creation of the interest-representation offices – do not 
make up for our calculable losses on the Arab market.
Based on the above, we consider it necessary, prior to the restoration of Hun-
garian-Israeli diplomatic relations, that decisions be taken in Israel or via Israel that 
strengthen the positions of our country in the international money markets, facilitate 
the import of working capital and advanced technology and/or result in the place-
ment of greater deposits at the National Bank of Hungary. For this reason, when the 
Central Committee decides on the proposal, it would be necessary to declare its wish 
that our competent economic-financial bodies should elaborate, in a specific and 
detailed fashion, the conditions whose fulfilment would justify Hungary taking this 
decision – the restoration of diplomatic relations – which is so crucial for Israel.
The protection of our interests with regard to maintaining and developing co-op-
eration with the Arab countries, and a reduction in the harmful consequences of the 
decision, require that, alongside the oral arguments made until now, which will be 
fully inadequate in the case of the restoration of diplomatic relations, we should also 
launch goodwill missions at a higher level. Our competent bodies should provide 
the funding necessary for concrete steps, whether such steps are delegation visits or 
other measures, e.g. events of a cultural nature. 
After the Central Committee has given its approval, we should resume Hun-
garian–Israeli contacts. Depending on how such contacts proceed and how Israeli 
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domestic politics and the situation in the region develop, it would be worth deciding 
on when to commence talks on the restoration of diplomatic relations.
It would seem necessary for us to concur and agree in advance with the Soviet 
Union on this decision, so that it does not stand in the way of the Soviet Union’s 
endeavours in the Soviet–U.S. talks pertaining to the region. 


IV The International Jewish Organisations, the 
Jewish Community and the State

Introduction
The documents selected for this chapter show the development of relations between 
the Jewish community in Hungary and the international Jewish organisations in the 
period 1956–1989. Contacts between the two sides were subject to the scrutiny of the 
Party State leadership throughout the period, and so the development of relations 
tended to reflect Party decisions and their implementation by the responsible state 
institutions. The “advice” received from the Soviet Union and the stances taken by 
“fraternal countries” were additional influential factors. These documents reveal the 
policies pursued by the Hungarian Communist Party State towards the World Jewish 
Congress (WJC), the largest international Jewish political organisation, and towards 
the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (“the Joint”), the world’s leading 
Jewish relief organisation.1 
The first signs of a softening of “Jewish policy” came in the immediate aftermath 
of the 1956 Revolution (see Chapter 1), when the National Representation of Hungar-
ian Israelites (NRHI) was granted permission to join the WJC. In Zürich on 26 April 
1957, the deputy chairman of the NRHI informed representatives of the WJC that the 
NRHI was in a position to restore relations, having received the approval of the Hun-
garian government for such a move.2 Several months later, on 25 August, the NRHI 
officially announced its membership of the WJC. The Hungarian Jewish body dele-
gated one member and one associate member to the Executive Committee of the WJC.3 
The Hungarian government’s decision to approve the NRHI’s membership of 
the WJC, a measure aimed at mitigating Hungary’s international isolation after the 
suppression of the 1956 Revolution, came under immediate pressure. In February 
1958, the Hungarian legate in Tel Aviv announced that: “The diplomats of the frater-
nal countries’ embassies in Tel Aviv have asked the Embassy’s chargé d’affaires on 
several occasions whether the Hungarian government had consented to the NRHI’s 
joining the World Jewish Council, or whether the NRHI’s action should be viewed 
as having been taken independently”.4 Evidently, action by the Israeli Communist 
Party may have been, at least in part, behind such interest, as Document 1 suggests. 
1 On the policies of the World Jewish Congress between 1945 and 1953 in Hungary see Kinga Frojimo-
vics. The role of the World Jewish Congress in the reestablishment of Jewish communal life in Hungary 
after the Holocaust (1945/1953). In The Holocaust in Hungary. A European Perspective, ed. Judit Molnár 
(Budapest: Balassi, 2015), 300–315.
2 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-a 9.d. 170-11/1957 (16 May 1957).
3 The text of the agreement and the consent of the State Office for Church Affairs see National Ar-
chives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-a 9.d. 170-19/1957, 170-20/1957/ (25 August 1957). For a chronology of the 
history of relations with the WJC, see National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-c 87.d. 520/5 (2 April 
1980).
4 Letter of Péter Kós, Head of the Fourth Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
János Horváth of the Ministry of Culture and Education], National Archives of Hungary, XIX-J-1-j 3.d. 
0011/1958 (17 February 1958).
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According to the legate’s report of October 1958, Meir Vilner, one of the ICP leaders, 
had contacted the Hungarian embassy – and clearly the diplomatic representations 
of the other Communist countries too – to express the ICP’s displeasure at the NRHI’s 
decision to join an international organisation that was “under Zionist direction”. 
Vilner had also implied that the “fraternal countries” disagreed with this decision. At 
the time, Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to express support for the 
decision, citing arguments that focused on the political factors, and which would be 
made repeatedly in subsequent documents. The Ministry argued, for instance, that 
as a full member of the organisation, the NRHI would find it easier to influence the 
policies of the WJC, and in particular, its policies towards the Soviet Union’s Jewish 
communities. Furthermore, WJC membership would enable the NRHI to keep the 
topic of Israel’s neutrality – a prospect raised by Soviet diplomacy at intervals in the 
aftermath of the Suez Crisis as a means of bringing an end to the Middle-East Crisis – 
on the agenda.  
In the following year, however, Hungarian policy underwent a shift. This notice-
able change was not only due to a cooling of relations with Israel (see Chapter 1). 
Rather, it reflected the fact that the WJC, along with other international Jewish organ-
isations, had become increasingly vociferous in its defence of Soviet Jewry. In the 
summer of 1959, when the NRHI was still a member of the WJC, the State Office for 
Church Affairs prohibited Hungarian delegates from attending the WJC’s conference 
in Stockholm. Then, in July 1960, following a proposal made by the State Office for 
Church Affairs, the Political Committee of the HSWP decreed that the NRHI should 
cancel its membership of the WJC. In its proposal, the State Office cited a resolution 
adopted at the Stockholm conference on Soviet Jewry, and the expression of gratitude 
made at the same conference to the West-German government in response to the lat-
ter’s decision to offer compensation, as reasons for the NRHI’s exit from the WJC. The 
NRHI announced that it was leaving the WJC on 24 July 1960. 
In subsequent years, the WJC leadership, and in particular its European direc-
tor, Siegfried (Stephen) Roth, who had Hungarian ancestry and who would become 
WJC director in 1966, made multiple attempts to improve relations with Hungary and 
Jewish organisations in Hungary. During these years, the main political objectives of 
the WJC continued to be an improvement in the situation of Soviet Jews, and the facil-
itation of their emigration. The WJC leadership believed that the situation of Soviet 
Jewry could be improved by disrupting the unity of the Soviet bloc, and by establish-
ing bilateral relations of varying intensity with the Soviet Union’s European allies 
and their Jewish communities. To this end, in its messages to Jewish and government 
leaders in Hungary, and in the course of personal meetings, the WJC leadership not 
only emphasised the shared interest in seeking out and bringing to justice war crim-
inals, it also showed a willingness to consider Soviet foreign-policy interests, and to 
promote the economic interests of the Communist countries in the West (e.g. in resolv-
ing the matter of German reparations). A document dated 27 July 1962 and signed 
by a leading official of the political police working in the department responsible 
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for church affairs (Document 3) reveals one such attempt. At the time, the response5 
of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to reject, although it expressed a 
willingness to co-operate in the matter of Nazi war criminals. From the mid-1960s, 
however, the Ministry’s tone modified somewhat, which seems to have reflected an 
improvement in relations with Israel (see Chapter 1). The contents of the document 
dated 16 May 1966 (Document 4) are symptomatic of this easing: the NRHI received 
authorisation to send an observer to the Brussels Conference of the WJC, and the 
decision was taken not to rule out the re-involvement of the NRHI in the work of the 
WJC during discussions with representatives of international Jewish organisations. A 
further step forward came in the summer of the same year, when authorisation was 
given for Hungarian delegates to actually participate in the Brussels Conference. The 
reports on conference proceedings, as well as a summary sent to Party and govern-
ment officials (Documents 5, 6 and 7), reveal that Jewish leaders in Hungary were 
intensely lobbying for renewed membership of the organisation. The authors of these 
documents did not oppose this lobbying either, albeit only after “consultations” with 
the religious affairs organs in the Soviet Union and other “fraternal countries”. 
A rapprochement with the WJC is reflected in a decision taken in early 1967 by 
staff at the State Office for Church Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
gave consent to a visit to Hungary by Nahum Goldmann, President of the WJC. Corre-
spondence between József Prantner, Head of the State Office for Church Affairs, and 
Deputy Foreign Minister Béla Szilágyi, reveals that Goldmann had expressed a desire 
to travel to Hungary on multiple occasions in earlier years, but the Hungarian side had 
not responded to his requests. Now, however, as Prantner wrote to Szilágyi, “it would 
be difficult to find any grounds” to reject a visit by Goldmann, since the Hungarian 
Jewish Religious Denomination had already established relations with the WJC. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs opted not to reject outright Goldmann’s visit. Nevertheless, 
it appeared to link any final decision to the stance taken by allied countries: if they 
decided to admit Goldmann, then Hungary would not be in a position to reject him. 
“[W]e request clarification from the fraternal organs concerning the extent to which 
the media are dealing with the visit of Goldmann. In our opinion, his visit to Hungary 
should not get excessive publicity; neither, however, does it warrant concealment”.6 
Goldmann’s visit to Hungary finally took place in the spring of 1967. Evidently, 
authorisation for the visit reflected the fact that he had been permitted to visit Czecho-
slovakia in 1966.7 Document 8 contains an account of Goldmann’s visit to Hungary. 
In the hope of receiving economic benefits, Hungary’s political leaders had evidently 
become less dismissive of relations with the WJC. Their position contrasts with that of 
the Czechoslovak leadership, which in late 1966 had refused even to give its consent 
5 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 17.d. 044-3/1962 (19 June 1962).
6 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 37.d. 005-2/1967 (31 January 1967).
7 Labendz, Renegotiating Czechoslovakia, 416.
222   IV The International Jewish Organisations, the Jewish Community and the State
to official observer status.8 Reflecting the Hungarian government’s position, Jewish 
denomination leaders from Hungary attended the Milan conference of the European 
branch of the WJC as observers. 
The gradual improvement in relations came to a swift end in 1967 with the sev-
erance of diplomatic relations after the Six-Day War. A memo of the State Office for 
Church Affairs dated 27 August 1967 records this change: “We have authorised the 
visit of Nahum Goldmann, but in the light of the situation that has arisen following 
the Israeli aggression the various factors surrounding the visit must be reappraised”.9 
In subsequent years, the WJC made repeated attempts to persuade the Hungarian 
authorities to reauthorise the NRHI’s participation in the various events staged by the 
WJC. During this period, WJC officials visited Hungary in a private capacity. Thus, for 
instance, Armand Kaplan, Deputy Head of the International Department of the WJC, 
met with the heads of the NRHI and the State Office for Church Affairs in Budapest 
in both 1968 and 1969.10 During the discussions, emphasis was laid on the economic 
benefits of closer relations with the WJC, while the WJC leaders carefully avoided rep-
resenting Zionist positions, and there was only muted criticism of the Soviet Union. 
WJC leaders also cited examples – often non-existent ones – in their relations with 
other Communist countries, which could serve as “inspiration”. (Among other things, 
this demonstrates the extent to which the WJC leadership underestimated political 
co-ordination among Eastern-bloc countries. Furthermore, in some cases, the WJC’s 
information was entirely false: for instance, the organisation had a very positive view 
of Tito’s role in the aftermath of the 1967 war, whereas in reality – as the documents 
published in this volume show – Tito was encouraging his fellow Communist leaders 
to take a radically pro-Arab stance in the Middle-East conflict.) The WJC evidently 
overestimated its ability to mislead officials working at the State Office for Church 
Affairs, who noted the following in the conclusion of a report submitted to the Party 
and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
In connection with the visit of Armand Kaplan and in view of the fact that the State Office for 
Church Affairs is acquainted with his person and his political stance, there should be strong 
reservations about the views and opinions expressed in the aforementioned. Taking all these 
things into consideration, one can state that Kaplan’s primary aim in visiting Hungary was to 
persuade the NRHI to co-operate more closely with the WJC and to call for open relations. In our 
opinion, this explains not only the promise of financial aid but also the positive assessment of 
the Soviet Union.11 
8 Ibid, 512.
9 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 39.d. 0020-3/b/1967 (27 August 1967).
10 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 43.d. 0020-1/1968 (28 March 1968) and 48.d. 0020-4/1969 
(20 April 1969). 
11 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 43.d. 0020-1/1968 (28 March 1968).
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A change in the relationship with the WJC came only in the mid-1970s. In May 1975, the 
official in charge of Jewish matters at the State Office for Church Affairs still opposed 
the participation of a Hungarian delegate at a meeting of the European Branch of 
the WJC. Yet, at the top of the document, we find a comment by István Balló, Deputy 
Head of the State Office for Church Affairs: “I believe the issue requires consideration. 
In my view, a complete reassessment [of the earlier position – AK] is not required if 
someone attends the meeting of the European Branch. In the Middle-East region, 
the trend now is for détente. Why should we be the inflexible ones?”12 In a develop-
ment that was not unrelated to the process of détente and the signing of the Helsinki 
Accords, in the summer of 1975, the State Office for Church Affairs finally gave consent 
for Géza Seifert, Head of the NRHI, to attend a meeting of the European Branch – for 
the first time since 1967. The document approving Seifert’s attendance at the meeting 
also reveals that the decision had been taken after prior consultations with the Soviet 
Union’s Council for Religious Affairs, and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.13 
After further consultations, delegates from the Jewish religious communities in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany were subsequently permitted to attend 
the WJC’s December 1976 Madrid conference as observers. The political “tasks” of the 
Hungarian delegates, and those of delegates from the other Communist countries, 
were determined in advance by the authorities responsible for religious affairs: they 
were to prevent the adoption of decrees and positions relating to Soviet Jewry, and to 
Eastern bloc’s Middle-East policy. 
The policy tactics of the WJC did not change significantly in subsequent years. 
In their statements and over the course of their visits, WJC leaders pledged economic 
benefits in return for renewed membership. In the late 1970s, it was increasingly 
suggested that “most favoured nation” status should or could be one of these bene-
fits. While no specific offer was made, the possibility of such an offer was hinted at 
during negotiations with the Hungarian side (Document 9), and with Czechoslovak 
officials.14  
After lengthy preliminary negotiations, renewed Hungarian membership of the 
WJC was officially announced in 1981. The WJC leadership regarded this event as a 
major success, an important means towards achieving an improvement in the situ-
ation of Soviet Jews, and the facilitation of their emigration. All this is revealed in a 
rather aloof memorandum drafted in the summer of 1982 by Imre Miklós, Head of the 
State Office for Church Affairs. The memo contained details of a conversation between 
Miklós and Edgar M. Bronfman, President of the WJC, who had been invited to Buda-
pest by the NRHI: 
12 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 84.d. 0020-2/1975 (29 May 1975).
13 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 84.d. 0020-2/1975 (17 June 1975).
14 Labendz, op. cit., 518.
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President Bronfman [...] mentioned the situation and operational difficulties of the Jewish com-
munities in the Soviet Union. In his assessment, notwithstanding previous efforts, the issue is 
one of the hot spots at a time of increased tensions between the Soviet Union and the United 
States [...]. President Bronfman emphasised his conviction that the Hungarian State’s good rela-
tions with the Hungarian Jewish community and with the WJC could be beneficial in terms of 
exerting a positive influence on the stance of the competent Soviet organs [...]. He asked for 
my assistance in arranging for talks to be held with the competent Soviet state organs as soon 
as possible [...]. In my response I stated that I am not competent to deal with this issue [...]. It 
might be beneficial to broaden the WJC’s scope for action by making sure that relations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States are once again characterised by dialogue rather than by 
problems eliciting tensions [...]15 
For the WJC, a major political breakthrough came in late 1986 when the Hungarian author-
ities approved the holding a meeting of the enlarged WJC executive in Budapest the fol-
lowing year. In the end, the event was attended by delegates from 26 countries; it was the 
first time the meeting had been held in a Communist country. The negotiations that led 
to the meeting are revealed in the Documents 10 and 11. The contents of these documents 
show that Hungary’s political leaders were well aware of the importance of the event for 
the WJC, and that almost any condition set by the Hungarian side would be accepted. 
Indeed, WJC leaders not only pledged to refrain from mentioning the re-emergence of 
antisemitism in Hungary (Document 12); they also agreed to seek the prior consent of 
Hungarian political leaders in advance of publication of the final communiqué. The WJC 
seems to have viewed such pledges as part of an acceptable compromise that would ulti-
mately facilitate a change in Soviet policy on emigration, and the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between Israel and (at least some of) the Communist countries. The latter 
issue was the main topic of a July 1987 meeting between János Kádár, the Hungarian Party 
leader, and Edgar M. Bronfman. The meeting took place two months after the Budapest 
conference, and following a visit by Bronfman to the Soviet Union.16 
Relations between the Communist countries and the American Jewish Joint Distri-
bution Committee (“the Joint”) – arguably the most influential Jewish relief organisation 
operating in the Central- and Eastern-European region – underwent similar periodic 
changes. As in the case of the WJC, the Joint’s relations with government authorities in 
the various countries passed through various phases from the initial rupture in the imme-
diate aftermath of the Communist seizure of power, to the formal restoration of diplomatic 
ties around the turn of the 1980s. On closer inspection, however, we find significant dif-
ferences between the experiences of the two organisations. As an international non-po-
litical relief organisation, the Joint had already established robust and diverse relations 
with organisations and governments in Central and Eastern Europe in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II. The relief and assistance provided by the organisation after 
1945 had proved crucial not only for Jewish survivors, but also for the governments of the 
15 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 122.d. 0020-2/1982 (24 May 1982).
16 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 151.d. 0018/12-1/1987 (15 July 1987). 
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war-torn countries. In May 1947, a Hungarian Communist functionary of the Ministry of 
Welfare wrote in a confidential letter to one of the principal leaders of the Party: 
At present, our aim is to dig as deep as possible into the affairs of the Joint; we shall prevent their 
[monthly – AK] ten million forints [worth about 700,000 dollars – AK] from serving to support 
reactionary aims, and we shall defeat the Zionist line [...]. The question arises: Is it necessary 
that the Joint continue operating in Hungary? In the current situation it is absolutely necessary, 
because it means advantages from the economic and social point of view, but in terms of politics 
it must be brought under control.17 
In the period 1945–1952, the Joint spent 342 million dollars on assisting victims of the 
Holocaust, with 52 million dollars being spent in Hungary.18 
As a consequence of the “anti-Zionist” campaigns and trials of the early 1950s, 
formal relations between the Joint and governments in the various countries were 
severed. Thereafter, the organisation was often portrayed by Communist propagan-
dists as one of the “espionage organisations of imperialism”. Even so, the Joint always 
managed to find, even in the most difficult periods, the means to offer assistance to 
Holocaust survivors in Communist countries.19 During the period of détente that fol-
lowed Stalin’s death, and together with the help of other organisations, the Joint sought 
to indirectly provide social support to Jews living in Communist countries. In Poland, 
the Joint was granted official permission to recommence its activities in the late 1950s; 
it was banned again in 1967. Meanwhile, in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, the Joint 
could provide assistance via the Swiss-based Société de Secours et d’Entraide (SSE), an 
organisation founded by the Joint in 1953. Often such assistance was provided through 
informal channels, sometimes with the knowledge and tacit consent of the authorities 
in the two countries.20 A document issued by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in 1960 clearly informs the leaders of the State Office for Church Affairs that: “the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs does not object in foreign-policy terms to the Joint offering Hun-
garian Jewish organisations in the country far more financial support than before. This 
applies, however, only if the funds spent on this purpose do not arise from collections 
made for the assistance of Hungarian Jews”.21 According to a document from August 
17 Letter of Miklós Ajtai to Mihály Farkas, in László Svéd, Dokumentumok. A magyar zsidóság és a 
hatalom 1945–1955 [Documents. Hungarian Jewry and the Authorities, 1945–1955], Múltunk 2–3 (1993), 
248–298 (260–264).
18 Michael Beizer, American Joint Distribution Committee. The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern 
Europe. Accessed on 27 September 2016 at http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/American_
Jewish_Joint_Distribution_Committee#id0evlag. 
19 See Martin Šmok, “Every Jew is a Zionist, and Every Zionist is a Spy!” The Story of Jewish Social 
Assistance Networks in Communist Czechoslovakia. East European Jewish Affairs 44 (2014), 70–83; 
and Michael Beizer, “I Don’t Know Whom to Thank”: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Com-
mittee’s Secret Aid to Soviet Jewry. Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society 15 (2009), 111–136.
20 See Labendz, op. cit., 516.
21 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 7.d. 005-14/1960 (18 May 1960). 
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1967: “Since 1955, by means of the Swiss relief agency SSE and with the involvement 
of the State Office for Church Affairs and the Finance Ministry, financial aid worth 
nine million dollars has been sent to Hungary, as well as aid for the purchase of goods 
(medicines, food, clothing, vehicles, etc.), and for social purposes worth around 1.5 mil-
lion”.22 In 1972, Imre Miklós, Head of the State Office for Church Affairs, gave the follow-
ing summary of developments in the field of aid and relief: 
In 1955 an agreement was reached, which was signed by Dr Erwin Haymann [correctly: Hayman 
– AK] on behalf of the Swiss-based Societé de Secours et d’Entr’Aide [Société de Secours et d’En-
traide – AK] and by János Horváth, who was Head of the State Office for Church Affairs at the 
time. Under the terms of the agreement, the Swiss relief organisation provided 300,000 dollars 
for social support. Subsequently, aid received from this relief organisation rose to as much as 
774,000 dollars per annum, and the current annual sum stands at about 600,000 dollars. The 
provision of aid was tied to specific individuals, and the amount was determined on the basis of 
need. The sum steadily declined as the beneficiaries passed away. Our relations with the Swiss 
relief organisation have been smooth to date. We have ensured that the aid and relief is not tied to 
political conditions. The distribution of aid is undertaken centrally by the MIOK KSZB [National 
Representation of Hungarian Israelites, Central Social Committee]. The utilisation of the aid is 
verified annually with our consent by the Swiss aid organisation.23 
According to the documents, in addition to the aid received for social support, in 
1967, the sum of aid spent on culture (stemming mainly from the Claims Conference) 
amounted to approximately 200,000 dollars over a ten-year period.24 
Whereas an improvement or deterioration in relations with the WJC depended 
exclusively on political factors, with regard to the SSE, the Hungarian authorities, who 
were struggling with a lack of foreign currency at the time, evidently had no interest in 
squeezing the agency out of the country. Rather, they sought to control the aid and relief 
arriving in the country, just as they had done with respect to the Joint between 1945 and 
1952. Since the authorities did not have some of the required information about the exact 
amount and beneficiaries of foreign aid, the political police utilised secret informers for 
obtaining such information. This is revealed in a document stemming from January 1962. 
The document was placed in a file on Mihály Borsa, Head of the Central Social Commit-
tee, the Hungarian organisation charged with distributing SSE aid and relief: 
According to our information, in late January 1962 the Geneva attorney Dr Erwin Haymann 
[Hayman – AK], one of the leaders of the international Jewish relief bodies, will come to Buda-
pest for a few days [...]. [O]ur experiences to date show that he will call on many people as negoti-
ating partners. We also have reports indicating that [...] he will bring in illegally certain amounts 
of money.25 
22 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 39.d. 0020-3/b/1967 (27 August 1967). 
23 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 67.d. 0020-1/1972 (30 March 1972).
24 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 39.d. 0020-3/b/1967 (27 August 1967).
25 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-13558/1, BM III/II. 4.a., Personal folder: 
“Milliomos” [Millionaire], Nr.: Sz-7088 (15 January 1962).
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Still, the state organs responsible for checking on the Jewish denomination were even 
unable to take full control of the distribution of aid brought into the country officially. 
Mihály Borsa and Sándor Scheiber, Head of the Rabbinical Seminary, who oversaw 
the distribution of aid allocated for cultural purposes resisted – more or less success-
fully – the attempts of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites, in col-
laboration with the state authorities, to take control of their organisations (Chapter 5 
contains several documents that refer to these conflicts).
Between 1967 and 1975, the leaders of the Joint tried on several occasions to estab-
lish direct contacts with Hungary’s Jewish organisations, with a view to dispatching 
various forms of assistance and support to the country, without Hungarian state 
interference. With this goal in mind, they reiterated their earlier offers to increase the 
amount of aid and relief. These attempts were averted by the Hungarian political lead-
ership. For instance, in 1972, Imre Miklós, Head of the State Office for Church Affairs, 
reported to the competent state and Party officials the following: 
For years the Joint has been seeking for ways to send once again the aid and relief directly to the 
Hungarian Jewish Denomination. Recently, Luis Horovitz [sic! – AK], CEO of the Joint in Romania, 
specifically mentioned to Dr Géza Seifert, Head of the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites, the possibility of establishing direct relations. Dr Seifert […] is of the view that the Joint 
would give far more aid than it does at present if it could transfer the sums directly. The giving of 
aid will not be made subject to political or other conditions. The Joint chairman also stated that 
the organisation had already been involved in the provision of aid to Hungarian Jewry by way of 
the Societé de Secours et d’Entraide. In the future they wish to be able to support the Hungarian 
Jewish Denomination directly. With this in mind, their representatives seek to visit Hungary to 
get acquainted with the work of the Central Social Committee and assess the specific needs for 
aid and relief. They stated that they themselves were able to accept the present administrative 
mode and control of aid-giving. Suggestion: we should give our approval to a visit to Hungary by 
representatives of the Joint. The State Office for Church Affairs should contact them for informa-
tive purposes only and listen to their ideas on aid-giving; during the talks, the State Office should 
not make any kind of commitment to the Joint’s representatives or any reference thereto.26 
From the second half of the 1970s, there was a shift in the basic position that had 
rejected direct contacts with the Joint. After the Soviet religious affairs authorities 
gave their consent to the restoration of relations with the WJC, and the Jewish organ-
isations in the allied countries took such a step, WJC leaders raised the possibility of 
direct contacts with the Joint during their talks. These took place after the ceremo-
nious return to Hungary of the Hungarian royal crown, which had been taken to the 
United States in the aftermath of World War II. The return of the royal crown marked a 
spectacular improvement in Hungarian-U.S. relations. As the contents of a document 
dated 25 January 1978 (Document 9) reveal, the Hungarian side had found out from a 
secret service source that during the talks in Budapest, Philip Klutznick, President of 
the WJC, had wanted to link the issue of relations with Jewish organisations with the 
26 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 67.d. 0020-1/1972 (30 March 1972).
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negotiations being between the Hungarian government and the United States on the 
granting of most-favoured nation status. At the time, those negotiations were in their 
final stages, but the U.S. ambassador to Hungary advised Klutznick not to link the two 
issues. (Hungary was then granted the most-favoured nation status in the course of 
1978.) Despite these developments, and as revealed in a memorandum authored by 
Imre Miklós, the Hungarian authorities were convinced that not linking these issues 
was merely a tactic, and that both the WJC and the Joint were simply tools of the 
U.S. government for promoting U.S. interests, which thus set the guidelines for nego-
tiations with the two organisations. As it turns out from the memorandum, in the 
negotiations with Klutznick, Miklós hinted clearly that the scope for action of Jewish 
organisations in Hungary was actually determined by Hungarian political authorities, 
and that under certain circumstances, the Hungarian government was open to the 
possibility allowing Hungarian Jewish organisations greater scope for action in their 
relations with both the Joint and the WJC. Then, in September 1978, the Hungarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs signalled to the State Office for Church Affairs that the U.S. 
Embassy was emphatically requesting that the Joint’s leaders be invited to Hungary. 
In his response, Miklós sought to prevaricate: 
[…] The request of the U.S. Embassy in this matter is part of an intentional tactical approach that 
has been pursued for some years. In my judgement, the Joint needs the State Office for Church 
Affairs to issue the letter of invitation in order to give the impression that it is our initiative. We 
have never sought direct relations with the Joint; rather the Joint has sought direct relations with 
us, and our interests are best served by continuing to refrain from initiating anything in this 
matter.27 
This stance, however, could not be maintained for long. In a memo dated 5 March 1979, 
Miklós reported that in a meeting with Donald M. Robinson and Ralph I. Goldman, the 
Chairman and Executive Deputy Chairman of the Joint Executive Committee respec-
tively, an agreement had been made on direct and increased aid for Hungarian Jews. 
He then added, as if by way of an apology for his earlier position, the following: “[I]t 
was not because of us that the provision of aid was earlier subordinated to Hungari-
an–U.S. bilateral relations”.28 Similar steps were taken in Czechoslovakia and Poland 
only in 1981. 
The 1980s saw relations between the Hungarian Jewish bodies on the one side, 
and the Joint and the WJC on the other, develop in a similar manner. As the final act in 
the story, following the resignation of Imre Miklós and, only a month before its abo-
lition, the State Office for Church Affairs proposed to Miklós Németh, Hungary’s last 
Communist prime minister, that the Joint be granted permission to open a permanent 
office in Budapest.29 
27 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 101.d. 0020-5/1978 (14 September 1978).
28 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 107.d. 0020-1/a/1979 (5 March 1979).
29 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 164.d. 0017/6-1/1989 (5 June 1989).
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Documents
1 Conversation with Meir Vilner, Member of the ICP CC
19 October 1958
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (2.d.) 
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
Report of the Embassy in Tel Aviv
Subject: Conversation with Comrade Vilner, member of the ICP CC
[…]
d./ [Vilner said that – AK] The International Jewish organisations are under the direc-
tion of the Zionists and they serve the policy of the Israeli government. This also 
applies to the World Jewish Congress. He [Vilner – AK] wants, in particular, to mention 
this “in view of its Hungarian aspects”. The entry of Hungarian Jewry into the World 
Congress came as a surprise. In his opinion this happened because at the time, the 
Hungarian Party was under pressure. Clearly, some internal tactical issues play a role 
here, and he does not want to deal with this, as in his opinion, the Hungarian Party 
knows best which internal tactics to employ concerning the Jews, for instance. Entry 
into the World Congress, however, is not only a domestic but also an international 
problem, and so, in his view, co-ordination between the various parties would have 
been necessary. The situation today is that only the Hungarian Jews are in the Con-
gress, which causes a problem for many. (He mentioned, for instance, that recently 
a Party meeting had been held in south Tel Aviv, where questions had been put to 
him: Why are only the Hungarians in the Congress, and why don’t the Poles and the 
others join. If the Jewish organisation in the People’s Republic of Hungary can join the 
World Congress, then why can’t the Jews who belong to the ICP become members of 
the World Congress, etc.) Comrade Vilner had replied that it was entirely an internal 
matter of the Hungarian Party as to how it decides on this issue.
I noted how signals in the media suggest that the Poles and Romanians will also 
join soon.
According to Comrade Vilner, based on the World Congress’s current political 
platform, neither the Poles nor the Romanians will join. If, however, the World Con-
gress accepts the conditions of the Poles (which, he believes, the Romanians have 
adopted too), then their membership is a possibility. The Polish Party had sent its con-
ditions to the Israeli Party for the purpose of appraisal, before talks begin between the 
Polish Jews and the World Congress on membership. The conditions demand, among 
other things, that the World Congress should give its support to the: struggle for world 
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peace and for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, against West-German 
rearmament, etc. (Unfortunately, I do not remember exactly the other points – G.) 
The ICP found these conditions to be the correct ones. If the World Congress gives 
them its support, then membership will be the right step. He does not consider it 
likely, however, that the reactionary and Zionist leaders of the World Congress will 
accept the conditions, even though the conditions are not Communist but merely the 
minimum democratic demands. If, however, they do not accept them, then the Poles 
will not join; the Polish Party is strong and capable of preventing this. He thinks that 
what has been said also applies to the Romanians.





Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Budapest
With reference to the transcript with the above reference number, I inform of the fol-
lowing:
I.
I agree with what Comrade Garai writes about the appraisal, the objective, activities 
and tactics of the World Jewish Congress. It is clear that they are making great efforts 
to involve all the Jewish denominations of all countries, which can only be done if 
they conceal their Zionist aims or cleverly disguise them, setting forth a programme 
that is generally acceptable to the Jewish denominations of all countries. The recent 
conduct of Dr Nahum Goldmann proves that one cannot accomplish the participation 
in the World Jewish Congress of all the Jewish denominations by voicing extremist 
Zionist views and interests.
Evidently, they are not endeavouring to involve the Jewish denominations in 
the Socialist countries with a view to strengthening Socialism. Nor can one ignore, 
however, the fact that there are disagreements within the World Jewish Congress on 
the issue of relations with the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries, but even 
from the perspective of national and capitalist interests one cannot call the World 
Jewish Congress a Zionist organisation that is united on every issue.
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II.
On the basis of which considerations does the Hungarian Jewish denomination take 
part in the meetings of the World Jewish Congress?
The World Congress seeks to accomplish the participation of the Jewish denom-
inations of the Socialist countries by offering international protection from antisem-
itism, by upholding religious life in our country through the financial and moral 
support granted to Jewish culture, by obtaining financial compensation for the family 
members of the victims of Hitlerism.
In our view, Hungarian Jews should take part in the organisation of the World 
Jewish Congress, because
1./ An attempt must be made for the peace policy of the Socialist countries to be 
voiced in the international religious organisation, let there be someone there from our 
country, who struggles against and uncovers the agents of imperialism dressed in reli-
gious clothing, someone who refutes and prevents the defamation of the Soviet Union 
and the Socialist countries. A specific task will be, in this forum too, to take a clear 
stand – vital for all of Jewry – against neo-Fascism and the arming of West Germany 
and the neo-Fascists.
2./ We wanted to ensure that the Congress take a stand in favour of Israel’s neu-
trality, because this was a real possibility. […]
3./ An attempt must be made to break into, to struggle against and disrupt the 
unity of the reaction.
4./ The conditions are there for the Hungarian Jewish denomination to represent 
itself at the Congress with delegates who fully support our cause and fight consis-
tently for it.
III.
The Hungarian Jewish denomination has been in contact with the World Jewish Con-
gress since 1957. In November 1957, Endre Sós, Chairman of the National Representa-
tion of Hungarian Israelites, and Dr Imre Benesovszky [sic! – AK], leading chief rabbi 
of Budapest, took part in the Paris meeting of the European Executive Committee of 
the World Jewish Congress.
In March 1958, the meeting of the European Executive Committee of the World 
Jewish Congress was held in Amsterdam, at which the Hungarian delegate (Endre 
Sós) rejected the accusations which had been made by various Western Jewish circles 
against the Soviet Union’s policy on religion and the statements on the denial of cul-
tural rights to Soviet Jewry.
In consequence of these comments the meeting did not proceed with the planned 
discussion of the pre-prepared anti-Soviet draft resolution. This is not only the result 
of Nachum Goldmann pursuing more cautious tactics against the Soviet Union but 
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also a consequence of the Hungarian delegates’ efforts, for the draft had already been 
elaborated and if the Hungarian delegation had remained silent, then a resolution 
would have been passed, as the example of the Rome conference also shows. 
In the summer of 1958, the International Executive Committee of the World Jewish 
Congress convened in Geneva. Prior to the meeting the Hungarian delegation sub-
mitted a peace decree [plan – AK] which supported, in terms of its main principles, 
the resolution of the Stockholm congress of the World Peace Council. On this basis, 
the World Jewish Congress condemned, in a resolution, experiments with weapons 
of mass destruction and demanded that they be ended. The American delegation in 
particular fought against the resolution.
The Hungarian Jewish delegation propagandised in favour of neutrality for Israel, 
which received strong backing, with several Western Jewish delegations giving their 
support.
At the Geneva meeting, Nachum Goldmann approved the position of the Hungar-
ian Jewish delegation. He pledged to end the anti-Soviet propaganda in the bodies of 
the World Congress. At the same time, he requested the Hungarian delegates seek to 
build a bridge between Soviet Jewry and the World Jewish Congress.
The events clearly show that the World Jewish Congress is playing tactics; it 
wants to use the Hungarian Jewish delegation to win over the Jewish organisations of 
the other Socialist countries. Still, it is also evident that it has no choice but to end, 
or at least reduce, its aggressive propaganda, and that it has no choice but to make a 
statement or pass a resolution which, in the absence of the Hungarian delegates, it 
would not have done.
I do not want to exaggerate the role of the delegation of Hungarian Jews in the 
World Congress. Clearly, the concessions made by Nachum Goldmann towards the 
Hungarian delegation may simply be bait for the Jewish bodies in the other Socialist 
countries.
The participation of the Hungarian Jewish denomination in the World Jewish 
Congress is an attempt – a test of whether, in the current situation, we can influence 
the positions taken on specific international issues and, in the more distant future, we 
can even change the balance of power within the World Congress.
If the attempt fails, the Hungarian Jewish denomination can leave the World Con-
gress at any point in time, doing so in such a manner that we draw political benefit.
Budapest, 3 February 1959
(Imre Miklós)
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2 Proposal for the Exit of the Hungarian Jewish Denomination 
from the World Jewish Congress
15 June 1960
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (9.d.) 
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
Proposal
For the exit of the Hungarian Jewish Denomination from the World Jewish Congress
The Hungarian Jewish Denomination has been a member of the World Jewish Con-
gress since July 1957. Participation in this world organisation was an attempt to use 
this forum to propagate the peace policy of the Socialist countries, to unveil the 
actions of imperialism in the religious field, to refute the defamations being made 
against the Socialist countries, and to seek to influence the positions of the World 
Jewish Congress in concrete international issues, such as the neutrality of the State 
of Israel. The delegates of the Hungarian Jewish denomination represented our objec-
tives in an adequate fashion and achieved certain successes when they took part in 
the various meetings of the World Jewish Congress. For instance, at the meeting of the 
Executive Committee in Amsterdam in March 1958, a pre-elaborated draft resolution 
slandering the Soviet Union was withdrawn by the chairman following a statement by 
the Hungarian delegate. At Geneva, in the summer of 1958, based on a peace decree 
submitted by the Hungarian delegation, the World Jewish Congress condemned the 
atomic-weapon experiments and demanded their termination.
The conduct of the World Jewish Congress seen in 1957–58 has recently taken a 
negative turn. The more moderate stance has been replaced by the most extreme and 
reactionary politicising, made particularly manifest in the resolutions of the Stock-
holm meeting of 19 August 1959.
According to one of the resolutions, freedom of worship for Jews is being pre-
vented in the Soviet Union, and they protest against this. Another resolution expresses 
gratitude to the West-German government for giving reparations to Jews and its dis-
appointment with the German Democratic Republic for failing to pay reparations to 
Jews, etc.
The same meeting rejected the Polish proposal for the Congress to condemn 
West-German rearmament and the supply of weapons by Israel, etc.
Under the present circumstances, the participation of the Hungarian Jewish 
Denomination in the World Jewish Congress is creating confusion, particularly as 
the Jewish communities of other Socialist countries are not officially members of the 
World Jewish Congress. The situation causes problems, in particular, for the Israeli 
Communist Party. For this reason, the Hungarian Jewish Denomination has not been 
attending the meetings of the World Jewish Congress for more than a year now. On 
234   IV The International Jewish Organisations, the Jewish Community and the State
multiple occasions it has protested against the current stance of the World Jewish 
Congress, doing so, however, in vain.
Based on the above, I propose that in the course of July 1960 the Hungarian Jewish 
Denomination should officially leave the World Jewish Congress.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs agrees with the proposal, as does the Ministry of 
Interior.
The text is authentic: Károly Olt, manu propria 
Attachment
State Office for Church Affairs
Memorandum
to Comrade Gyula Rapai
The State Office for Church Affairs has submitted a proposal to the Political Commit-
tee, in which it proposed that the Jewish Denomination should leave the World Jewish 
Congress in July 1960. Concerning the proposal made in the submission, Comrade 
Rapai instructed me by telephone to request Comrade János Péter, the Deputy Foreign 
Minister, to consult – prior to the exit from the World Jewish Congress – with the 
Soviet and Czechoslovak comrades, because it is possible that there is a politically 
beneficial side to the Hungarian Jewish denomination remaining a member of the 
World Jewish Congress. In line with the instruction, I made the request to Comrade 
János Péter, who, on 30 June informed me of the following:
He discussed the matter with the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the view was formed that it would be necessary to ask once again for the opinions of 
the Soviet and Czech comrades, because it was absolutely clear from the consulta-
tions of last year that the Socialist camp does not have an interest in the participa-
tion in the Jewish World Congress of the Hungarian Jewish Denomination, indeed 
whether, from this perspective, an exit would even be desirable.
Comrade János Péter mentioned how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had taken 
into consideration the previous consultation when expressing its agreement with the 
Hungarian Jewish Denomination leaving the World Jewish Congress.
Budapest, 2 July 1960
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3 The Aims of the World Jewish Congress with Regard to the 
Hungarian Jewish Denomination
27 July 1962
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169
From: Ministry of Interior
II, Sub-department 5-c
Subject: The aims of the World Jewish Congress with regard to the Hungarian Jewish 
denomination
Report
Budapest, 27 July 1962
At the beginning of this month the leaders of the National Representation of Hun-
garian Israelites received a message from Dr SIGRID RÓTH [sic! – AK] secretary of the 
European section of the World Jewish Congress. The essence of the message was that 
Dr Nachum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress and the World Zionist 
Organisation, is to visit Romania in September, where he will view the denomina-
tional institutions there and hold talks with Romanian official circles. Dr Nachum 
Goldmann would like to come to Budapest prior to his visit to Romania and discuss 
with the leaders of Hungarian Jewry and perhaps with representatives of the state 
organs the matter of the compensation claimed from the West Germans by Hungarian 
Jewry. (The verified damages claim is 60 million marks = 15 million dollars.) 
In the message the leaders of the NRHI are asked to seek out information from 
the state organs concerning the matter of the invitation of Nachum Goldmann. The 
message emphasises that the probing should not take place on behalf of Goldmann, 
but rather as the forwarding of Sigfrid Róth’s idea.
This wish is essentially a response to a motion from the leaders of the denomi-
nation concerning the desire to hold a meeting with Nachum Goldmann somewhere 
abroad for the purpose of discussing matter of the compensation claims of Hungarian 
Jewry.
The speedy and audacious reaction to the proposal is linked with the desire on 
the part of Dr Nachum Goldmann, which he has had for some time, for representa-
tives of the Jews in the Eastern-European countries and the Soviet Union to take part 
in the World Jewish Congress. Now that they have turned to him, he considers the 
time is ripe for a return to this issue.
At the end of May a leader of the NRHI held talks in Vienna with Dr Sigfrid Róth 
on the matter of compensation. On behalf of the World Jewish Congress and Nachum 
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Goldmann, Sigfrid Róth set out the prospect of their full support for the matter of 
the compensation claims, and yet, as a kind of condition for this, he wanted Jews in 
Hungary to show some kind of movement towards the Congress.
Sigfrid Róth stated that as a condition of membership they do not want Hungar-
ian Jewry to abandon its political position. If they do not agree with something, they 
can say this in an open forum or vote against it, but it would be better to be there. In 
response to the claim of the Congress being anti-Soviet, Sigfrid Róth stated the follow-
ing on behalf of Nachum Goldmann:
 – They do not consider the detention of denominational leaders in the Soviet Union 
to be “official antisemitism”, but a criminal matter. These persons have commit-
ted crimes for which they would be punished in any country.
 – Since the World Jewish Congress represents the interests of world Jewry, they 
therefore exercise criticism of the Soviet Union with regard to the situation of 
Soviet Jewry. Thus, for instance, they had complained about the lack of a united 
organisation for the Soviet Union’s Jews. 
 – More than 500,000 Soviet Jews had identified Yiddish as their native language; 
thus, a Soviet Jewry does exist. Even so, they do not have the same cultural oppor-
tunities as other nationalities. (Schools, theatres, newspapers.)
 – They complained about the religious inequality that exists in the Soviet Union. 
The Russian Orthodox, Roman Catholic and other churches in the Soviet Union 
have united organisations and can participate in various international confer-
ences; indeed, the Russian Orthodox Church had even become a member of the 
World Council of Churches. Why is it not possible for the Jews to enjoy the same 
rights?
Sigfrid Róth stated that what they are complaining about with regard to the situation 
of Soviet Jewry does not exceed legitimate criticism, but that they – as Jewry’s advo-
cacy body – were obliged to do this. After raising these points, Sigfrid Róth spoke once 
again in favour of Hungarian Jewry’s joining the Congress.
In order to make the Congress attractive and membership of the body acceptable, 
he then noted the following:
 – He emphatically stated that the Congress does not intend to criticise the Soviet 
Union.
 – He explained that the Congress supports peace, and that there is a basis for 
co-operation on this issue.
 – The Congress is the international body of various shades of Jewry, but it is not a 
Zionist organisation. In theory, an anti-Zionist organisation could be a member. 
As an example, he mentioned the organisation of Swiss Jewish communities.
 – In his view, the Congress supports neutrality. As he said, Nachum Goldmann also 
wants to achieve Israel’s neutrality, but considers this to be almost impossible to 
implement.
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 – Even though he said it incidentally, his main point was that the Congress could 
offer more effective support on the matter of compensation if Hungarian Jewry 
had membership of the Congress.
The above topics are raised at almost every meeting abroad.
[…]
As a result of the machinations of visitors from abroad and the [Israeli – AK] Embassy, 
a situation has arisen in which even among the official denominational leaders the 
focus is increasingly on the person of Nachum Goldmann and on the necessity of 
German reparations, and they place all their attention on the World Zionist Organisa-
tion, ignoring the political danger of doing so.
Completed in 3 copies
Record no. 38
Distr. 1 copy to Comrade Geréb
 1 copy to the advisor Comrade [Soviet advisor – AK] 
 I copy for information
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4 On the Foreign Relations of the Hungarian Jewish Religious 
Denomination
16 May 1966
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (34.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
Completed in 3 copies
Copy no. 1
Report
on the foreign relations of the Hungarian Jewish Religious Denomination
In the past two-three years, there has been a revival of interest in the societal and 
social situation of Hungarian Jewry and their religious circumstances on the part of 
the Western Jewish organisations, private individuals and Jewish emigrants.
Over the past year, around 1,200 Jewish tourists have visited – either in groups or 
as individuals – the various Jewish religious, cultural and social institutions.
Interest has spiked since the election of the new leadership [in January and March 
1966, see Document 10 in Chapter 5 – AK] of the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites (NRHI), particularly on the part of the Western international Jewish organi-
sations and institutions.
The increased international interest has necessitated the appraisal and co-ordi-
nation of the international relations of the Jewish religious denomination.
I.
The relationship towards the international Jewish organisations and institutions
[…]
a./ In the first instance, after Liberation, the relationship developed in such a manner 
that an office of the WJC operated – under the name “Hungarian Section of the WJC” 
– as an independent organisation alongside the NRHI. At the time, the organisation 
was concerned with appraising the wartime damages of Hungarian Jewry, searching 
for lost and missing family members, offering social assistance to a certain extent, 
and gathering together Hungarian-Jewish related documents on Fascism.
Over the years, the activities of the WJC’s Office gradually became dominated by 
efforts to realise the political demands of the various Western imperialist powers and 
capitalist groups, and so, by 1950, the dissolution of the Hungarian Section of the 
WJC, or rather its assimilation into the NRHI framework, had become necessary.
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In this way, the WJC’s Office functioned, with three officials and reduced compe-
tences, until 1953, whereupon all contact with the WJC was broken off.
b./ In the second instance, in 1957 contact was established between Hungarian Jewry 
and the WJC. At that time, the NRHI officially joined the WJC, as a consequence of 
which Hungarian Jewry received two places in the European executive. Contempo-
raneously, the Hungarian Committee of the WJC was established in Hungary, whose 
office operated within the NRHI framework.
In the summer of 1960, relations between Hungarian Jewry and the WJC were 
severed once more.
There were basically two causes of the split:
1./ In early 1958, a nascent Jewish organ convened in Rome, in which the WJC also 
represented itself. This Rome meeting wanted to declare that Jews living in the Soviet 
Union could not freely manifest their religion and culture.
This meeting was led by Nahum Goldmann.
2./ In 1959, the WJC expressed “its grateful thanks” to the West-German government 
for paying out reparations to Jews. At the same time, however, the Jews of many coun-
tries – including Hungarian Jewry – were excluded from such reparations for political 
reasons.
Last month the leadership of the World Jewish Congress restored relations with 
representatives of Hungarian Jewry with a view to the NRHI participating in the work 
of the WJC as a full member.
The WJC’s representative Armand Kaplan, the secretary-general, stated that the 
WJC would hold its fifth plenary world conference in Brussels on 31 July of this year.
The leadership of the WJC considers it extremely important that representatives 
of Hungarian Jewry attend the world conference and join the WJC.
He mentioned that prior to his arrival in Hungary he had visited Romania and 
Czechoslovakia. Romania had agreed to take part in the work of the WJC once again, 
while Czechoslovakia was considering the issue and would give a definite answer 
later on.
According to Secretary-General Kaplan, the leadership of the WJC had accepted 
that in future, the Congress must pursue a policy of realism.
[…]
Another matter raised during the talks was the WJC’s relationship with the Soviet 
Union and with respect to the situation of Soviet Jewry.
The secretary-general stated that within the WJC, and with Nahum Goldmann at 
the fore there was an increasingly strong group who had accepted that the “tone” and 
methods employed by them against the Soviet Union were not correct, and that it was 
not possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union in such a tone.
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There was a great desire on their part for representatives of Jewry in the Soviet 
Union to take part in the work of the WJC.
It was unambiguously clear from the talks that the leadership of the WJC would 
consider the participation of the Socialist countries’ Jews in the work of the Congress 
to be extremely important. As they explained: in place of the present monologue, they 
would like, in the future, to hold a dialogue on the great and all-embracing problems 
affecting humanity and Jewry.
The WJC secretary-general laid out the prospect of significant financial support 
for Hungarian Jewry if representatives of Hungarian Jewry were to agree to participate 




1./ Our relations with the World Jewish Congress must be discussed in advance with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Offices for Church Affairs of the Socialist 
countries affected, in particular the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.
For the time being and subject to approval from above, Hungary should merely 
send observers to the World Conference, which is to be held in Brussels from 31 July, 
while a final decision on participation in the work of the WJC should be made once we 
have acquired some experience.
2./ The representatives of Hungarian Jewry should not rule out making contact with 
the more loyal and influential leadership members of the World Federation of Hun-
garian Jews, and fostering and enhancing the existing contacts.
[…]
3./ The board of the NRHI should further expand its relations with the associations of 
Hungarian Jews in various capitalist countries, above all the associations of Hungar-
ian Jews in Canada and Uruguay.
[…]
4./ It must be ensured that relations between the Israeli Embassy and the religious 
denomination are of a religious nature.
At the same time, in their official and private relations – similarly to other foreign 
representations – they must adhere to the rules of protocol.
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The newly elected leaderships of the NRHI and the BJC are suitable for establish-
ing relations with the State of Israel and its Embassy in Budapest that are more ben-
eficial than before and more appropriate to the interests of our state and our society.
[…]
6./ The recent attempts by the State of Israel to establish relations in the religious-cul-
tural, cultural, literary and artistic fields by way of the Hungarian Jewish Religious 
Denomination or utilising the denomination must be warded off in future. Judgement 
on the appropriateness of such relations lies within the competence of the appropri-
ate Hungarian state or societal cultural organs.
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Report
on the fifth conference of the World Jewish Congress in Brussels
The 5th plenary conference of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) was held in Brussels 
from 31 July until 9 August. The conference was attended by the Jewish religious and 
political organisations of 57 countries as well as several international organisations 
(UN, UNESCO, etc.). From the Socialist countries, representatives of the Yugoslav, 
Romanian and Hungarian religious denominations were present – the Hungarians 
as observers.
Most of the comments and statements made at the assembly, as well as the resolu-
tions adopted, support our earlier assessment that nothing has changed in the basic 
political stance of the World Jewish Congress over the past eight to ten years.
As before, the Congress is still characterised by strong Zionism, maximum sub-
servience to imperialist interests and hostility towards the Soviet Union.
Experience has shown that the representatives of a policy of realism constitute 
a significantly smaller force than in other world religious organisations. This is pre-
sumably a consequence of the direct – without transference – political and economic 
relations of the World Jewish Congress with the United States.
Certain changes could be perceived in the tone and negotiating methods of the 
official leaders of the WJC. This, however, is merely a tactical change and the clever 
division – or redistribution – of roles, as several of N. Goldmann’s statements also 
prove.
 – The unchanging Zionist stance of the Congress is reflected, apart from in the 
various resolutions and reports, mainly in the speeches of Goldmann. For the 
chairman spoke emphatically and in every case of the “Jewish people”, which 
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has, in his view, a real state: Israel, to which, as the “centre of collective Jewish 
life”, Jews belong wherever they are living in the world, and which, for this very 
reason, it is obligatory to support.
 – The anti-Soviet stance of the WJC is exhibited most graphically in the resolution 
on the situation of Soviet Jewry. The resolution calls on the Soviet authorities to 
guarantee in full and without hindrance the practice of religion by the Jewish 
religious communities in the country, the establishment of a national Jewish rep-
resentative body and the realisation of the national and cultural rights of Jews. It 
requests the Soviet government to enable the unification of Jewish families that 
have been separated “in Israel or elsewhere”. The conference also took a position 
on keeping the situation of Soviet Jewry on the agenda of world public opinion. 
To this end, “the friends of the Soviet Union, including the major Communist 
groups, must be won over for the cause”, the resolution states. A tactical change 
in their stance is shown in the following statement by Goldmann: “On this issue, 
many sought a tougher stance than mine, but I hold the flute in higher esteem 
than the drum”.
 – The resolution concerning the relationship between Jewry and West Germany – 
despite protests from some of the delegates – defended the diplomatic and other 
relations that have arisen between Israel and West Germany as something that 
serves to strengthen Israel. All signs indicate that the WJC seeks a compromise 
with neo-Nazism, and the only brake on this endeavour for the time being are the 
Jewish masses who find it more difficult to forget.
 – At the proposal of the Hungarian observers, the resolution adopted on the issue of 
“German reparation” also mentions the necessity of making amends to the Jews 
living in the Eastern-European countries. What this stance by the World Jewish 
Congress really means in practice is shown by the response given to the Hungar-
ian observers by Rieger [sic! – AK], the secretary-general: “With this resolution 
alone, you will not get far. What is also needed is for the Hungarian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to turn to the West-German government with a similar request”.
 – An “internal” resolution of the conference deals with relations between Christi-
anity and the Jews. It determines that it will organise in the future a permanent 
committee, which will maintain more intensive relations between the WJC and 
various Christian churches, and above all with The Vatican, the World Council 
of Churches and the Anglican Church. There is no doubt that the WJC is willing 
to accept the ecumenical invitation of the Christian churches, thereby forgetting 
all the humiliation and persecution of 2,000 years – presumably because this 
“religious ecumene” has been, for some time now, anti-Communist rather than 
religious – in line with American instructions.
 – The resolution on human rights urges the ratification of the concept of human 
rights and the establishment of the office of a human rights commissioner, 
because, as it argues, “in all parts of the world, reactionary and extreme national-
ist movements have raised their heads”. The aim of this nebulous generalisation 
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is clearly to disguise the increasingly nationalist, revisionist and racist endeav-
ours in certain capitalist countries – above all in America and West Germany.
[…]
 – The leadership of the WJC dealt with the representatives of the religious denom-
inations of the Socialist countries “with particular attentiveness”. N. Goldmann 
held a special reception for them, where he laid emphasis on his desire for the 
Socialist countries to form a so-called “Eastern bloc” so that they could represent 
their interests in the most appropriate manner at the Congress. The formation of 
an “Eastern bloc” would be the first step towards the martyr celebration to be 
held in Sarajevo in October of this year, to which, in addition to religious denomi-
national representatives of the Socialist countries, the leaders of the WJC, includ-
ing N. Goldmann, had also been invited. At the Brussels meeting of the WJC, it 
became clear that “their particular loyalty” shown towards the Socialist coun-
tries, together with the criticism of conditions in the Soviet Union and efforts to 
form an “Eastern bloc” constitute integral parts of the endeavours of imperialism 
to loosen and to penetrate [the bloc of Socialist countries – AK]. To this end, they 
are, of course, willing to make financial sacrifices. In this respect, Secretary-Gen-
eral Kaplan made the following comment to the Hungarian observers: “We are 
even willing [to give] financial support, but it all depends on you”.
 – The Hungarian observers – according to our information – consistently empha-
sised in their anti-Fascist speeches that Jewry should serve social progress and 
peace. They highlighted that Hungarian Jews too had been liberated by the Soviet 
army and that, together with their compatriots of other religions and worldviews, 
they are building a new and just society.
Chairman Géza Seifert, as well as Chief Rabbi Beneschofszky [sic! – AK], were inter-
viewed by several Western newspaper and radio reporters. They became acquainted 
with many distinguished foreign Jewish figures, all of whom showed great interest 
in the People’s Republic of Hungary and the life of Hungarian Jewry. Several of them 
promised to visit our country soon. Thus, among others, Nahum Goldmann also 
announced that he wishes to visit Hungary in the spring of next year. He has not yet 
received a response to his announcement.
T a s k s:
1./ The content of our report on the WJC’s Brussels meeting and the assessment must 
be made known to the offices for church affairs in other Socialist countries, in par-
ticular those of the Soviet Union, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Where 
possible, there must be direct consultations with them on the issue.
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2./ Concerning further relations with the WJC, the current observer status should be 
maintained and we should fight consistently from this position against the reaction-
ary endeavours of the Congress.
3./ The efforts of Goldmann and his associates to develop an “Eastern Jewish bloc” 
should be monitored and studied in relation to all of the Socialist countries, which, 
from this aspect, requires that our relations become more intensive.
4./ The planned visit to Hungary of N. Goldmann and the other WJC leaders should 
be made the subject of an inquiry, whereby any further positions and statements by 
them should be monitored. We should not give space in the future to efforts on their 
part to influence the Hungarian religious denomination by holding out the prospect 
of greater financial assistance.
5./ Regarding the official relations with the world conference, it may be far more ben-
eficial to make correct use of the wide-ranging personal acquaintances made by the 
Hungarian observers in Brussels. The leaders of the National Representation of Hun-
garian Israelites, above all, the observers who participated in the WJC, should elabo-
rate a proposal concerning the identity of those conference acquaintances with which 
they wish to maintain contact in the future, and how they can do so.
(József Prantner)
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6 The Fifth Conference of the World Jewish Congress
Brussels, 31 July – 9 August 1966
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-c (83.d). 
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
Memorandum




The participation of the Hungarian delegation
1/ Preliminary conceptions
a/ The Hungarian delegates take part only as observers, given that Hungarian 
Jewry left the World Congress earlier on (due to its anti-Soviet stance and because it 
did not take a stand against West Germany’s discriminatory policy on the matter of 
compensation).
b/ The Hungarian delegation does not negotiate during the conference on joining 
the World Congress,
c/ or on financial aid.
d/ The Hungarian delegation demands an end to discrimination in the field of 
compensation and persuades, if possible, the World Congress to take the same posi-
tion.
e/ Members of the delegation can speak in their capacity as observers, particu-
larly on the burning issues affecting humanity.
f/ In cases of crude anti-Sovietism, the Hungarian delegation will protest.




1/ Compared with the position in the past, there has appeared, in the work of the 
World Congress, a new kind of tone, but without one being able to perceive any signif-
icant changes of substance. There are tactical reasons for the change in tone.
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2/ The duality of the new tone and the unchanged substance is manifest above all in 
the stance taken in relation to the Soviet Union. The tone has become a little smoother 
in a formal sense and the tactics have also been refined, but the basic hostility towards 
the Soviet Union has remained the same as it was before.
3/ A main objective of the World Congress is to win over the Jews of the Socialist coun-
tries, to achieve their membership and – to a certain extent – their cohesion. At the 
same time, the symptoms of the policy of division are also manifest (creating a rift 
between the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries).
4/ The Zionist stance was perceptible throughout the conference, although from place 
to place the points of non-Israeli Jews were also made.
5/ The documents address, in several points, international and world political issues. 
The statements made on peace and disarmament contain numerous positives. One 
should not forget, however, that the decisive groups openly expressed the tactical 
tone and background of such resolutions.
On the Vietnam issue, the statements show nothing particularly positive. Here, 
too, an American effort to avoid the Vietnam issue being addressed became clear, and 
if this effort failed, then they would seek by all means to achieve the taking of weak-
ened positions on the matter.
6/ There were several tangible signs of an increase in American influence.
7/ The leaders of the World Congress seek the friendship of the FRG. They do so 
mainly in order to secure the reparation sums and in support of the State of Israel’s 
foreign-policy objectives. It is clear, however, that this position still encounters emo-
tionally justified opposition among broad Jewish circles.
8/ On several points the consequence can be drawn that the World Congress is, tac-
tically speaking and on an on-going basis, employing the prior division of roles (The 
French leader Kaplan’s forming a friendship with the Hungarian delegation, the 
debate concerning the Soviet Union and then concerning Germany).
9/ The Hungarian proposal concerning compensation was included in the conference 
document. This is positive even if they tried by all means to counter the proposal. (The 
call for the GDR to provide compensation was an attempt to divide.) The issue now 
is the extent to which they try to ensure the application in practice of the resolution.
10/ Thus, there are some changes in the course taken by the World Congress and in 
its operation. Most of these are tactically motivated. Experience has shown, however, 
that among the members of the World Congress there is a significant number of groups 
and leading figures with attitudes reflecting a policy of realism. From the Hungarian 
side, it may be useful to maintain contact in the future with these groups and figures.
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11/ There were positive results of the Hungarian delegation’s participation (the com-
pensation resolution, the propagandising opportunities). Accession to, or retraction 
from, the World Congress, however, could only be considered if
a/ the anti-Soviet tendency would end for good;
b/ the Zionist approach would end or at least be given less prominence;
c/ there would be more positive and forceful resolutions on issues affecting 
humanity;
d/ and, finally, if the compensation of Hungarian Jewry were to be realised in 
practice.
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7 The Foreign Relations of the Jewish Religious Denomination
19 November 1966
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (34.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
Memorandum
on the foreign relations of the Jewish Religious Denomination
Concerning the foreign activities of the Jewish Religious Denomination, several issues 
arise where a final position must be formed.
These are the following:
I  The NRHI’s relations in the future with the World Jewish Congress
[…]
Regarding the future relations with the WJC, there are two options:
a./ Continue to maintain relations at their current level – observer status;
b./ Join the WJC as a member.
In terms of making a decision, the following phenomena should be considered:
1./ The Brussels conference of the WJC has proven that the WJC is – despite some 
forced tactical prevarication – a loyal servant of the political line taken by the United 
States.
[…]
2./ The WJC exhibits a strongly anti-Soviet stance
[…]
3./ The WJC is under the management of international Zionist forces:
[…]
4./ A majority of the leaders of Hungarian Jewry – explicitly or in an implicit, reason-
ing manner – are sympathetic to the idea of joining the WJC.
Among these those with more progressive political attitudes support membership 
primarily in the hope of financial support, while those who are more negative do so in 
the spirit of international Jewish cohesion/solidarity as well as for financial reasons.
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It may be argued that in the event of membership the NRHI would receive more 
significant and regular financial support by way of the WJC, which would undeniably 
resolve for a temporary period the threat of succumbing to its regular annual losses 
of several million forints.
Proposal:
 – According to the opinion of the department, a more correct solution is for the 
NRHI not to become a member of the WJC for the time being, but rather, by main-
taining its current status, to take part as an observer in the various manifestations 
of the WJC.
 – The NRHI representatives should utilise the position as observer to draw the WJC’s 
attention to the reactionary endeavours with which Hungarian Jewry cannot 
agree and which isolate the Congress and prevent if from forming the broadest 
international relations.
 – On the occasion of our upcoming talks with representatives of the Soviet Union’s 
Council for Church Affairs, there must be consultation on the issue of our rela-
tionship with the WJC.
[…]
III./ The visit to Hungary of Jack Weiler, Vice-Chairman of the Joint
[…]
J. Weiler pledged to arrange for the Joint to transfer a one-time grant of 150,000 dollars 
for use by the Jewish social institutions in Hungary. This event is significant because 
since the break with the Joint, that is to say, since 1953, this is the first instance on 
their part when they seek to directly support Hungarian Jewry.
According to the opinion of the department, the dollar grant that has been offered 
will be acceptable if no political conditions are attached to it.
To date, we have not observed such an endeavour.
IV./ The issue of West-German reparations
As is known, the proposal of the WJC leaders on this issue was that the Hungarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs should turn to the West-German government with a request 
for payment of the reparations.
In Sarajevo, Secretary-General Rigner [sic! – AK] suggested to Seifert that he, as 
chairman of the NRHI, should write a letter directly to Gerstenmöyer [sic! – AK] with 
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a view to the payment of reparations. Rieger [sic! – AK] referred to the fact that Kadel-
burg, the Yugoslav chairman, had written a similar letter to Gertonmöyer [sic! – AK], 
and so they can rightly expect the payment of reparations.
Concerning this issue, our suggestion is that Chairman Seifert should not write a 
letter on this matter to Gerstenmaier.
According to the opinion of the WJC leaders at the time, Gertenmayer [sic! – AK] 
is the candidate with the greatest chances for the position of chancellor, and this is 
why they invited him rather than anyone else to the Brussels conference of the WJC.
V./ Organising the Eastern-European Jewish Bloc
At the Brussels meeting of the WJC, N. Goldmann stated his desire for the establish-
ment of an Eastern-European Jewish bloc. Its aim, in his view, would be for East-
ern-European Jewry to represent a unanimous position in the WJC.
The main organiser and patron of the establishment of the bloc was the Chief 
Rabbi of Romania, Mózes Rósen [sic! – AK].
Our supposition that the WJC leaders and Rózen [sic! – AK] wanted to use the 
martyr celebrations in Yugoslavia to organise the creation of the bloc, proved correct.
The Hungarian delegation attending the celebrations played a decisive part in 
preventing the realisation of the creation of the Eastern-European Jewish bloc, by 
emphasising that they had come to Yugoslavia to celebrate rather than organise [a 
bloc].
In our opinion, such attempts at unification must to be prevented in the future 
too, because they reflect in part an anti-Soviet tendency, and in part a Zionist ten-
dency.
252   IV The International Jewish Organisations, the Jewish Community and the State
8 On the Visit to Hungary of Dr Nahum Goldmann and his 
Colleagues
18 April 1967
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (37.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
Completed in 5 copies
Copy no. 1: HSWP CC, Comrade Á. Pullai
Copy no. 2: Ministry of Culture, Comrade P. Ilku
Copy no. 3: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade J. Péter
Copy no. 4: HSWP CC, Comrade I. Darvasi
Copy no. 5: State Office for Church Affairs
Copy no. 5
Report
on the visit to Hungary of Dr Nahum Goldmann and his colleagues
Dr Nahum GOLDMANN, Chairman of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), and his col-
leagues – Dr Gergart [sic! – AK] Riegner, Secretary-General of the WJC, Dr Armand 
Kaplan, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the WJC and Dr Stephen 
Róth [sic! – AK], Secretary-General of the European Section of the WJC – visited Buda-
pest from 3 April until 7 April as the guests of the National Representation of Hungar-
ian Israelites.
The visit to Hungary of the leading functionaries of the WJC was part of an infor-
mation-gathering tour, in the course of which they also visited Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland.
During their stay, Goldmann and his associates visited several Jewish religious, 
cultural and social institutions, they met with representatives of Hungarian Jewish 
religious life, they held talks with the leaders of the religious denomination, and they 
also paid a courtesy visit to the head of the State Office for Church Affairs.
 – They made statements expressing sincere admiration for the situation and activ-
ities of the Jewish religious, cultural and social institutions. At the same time, 
they did not fail to note that “they would be happier if, in other Socialist countries 
too, Jewry would receive similar esteem and would have similar rights to those in 
Hungary”.
 – Goldmann and his group had two opportunities to meet with the wider plenum 
of Hungarian religious Jews – at the religious denomination’s liberation celebra-
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tions and a reception held at the Hotel Gellért, which was attended by a broader 
circle. Goldmann utilised both occasions to speak in public. In the introduction 
to his speeches, he spoke positively of the Soviet Union, which in the 1930s had 
been the first and only country to recognise the danger of Fascism and had called 
on the peoples to take a common stand against Fascism. He praised the Soviet 
Union’s role as liberator, a factor to which the remnant Hungarian Jewry owed 
their lives. In the other parts of his speech, Zionist ideas were predominant. He 
explained at length the significance of the State of Israel, as the homeland of Jews 
wherever they are living in the world. Citing Heine, he stated that, ultimately, 
every Jewish person “carries his homeland on his shoulders, in the Torah scrolls”. 
He also mentioned neo-Nazism and the antisemitism that is awakening once 
again in certain countries as a factor that should be watched. But for Goldmann, 
this is not the main danger to Jewry; rather, in his view, it lies in the assimila-
tion of Jewry. In being sucked away into the nation and the society as a whole 
and ceasing to exist as a “separate people”. Goldmann’s speeches were not an 
undivided success, and this was especially true of his second speech, which was 
received by rather sporadic and “polite” applause.
The following issues arose during the visit by Goldmann and his colleagues to the 
State Office for Church Affairs and during their talks with the leaders of the religious 
denomination:
 – They portrayed the WJC in the most positive terms, as an international organisa-
tion that was fighting against Fascism and on behalf of human progress. Their 
goal is that the Jewry of every country should take part in the work of the Con-
gress.
 – They announced their intention to give financial support to the Hungarian Jewish 
Religious Denomination, the means of which were soon to be discussed with the 
Denomination.
 – They stated their willingness to support the payment of reparations to Hungarian 
Jewry by West Germany in the event of diplomatic relations being established 
between Hungary and West Germany. They suggested that the Hungarian State 
raise, at governmental level, the reparation issue with the West Germans.
To the questions raised, Goldmann and his group essentially received the following 
answers:
 –  We emphasised that Hungarian Jewry has only one homeland: the People’s 
Republic of Hungary, where the majority of citizens of Jewish religion had found 
their place, felt themselves comfortable and as citizens with full rights. This is 
also the basis for relations between the Religious Denomination and the various 
international Jewish organs.
 – We pointed out that the WJC had, for some years, been openly supporting the 
Cold-War policies of imperialism and even today had failed to take a clear stance 
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on such important issues as the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the persecution 
of black people.
 – On the issue of reparations, we criticised the discriminatory stance of the 
West-German government and, irrespective of diplomatic relations, we continue 
to view Hungarian Jewry’s demands for reparations as legitimate.
 – We do not exclude the possibility of Hungarian Jewry receiving financial support 
from the WJC, subject to it not being tied – either overtly or covertly – to political 
conditions.
Goldmann agreed in general with the responses we gave, seeking merely to prove that 
the WJC had spoken out several times against the Vietnam War and the persecution 
of black people.
[…]
Goldmann’s visit to Hungary did not make a particularly great effect at the rabbini-
cal faculty or within the religious Jewish population. His haughty and condescend-
ing manner created a distance between him and many people who had previously 
nurtured illusions about him. The leaders of the denomination – above all Dr Géza 
Seifert, the chairman – treated Goldmann and his associates as equals and held their 
ground in every respect.
Based on the experiences made in the course of the visit, one may conclude that 
the religious policy line followed with respect to the Hungarian Jewish Religious 
Denomination is the correct one and corresponds with the goal. The relationship 
between the religious denomination and the WJC must be kept at the current level, 
and for the time being there is no need to change this.
 (József Prantner)
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Memorandum
on a conversation with Dr Philip Klutznyck [sic! – AK] President of the World Jewish 
Congress
At the invitation of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites, Dr Philip 
Klutznyck, President of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), visited Budapest from 
15–19 January 1978. Before his departure, he paid a visit to the State Office for Church 
Affairs, accompanied by Armand Kaplan, Head of the International Department of 
the WJC; Imre Héber, Chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian Israel-
ites; and Mr Dr Géza Seifert, General Secretary of the NRHI.
During the conversation, Philip Klutznyck posed two issues:
1./ The possibility of the participation of Hungarian Jewry with full rights in the 
work of the World Jewish Congress, where at present the denomination takes part 
merely as an observer.
2./ The support to be offered by the JOINT to the Hungarian Jewish denomination.
He mentioned that he had also consulted with the U.S. ambassador in Budapest, 
who had encouraged him to raise these issues during the discussion with the chair-
man of the State Office for Church Affairs. (According to our information, he had been 
prepared preliminarily to speak of the possibility of the granting of most-favoured 
nation status, but he and Ambassador Kaiser had agreed that he would not speak of 
this issue.)
 – Concerning the first issue, he pointed out that the conditions were ripe for the 
Hungarian Jewish denomination to participate as a full member in the work of 
the WJC. While observer status enables them to be present at the meetings and to 
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make their voice heard, they cannot take part in adopting concrete resolutions. 
He referred to the fact that, among the Socialist countries, both Romania and 
Yugoslavia were participating as full members in the work of the world organisa-
tion. In his view, the WJC evaluates the situation of Jewry in an objective and real-
istic fashion and does not undertake any activities that would offend the Socialist 
countries.
 – Concerning aid provided by the JOINT, he stated that in his opinion an unjust sit-
uation had arisen. For instance, Jewry in Romania are receiving an annual sum of 
3.5 million dollars, even though the number of Jews there is significantly smaller 
than the number living in Hungary, who receive only around a fifth of the above 
sum. While the division of aid does not fall under the competence of the WJC, on 
his return to the United States he will use his influence to ensure that Hungarian 
Jewry receive greater support for their social institutions.
I made known our position as follows: I am pleased about the meeting with the new 
president of the WJC, because in this way I have an opportunity to explain in person 
what I earlier told Nahum Goldmann and other leaders of the WJC. I consider it 
natural that he consulted with the ambassador of the United States of America. And I 
consider it understandable that he also sought out a representative of the Hungarian 
government.
 – Concerning the participation of the Hungarian Jewish Denomination in the work 
of the World Jewish Congress, the leadership of the denomination has the author-
ity to take a position. It depends primarily on them; do they want to change their 
status or not. Of course, the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites, like 
any other denomination, cannot keep itself removed from politics, and just as he 
too consulted with the U.S. ambassador in Budapest on the issue, so the leaders 
of the denomination also ask us about our opinion.
 – To Nahum Goldmann too, I stated that it depended primarily on the WJC and its 
leaders as to how the leadership of the Hungarian denomination would decide on 
the issue of further participation in the work of the WJC. If the favourable trends 
continue, which contributed to the Hungarian Jewish Denomination participating 
as an observer in the recent congress of the WJC, then clearly additional options 
will also be examined. If, however, there is a strengthening of the anti-Soviet and 
anti-Communist wing, this will exclude the possibility of further participation. 
For us and for the Jewish denomination, the relationship to the Soviet Union is 
also an issue of principle. The Hungarian people, including those of Jewish reli-
gion, can thank the Soviet Union for freedom and life, and so we naturally keep 
our distance from any organisation that undertakes anti-Soviet activity.
 – Concerning aid provided by the JOINT, I pointed out that it is up to the leadership 
of the JOINT to decide whether or not to support the Hungarian denomination. 
We shall not beg for such aid, and we will not allow the provision of aid to the 
denomination to be tied to any political or economic conditions. There is a need 
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for the JOINT to elaborate its proposal, which we are ready to examine. The Hun-
garian state has done its utmost to mitigate the burdens faced by Jewish people 
left on their own and to assist in resolving their problems. In the future too, we 
will support the denomination in line with our capacities. This will make it possi-
ble for members of the denomination to reach the standard of living available to 
other citizens in our country.
Philip Klutznyck sought to provide an apology for the activities of the WJC. He referred 
to the fact that an anti-Soviet stance and anti-Communism were not characteristic of 
the whole of the WJC, but only of the opinions and positions of certain participating 
individuals. He is decisively against all such manifestations, but we have to under-
stand that not everyone can be prevented from expressing an opinion. Their reso-
lutions were, so to say, never anti-Soviet; rather, they merely called on the Socialist 
countries to be in harmony with their own principles. He agreed with the points made 
by the Hungarian denomination in connection with the aid to be provided by the 
JOINT. He promised to make use of what had been said at the February meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the JOINT. 
He also mentioned how he had made some very good experiences and received 
very good impressions in Hungary, and that he was particularly pleased to have had 
the opportunity to exchange opinions on these issues.
In the concluding part of our conversation, I emphasised our openness to every 
religious world organisation and that our relations with several major religious world 
organisations had improved in the past year. It was up to the WJC as to whether the 
obstacles to the Jewish denomination participating in future in the work of the World 
Congress – perhaps in another status – could be averted.
The meeting, which lasted an hour and a half, was conducted in an open and 
constructive spirit throughout. 
(Imre Miklós)
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National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (146.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
Completed in 2 copies
Copy no. 1: Czechoslovak State Office for Church Affairs – Hungarian Embassy in 
Prague
Copy no. 2: State Office for Church Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no purview.
Dr István Szatmári
Memorandum
on negotiations held with the leaders of the World Jewish Congress
In the summer of this year, the leaders of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) turned to 
the Board of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites (NRHI) and to our 
Office with the request that the WJC be permitted to hold one of its meetings in 1987 
in our country, in Budapest.
In preliminary discussions we made known to the representatives of the WJC that 
it is theoretically possible for a meeting to be held in our country in 1987, but before 
final approval is given, we must receive an appropriate guarantee that the interests 
of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries will not be damaged at their meeting. 
They must take into consideration that our country is a member of an alliance, of the 
system of the Socialist countries; we do not have diplomatic relations with Israel and 
the interests of the Jewish denominations of the European Socialist countries include 
primarily peace, the issues of European security and co-operation, as well as the fight 
against all forms of antisemitism and neo-Fascism.
After the negotiations, a circular letter from Theo Klein, the French chairman of 
the EJC [European Jewish Congress], appeared, in which the matter of Jewry in the 
Soviet Union and enhanced assistance for the State of Israel featured as the central 
topics of next year’s meeting.
A delegation of the Board of the NRHI took part in a meeting of the EJC in Paris in 
November 1986 and firmly protested against the programme suggested by Theo Klein. 
They stated that if they wanted to discuss such issues at next year’s meeting, then 
there was no way Budapest could be the venue.
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Of particularly useful help to the NRHI delegation was a letter sent to Theo Klein 
by Bohumil Heller, Chairman of the Council of Jewish Religious Communities of the 
ČSSR, in which Heller specifically and firmly protested against the ridiculous pro-
gramme. The Board of the NRHI agrees in full with the contents of Chairman Bohumil 
Heller’s letter and expressed this in the talks held with the WJC leaders.
Also in attendance at the EJC meeting in Paris was Dr Israel Singer, the Secre-
tary-General of the WJC. Referring to the lack of agreement, they arranged for Theo 
Klein to officially withdraw the ominous circular letter, and they gave a pledge to 
elaborate a new programme that would give the fullest consideration to the interests 
of Jewry in the Socialist countries.
On 12 November, Comrade Imre Miklós held talks in Budapest with Dr Israel 
Singer, the secretary-general, who confirmed that the requested guarantees would be 
upheld by the WJC and that, together with President Edgar Bronfman, they undertook 
to ensure that the Budapest meeting will feature only such topics that do not violate 
the interests of the Soviet Union and the European Socialist countries. They also 
undertook that when elaborating the topics, they will consult with the Board of the 
NRHI, present in advance the lectures to be given, and will also ask for our opinion on 
persons coming as “observers” [to the conference].
Our experiences to date suggest that the WJC leaders consider it an important 
issue to represent their world-organisation status and the international nature of the 
Congress by holding a meeting in a Socialist country. To this end, they are willing 
to make compromises that are favourable to us. In view of the circumstances and 
the guarantees received, we have made a proposal concerning authorisation for the 
holding of the planned meeting in Budapest.
If the meeting is indeed held in Budapest, it is desirable that Czechoslovakian 
and Hungarian Jewry take part in it while continuing to co-operate well.
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11 On the Suggestion to Hold in Budapest the 1987 Annual 
Assembly of EJC
November 1986
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (146.d.) 
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
From: Ministry of Interior
Report
The senior management of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) has taken steps to 
approach the board of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites (NRHI) 
and the State Office for Church Affairs with a view to the holding in Budapest of the 
1987 annual assembly of the European Jewish Congress (EJC).
In doing so, they are seeking to realise their endeavour going back several years. 
To this end, at the EJC held in Geneva in 1986, Dr Israel Singer, the Secretary-General 
of the EJC, asked Dr András Losonci, the Chairman of the NRHI, to pass on their sug-
gestion to the Hungarian state organs.
The State Office for Church Affairs gave its preliminary consent to the commence-
ment of talks, and it requested assurances from the management of the WJC that they 
would not give space for anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist and Zionist propaganda at the 
planned event in Budapest.
There was no common position in the management of the WJC on the subject 
of assurances. At the talks held with the board of the NRHI, they sought to portray 
the holding of the EJC event in Budapest as something that would be primarily in 
the interest of the NRHI and the Hungarian government, meaning that the EJC is not 
obliged to give assurances.
Over the past half-year, there have been significant personnel changes at the EJC; 
Theo Klein, the French Jewish leader known for his Zionist attitudes, became the 
chairman of the EJC.
In his inaugural circular letter, he spoke out “in defence of the human rights of 
Soviet Jewry” and for a broadening of relations with the State of Israel. An essential 
point in Klein’s letter is that he announces the WJC as a political movement with a 
different line from the previous one, in the tone of which the extreme Zionist style 
reappeared for the first time in many years.
In the situation described above, at the plenary meeting of the EJC held in Paris 
in November 1986, the delegation of the NRHI called on the WJC management to 
return to the principles of Nahum Goldmann and to clarify the problems raised. In 
his response, Dr Israel Singer assured the NRHI delegation of his full agreement, with 
regard to both the Klein letter and the need for guarantees. Various different expla-
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nations were heard of how the cited letter had come into being, but irrespective of 
such explanations, there was full agreement concerning its damaging and erroneous 
nature. Theo Klein himself apologised for the ideas found in the letter, which could 
be misunderstood.
Dr Israel Singer held discussions with the leaders of the NRHI in Budapest on 
10–12 November. In the course of the talks, he stated that the board of the WJC is cur-
rently planning, in order to raise the prestige of the annual general assembly of the 
EJC, for the office of chairman to be occupied by Edgar Bronfman, the chairman of the 
WJC. The narrow circle of invitees would be determined in consultation with the Hun-
garian side. The selection of the participants in this manner would represent, accord-
ing to Singer, the guarantee demanded by the Hungarian government for filtering out 
extremist elements. At the same time, such an event would provide an opportunity 
for the important economic experts and the persons with capital-investment potential 
who are active in the management bodies of the World Jewish Congress to travel to 
Hungary, which might also promote a strengthening of economic relations.
As an additional argument, Dr Singer set out the prospect of the Joint contrib-
uting, with the provision of a substantial sum, to the renovation of the dilapidated 
religious buildings and historical monuments of the NRHI. A guarantee for this is the 
current chairman of the WJC – Bronfman – who is one of the main sponsors of the aid 
organisation.
According to the assessment of the NRHI, the WJC continues to have a significant 
political interest in the holding in Budapest of the EJC event. To this end, they utilise, 
as an argument, political and economic blackmail, doing so in unbridled fashion. The 
realisation of such an idea, even leaving aside the statements made and the closing 
documents, would be a great political and moral achievement for the WJC. They 
regard as a step forward a further improvement of relations with the state bodies, 
with a view to achieving recognition of the State of Israel.
Recipients:  1./ Comrade István Horváth
    2./ Comrade János Berecz
   3./ Comrade Judit Csehák
   4./ Comrade Ernő Lakatos
   5./ Comrade Imre Miklós
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12 Comments of the Secretary-General of the WJC
17 February 1987
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (151.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
From: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Recipients: Comrade Ernő Lakatos
Comrade Imre Miklós
Comments of the Secretary-General of the World Jewish Congress
Israel Singer, the Secretary-General of the World Jewish Congress, and Elen [sic! – AK] 
Steinberg, the Executive Director of the organisation, said the following to our consul 
general to New York who was paying them an inaugural visit:
The meeting in Budapest in May of the leadership of the World Jewish Congress 
will positively impact on the image of Hungary in America and internationally. The 
effect will be favourable in an East-West sense too, because it will dispel the prejudice 
of many participants that in Socialism there can only be religious repression.
They appreciate the flexibility of the Hungarian political leadership. They will not 
cause any unpleasantness for the hosts. In the field of information and propaganda, 
they will only do what we wish them to. If we want, they will keep completely quiet 
about the event, but if we want them to present Hungary’s results, its open policy to 
both East and West, and everything that the opportunity to hold the meeting in Buda-
pest symbolises – that, too, will be possible:
 – They will arrange for a reporter from the New York Times and a TV crew to accom-
pany them, who will report in a guaranteed positive tone.
 – There could be a joint propaganda campaign too. For instance, prior to the 
meeting we could hold a joint press conference in Budapest or New York (with 
the participation of our consul general).
 – If we give our consent, they will also invite Elie Wiesel, the Nobel Prize-winning 
writer, with Wiesel’s Hungarian ancestry providing a good reason to do so. In 
case of our agreement, he would give a talk in a lecture or theatre hall. He would 
speak only about the Nazi years, emphasise the importance of peace and avoid 
any unpleasant reference for us.
They do not regard as a significant problem the minor antisemitic incidents that 
have occurred in Hungary in recent times (e.g. a football match) [antisemitic slurs at 
a football match on 29 November 1986 – AK]. They know and appreciate the Hungar-
ian government’s position. They do observe, however, how some people – partly in 
Jewish circles and partly in right-wing and presumably opposition Hungarian émigré 
 Documents   263
circles – are not pleased about the “rapprochement between Jews and Hungary” and 
magnify such incidents.
For this reason they hope that Bronfman, the WJC president, will meet with 
Comrade Kádár. For them it would be a help and a referential point if a half-sentence 
reference would be made to how “in our country, too, there have been one or two 
minor problems, which occur everywhere, but we will resolve them”.
It would be satisfactory if this were to be said by Comrade Miklós too.
Concerning the position of Waldheim, the Austrian president, they stated that 
according to a copy of the minutes of the UN War Crimes Commission, dated 19 Feb-
ruary 1948, Yugoslavia accused Waldheim of murder and the killing of hostages. 
New documents prove that Waldheim also committed war crimes on the territory of 
Hungary, near the Yugoslav border. In the near future, they will hand over the docu-
mentation to the Hungarian government.
Bronfman and Singer will travel next week to the Soviet Union with an important 
message from the Israeli government that “will be a significant advance on an earlier 
letter from Peres to Gorbachev. They are counting on Comrade Gorbachev receiving 
Bronfman too.
In approx. two weeks’ time, Singer will host our consul general at a lunch.
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13 The Meeting in Budapest of the Executive Committee of the 
WJC
15 April 1987
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (151.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]




Subject: the meeting in Budapest of the Executive Committee of the World Jewish Con-
gress
At the request of the Syrian ambassador, together with Comrade Zoltán Pereszlényi, 
we received the five members of the Council of Arab Ambassadors accredited to Buda-
pest: Syrian Ambassador Masharika, Iraqi Ambassador Al-Rawi, Algerian Ambassa-
dor Boutaieb, as well as Ghadban, the temporary chargé d’affaires of the Libyan Peo-
ple’s Bureau, and Dweik, the deputy head of the PLO’s representation in Budapest.
The Syrian ambassador emphasised that they had asked for the visit as the repre-
sentatives of Arab states with friendly relations with the People’s Republic of Hungary. 
Several months ago they had read in the Western-European press that the Executive 
Committee of the World Jewish Congress was to hold its next meeting in Budapest. 
They had sought to check the validity of the report in the Hungarian press, but they 
had found no trace of it there. They thought that the publication of such a report 
in the Western-European press was designed to undermine Hungarian–Arab friendly 
relations. They had grown accustomed to this on the part of the Western-European 
press, and so initially they had not attributed significance to the matter.
Thereafter they had received various answers to their questions from Hungarian 
figures. Some knew nothing about it, while others had responded that the WJC’s Exec-
utive Committee meeting would be held in Budapest, but that it would not address 
political issues. According to others, the People’s Republic of Hungary had an inter-
est in developing tourism, and so it was willing to serve as a venue for the events of 
various international organisations. The answers received had not been satisfactory 
for them.
The aim of their visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was, in addition to foster-
ing Hungarian–Arab friendly relations, to voice their disquiet at the holding in Buda-
pest of the meeting of the WJC’s Executive Committee and to receive information from 
the Hungarian side.
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The Syrian ambassador submitted, on behalf of the Council of Arab Ambassa-
dors, a note (attached), in which they express “their profound concern and disap-
pointment” that the People’s Republic of Hungary “has shown itself willing to hold 
the meeting of the WJC’s Executive Committee”. According to the note, the basis of 
the WJC’s operation is “interference in the domestic affairs of other states, in places 
where people of Jewish religion are living, and to undertake activities against the 
Socialist community”. The Arab states are afraid that “the WJC will understand this 
step by Hungary as a kind of expression of support”.
In my response, I made known our opinion on the meeting in Budapest of the 
WJC, which Comrade Pereszlényi then expanded. The main elements of the stated 
points are:
 – the Budapest meeting is to be examined, not in the Arab–Israeli context
 – nor in the regional aspects of the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of 
Hungary
 – but within the relationship between the Hungarian state and the churches.
 – We understand and respect their reservations concerning the WJC. They too 
should understand that they should also respect our approach.
 – The balanced and internationally recognised relationship between state and 
Church is a significant achievement of our social development. We cannot dis-
criminate among the recognised churches in Hungary. The NRHI is a regular 
member of the WJC, in which it seeks to strengthen the positive trends, which, 
however, also serve the interests of the Arab countries. The holding of the WJC 
meeting in Budapest will promote this anticipated role.
 – We handle Hungarian–Israeli relations in separation from this. Our theoretical 
position has not changed since 1967. It did not even change when certain Arab 
countries established diplomatic or other relations with Israel.
 – The Budapest meeting of the WJC is not an extraordinary event, it is not linked 
with Hungarian–Arab relations, and we have no greater interest in holding it than 
do the Arab countries themselves.
 – We are striving for the uninterrupted development of our relations with the Arab 
countries, we would like to establish diplomatic relations with those Arab coun-
tries which have so far declined [such a move].
 – We strive for balanced relations with every church in the world. We are ready 
in the future to give space in Budapest to other churches. At present, we are in 
discussions with the Islamic world organisation about the establishment of an 
Islamic centre in Budapest. (This announcement – and the letter about it in the 
Arab language – met with great interest on the part of the Arab ambassadors in 
attendance.)
In the course of the conversation that ensued, the Syrian and Iraqi ambassadors 
and the PLO representative emphasised the secular political nature of the WJC. They 
referred to the earlier activities and resolutions of the organisation, concerning which 
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they submitted an information brochure, identifying the WJC with the World Zionist 
Organization. (For our part, we pointed out that the WJC is not the same as that organ-
isation!)
The Arab heads of mission confirmed once again that they attribute great signif-
icance to the matter of the holding in Budapest of the meeting of the WJC’s Executive 
Committee, and, for this reason, they wished to meet with our Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. They expressed their hope that their position would be made known to him. 
In the view of the PLO’s representative, one cannot evaluate on the same basis the 
WJC holding its meeting in Vienna or in Budapest. This explains why news of the 
meeting being held in Budapest gave rise to particular attention in those Arab states 
enjoying friendly relations with the People’s Republic of Hungary.
During the conversation we pointed out the role played by the NRHI, as well as the 
pledge made by WJC leaders that opinions would not be voiced infringing on the for-
eign-policy principles of the People’s Republic of Hungary, nurtures the hope that the 
holding of the meeting of the WJC’s Executive Committee in a Socialist country might 
strengthen positive trends within the organisation and this could indirectly serve the 
cause of the Arab countries. In this connection the Iraqi ambassador inquired what 
the Hungarian side would do if the WJC leaders failed to keep their promise.
The Syrian ambassador expressed thanks for the information received and, on 
behalf of his associates, he promised to forward it. He expressed hope that our infor-
mation would be convincing for their governments. He added that they would con-
tinue to monitor the matter of the meeting in Budapest of the WJC and that they wish 
for it to end with good results.
The conversation, which lasted for about 100 minutes with the Arabic interpre-
tation, became more and more relaxed, and while the heads of the Arab missions did 
not revoke their opinion, one could feel the effect of our argument as food for thought 
and its favourable reception on the part of the individuals.

V Mechanisms of Repression and the Jews

Introduction
The documents in this next chapter reveal the means by which the Communist Par-
ty-state obtained information about the internal affairs of the Jewish religious com-
munity and, more generally, about Jewish people living in the country. The docu-
ments also show how such information was then used to realise the regime’s political 
goals concerning Hungary’s Jewish population and its Jewish institutions. 
In each of the East-Central European Communist countries, the political supervi-
sion of Jews as a religious denomination was the task of the state organs for church 
and religious affairs. To this end, such organs made use of data from the secret ser-
vices as well as information obtained during on-going consultations with religious 
community leaders. The manipulative and repressive policies employed by the 
Party-state against the Jewish denomination were no different from those pursued 
against other religious denominations. However, Jews were affected by additional 
forms of repression, inflicted on real or perceived manifestations of secular, non-reli-
gious Jewish identities and activities.
Sometimes, these activities occurred within the framework of the legal Jewish 
institutional system, but when Jews appeared to be transgressing the borders of these 
institutions, or freeing themselves from institutional control, they were soon sub-
jected to the repressive mechanisms of the system. The perennial question of the time 
was where these boundaries actually lay. 
As the documents in Chapter 5 demonstrate, the boundaries not only changed 
over time but were drawn, even within the same period, at different points by the 
state apparatus and the state security organs. The differences and changes reflected, 
on the one hand, changes in the international political context; at the same time, they 
were also symptomatic of policy conflicts arising within the individual Communist 
leaderships and/or between the various elements and levels of the each country’s 
institutional structures.1 It should also be noted, however, that conflicts of opinion or 
interest among the various sub-systems of the Party-state provided the Jewish institu-
tions with some leeway for action, and thus they could seek out supporters or allies 
within the institutional system when seeking to increase their autonomy. 
1 Chapters 1, 3 and 4 of this volume cover conflicts in this field in Hungary between the various de-
partments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign 
Affairs Department of the Party, and between the economic and political leadership. For differences 
of view and conflicts between religious policy makers and the secret services, see Labendz, Renegoti-
ating Czechoslovakia, 439–440; on the fractious struggle within the Polish United Workers’ Party and 
the role of antisemitism therein, see Schatz, The Generation, 276, 281, 293; Dariusz Stola, Anti-Zionism 
as a Multipurpose Policy Instrument: The Anti-Semitic Campaign in Poland, 1967–1968. In Anti-Semi-
tism and Anti-Zionism in Historical Perspective, ed. Jeffrey Herf (New York: Routledge, 2007), 159–184; 
and Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 398–399; on differences between the foreign and domestic 
affairs apparatus in Poland, see ibid, 375, 398–399.
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In the post-Stalinist era, each East-Central European Communist Party-state had 
similar frameworks for managing the secret service organs responsible for religious 
and Jewish affairs. State control of churches and religious affairs was undertaken 
either by way of an independent quasi-ministry, as in Hungary, or via the indepen-
dent units of other state organisations, as in Czechoslovakia and Poland.2 In the case 
of the secret services, Jewish matters were handled by the intelligence and counter-in-
telligence bodies, and by departments monitoring “domestic reactionary forces”. All 
these bodies closely co-operated with Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence,3 
but departments responsible for specific issues or matters changed from time to time. 
The issues they investigated – “the struggle against religious reaction”, “clandestine 
Zionist plotting”, “hostile diversions by Israeli bodies” – appear in contexts that 
partly differ and partly overlap, depending on the period in which the documents 
were created. In all countries and throughout the period, there was a steady exchange 
of information between the secret services and the state organs responsible for church 
and religious affairs. Moreover, when they deemed it necessary, both these institu-
tional structures would make direct contact through their own channels with the 
competent Party bodies and government ministries, for the purpose of forwarding 
information or requesting instructions.
The documents on “Jewish affairs” reveal the blurred and transient definitions 
of the group targeted for repressive measures: “Jews”, “Jewry”, and “Zionists”. Evi-
dently, the targeted group included members, dignitaries and employees of the Jewish 
religious denomination, and, in Poland, members of a legalised secular organization, 
the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland. Even so, it was never clarified 
which individuals among the secular Jewish population or among people of Jewish 
ancestry were to be included in the potential target group for the state organs dealing 
with “Jewish affairs”. This uncertainty may well have given rise to a phenomenon – 
the “listing” of Jews in Communist countries – that has been interpreted in so many 
different ways by historians.4 
2 Labendz, op. cit., 499–500. 
3 Such cooperation is best documented by the papers in the Stasi archives. See BStU, MfS HA XX/4 
2157, Berichte über Beratungen mit den Sicherheitsorganen Ungarns in Berlin und Budapest, Dez. 
1982, Nov. 1986, Juli 1987, Nov. 1988; BStU, MfS HA XX/4 144, Entwurf einer Arbeitsvereinigung zwi-
schen der V. Verwaltung der polnischen GD und der HA XX, Apr. 1977; BStU, MfS HA XX/4 2158, Be-
richte über die Beratungen mit den Sicherheitsorganen der ČSSR, 1977–1988; BStU, MfS HA XX/4 235, 
Zusammenarbeit mit den Sicherheitsorganen der UdSSR, 1971–1972, 1974–1979. Cf. Szaynok, Poland–
Israel, 325, 331–332. Material documenting the international relations of the Hungarian secret service 
has not been transferred to the archive containing documents that are available for public research 
(Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, ÁBTL – Historical Archives of the Hungarian State 
Security).
4 Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Antisemitism (New York: Karz-Cohl, 1982), 
239–240; Kovács, Antisemitic Elements in Communist Discourse; Labendz, op. cit., 106, 439–446, 
473–490; Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 422–423.
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The sources researched to date indicate that “lists of Jews” were drawn up by the 
secret services in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Assumptions 
about the existence of these lists had already arisen after the Polish antisemitic cam-
paigns of 1967 and 1968. This suspicion was fostered primarily by the authorities’ 
surprisingly fast and effective identification during the “anti-Zionist” campaigns of 
people of (often partly) Jewish ancestry in various institutions in order to later force 
them to emigrate. This included those who, until they received the order to emigrate, 
did not know that they had Jewish ancestry.5 The documents made public since that 
time reveal that after the Six-Day War, the Polish secret services did indeed create 
a database containing the data details of persons of Jewish ancestry, and, it would 
seem, of people who had close contacts with them.6 Among the papers of the East 
German State Security Service, the Stasi, we also find, for some years, detailed lists 
with the names and personal data of members of the Jewish congregations in East 
Germany. The first such list stems from 1953 and mentions 1,200 individuals, while 
the final list was drawn up in 1988 and contains the details of approximately 300 
persons. An executive order issued in East Germany on 27 July 1967 (that is, around 
the time of the drafting of the Polish list) expressly instructed the compilation of a full 
list of members of the Jewish congregations in the country “in view of the situation 
in the Middle East”. In the end, the list, which was completed by the deadline of 17 
August 1967, contained almost 600 names.7 
In Hungary, we have also found lists of names among the state security papers. 
Compiled in the period 1965–1977, the lists relate mainly to the teachers and pupils 
of the Jewish grammar school and members of certain Budapest congregations.8 The 
documents created by the secret police in Czechoslovakia provide the deepest insights 
into the practice of drawing up “lists of Jews”. The infamous “Action Spider”, which 
aimed at creating a full list of Czechoslovak Jews, is the subject of on-going academic 
debate.9 This campaign, which began in the 1950s, was temporarily halted in 1961 and 
recommenced in 1972, several years after the suppression of the Prague Spring. The 
list was still being compiled in the late 1980s. Indeed, the number of registered names 
in the 1988 list was close to 10,000. 
A document drawn up in March 1987 frankly states the purpose of the campaign: 
“The decision to map and register all persons of Jewish denomination and descent 
was undertaken in July 1972, with the aim of learning about the distribution and con-
centration of these persons in the highest spheres of our society”.10 
5 See Checinski, op. cit., 239–240. 
6 Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 422–424.
7 BStU, MfS XX 4 754, Jüdische Gemeinde DDR, 1953–1968, 3. 203–221.
8 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/5, Folder: “Zionists undertaking 
hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 6. 
9 For a summary of the debates, see Labendz, op. cit., 439–443.
10 “Akce PAVAOUK. Informace pro 1. NMV ČSSR.” Archive of the Ministry of the Interior, Prague, 
carton F-16S/93. Cited by Heitlinger, In the Shadow of the Holocaust and Communism, 34.
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Opinions are divided on the function of such lists. In Czechoslovakia, it was 
claimed that the lists contained the potential targets of Arab terrorists residing in the 
country.11 Others were of the view that the lists formed part of preparations ordered by 
the Soviet leadership in the aftermath of the suppression of the Prague Spring for an 
anti-Zionist trial similar to the earlier Slánský trial. (In post-1968 propaganda, anti-Zi-
onist rhetoric did, indeed, become a feature of the attacks levelled at leading Commu-
nist reformers of Jewish descent such as Eduard Goldstücker, Frantisek Kriegel and 
Ota Šik.)12 For Alena Heitlinger, the main goal of the programme was to intimidate 
ordinary Jews, as Jewish ancestry offered sufficient grounds to harass them at any 
point in time.13 Jacob Ari Labendz, on the other hand, has claimed that in the post-
1967 period and particularly after the suppression of the Prague Spring, the campaign 
was recommenced by antisemitic functionaries working for the security services. 
These functionaries exploited favourable political conditions to incorporate the cam-
paign into their activities targeting the “enemies of Socialism”.14 
We cannot exclude the possibility that the “listing” of Jews was undertaken in a 
co-ordinated manner in the Soviet bloc countries under Soviet instruction, but nev-
ertheless carried out differently in each country. To date, this supposition could not 
be proved on the basis of the archival sources, as researchers have found no such 
Soviet instructions or direct references thereto. Nevertheless, arguments in favour of 
the supposition can be made based on the documents. Indeed, we know from the 
documents at our disposal – some of which have already been cited – that Soviet 
intelligence and counter-intelligence organs were in regular contact with their coun-
terparts in the “fraternal countries”, and that “Zionist activity” was one of the fields 
regularly surveyed. A Stasi document compiled from Soviet sources summarising 
the nature of “Zionist diversion” includes the assertion that the agents and potential 
agents of the Israeli secret services were to be found among the Jewish population 
in every country.15 This conviction may have been perceived – especially in critical 
political circumstances – as sufficient grounds to compile a list of “potential spies”. A 
degree of co-ordination may also be inferred from the fact that the campaigns in the 
various Communist countries of East-Central Europe coincided with each other: all 
such campaigns took place after the 1967 war. Another sign of some kind of co-ordi-
nation might be the appearance of several random lists of Jews in Hungary during this 
period. The sheer size of the country’s Jewish community meant that exhaustive lists 
11 Peter S. Green, Czechs Seek to Indict Officials Who Assembled Lists of Jews, International Herald 
Tribune, 27 November 2003.
12 Prague Daily Warns of Mounting Anti-Semitism in Czechoslovakia, Asks Ban. Jewish Telegraph 
Agency, 10 April 1969. Accessed on 27 September 2016 at http://www.jta.org/1969/04/10/archive/
prague-daily-warns-of-mounting-anti-semitism-in-czechoslovakia-asks-ban. 
13 Heitlinger, op. cit., 35.
14 Labendz, op. cit., 473–490.
15 BStU, MfS HA II Nr. 24003, February 25, 1985. Informationen über Erkenntnisse zur Arbeitsweise 
des israelischen Geheimdienstes gegen die UdSSR und die soz. Staatengemeinschaft, S. 5–12.
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could never be completed. It may be that on realising the impossibility of the task, the 
Hungarian authorities decided to draw up the lists as a kind of alibi, and merely with 
a view to meeting Soviet expectations in a formal sense.
The appendix to Chapter 5 includes a document created in the course of Action 
Spider,16 and which provides an unambiguous answer as to whom Communist offi-
cials regarded as Jews when discussing Jewish matters. The document states the fol-
lowing:
To ensure consistency when registering people of Jewish origin, it is necessary to introduce these 
terms:
— a person of Jewish faith: a person who is active in the JRC (or a Synagogue Congregation) and 
features on the list of its members or a person who, although not participating in the activities of 
the JRC (or a Synagogue Congregation), is registered on the list of members. 
— a person of Jewish origin: a person who does not profess Jewish faith and does not feature on 
the register of the JRC (or a Synagogue Congregation) but who has at least one parent who is/was 
of Jewish faith or who, before 1948, declared Jewish nationality or was a member of the Zionist 
organisation Hashomer Hacair, which worked legally in the ČSSR until 1948, or of any other 
Zionist or Jewish organisation [...].
As is clear from the text, the political police employed, for operational aims, what 
is clearly a Nuremberg-style racial definition of Jews. This shows that in certain sit-
uations (e.g. when the Communist leadership felt that “Jewish affairs” necessitated 
institutional intervention), the racist foundations of their image of the Jew surfaced. 
In public and within the broader Communist Party context, discourses concern-
ing Jewish affairs took place in mostly codified form, so that the word “Jew” rarely 
appeared. In this way, discourses conformed to the norms of official ideology. Within 
the narrower Party context, however, they did not automatically retain the use of cod-
ified language, and it is here that we see the overt use of a racial definition of Jews 
and traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes.17 Ultimately, at the level where, due to insti-
tutional pressures, the meaning of the word ‘Jewish’ had to be operationalised, racist 
speech appeared openly. 
The Party and state bodies – and the secret services that worked in co-operation 
with them – wanted first and foremost to bring Jewish denominational institutions 
and other associated bodies under their control. The primary means of control was 
the system of the Party-state nomenklatura, which functioned in each of the Com-
munist countries and which, in Hungary, was regulated with respect to the Jewish 
denomination by Law-Decree No. 22 of 1957. Under the provisions of this legislation, 
the prior consent of the Presidential Council of the People’s Republic of Hungary 
was required when appointing (or dismissing) the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and 
General Secretary of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites, the Presi-
16 See attachment to Chapter 5. 
17 See Kovács, Antisemitic Elements in Communist Discourse.
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dent and Vice-President of the Budapest Israelite Congregation, and the Chairmen of 
the Neolog and Orthodox rabbinical councils. Furthermore, the consent of the head of 
the State Office for Church Affairs was required when appointing (or dismissing) the 
director of the Rabbinical Seminary, and the principal of the Jewish Grammar School. 
Religious denominations in Hungary were financially dependent on the state. 
Indeed, state funding accounted for almost their entire budgets, and thus the state 
had further opportunities to control and interfere. In Hungary, the annual sum 
granted to the Jewish denomination was regulated by an agreement signed in 1948, 
which stated that the amount of funding would be reduced by 25 per cent every 
five years for the next two decades, and that funding would cease completely from 
1968.18 This agreement, which resembled agreements signed with the major churches 
in Hungary, was unsustainable, given the absence of other sources of income. For 
this reason, in 1957, the Party leadership agreed to implement the reduction in state 
funding foreseen in the earlier agreement in such a way that the reductions would 
be offset by equivalent amounts of “extraordinary state aid” for the denominations. 
However, the “political justification” for this latter type of funding was to be reviewed 
annually. This new framework remained in force during the subsequent period. In 
effect, it made the religious denominations even more dependent on the whims of 
the Communist state.19 Nevertheless, even the control exercised by state authorities 
via legal provisions manipulating leadership elections and governing the use of state 
funding was no guarantee that these authorities would be able to influence everyday 
events to the extent desired by the Party-state leadership.
In the post-Stalinist era, the regime sought to maintain the impression of legality. 
So, for instance, it was reluctant to make use of its right of appointment under the 
nomenklatura system, doing so only when all else failed. Instead, the organs of the 
Party-state were inclined to maintain democratic appearances, and to assist individ-
uals loyal to (and dependent upon) the state in achieving leading positions by means 
of manipulating religious denominations’ election processes.20 Additionally, in order 
to ensure a constant presence in the everyday workings of these denominations, the 
state authorities made efforts to place reliable cadres even in posts where interven-
tions could not be made legally under the nomenklatura system. In addition to the 
manipulation of elections, and the prevention or management of conflicts regarded 
as indicative of political “deviations” or as otherwise politically or ideologically sen-
sitive, the main aim of such surveillance and interference was to prevent the devel-
opment of groups that might gain some form of autonomy. In each country, the secret 
services and religious affairs organs paid particular attention to younger age groups, 
to youth groups operating (often informally) within the denomination, to individuals 
inside or outside the denomination who were in contact with the Israeli Embassy and 
18 Hungarian Jewish Archives, XXXIII-5-a-19, 7 December 1948.
19 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 6.d. 0047/1959 (16 October 1959).
20 On this practice, see Documents 1 and 10; Labendz, op. cit., 397, 504–505; Heitlinger, op. cit., 36.
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Israeli institutions, and to individuals and groups who sought regular contact with 
Jewish émigrés.21 
The authorities called such groups and the individuals who comprised them 
“Zionists”, thereby legitimising, in the context of official ideology, their control and 
harassment by the state. Attention was focused on “foreign agents of Zionist sub-
version”: foreign institutions who might provide financial or other support to small 
groups and personal networks wishing to escape state control as much as possible. 
Such institutions were foreign Jewish organisations, Israeli diplomatic representa-
tions and their members, and Jewish personalities who came to the country seeking 
contact with domestic Jewry.22 Information was gathered mainly by the secret ser-
vices, while the combatting of “Zionism” – that is, dealing with Jewish affairs – was 
the task of both counter-intelligence and the domestic security organs. Most of the 
information collected and evaluated by the secret services was placed at the disposal 
of the religious affairs organs, and decisions on the required measures and on the 
bodies responsible for their implementation were then taken in line with these organs. 
The senior Party leadership would also be informed directly about matters considered 
particularly important. The documents published below from the Hungarian archives 
give detailed insights into how such mechanisms worked. 
Some of the documents below were created by the State Office for Church Affairs 
but the majority stem from the various departments of the domestic secret services. 
The Hungarian state security organs regularly compiled an annual report on Jewish 
issues. Examining them, we find that the organs did not deal systematically with 
Jewish issues between the 1956 Revolution and 1961.23 The need to reorganise the 
apparatus tasked with fighting “Zionism” and hostile elements in the Jewish commu-
nity and the network of secret informers within Jewish institutions, appeared for the 
first time in a report of September 1961.24 
In August 1962, the Hungarian secret services were restructured. Out of the 
Department for Political Investigations (Department No. II), which had elaborated 
the above-mentioned working plan to “fight Zionism”, was formed a new top secret 
services organisation, the Interior Ministry’s State Security Directorate No. III, which 
comprised five departments (III/I – intelligence; III/II – counterintelligence; III/III – 
counter domestic reaction; III/IV – military intelligence; III/5 – operational technol-
21 See Heitlinger, op. cit., 105–125; Labendz, op. cit., 430; Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 377, 
380–381.
22 Szaynok, Poland–Israel 1944–1968, 325–330, 381–383.
23 According to the report, surveillance of “Zionism” was suspended after 1956, but reintroduced in 
December 1961 on the basis of a working plan drafted by the II/2 and II/3 departments. As the report 
states, the work had to be started anew, as much of the prior operative material had been destroyed in 
1956. (This statement contradicts the fact that quite a few pre-1956 folders on “Zionist issues” are to be 
found among the folders stored in the ÁBTL). On the reintroduction of regular surveillance, 127 former 
Zionists were found to feature in the operative records (see Document 4, 12 April 1962). 
24 See Document 3 (4 September 1961).
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ogy). Until 1974, counterintelligence, which included “Zionist issues”, was handled 
by Department III/II, whereby operational work was considered to be one aspect of 
counter-espionage (see Document 16). After 1974 however, it was rather the organs 
dealing with “domestic reaction” which dealt with “Zionist issues” and other “domes-
tic enemies”, particularly Department III/III-1, which specialised in church and reli-
gious issues; Department III/III-2 which targeted hostile elements among young 
people; Department III/III-3 which organised the control of people placed under 
observation; and Department III/III-4 which targeted hostile persons working in cul-
ture.25 Consequently, most of the post-1974 documents were created by these depart-
ments, which did not work in strict separation. Rather, they co-operated on a mutual 
basis, sharing both information and informers.
At the time of the “reopening” of the “Jewish line”, five years after the 1956 Rev-
olution, no Zionist organisation had been operating in Hungary for long time. The 
vast majority of former Zionists had either left the country or renounced their former 
views. Not surprisingly, those at the political police responsible for the issue thought 
that the time was ripe to redefine groups to be targeted by units dealing with “Zionist 
affairs”, and to determine why the surveillance and harassment of “Zionists under-
taking hostile activities” should extend to the Jewish denomination and individuals 
with rather loose connections to it. This is addressed in Document 4, dated 3 April 
1962. What was asserted at that time went on to determine, for the following decades, 
the work of the secret service units dealing with domestic Jewish affairs: 
It has become clear to the Zionists that they cannot appear openly, and that their practical 
methods applied in the past are not applicable under the present conditions. For this reason, 
they have started spreading the nationalist and Zionist propaganda by legal means and utilising, 
for this purpose, the religious institutions and religious education. They do not undertake overt 
Zionist propaganda, but through the teachings of the Talmud and the Torah they seek to keep 
alive “spiritual cohesion” in the Zionist sense, while also encouraging a “love of the Holy Land”. 
In the language of this document – and in that of Document 3 created a few months 
later – we find the Communist-era stereotypes that only surfaced in the wider public 
domain during major antisemitic campaigns: the anti-national cosmopolitanism of 
Jews; their occupation of elite positions in society; Jewish oversensitivity; and clan-
nish Jewish cohesion and solidarity supported by international conspiratorial net-
works. It would seem that similar organs in the “fraternal countries” used the same 
language, a good example of which is provided in a document created by the Czecho-
slovak secret service, according to which the solidarity of persons of a pro-Zionist 
orientation in Czechoslovakia:
25 A Belügyminisztérium III/III. Csoportfőnökség ügyrendje [Standing Orders of the Ministry of In-
terior III/III Head of Department]. Accessed on 3 October 2016 at http://www.abtl.hu/sites/default/
files/forrasok/ugyrend_3.pdf. 
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[I]s founded on the basis of common ethnic ancestry and religion […]. [They] are bearers of the 
ideology of bourgeois nationalism. These persons come largely from the ranks of former bour-
geoisie and intellectuals. They have a bond of cosmopolitan solidarity, their relation to the Czech 
and Slovak nation is rather tepid, and they are completely indifferent to the development of our 
society. It has been noted that these persons are mutually promoting each other at the expense 
of other intellectuals, and that they are trying to gain positions in the most important spheres of 
our society with the goal of influencing public opinion.26 
The shared attitudes and language which formed the basis of co-operation between 
the “fraternal” secret services is manifest in several of the documents. Such co-op-
eration meant not only the exchange of information, but also participation in joint 
actions, including the transfer of agents, as in the case of Jewish immigrants from the 
Soviet Union27 (see Documents 13 and 16).
Several documents provide insights into the secret services’ activities, modus 
operandi and targets (groups and individuals), as well as their relations with various 
other institutions. It is the secret services’ annual reports, however, that enable us to 
reconstruct how these organisations operated in the field of “Jewish affairs” (see Doc-
uments 14 and 16). We learn that information was gathered partly by technical means 
such as bugging,28 with such methods proving increasingly effective. For instance, 
the entire conversation (in Yiddish) between a group of Soviet Jewish leaders and WJC 
leaders during the Budapest conference was secretly recorded. The tape recording 
was then attached to a document summarising the contents of the conversation (see 
Document 16).
Informers within religious institutions and various Jewish groups (includ-
ing secret informers, agents and social contacts) represented a further resource for 
gathering information and manipulating events. Between 1961 and 1978, there were 
between four and 11 such informers in Hungary.29 The secret service heads considered 
this to be insufficient (see Documents 4 and 14), despite the fact that the informers 
included senior religious officials and rabbis. As Documents 7 and 8 demonstrate, 
from the secret service’s perspective, a spectacular failure of its network of inform-
ers occurred in 1965, when an instruction was given for a specific political action 
26 “Akce PAVAOUK”, 34.
27 See footnote 3.
28 The meanings of code-words used in the documents to signify various technical means of sur-
veillance are as follows: K-check = mail checks, 3/a measure = telephone bugging, 3/e measure = 
room bugging. K-apartment, T-apartment: apartments used by the secret service for conspiratorial 
purposes.
29 In the secret service documents, secret informers were those individuals who cooperated with the 
secret service out of conviction, while the secret agents were those who had been blackmailed to coop-
erate by the secret services who possessed some kind of incriminating or compromising information 
about them; and/or who had received certain benefits, such as a passport, payments, hard currency, 
or promotion at work. Social contacts were those individuals who provided information on an irregu-
lar basis, and without formalizing their cooperation in a signed agreement. 
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but subsequent events unfolded differently. In this specific case, and with a view to 
ultimately reducing the influence of the Israeli Embassy in Budapest over Hungary’s 
Jewish community, the secret service sought in vain for its informers within various 
Jewish institutions to take the stance that Hungary’s Jews opposed the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between Israel and West Germany, on the pretext that such a 
move would be a betrayal of the Jewish issue.
Information relating to “Jewish affairs” was placed in various types of files and 
folders. Most of the documents published here originate from a six-volume “object 
file” entitled “Zionists undertaking hostile activities”, but the secret services also 
maintained so-called group and personal files on related matters under various cover 
names.30 The tasks of counter-intelligence organs targeting “internal enemies” and 
dealing with “Jewish affairs” were summarised most succinctly in a memorandum 
on activities between 1974 and 1978, and which also contained a retrospect of earlier 
years (see Document 16). Here we read that the main task “was to acquire, on a contin-
uous basis, information of operational value and of assistance to [the formulation of] 
religious policy on domestic and foreign hostile endeavours, objectives and methods. 
We then have to draft appropriate information material on these for the leadership 
and, if necessary, for the state security bodies of friendly countries, etc.” 
A secondary task was summarised as follows: “We had to organise the investiga-
tion and control of the Jewish national groupings that had come into being and of the 
persons involved in such activities, thereafter taking proper measures to disrupt such 
groups and suppress and terminate their detrimental activities”.
Between 1956 and 1988, Party-state documents on Jewish issues estimated that 
there were 75–100,000 Jews living in Hungary, around 65,000 of whom lived in Buda-
pest. According to data contained in the documents, 20,000 Jews paid “church tax” 
in 1962, which evidently referred to the number of people who paid the annual vol-
untary denominational donation. In the early 1960s, it was reported that there were 
in total 30 active rabbis in Hungary, with 18 Jewish congregational districts in Buda-
pest, and four congregational districts in other parts of the country. A document 
dating from 1975 mentions 76 Jewish congregations, 105 functioning synagogues, and 
26 rabbis.31 In the 1960s, the Jewish denomination was reported to have 500–600 
employees. Although this number was falling, the state’s religious affairs authorities 
30 In the object folders, information was gathered on certain institutions or subject matters (in this 
case, Jewry in general). In the group folders, information was gathered on groups of individuals under 
surveillance, and the personal folders contained information gathered on individuals under surveil-
lance. The “work folders” contained the informers’ written reports. The folder with the codename 
“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták” [“Zionists Undertaking Hostile Activities”] comprises six 
volumes and contains a total of more than 2,000 pages of documents. In the documents published 
here, mention is made of the group folders codenamed “Együttműködők” [Co-operators], “Túristák” 
[Tourists] (Document 6) and “Salom” [Shalom] (Document 11), as well as the personal folders with the 
codenames “Direktor” [Director] and “Milliomos” [Millionaire]. 
31 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 84.d. 0020-1/1975 (21 June 1975). 
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applied pressure to bring about a more rapid decline. In addition to providing the 
institutional background for religious activities, the denomination also maintained 
a substantial network of social institutions, with assistance being offered to several 
thousand individuals (10,000 in 1961). It also ran a nursing home and a hospital, as 
well as the Anne Frank Grammar School and the Budapest Rabbinical Seminary. In 
this period, the Jewish weekly newspaper Új Élet [New Life] had a print run of 6–7,000 
(see Documents 2, 4 and 9).
While such data may not have been entirely accurate, the figures clearly show 
that in the field of “Jewish affairs”, the organs of the Party-state in Hungary, including 
the secret police, were required to employ methods that differed substantially from 
those used by similar bodies in Czechoslovakia and Poland, whose Jewish communi-
ties were so much smaller. As mentioned above, the numbers in Hungary precluded, 
for instance, the drawing up of exhaustive lists of Jewish individuals, even if there 
had been a Soviet directive to this effect. In line with Party directives, the secret ser-
vices, when reinstituting the systematic surveillance of Jewish organisations, groups 
and individuals, designated areas that required on-going monitoring (see Docu-
ments 3 and 4). Targets included groups attending religious classes at the synagogue 
(mostly children of school age and their parents), Jewish educational institutions 
(the grammar school and the Rabbinical Seminary headed by Sándor Scheiber), the 
Central Social Committee (headed by Mihály Borsa, and which distributed most of 
the social assistance), and the Israeli Embassy in Budapest (with its array of contacts 
among the local Jewish population). 
These institutions and their staff were not the only subjects of surveillance, for 
the monitoring also extended, on occasion, to individuals with rather tenuous links to 
Jewry. The logic behind the designation of targets was clear: the aim was to constantly 
monitor those institutions, informal networks and personalities suspected of being 
potentially able to extricate themselves from the tight control of the denomination, 
and to obtain funding from outside sources. Throughout the entire period, the logic 
of the disruptive and often repressive measures, as well as the identity of the targeted 
groups and individuals, remained essentially unchanged. A 1967 document drafted 
during the intensification of “anti-Zionist” efforts following the Six-Day War restates 
the designated aims, employing the customary rhetoric to do so: 
Zionist manifestations occur principally among young rabbis, theology students and Jewish 
youths, and they mainly affect those individuals who have come into close contact with the 
Israeli Embassy. Zionism’s main base was the Israeli Embassy. […] In recent years, the activity 
level of international and denominational reaction has increased. […] Zionism is characterised 
by anti-Communism – hostility to the Soviet Union, subservience to international imperialism, 
the praising of capitalist Israel, an emphasis on Jewish superiority, and the enticement of Jews 
to Israel. […] Our political work relating to the Jewish denomination is made more difficult by 
the circumstance that they are receiving significant amounts of Western aid. Such aid influences 
even the most progressive [meaning: supporters of the Party – AK] Jewish leaders, especially in 
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regard to their positions on the WJC and on Western Jewry. [The designated goals … – AK] a./ 
The NRHI should dispose of the foreign aid sent to the denomination. Irregularities that have 
surfaced in the field of the organisation and distribution of foreign aid must be resolved. […] The 
training of rabbis should be made more democratic in spirit. The system of rotation of deans 
should be introduced to rabbi training, and the teaching staff should be refreshed with the addi-
tion of several progressive rabbis.32 
A report from 1977 summarised the targets of surveillance from the 1960s onwards as 
follows: “1. The role and activities of the Israeli Embassy until 1967; 2. After 1967, the 
National Rabbinical Seminary, private apartments and public places; 3. From 1972–
73, the influence of Western Jewish organisations and the involvement of Hungarian 
Jewry in international work”.33
In many ways, the goals and activities of the Hungarian secret police with respect 
to Jewish young people, Jewish youth groups and the Israeli Embassy resemble those 
of their counterparts in Czechoslovakia and Poland. In Hungary, however, there were 
two institutions that managed to preserve a degree of autonomy, even in the most dif-
ficult periods, largely as a consequence of the indomitability and successful tactical 
manoeuvring of their leaders, but also thanks to their relations with organisations 
abroad. It comes as no surprise that both institutions received the particular attention 
of religious affairs organs and the secret service throughout the period. The first such 
institution was the Central Social Committee, headed by Mihály Borsa, which dis-
tributed funds received from Jewish organisations abroad (principally the Joint) with 
little input from the denomination’s leadership, a situation that severely limited the 
state’s capacity to control and monitor. Borsa had been under surveillance since the 
early 1960s. His correspondence was monitored, his telephone tapped, and he had 
been declared a suspected spy on several occasions. On this basis, from 1966 until 
1974, documents about him were stored in a file code-named “Milliomos” [Million-
aire].34 
The second institution with a degree of autonomy and independence was the 
Budapest Rabbinical Seminary, headed by the world-famous scholar of Judaism 
Sándor Scheiber. In the manner of a case study, the documents relating to Scheiber 
and the Rabbinical Seminary serve to provide insights into the workings of the entire 
regime. Concerning the Rabbinical Seminary, the aims of the state and state secu-
rity organs were manifold. First of all, they strove to subordinate the Seminary to the 
community leadership which was ready to collaborate in every case, and without any 
conditions. The first step in this direction took place in August 1960 when the State 
32 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 37.d. 002-a-3/d/1967 (2 November 1967). 
33 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/5, Folder: “Zionists undertaking 
hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 6. (31 October 1977). Document 
16 is a later version of this report. 
34 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-13558/1, Personal folder: “Milliomos” 
[Millionaire], Nr.: Sz-7088, opened 27 July 1966. 
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Office for Church Affairs arranged new elections for the Board of the Seminary. Schei-
ber protested in vain against the list of candidates which had been put together by the 
head of the Community, who was a secret informer. A new Board was elected, two of 
its members functioned as secret informers and a third was known as the most reli-
able supporter of the Party in the Rabbinate.35 
The following year, the secret service placed Scheiber and the students of the 
seminary under systematic surveillance. They bugged his office and apartment, and 
intercepted his mail; these measures were repeated regularly in subsequent years. The 
results of such surveillance and all connected materials were stored in a file under the 
name “Direktor”, which was not available at the time of writing.36 The authorities 
noted with regret that Scheiber had been elected to the Board of the World Jewish 
Congress, and had received the authority to distribute Claims Conference funds in 
Hungary (see Document 4). Scheiber neglected the bureaucratic rules for spending 
these funds, using them instead for both academic and social purposes. This was a 
recurrent subject in the reports by agent “Xavér”, the director of the Jewish Museum 
in Budapest, a person close to Scheiber. And it was this little freedom that was exactly 
what the authorities wanted to hinder: uncontrolled research activities and publica-
tions under the aegis of the Seminary, interpreted as a cover for a “Zionist conspir-
acy”. Having realised that Scheiber was not seeking to leave the country – he refused 
to accept a leading academic position in Britain – the authorities tried to cut him off 
from the broader Jewish community.37 
In February 1964, the rabbi mentioned above as a Party line representative sub-
mitted a resolution to the Rabbinate to prohibit all non-Rabbinate members – includ-
ing Scheiber – from rabbinical practice. The resolution was passed, but the Rabbinate 
was later unable to enforce it.38 A report sent to the Agitation and Propaganda Depart-
ment of the HSWP by the State Office for Church Affairs stressed that: “The Rabbinical 
35 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. M-37478; vol. 2. Work folder: “Xavér”, 
file: Jelentés a Rabbiképző Intézőbizottságának újraválasztásáról, 1960. augusztus 12. [Report on the 
Re-election of the Rabbinical Board, 12 August 1960]. 
36 The surveillance of Scheiber and the Seminary is already mentioned in a report drafted in the 
immediate aftermath of the elaboration of a systematic surveillance plan (1961). See, for instance, 
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/0, Folder: “Zionists undertaking hos-
tile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 1. (14 March 1962). Many subsequent 
reports also contain notes on the continuous surveillance and bugging, as well as the folder with the 
codename “Direktor”. See, for instance, the following files in the above folder: 17169/4, vol. 5. (20 
October 1976); 17169/5, vol. 6. (23 November 1974); 17169/5, vol. 6. (26 November 1976). 
37 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. M-37809; vol. 1. Work folder: “Sárvári 
György”, file: Jelentés Scheiber amerikai útjáról. 1964. január 17. [Report on Scheiber’s Visit to Amer-
ica. 17 January 1964]. According to the report, Scheiber was offered a leading position at the London 
Seminary, an offer he declined. The evaluating officer expressed surprise at Scheiber’s decision. 
38 While the vote was taken in secret, the agent reporting on the decision knew who had voted and 
how. The report evaluated the vote as “a victory for the loyal group that we also support.” See His-
torical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/1, Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile 
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Seminary is a hotbed of Zionism, and we have recently examined its activities and 
have begun to implement the required political measures”.39
In 1968, having organised a trial of students accused of “Zionist activities” and 
incitement against the state,40 and with a view to forcing Scheiber out, the Rabbinate 
decided to introduce a rotational system for the position of Seminary director. It also 
prescribed additional mandatory classes on Marxist philosophy and social science (see 
Document 11).41 These efforts also proved unsuccessful. Scheiber’s popularity grew, 
and in the 1970s many young people regularly attended his Friday evening Kiddush, 
before continuing their debates and conversations in coffee-houses and apartments. 
Although the Friday evening lectures adhered strictly to religious themes, hundreds 
of pages were filled with agents’ reports about the “Zionist-suspect” activities that 
were taking place in and around the Rabbinical Seminary. In 1977, a summary report 
mentioned with boastful pride how the state authorities had successfully prevented 
the public circulation of Scheiber’s monumental work Folklore and Material Culture, 
leading him to attempt to circulate it through private channels.42 
Yet in the late 1970s, the reports became more resigned in tone: they recorded 
how the professor’s “hostile activities” were continuing, how his “Zionist-nationalist 
views” had received strong support from foreign Jewish organisations, how his schol-
arly achievements in the field of Hungarian-Jewish literature were widely acknowl-
edged and, consequently, how his international reputation was on the rise. The cited 
report concludes, however, that while it might have been possible to put Scheiber 
on trial for non-political criminal offences (for example financial irregularities), the 
presentation of evidence might have uncovered the informers in his circle. Moreover, 
in view of Scheiber’s domestic and international reputation, a legal procedure might 
have produced a serious backlash. The final decision was to continue surveillance, to 
seek to intensify the conflict between Scheiber and the community leadership, and 
to recruit further informers from Scheiber’s circle.43 Indeed, in a document entitled 
Proposal for operational measures related to the centenary of the Rabbinical Seminary, 
activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 2. (18 February 1964), file: “Sárosi” tmb. 
jelentése [Report submitted by Secret Informer “Sárosi”].
39 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d, 37.d 002-2/1967 (21 February 1967). 
40 This was the so-called “realization” of the “Shalom” case, which meant that the secret investiga-
tion codenamed “Shalom” was turned into a court case. Finally, on 9 October 1968, two members of 
the youth group were sentenced to four months imprisonment. See Historical Archives of the Hungar-
ian State Security 3.1.5. O-13772; vol. 1–3, Group folder: “Salom”. 
41 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/2, Folder: “Zionists undertaking 
hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 3. (18 May 1968).
42 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/5, Folder: “Zionists undertaking 
hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 6. (25 April 1975 and September 
1975]. The memoranda reveal how the sale of the book by state-owned book distributors was prevent-
ed as it might “incite Zionist sentiments.”
43 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/4, Folder: “Zionists Undertaking 
Hostile Activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 5. (20 October 1976). 
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and in another document in which the officer responsible for the operation evaluates 
the work of the agent network, 11 secret informers and agents involved in an action 
are mentioned, among them the head and financial director of the community, the 
chief rabbi of the Dohány Street Synagogue, and some students of the Seminary.44
Several factors explain Borsa and Scheiber’s relative success in maintaining their 
relative independence. The principal factors were their contacts abroad and, in Schei-
ber’s case, an international reputation. A second factor was the ability of both men 
to exploit conflicts arising within the religious community and the State Office for 
Church Affairs and, between these two institutions. They regularly used these con-
flicts to win supporters for their cause. Borsa and Scheiber had a fine sense of how far 
they could go, and where the boundaries lay. They proved adept at striking a balance 
between co-operation and resistance. Borsa made effective use of his good contacts 
among former Smallholder Party politicians who had been co-opted into the senior 
Communist political hierarchy, for whom he obtained various financial advantages 
bordering on bribery (e.g. funding for trips abroad, importing cars free from custom 
tax), and to whom he often referred in the course of meetings held with denomina-
tional leaders or the functionaries of the State Office for Church Affairs. Scheiber’s 
political capital was his international reputation as a scholar: the authorities had to 
reckon with the fact that any measure taken against him would be widely reported in 
the Western media to the detriment of Hungary’s international reputation. Micro-his-
torical analyses of these two men and their institutions would greatly contribute to a 
better understanding of the functioning of the post-Stalinist regimes. 
From the latter third of the 1970s, we do not find any secret service documents 
relating to “Jewish affairs” in the public archives. The few documents to which we do 
have access provide a picture that resembles the one that may be formed from docu-
ments relating to contacts with international Jewish organisations: while the institu-
tions of state control and interference continued to operate in an unchanged fashion, 
the Jewish institutions’ scope for action increased after the signing of the Helsinki 
Accords. Even so, the customary policies of control and manipulation successfully 
prevented the development of movements seeking significant institutional autonomy 
within the existing system of Jewish institutions. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a few informal groups were established outside 
the official Jewish institutional system in Hungary, although they never attained the 
degree of institutionalisation as part of the oppositional counter-culture that was 
characteristic of contemporary informal Jewish educational groups in the Soviet 
Union, Poland and – in the late 1980s – Czechoslovakia.45 Only in the mid-1980s did 
there appear – in the illegal press of the semi-clandestine democratic opposition – a 
44 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/5, Folder: “Zionists undertaking 
hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 6. (7 December 1976 and 14 No-
vember 1977).
45 For a detailed analysis of Jewish youth groups in Czechoslovakia, see Heitlinger, op. cit.
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political programme that formulated both the demand for sovereign Jewish politics, 
and the possible principles of such politics in the name of a clandestine Jewish oppo-
sitional group, Shalom.46 
The Hungarian secret service’s final campaign in the field of Jewish affairs for 
which we have documentary evidence relates to the informal Jewish groups in Buda-
pest. It took place in 1985–86, by which time the fledgling Jewish network of mostly 
young people had been under surveillance for some time, as evidenced by a report 
written for the East-German secret service preserved in the Stasi archives47, and by 
subsequently published memoirs.48 Once again, the tactics of intimidation and dis-
ruption were successfully employed first to manipulate and then, in 1986, to break up 
these groups. 
Shortly before the collapse of the regime, the State Office for Church Affairs made 
a number of rather desperate attempts to restrict the ground for emerging Jewish 
initiatives outside the religious community. It suddenly proposed, for instance, the 
establishment of a secular Jewish cultural magazine and a secular cultural associa-
tion, suggesting that the latter be run under the auspices of the religious communi-
ty.49 However, all such endeavours – together with the State Office for Church Affairs 
– were soon swept away by the tide of change. 
46 Nyílt levél a magyar társadalomhoz és a magyar zsidósághoz [An Open Letter to Hungarian Society 
and Hungarian Jews] in AB Hírmondó 6–7, May–June 1984, 23–37. For Shalom’s open letter, see Kovács, 
Hungarian Jewish Politics, 124–156.
47 “Auf das Bestreben der Zionisten, dass auf die Erhöhung des Einflusses der Juden in Ungarn ge-
richtet ist, verweist auch, dass verschiedene Personen in ihrer eigenen Wohnungen systematisch Ver-
sammlungen für jüdische Jugendgruppen veranstalten. Sie wurden von Personen geleitet, die sich 
bewusst als gegen die sozialistische Gesellschaftsordnung auftretende Personen vorstellen und sich 
in der Konspiration auskennen. Ihre Zusammenkünfte legalisieren sie mit jüdischer religiöser Tätig-
keit. Zur Organisierung ihrer Tätigkeit erhalten sie systematisch über verschiedene Kanäle materielle 
Hilfe, Instruktionen und Popagandamaterial von ihrer Verbindungen.” BStU, MfS HA XXII, Nr. 1767, 
Information der Sicherheitsdienste Ungarns über die subversive Tätigkeit der israelischen Geheim-
dienste und der zionistischen Organisationen (21 February 1985). 
48 “Szóval azt mondja, aki zsidó, tartsa magát zsidónak?” Mihancsik Zsófia interjúja Rácz András-
sal [“So whoever is Jewish should regard themselves as a Jew?” Zsófia Mihancsik interviews András 
Rácz]. Budapesti Negyed 8 (1995), 227–259.
49 National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d 159.d. 0017/6-4/1988 (1 August 1988), and 164.d. 
0017/4/1989 (23 February 1989). 
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Documents
1 The Current Situation of the Jewish Denomination
13 May 1957
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d-0029-1/1957 (2.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
On 18 April 1957, based on a preliminary discussion with the State Office for Church 
Affairs, we arranged for Dr Lajos Heves, Chairman of the National Office of Hungarian 
Jews and the Budapest Israelite Congregation, to resign [from his posts]. The reason 
for his resignation was in part a consideration of the operational aspects [aspects 
essential for the security organs – AK] and in part the fact that as the leader of Hun-
garian Jewry he has been pursuing a denominational policy in opposition to the gov-
ernment.
From 1954 onwards, he established, as chairman, close relations with the Israeli 
Embassy in Budapest, falling completely under its control. He took his measures – in 
relation to Hungarian Jewry – having first discussed them with the Embassy and with 
its approval. He ignored or applied only in an ostensible manner the criteria received 
from the State Office for Church Affairs. He did not support wholeheartedly the correct 
measures arising from the political and economic situation. For a lengthy period he 
gave his full support to Jewish nationalist ideology and he performed his tasks as 
chairman in this spirit. This explains why, after the October events [the 1956 anti-Com-
munist Revolution in Hungary – AK], he was unwilling to make a statement on the 
revolutionary or counter-revolutionary nature of the events in Hungary. According to 
our concrete data, on this issue too, he represented the view of the Israeli Embassy 
in Budapest. With his Jewish nationalist views and through the concrete application 
of this ideology, he promoted the large-scale illegal wave of emigration. Exaggerating 
some of the antisemitic outbursts manifested at the time of the October counter-rev-
olution, he utilised them to increase Jewish nationalism. He continued this activity 
throughout his time as chairman, and even after his dismissal he still represents this 
position, seeking to achieve – and the attempt could be successful under current cir-
cumstances – the “liquidation” of the religious leaders of Jewry from Hungary.
His listed actions have compelled a significant proportion of denominational 
persons to emigrate, thereby causing panic among Hungarian Jewry, who are now 
leaving or seeking to leave the country in large numbers. He took his Jewish national-
ist propaganda to such a level that, in several instances, he spoke in front of leading 
Jewish persons of the coming pogroms, thereby making their emigration even more 
likely.
Many leading functionaries in the denomination disagreed with the Jewish 
nationalist line taken by Dr Lajos Heves and with his close contact with the Embassy. 
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These persons even voiced their opinion, whereupon Dr Lajos Heves had them 
removed from the leadership, forcing his arbitrary rule on a part of the prefecture.
He developed around his person a narrow group of those in agreement with 
his leadership line; however, these persons, together with Dr Lajos Heves, are fully 
opposed, in a political sense, to the people’s democracy system.
[…]
Naturally, these persons seek the same Jewish nationalist line and to maintain the 
close relations with the Israeli Embassy in Budapest.
This clique has fully subordinated the denomination to the Embassy and they 
consider the Israeli Embassy rather than the Hungarian government as their highest 
organ, whose guidance they view as obligatory.
A group of those who support the other line, whom Dr Lajos Heves had removed 
from the leadership by exploiting the October events, display a loyal attitude to the 
government and they fully agree with and support its policies. They oppose the 
denomination’s tutelage to the Israeli Embassy in Budapest and they consider the 
Hungarian government rather than the Israeli Embassy to be their superior organ. In 
their view, for as long as the Jews in Hungary are living here, it is their obligation to 
support the policy of the Hungarian government, and they view the principles laid 
down in the Constitution of the People’s Republic as compulsory. This opposition 
force seeks the unification of Jewry, its education in an anti-Zionist spirit, and the 
establishment of trust towards the government.
Dr Lajos Heves disagreed with these principles and did his utmost to discredit 
these persons, so that he could continue, in an undisturbed fashion, his Jewish 
nationalist denominational policy.
Summarising the current situation of the denomination, it can be stated that, 
since his resignation, he has sought to influence the present leadership and promote 
his Jewish nationalist denominational policy. Through his reactionary friends in the 
leadership, he hinders the advance of the opposition camp – that is, those that seek 
to realise the correct line of leadership, and, in doing so, he seeks to increase the 
authority of his own person towards Israel.
This dubious situation exerts a grave influence on Jewry and on the life of the 
denomination. A significant part of Jewry wants, in view of these circumstances, to 
emigrate, because they do not see the practice of the life of the denomination assured 
amid all the rivalry. A majority of Hungarian Jews supports the loyal policy of the 
opposition, agree with its denominational policy, and make this policy their own.
Based on the foregoing, we propose:
1./ To hold a discussion with the State Office for Church Affairs concerning the taking 
of effective measures to put a stop to the Jewish nationalist line of leadership. This can 
be accomplished by the State Office for Church Affairs calling upon Dr László Fleisch-
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mann, deputy chairman, to reinstate to their original posts the persons who have 
been deprived of their functions, who can then bring an end to the Jewish nationalist 
line of leadership. The return of these persons to the leadership of the denomination 
is vital on operational grounds.
2./ For a temporary period, the denomination should be led by the two deputy chair-
men in co-operation, whereby a loyal denominational policy can be realised free of 
external influence.
3./ Constant contact with the State Office for Church Affairs is necessary to ensure 
that when certain persons are placed in functions ,we can also take the operational 
criteria into account.
4./ The State Office for Church Affairs should invite the deputy chairmen Dr László 
Fleischmann and Dr Géza Seifert for a discussion, informing them of the State Office’s 
position that they disapprove of the continuation of the Jewish nationalist line of 
leadership.
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2 The Jewish Denomination
13 May 1963
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (20.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
The Jewish Denomination
I.
The supreme religious, social and cultural administrative body of the 80,000 Hungar-
ian Jews who remain out of the 500,000 Jews of the pre-WWII era is the National Rep-
resentation of Hungarian Israelites: NRHI. The leadership of the NRHI, which com-
prises a president, a general secretary and 5 deputy chairmen, is elected at a national 
conference for a period of four years by the leaders of congregations in the provinces 
based on the five geographical regions in the country and of the Budapest Israelite 
Congregation, which includes approx. 65,000 members.
The task of the NRHI is to operate the Nursing Hospital, the Boys’ and Girls’ 
Orphanages, the Jewish Seminary [the Rabbinical Seminary of Budapest – AK], the 
five nursing homes and the six soup kitchens (which distribute 2,500 lunches per 
day). But it is also to care for the cemeteries, synagogues, prayer houses etc., as well 
as to operate the industrial and commercial units relating to ritual life (butchers, 
kosher wine-handling, matzah production, etc.) 
Relations among the secular and religious leaders of Hungary Jewry are characterised 
by permanent discord of an open or implicit nature. This is caused in part by the [fight 
for the – AK] acquiring of power, which is accompanied by financial advantages, and 
in part by the attraction to the rich Jewish population in the West and the mainte-
nance of overt and hidden relations with the State of Israel. Among the disruptive 
methods utilised by the leaders, one finds all kinds of means from idle gossiping to 
anonymous letter campaigns.
[…]
In the Jewish denomination, the reactionary group is manifest in two forms. First, it 
criticises those members of the central leadership who co-operate with the state. It 
always undertakes such attacks, however, in the disguise of defending the truth, as if 
it were defending the true interests of Jewry, whereas in reality it seeks merely to dis-
credit and topple those leaders who are ready to work with the state. The intellectual 
leader of this movement is Sándor Scheiber, who has succeeded, by means of offering 
financial assistance – given that he manages the funds of the Claims Conference – in 
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winning over the disaffected. Included in that group is Mihály Borsa, who seeks pop-
ularity in his endeavour to occupy the seat of chairman.
The other type of the manifestation of reactionary forces is the active, illegal pro-
paganda work, which is pursued among Hungarian Jewry – above all using finan-
cial means – by the Israeli Embassy to promote Zionism and emigration. Given that 
Zionism is thriving among the religious functionaries and the Orthodox Jews, they are 
sympathetic to, and in contact with, the Embassy. In the past year, János Péter and 
Károly Szarka spoke with the Israeli chargé d’affaires about the propaganda activity, 
who sought to evade the accusations and has since proceeded with his illegal work in 
a more cautious fashion.
It is to be noted that the two forms of the reaction overlap to a certain degree, just 
as the intellectual motor behind each school of thought is Sándor Scheiber.
For our part, we regularly inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the activi-
ties of the Embassy that have come to our knowledge. Even so, there is a need for the 
Ministry to re-examine this problem. Another requirement would be for the leaders 
of the Jewish denomination to meet with the head of the Office, in order to exchange 
views on the above problems.
II.
Other than the congregations in Debrecen, Pécs, Szeged and Kaposvár, regular denom-
inational life is seen only in the 18 Budapest congregations. In the smaller places, 
noteworthy religious activity occurs only at the time of major festivals, occasional 
celebrations and events. The rituals are performed nationally by 31 rabbis (15 Neolog 
and 16 Orthodox rabbis) and 18 cantors. In addition, there are numerous occasional 
hazzans and Torah readers, particularly in the remote places. (With a view to mitigat-
ing the lack of rabbis, there are currently 10 [handwritten correction on the document: 
8 – AK] students studying at the Rabbinical Seminary. The Luach (or denominational 
calendar), published in 10,000 copies each year, promotes the religious life of the 
diaspora populations.
A bigoted religious life is lived only by the small number of Orthodox Jews, who 
live in separation [from the majority of Jews – AK]. Other than this, only the elderly 
Neolog Jews attend synagogue regularly. Among those who attend synagogue now, one 
cannot expect their numbers to decrease in the Orthodox branch, while in the Neolog 
congregations only a very slow decline in numbers is anticipated. Most Jews, however, 
feel themselves as belonging to the community, which, however, is expressed only on 
certain occasions (major festivals, bar mitzvah, weddings, funerals, etc.).
Official religious instruction for youths is undertaken only in the yeshiva or at the 
Jewish Grammar School. Still, various other means (Talmud lessons, Torah readings, 
etc.) are used to get acquainted with the basic tenets of the religion.
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Recently – since there has been the in-fighting at the NRHI – the centre has lost 
control and direction of religious life in areas outside Budapest. This does not mean 
that activities relating to religious life have declined in such country areas. Rather, we 
do not know their activity and their attitudes. In any case, we intend to use the rabbi 
candidates and activate some members of the NRHI in order to enable us to follow 
what happens in the religious life of Jews outside Budapest. 
III.
The international relations of the leaders of Hungarian Jewry are lively and develop-
ing. In the recent past, delegations have visited Paris, Brussels and London. Now the 
initial steps have been taken towards the Jewish community in Austria.
Among the People’s democracies, their relations with the GDR are the most inten-
sive, and they provide regular political, denominational, cultural and moral support 
to German Jews. Unfortunately, to date it is only with Polish Jewry that healthy rela-
tions have not been established.
For those religious and secular leaders of the denomination who are deserving 
in a political sense, we are gradually enabling them to speak personally about the 
domestic life of Hungarian Jewry in the capitalist states. 
Hungarian Jewry maintains contact with family members who have, in many 
cases, emigrated, and with the various international organisations, which are observ-
ing attentively the integration of Hungarian Jewry into Socialist society. In 1962, almost 
a hundred foreign (above all American and British) religious and secular denomina-
tional leaders visited Hungary, viewing the Jewish religious institutions and events 
either as guests of the NRHI or as private individuals. Extensive reports and articles 
were published in Western Jewish magazines and in Western newspapers about their 
realistic and positive experiences. On the occasion of the [Jewish] New Year of 5723, 75 
foreign Jewish leaders or organisations sent their good wishes to the NRHI, compared 
with 50 such greetings in the preceding year. 
In 1962, interest in the current situation of Hungarian Jewry was expressed for 
the first time from the Latin-American states. We are only beginning to appreciate the 
advantageous side of Hungarian Jewry’s foreign contacts, and to date such contacts 
have been of an accidental or desultory nature. The time has now come for us to focus 
– in harmony with the competent organs – on building and consolidating interna-
tional relations, doing so in a planned and future-oriented manner.
At present, around 20,000 Jews pay the religious tax levy, but this number is con-
tinuously, albeit slowly, decreasing. The main additional sources of revenue are the 
fees levied on kosher products. (Owing to a decrease in the number of veal calves 
slaughtered, there is currently a large decline in this area.) The denomination has 
many other minor sources of revenue (CHEVRA, donations, etc.), but these too are 
slowly decreasing.
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The cost of wages for the more 500 workers employed in the field of the NRHI is 
not decreasing – albeit most of them receive low wages. And so the deficit is covered 
from the sale of disused synagogues. Initially, the response to the sales was great. 
Today, however, the problem is finding buyers, because there is now an awareness of 
the extent of the financial problem presented by the upkeep of the disused buildings. 
Of course, the property sales must be monitored to prevent the possibility of mutual 
speculation or the speedy liquidation of synagogues.
The main funding source for the social expenditures is the 25 million forints pro-
vided by the SSE on an annual basis. Meanwhile, the Claims Conference provides 
40,000 dollars annually in financial aid for the cultural purposes of Hungarian Jewry, 
which covers book publications and research on the Jewish past.
The state provides the denomination with an annual sum of …………. forints 
congrua [sum is missing; state contribution to salaries of rabbis – AK], pensions, main-
tenance of buildings, etc.
It is extraordinarily important that, as revenues slowly fall, the expenditure of the 
denominational institutions should also decrease. However, rationalisation can only 
be achieved by way of considered and circumspect measures, lest it cause panic and 
the competent organs use the declining costs for the purpose of propaganda concern-
ing the liquidation of the denomination.
P r o p o s a l
1./ For the sake of expanding foreign relations, to consolidate existing relations and 
seek contact with Jewish populations in additional countries (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs).
a./ Based on the good relationship that arose out of the journey to England, 
enhancing relations in the religious and cultural fields and inviting progressive 
British religious Jewish leaders. 
b./ Making contact with progressive Jewish communities in the South-American 
states.
c./ Contacting Hungarian Jewish communities abroad (World Federation of Hun-
garians).
d./ Clarify with the Polish comrades whether or not it is still necessary to isolate 
Polish and Hungarian Jews from each other.
2./ Restricting the propaganda activity of the Israeli Embassy (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs).
3./ Timely discussions by the Office [State Office for Religious Affairs – AK] with the 
secular and religious leaders of the Jewish denomination.
4./ To reduce costs, compel the NRHI to make the savings necessary in every field.
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3 Operational  Situation of the Jewish Denomination
4 September 1961
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 1. 
Ministry of Interior
II, Sub-department 5-C.
Subject: operational situation of the Jewish denomination
Report
Budapest, 4 September 1961
Since 1958 and the dismissal of the Denomination’s president, Dr Lajos Heves, the 
activities of the leaders of the Jewish Denomination in Hungary have been character-
ised by an attempt to establish better co-operation between the new leadership and 
the state bodies. Proof of this are the positive sounding articles published in Új Élet 
[New Life], as well as statements made at various events – which call for integration 
within the system.
We have no knowledge of the influence of the Israeli Embassy exerting a greater 
effect on the religious denomination than in earlier years. By way of agents, we have 
managed to ensure that staff members of the Embassy attend events held by the reli-
gious denomination only to a minimum extent. We also have no knowledge of the 
Embassy continuing to provide illegal aid. 
I.
The number of Jews in Hungary can be put at around 75,000, although the leaders of 
the religious denomination speak of 100,000. In doing so, however, their aim is clearly 
to ensure that they keep receiving the same amount of foreign aid. (Nearly 90 per 
cent of Jews live in Budapest.) Religious life in the community is in constant decline, 
which has spurred the leaders of the religious denomination to raise the number of 
taxpayers (by way of agents we managed to put an end to this). The necessity of this is 
justified by the fact that, despite the sharp decline in numbers, an apparatus of 600, 
appropriate for the pre-war community of 700,000, is still maintained. There are two 
shades of the Jewish religion in Hungary, and in line with this there are Neolog head-
quarters and Orthodox headquarters, both having an adequate number of staff. The 
number of Orthodox Jews is not so high, approx. 5,000 people. Apart from Budapest, 
only Debrecen has an Orthodox congregation. Despite the small numbers, the Ortho-
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dox community is the more dangerous, in view of it being more organised and more 
influential. Their integration into the system of a People’s democracy is unlikely, and 
they do not take part in productive work. In Budapest they have one operating syna-
gogue, which has a lively religious life. In addition, they also have a working Yeshiva, 
providing religious instruction throughout the day.
The Neolog branch is less unified and not so well organised, but also much richer 
than the Orthodox one. It has a rabbinical seminary with 4 students, a hospital with 
200 beds and a network of nursing homes throughout the country, including two 
in Budapest. Incidentally, the congregation provides financial assistance to almost 
10,000 persons, while 2,300 individuals receive meals at a soup kitchen, and this is 
not to mention the assistance given in the form of clothing, medicines and food. The 
division of such assistance is the task of the “Central Social Committee” [Központi 
Szociális Bizottság, KSZB], which is independent of the congregation. The employees 
and senior managers of the Committee have no links with denominational life and 
are increasingly distant from the correct religious denominational policy. Illustrative 
of their independence is that they do not allow the leaders of the congregation to 
examine their affairs, even rejecting the very idea of this. Also in operation is a fairly 
well respected museum. The Budapest Israelite Congregation is divided into 18 dis-
tricts, and there are almost 30 synagogues in operation. In terms of the denomination, 
the country is divided into 6 parts, known as denominational districts.
These are:
1./ Budapest
2./ Northern Transdanubia (Győr)
3./ Southern Transdanubia (Pécs)
4./ Great Plain (Szeged)
5./ Transtisza (Debrecen)
6./ Northern Hungary (Miskolc)
A characteristic development is the flow of provincial Jews to Budapest and to the 
major cities from villages and minor towns. Accordingly, large congregations are to 
be found only in the seats of the denominational districts. Over the past two years, a 
development related to this migration flow to the cities has been the sale of 15 syna-
gogues (mostly in areas outside Budapest) to the state – to be used as cultural centres, 
stores or for some other purpose. At present, negotiations are underway concerning 
the sale of several synagogues – including two in Budapest. The sale of the syna-
gogues in Budapest is justified by the downturn in religious life and low attendance. 
The leadership and priesthood of the denomination are far from united. From 
time to time, groups or tiny groups arise with the aim of defeating the present lead-
ership. To date, such endeavours have been successfully countered. Such groups are 
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not long-lived, because they usually break up in consequence of other disputes or 
they do not continue their activities for fear of being suspected of forming a move-
ment. Of course, a major factor in this is fear of losing one’s position. The wave of 
emigration can now be regarded as concluded, whereby reports of Israel’s difficult 
economic situation have been a contributory factor. The number of people who would 
leave the country for Israel can be estimated at 3,000. The number of returning emi-
grants is substantially larger. The leaders of the denomination estimate that there are 
20,000 who would return if this were a possibility.
News reports from Romania – the on-going “deportation” of Romanian Jewry 
– cause some agitation from time to time. (This was confirmed by Agent “Doktor” 
[Doctor] who visited Romania.) Some Hungarian Jews think that the same thing will 
happen in Hungary one day.
The leadership of the denomination has, officially, no links with the Israeli 
Embassy. However, from time to time, staff members of the Embassy visit the syna-
gogues in a district and converse there with people. We do not know of any assistance 
given or of permanent contacts. There are only several persons concerning whom we 
have signs of indirect contact.
We have data indicating that the Embassy is inviting an increasingly large circle 
of Jewish intellectuals to its events, especially people from the scientific and artistic 
fields. A great amount of interest is shown by Jewish intellectuals in the events held 
by the Israeli Embassy.
The Embassy conducts active propaganda. It sends its bulletins – mostly by post 
– to a broad range of Jewry, and it also undertakes propaganda work by way of official 
distributors or other distributors. The bulletin is published in approx. 3,000 copies at 
irregular intervals, from once to three times a month. With reference to the Eichmann 
trial, the number of copies has been increased recently.
Since the counter-revolution, there has been a gradual expansion of the interna-
tional contacts of the Budapest Israelite Congregation – and today the network is a 
substantial one. Indeed, they are in contact with the Swiss Societe Secour [sic! – AK] 
(Joint) Jewish assistance organisation, with the Claims Conference (a body dealing 
with the distribution of funds originating from German reparation and compensa-
tion payments). But they also have good relations with Jewish bodies in almost all 
the Western-European countries. The only body with which there is no contact is the 
World Jewish Congress. However, the possibility of restoring contact has been raised.
There has been a huge increase in the number of foreign visitors to the Jewish 
denomination. Some of these come on a permanent basis as merchants and seek out 
contact with the congregation primarily in a private capacity. The “core” of such vis-
itors come to the country as tourists, and they establish a wide range of contacts. In 
many cases it was only after their departure from the country that it became clear they 
were in the country on a commission for a Jewish body. There are also some individu-
als who arrive for the purpose of conducting official talks with the Budapest Israelite 
Congregation, but they are in a minority.
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In the case of each of the three forms of visiting, it can be observed that the visitor 
first makes some private visits – as if for the purpose of orientation – and then the 
official contacts are made. Such visits bring no benefits, but we are not in a position 
to prevent them.
II.
A peculiarity of the field is that almost all the persons belonging here have wide-rang-
ing relations with the West, in view of the fact that Jews who left or emigrated from 
Hungary have spread all around the West.
The second peculiarity is the strong nationalism seen in the categories [of persons 
belonging to the field – AK]. In case of a real or perceived grievance, they feel them-
selves to have been offended in terms of their Jewish identity. They are very sensitive 
to any manifestation of antisemitism.
The third peculiarity is that almost all of them work in intellectual professions – 
medical doctors, journalists, officials. A favoured field is a career in commerce.
The fourth peculiarity is that many of them have experience in conspiracy; even 
the cleanest of business deals are made in secret. The custom that is seen in retailing 
has become their practice in everything they do.
The fifth peculiarity is that, unless absolutely necessary, they avoid all contact 
with Christian persons. This is linked with the fact that they live in compact areas.
All of these peculiarities make their presence felt in operational work.
At present, in the religious sphere, we have no knowledge of specific hostile activ-
ities. However, we have inadequate data suggesting that three areas deserve particu-
lar attention:
1./ The rabbinical seminary and its director Sándor Scheiber. We do not know 
exactly what activities are underway here. But the fact that Scheiber was, from 1953–
58, one of the main actors in the illegal assistance programme run by the Embassy 
and that in 1955 he received the assignment to collect data for the Israeli Documenta-
tion Center, and that Scheiber is a nationalist – he educates the seminary students in 
a Zionistic spirit and stands in opposition to our system – which his statements prove, 
means it is justified to concern ourselves with this field and with the persons involved. 
All the distinguished visitors [from Israel] seek out Scheiber. As the representative of 
the Claims Conference, he disposes of an annual sum of one million forints. Although 
the money serves scientific and cultural goals, nevertheless several hostile persons 
receive monthly amounts of 1,000 forints from this sum.
[…]
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He also has influence over the grammar school. Scheiber has influence over some 
of the rabbis from Budapest and the provinces. Typically, such persons oppose the 
people’s democracy system.
We have only limited opportunities of controlling Scheiber’s hostile activities by 
means of agents. Scheiber is compatible with no-one and sees an agent in everyone – 
he himself was an agent – [this statement of the author, an anonymous secret-service 
official, is without any documentary proof – AK] and these factors make an approach 
more difficult.
2./ The other area is the Central Social Committee. By means of this body, Hun-
garian Jewry receives an annual sum of a million dollars in assistance from the Joint 
and through the mediation of the Societe Secour. This is the equivalent, together with 
the supplement of the State Office for Church Affairs, of 30 million forints. The official 
purpose of the funding is to assist the elderly and people who cannot work.
[…]
We do not know the extent or objective of the assistance provided in this area. The 
persons receiving assistance are not known to us, and we have no data concerning 
the criteria for offering assistance. According to the information we have received, the 
Central Social Committee also deals with studying individuals in whom the foreign 
centre has expressed an interest.
[…]
It may be supposed, albeit we have no data for this, that the assistance conceals 
hostile activities. This suspicion is supported by the fact that the assistance is made in 
semi-legal circumstances, and the means used resemble those of the Embassy’s assis-
tance campaign. Mihály Borsa, head of the Central Social Committee, travels abroad 
4–5 times a year to attend talks with the centre [of the hostile agency – AK]. We do not 
know the extent to which such travel is justified or the nature of the talks held. Borsa 
has wide-ranging contacts in Jewish religious intellectual circles.
[…]
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4 Operational Work against the Zionist Movement
3 April 1962
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169




on the results of our operational work against the Zionist movement and further tasks
The resolution of the Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 
dated 21 July 1961, declares that currently the most organised opposition force in our 
country is the clerical reaction. Reflecting this resolution, we consider it necessary 
to examine the signals coming from the Jewish denominations. Based on the opera-
tional data at our disposal, we wish to report on the following:
The representatives of Zionism – as a political movement – conduct their activ-
ities in relation to Hungary in a complex and multi-faceted manner. Regarding their 
political goals, relative to the position in earlier years, there have been some changes. 
The conclusion they have drawn from the 1956 counter-revolutionary events and the 
development of the international situation is that the bourgeois democratic regime 
for which they had hoped cannot be realised under the given conditions in Hungary. 
Having recognised this state of affairs, they have directed all their efforts towards 
the support of Israel, viewing this as the central issue. Their endeavours seeking to 
broaden their mass influence also serve this goal. It is with this goal as a point of 
departure that they organise the foreign assistance dispatched to the Jewish denomi-
nations. They have also taken steps to draw the leadership of the congregations under 
their influence. They organise attacks against leaders that display loyal attitudes 
towards the state. According to our data, in such actions one can find indirectly the 
activity of the Israeli Embassy.
[…]
II.
At present, we know of approx. 250 Zionist activists or former leaders in Hungary. 
Among them, 127 feature on the operational records. To date, we have examined the 
situation of 150 former Zionists.
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The occupational breakdown of the 130 persons is as follows:
Physician  5 persons
Engineer  23 
Official  46 
Worker  30 
Artisan  10 
Merchant  25 
Univ. student  2 
Housewife   8 
Rabbi   1 
The Zionist persons examined do not take part – apart from several exceptions – in 
the life of the denominations. However, their influence on the middle management of 
the denominations and, through them, on the religious masses is great and steadily 
increasing. Alongside the increase in their influence, one can also observe an attempt 
to undermine the leadership and alienate the leaders from the religious masses. It 
is this goal that is served by the anonymous letters and, in general, by the attempts 
to undermine the leadership. Influential persons distance themselves from a loyal 
stance towards the state, which further increases the distance between the leader-
ship and the masses. In consequence, the districts seek independence and the Zionist 
tendencies come to the fore. Despite the leadership having prohibited it, they are in 
permanent contact with the Israeli Embassy; they invite them to their events, and 
they view the Embassy as their interest representation body.
Currently, the securing of the above category by means of agents is not assured to 
a satisfactory extent. We employ four agents on the Zionist line.
[…]
It has become clear to the Zionists that they cannot appear openly, and that their 
practical methods applied in the past are not applicable under the present condi-
tions. For this reason, they have started spreading the nationalist and Zionist propa-
ganda by legal means and utilising, for this purpose, the religious institutions and 
religious education. They do not undertake overt Zionist propaganda, but through 
the teachings of the Talmud and the Torah they seek to keep alive “spiritual cohe-
sion” in the Zionist sense, while also encouraging a “love of the Holy Land”. The 
greatest activity in this area is directed towards the youth. Their main endeavour is to 
develop, by means of religious education, separation trends in the youth while they 
are in their childhood, which can then be increased and strengthened. This objective 
is served by book publishing, the holding of cultural events and tea parties, as well 
as by group excursions. They always explain such separation from the others around 
as a response to antisemitism. The aim of the concept of separation and introversion, 
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which is funded and directed from abroad, is to remove the youth from Marxist-Lenin-
ist influence, so that they can “always be counted upon as Jews”.
It is for this purpose that they maintain, alongside the synagogue districts, the 
so-called Talmud-Torah circles, to be attended by children of school age. The number 
of persons in the circles in a particular district is 80–120. Considering the 18 syna-
gogue districts in Budapest, the total number attending can be estimated at 7–800. 
It is noteworthy that the reactionary Zionist rabbis have groups with the largest 
numbers. For example, the group run by Chief Rabbi Dr L. S. [László Salgó – AK] has 
in excess of 150 persons.
So-called religious-cultural lectures are held for secondary-school pupils, univer-
sity students and youths who have outgrown school.
Recently, the Israeli Embassy in Budapest has been extraordinarily active with 
regard to the denomination. Their legal efforts are clearly of a propaganda nature 
towards the districts and their events. Their goal is to be visible and that they too 
should get to know as many people as possible. On the occasion of a festival, they visit 
8–10 synagogues, where they disperse donations. In general the districts are pleased 
to see staff members of the Embassy, and give them prominent seats. There was even 
a case when the Hatikvah – the Israeli national anthem – was sung in their honour. 
We have few data concerning the Embassy’s illegal activities and the nature of 
such activities. It is a fact, however, that several Zionists among the leadership of the 
Jewish denomination have a conspiratorial relationship with the Embassy.
Dr S.S. [Sándor Scheiber – AK], the director of the rabbinical seminary and a 
person of hostile Zionist attitudes, was the main organiser of the assistance dispersed 
by the Embassy. According to our data, Dr S.S. is in contact with the Embassy at the 
present time, too.
[…]
It has come to our knowledge that Dr S.S. has been elected as a member of the 
five-member board of the World Jewish Congress, whose task in theory is to elaborate 
the cultural and educational programme. He has wide-ranging contacts with officials 
of various ranks working at the international Zionist organisations and institutions, 
and those coming to Hungary often visit him.
Dr S.S. has great influence over the members and leadership of the denomination 
and particularly over the youth.
[…]
He has succeeded in bringing under his influence the principal of the Jewish grammar 
school as well as several teachers, and, by way of them, he also exerts influence on 
the pupils’ education. J. Z. [Jenő Zsoldos – AK], the principal of the grammar school, 
stated with regard to the objectives of the teaching work:
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“Modern ideas are not worthy of Jewish schools, because they speed up and facilitate assimi-
lation. The youth have to be educated in such a way that they would feel remorse if they were 
unable to keep a festival or a dietary or other law”.
[…]
The authority and influence enjoyed by him [Sándor Scheiber – AK] among the adults 
stem from the fact that, like the director of the seminary, they are reputed as “great 
academics”, and this is an important factor particularly among elderly religious 
people. They have wide-ranging contacts with such people and can influence them 
on any issue.
[…]
The financial basis for the Zionist activity comprises funds originating abroad that 
arrive in the country in a legal fashion. The Central Social Committee, functioning 
under the auspices of the National Office of Hungarian Jews, receives an annual sum 
of USD 1 million (= 30 million forints) from one of the Joint’s mediatory bodies for 
the purpose of assistance. Under an agreement with the state, no-one – other than 
the foreign bodies – has the right to check how the above amount is used. The head 
of the Central Social Committee, Dr M. B. [Mihály Borsa – AK] is a former state secre-
tary of the Smallholders Party [the leading centre-right party of the post-war governing 
coalition – AK], who has been mentioned in the field of counter-espionage as a sus-
pected spy in several respects. Putting all this together, such an enormous sum in the 
hands of a person in leading position could be a means for financing hostile activities. 
It does not seem likely that the Joint would transfer the above sum without getting 
something in return or some visible benefit.
[…]
Other than the Zionists, no other category disposes, in a legal fashion, of such a large 
sum for the financing of their activities. The international Zionist organisations evi-
dently place great weight on ensuring that these funds continue to come to Hungary. 
Clearly, they consider the use of the sum to be satisfactory and they are also content 
with the outcomes of its use. The influence gained from the submission of the above 
amounts by the international Zionist organisations is significant.
The political and operational experiences made on the Zionist issue can be sum-
marised as follows:
 – The current objective of Zionist activities is to influence the masses and to win 
over the youth. The development of a public mood in which the process of assim-
ilation is slowed down and there is increased isolation and introversion.
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 – Surround the Embassy with Israel sympathisers, from whose circles intelligence 
can get its cadres
 – The illegal Zionist activities are being conducted – according to the indications 
we are receiving – under central control. The control takes place firstly from 
abroad and secondly by means of the Israeli Embassy in Budapest.
 – They have the necessary number of cadres and the financial resources to con-
tinue the illegal activity. Their cadres are embedded, in a legal fashion, in the life 
of the denomination. Replacement forces are recruited mainly from the institu-
tions of the denomination.
Based on experiences to date, we suggest that the main directions of counter-intelli-
gence should be determined as follows:
1./ In order to uncover the illegal Zionist activity in its breadth and depth, there should 
be a much more audacious policy of recruiting informers among senior leaders and 
the youth.
 – There has to be more co-ordinated processing work by agents, using the II/2 and 
II/3 departments. We must endeavour to get hold of as much data as possible in 
order to compromise the staff members of the Israeli Embassy.
2./ Working with the II/2 and II/3 departments and using more forceful measures, we 
should bring under control the financial basis for Zionist activities. We must ensure 
that we receive reports about the use of the sums in time.
3./ We must uncover and then document the Zionists’ illegal contacts with the con-
trolling centres – the Israeli Embassy and the international Zionist organisations.
4./ Technical infiltration [bugging – AK] must be implemented in the case of several 
major figures and secret house searches must be undertaken in their homes for the 
purpose of acquiring documentation.
5./ Differences of views among the members of various groups that have arisen within 
the Jewish congregation should be strengthened on the level of the individuals too. 
These differences should be utilised in accordance with our operational objectives. 
Support should be given to persons suitable for leadership in such a manner that they 
gradually obtain the major posts.
6./ By means of processing the youth groups, we should seek to discover who the 
theoretical leaders are. These persons should then be brought under active process-
ing. At the same time, we should ensure that, among the youth, wide-ranging illegal 
organisations and movements cannot be established.
7./ In the course of the processing work, draft proposals should be prepared concern-
ing which form of administrative measures should be used to terminate these groups. 
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At the same time, within such circles, we should undertake disruptive activities on a 
continuous basis with a view to preventing their re-emergence.
8./ To promote the political struggle against the Zionist movement, we will suggest 
that the names of some of the misled adults and young people who have fallen under 
Zionist influence, should be passed on to the competent Party and Alliance of Young 
Communist organisations so that they deal with these persons through re-education.
Completed in 5 copies, 12 pages 
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5 Conditions for the Indemnification of the Hungarian Jews
9 March 1964
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/1




Conditions for the indemnification of Hungarian Jews
The American journalist Carl Fell who, in August 1962, spent time in Hungary at the 
expense of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told a member of 
our UN mission in New York about the possibilities of indemnifying Hungary’s Jews 
as well as a proposal concerning the “benefits” of such for the Hungarian state “that 
cannot be ignored”.
Fell, in his offer – which was made in all likelihood at the behest of the Zionist 
movement and of Goldman [sic! – AK], leader of the World Jewish Congress, related 
that Erhard had promised Goldman a payment of 100 million dollars for the indem-
nification of Hungarian Jews. Under the terms of Fell’s proposal, Goldman would 
submit the amount to the Hungarian state subject to the fulfilment of the following 
conditions:
 – The Hungarian government authorises the official celebration of the birthday of 
– or the anniversary of the death of – Dr Theodore Herzel [sic! – AK], the Hungari-
an-born Jew and world founder of Zionism, and then invites Goldman to Hungary 
for this occasion. Fell makes no secret of the fact that – in their opinion – the sig-
nificance of the celebration would reach beyond Hungary’s borders, and so rep-
resentatives from Israel and of the Jews of other countries could also be invited.
Note:
1. The “confidential messages” given by Carl Fell are evidently part of the Zionist 
campaign against the countries of the Socialist camp. It can be stated that Gold-
man’s group seek to link the long-running issue of indemnification with political 
conditions, and that, in doing so, they are seeking to make political capital not 
only against the People’s Republic of Hungary.
2. Fell made a similar “proposal” already in January 1963, but at that time the 
amount mentioned was 50 million dollars, and, as it transpired, it was condi-
tional on the Hungarian government receiving the amount in goods, from the sale 
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of which the compensation claims could then have been settled. At that time too, 
Fell urged the acceptance of his “proposal”, referring to the need to wrap it up 
before Adenauer’s retirement, since, as an exceptional opportunity, it was thanks 
only to the good personal relationship existing between Adenauer and Goldman.
Completed: in 6 copies
  Info.
  Directorate III/III, 





Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/1
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 2. 
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
III/III, Sub-department 2-a.
Subject: on Zionist issues
Report
1./ In the matter of the “Együttműködők” [Co-operators] code-named group folder for 
preliminary observation, which we opened in May 1963, we have determined, in the 
course of the processing work carried out so far, that the decision to open the folder 
was the right one.
The persons involved in the matter have generally pro-Western views, represent 
– within the Jewish denomination – the Zionist wing, and are in contact with other 
Zionist persons, directing their activities towards undermining the loyal leaders and 
members of the congregation and bagging for themselves the leadership posts. These 
persons have close relations with the Western Zionist bodies and their leaders, and 
they also hold conspiratorial meetings with members of staff of the Israeli Embassy in 
Budapest, whom they inform about the internal situation in the Jewish denomination 
and about issues relating to various persons.
Based on the above, we can see that the direction of the processing work is 
correct. Concerning the continuity, speed and effectiveness of the processing work, 
there are inadequacies, particularly because, although additional informers have 
been recruited, we do not have the appropriate network for the matter, a network that 
would be capable of radical exploratory work.
2./ In the matter of the “Tanulók” [Students] code-named group folder for preliminary 
observation, which we opened in January 1964, we have determined that the young 
people involved in the matter come together on a regular basis, learn Hebrew, and 
read and study newspapers and other Zionist propaganda materials, which stem from 
the Embassy. The leaders of the group and some of its members are in regular contact 
with the Israeli Embassy. The content of their activities: Zionist education; assisting 
young people to emigrate to Israel, etc. The above is supported by the fact that the 
family of someone attending the group has already migrated to Israel, while another 
family is in the process of emigrating. The above activities hinder the integration of 
the Jewish population in our Socialist system, and so, here too, we are talking about 
activities that are dangerous for society.
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Based on the above, it may be stated that the launch and direction of the process-
ing work were correct.
The existing network is capable of exploratory work principally in an indirect 
fashion. Here, too, there is a need for further and deeper network infiltration.
3./ Based on indicators in addition to the above (we have not opened case-folders in 
these instances, because, beyond the primary indicator of the activities of persons 
featuring in the indicators, we dispose of no other data), we took control operational 
measures in the matter of two groups of young intellectuals.
[…]
II.
Regarding the operational and technical means applied in the processing work, we 
endeavoured to make full use of the old, existing network in the aforementioned 
matters and indications, and we also recruited additional informers (4 agents in total). 
The recruitment was realised either by way of compromising material or through an 
appeal to patriotic sentiment – or through a combination of the two. In essence, the 
recruitment was carried out gradually everywhere. Seven agents and two social con-
tacts are participating in the processing work. Concerning the effectiveness of their 
work, it can be stated that they are generally working well and submitting reports 
that have an operational value and are informative in nature. Even so, some of them 
are incapable of undertaking in-depth exploratory work, while the others constitute 
a new network and require considerable attention before they can become functional 
and qualified agents in both a political and a professional sense.
Thus, the conclusion may be drawn that we require further network people who 
are suitable for more in-depth work. The recruitment of such persons needs to be thor-
oughly prepared. However, it should be noted at this point that, in providing materi-
als, the existing network and the new one have assisted significantly the process of 
studying new candidates to be recruited as informers.
The techniques used in the course of the processing work – the application of 
measure 3/a in particular – have proved extraordinarily beneficial. We received many 
valuable insights that facilitated the implementation of the planned recruitment drive 
and other operational tasks. It is crucial to state that in the case of some persons 
under processing, results could be achieved only through multiple or continuous and 
long-term checks and controls, yielding specific data on contacts of a conspiratorial 
nature with the Israeli Embassy. At present, we have at our disposal measure 2 pieces 
of 3/a. There is a half 3/e line, whose material we are only now beginning to receive. 
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III.
1./ One of the biggest deficiencies is that the existing network obtains the information 
we need by indirect means and is not properly involved in the matters.
[…]
3./ On several occasions we tried to introduce agents to observe the persons under pro-
cessing (speaking here of our own agency and the agencies of related departments). 
However, these attempts were either unsuccessful or brought minimal results. This 
also shows the high qualifications of the persons under processing (e.g. in the case 
of Mihály B.).
[…]
7./ It is important to point out that the persons under processing in the matter of the 
“Együttműködők” are assessed according to different criteria by us and by the state 
and societal organs, which makes the processing work much more difficult and has a 
disruptive effect both on the agency and on loyal persons in the denomination.
[…]
Police Major Ferenc Mélykuti
Completed in 2 copies
Recipients:  1 copy to Sub-department Management
  1 copy CD-2381
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7 On the Israeli Embassy
17 March 1965
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/1
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”] vol. 2. 
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Directorate III/II, Sub-department 5-a.
Subject: Reducing the influence of the Israeli Embassy
I authorise:
Lajos Tóth
[Handwritten note of L.T: in the margin – AK]: We should be vigilant and not to assign tasks to agents 
who are double-dealer or disloyal, because the whole action will lose its effects.
Proposal
Abusing the correct measures of our Party and government, which are aimed at the 
democratisation of public life, the Israeli Embassy accredited to Budapest has, in the 
course of recent years, expanded significantly the range of its relations with society 
and has substantially increased its influence in several directions, including in the 
direction of the Hungarian Jewish religious community. The above influence has been 
manifested in pro-Israel propaganda and in increasing people’s love of the State of 
Israel.
To date, no measures have been taken to reduce the growing influence of the 
Israeli Embassy. On several occasions in recent years, however, we have seen dissatis-
faction with Israel’s policies on the part of ordinary sensible people and loyal leaders 
in several districts of the denomination. For instance, the news that Israel supplies 
armaments to West Germany was met by widespread indignation.
At present, the governments of West Germany and Israel are striving for closer 
bilateral co-operation. On the radio this morning, it was reported that Israel’s par-
liament has approved the establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany. 
The aforementioned foreign policy events are disquieting for some Hungarian 
Jews. Yesterday we encountered cases of some Jewish religious persons expressing 
their dissatisfaction and indignation concerning Israel’s foreign policy, which they 
made known to the Israeli Embassy in letters or by telephone.
Sensible and loyally thinking Jews consider it a betrayal for the Israeli govern-
ment to befriend that Germany which is the legal successor of Hitler’s Germany, 
where Nazi mass murderers are hiding and occupying top positions.
Given the proper operational measures, we can utilise the rightful indignation 
of the masses belonging to the Hungarian Jewish denomination to suppress the pro-
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paganda activities of the Israeli Embassy and reduce their contacts in society. In so 
doing, we can reduce in an effective manner the Embassy’s propaganda work among 
the masses.
In the implementation of this campaign, we will involve those members of our 
network who are known for their loyal behaviour and those agents that are reliable 
but who are no longer capable of in-depth exploratory work in hostile milieus.
In order to reduce the influence of the Israeli Embassy, we shall implement the 
following measures:
The tasks of Agent “Sárosi”:
1./ Organising six or seven people among the district chairmen and leadership 
members to write letters of protest, on an individual basis, to the Embassy. In addi-
tion, they should contact the chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites and the editorial board of Új Élet [New Life] asking them to protest.
2./ Members of the district leaderships in their circle of friends should arrange for 
three to four people in their milieu to write letters of protest to the Embassy. 
3./ The chief rabbis István Dér, Miklós Máté and Artur Geyer should protest individu-
ally by letter and each of them should also arrange for four to five people to protest in 
individual or family letters addressed to the Embassy.
4./ Around six persons from among the family or close relatives or friends of Agent 
“Sárosi” should protest, on an individual basis, in letters addressed to the Embassy, 
while they should also ask the chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites to express their protest.
5./ Chief Rabbi Henrik Fisch should arrange for eight to ten of the faithful to write 
similar letters of protest to the Embassy.
6./ János Hartmann, director of Chevra, should arrange for four to five people from his 
milieu to write similar letters to the Embassy.
7./ The wife of Agent “Sárosi” and the wife of János Hartmann, who are functionaries 
in the women’s section of the congregation, should also organise six to eight people 
for a similar purpose.
8./ From their pulpits, loyal rabbis should express their indignation in front of the 
faithful.
9./ At any district meetings that take place, they should arrange for one or two people 
to speak, who then express their indignation at Israel’s policies.
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The task of Agent “Xavér”:
1./ Persuade his elder brother, who is national chief rabbi, to express his indignation 
in a letter to the Embassy.
2./ In addition, arrange for two to four more people to do something similar.
3./ “Xavér” herself should express her indignation to diplomats working at the 
Embassy.
The task of Social Contact “Tanító” [Teacher]:
1./ Protest himself in a letter to the Embassy and arrange for six people in the two 
cities outside Budapest in his area to protest in letters addressed to the Embassy, who 
should also call upon the chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian Isra-
elites and the editorial board of Új Élet to protest.
The task of Social Contact “Sipos”:
1./ Inform about the wave of protest by means of the letters sent to him, and himself 
express his indignation, as a senior leader, to the Embassy.
2./ Arrange for four to five people among his intellectual contacts for a similar purpose.
3./ Express public indignation in the columns of Új Élet.
Agent “Pesti Péter”:
1./ Inform about the indignation by means of the letters sent to Új Élet and write an 
article in the newspaper. Then arrange for three to four people to write letters as indi-
viduals.
2./ Speak with the editor György Kecskeméti and ask him as the trade union leader to 
arrange for letters of protest to be written by trade union members (eight-ten persons).
Rabbinical Council:
The above matter must be placed on the agenda of the next rabbinical meeting and 
a resolution of protest adopted, with copies being sent to the leaders of the National 
Representation of Hungarian Israelites, the Embassy, the chief rabbi of Israel, and the 
editorial board of Új Élet.
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Committee of the Victims of Nazism:
Here, by way of the reliable contacts of Comrade Police Captain István Dékány, letters 
of protest should be arranged, to be sent by several people.
In addition to the above, our agents “Sárosi”, “Xavér”, “Pesti Péter” as well as the 
social contacts “Sipos” and “Tanító,” should write individually to their contacts in 
Israel and the West expressing their indignation. Their reliable friends and relatives 
should also write to people abroad.
The timing of the above action for the next few days is good because this is a 
favourable moment in a psychological sense and the necessary spontaneity is also 
assured. Thus, there is no need to employ various political and administrative mea-
sures and Socialist slogans. Rather, the departure point is the offended and ignored 
“Jewish emotions”, which simply has to be pushed in the right direction, whereby we 
can reduce the range of the influence exerted by the Israeli Embassy.
On commencement of the campaign, we will increase the frequency of meet-
ings with our network persons and increase the scope of control by means of various 
measures, with a view to keeping the campaign on its proper course and ensuring its 
success.
Based on the above, we request authorisation for implementation of the cam-
paign.
Police Captain István Lukács, head of sub-department
Police Major Ferenc Mélykuti
Police Major László Katona, head of department
Completed in 1 copy
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8 Campaign to Reduce the Influence of the Israeli Embassy
17 May 1965
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/1
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 2.
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Directorate III/II, Sub-department 5-a.
Subject: implemented campaign to reduce the influence of the Israeli Embassy
Report
Budapest, 17 May 1965
On 17 March 1965, we drafted a proposal for a campaign to partially reduce the influ-
ence of the Israeli Embassy. As the basis for the campaign, we took the increasing 
co-operation between West Germany and Israel and the disquiet among some Hun-
garian Jews about this.
In brief: the main features of the campaign were as follows:
1./ A letter campaign targeting the Embassy and the leading bodies of the Jewish con-
gregation.
2./ Sermons from the pulpit in the synagogues.
3./ A well-edited political article in Új Élet [New Life], the Jewish bi-weekly paper.
The campaign could be realised successfully only in part. Concerning the dispatch of 
the letters, we fathomed out the Committee for the Victims of Nazism through a reli-
able contact. The leaders of the Committee were dismissive of the idea and stated that 
co-operation between Israel and West Germany was, exclusively, a domestic matter 
for Israel and that we Hungarian Jews have nothing to say on this issue, and anyway 
they are preoccupied with the struggle against expiry [of the right to make a claim for 
reparations – AK].
The publication of an article on the relationship between West Germany and 
Israel through reliable social contacts was aborted at the State Office for Church 
Affairs, where they were unable to give a clear answer as to whether it was correct or 
incorrect to publish an article of such nature.
Having regard for the above negative developments, we aborted the letter cam-
paign.
We achieved some success in terms of the synagogue pulpit sermons. In Buda-
pest’s largest and best-attended synagogue (the Dohány Street synagogue) and in a 
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major synagogue outside Budapest, sessions condemning Israeli–West German rela-
tions were held.
In addition, entitled “A strange pairing”, a politically well-edited and well-timed 
article was published in the Jewish newspaper Új Élet, together with several articles 
arguing against West Germany’s policies. 
The above writings were well received by patriotic and loyal Hungarian Jews, who 
agreed with them and condemned Israel.
According to multilateral network reports, around 50 per cent of Hungarian Jews 
were positive about the campaign. The other 50 per cent showed either indifference 
or hostility – about half and half – towards the campaign.
This is also supported by a report drafted by a deeper agent, who reported that 
the pro-Western and reactionary wing of the Hungarian Jewish religious community – 
with Marcell Steiner, vice chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian Isra-
elites, and Sándor Scheiber, director of the rabbinical seminary, at the fore – consider 
the above article to be damaging from the vantage point of Israel.
The positive accomplishments of the campaign are particularly well illustrated 
by the words spoken by the diplomats David Ilan and Nachmann Ran on this subject, 
who, in an upset manner, scolded the article and its writer, stating “… this article has 
turned the Jews away from Israel and has greatly harmed us”.
Thus, based on the foregoing, we can state that the campaign – despite setbacks 
– was correct and successful.
Police Captain Ferenc Mélykuti
Completed in 1 copy
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9 The Economic Situation of the National Representation of 
Hungarian Israelites and the Budapest Israelite Congregation
11 August 1965
National Archives of Hungary, XIX-A-21-d (29.d.)
Collection: State Office for Religious Affairs [Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal, ÁEH]
[…]
2./ The economic situation of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites 
and the Budapest Israelite Congregation
It is a known fact that, for some years now, economic management at the NRHI and 
the BIC has failed to meet the basic requirements of economic efficiency; economic 
management has been loss-making.
In many instances, our office has drawn this to the attention of the board of 
chairmen, requesting them to elaborate suitable proposals and sensible solutions for 
proper economic management.
While the board has made certain attempts to make savings in recent years, it has 
been fundamentally unable to resolve the problems, owing to an unwillingness to 
address the root of the problems.
There was no understanding for our warning that it is not possible to speak of effi-
cient economic management as long as the denomination seeks to maintain such a 
large administrative and unproductive apparatus – together with its institutions and 
premises – which was oversized even in relation to the pre-war denomination with 
more than half a million members. Without solving this problem, an advance in the 
economic field is unlikely in the future.
The board of the NRHI – or at least some of its members – expected that our office 
would elaborate the reorganisation programme, its principles and topics, so that it 
could once again be a point of reference for “the board [to say it] is only implementing 
the will of the state”.
Our office will not elaborate such a programme, [neither now] nor in the future, 
but it will fully support the newly elected board of chairmen, as they finally dismantle 
the superfluous and costly apparatus.
Nor has the significant sum arising from the sale of synagogues and other prem-
ises – about 6.5 forints [sic! – probably 6.5 million forints – AK] over the past five years 
– resolved the loss-making economic management.
The new leadership has to face up to an even greater responsibility, because there 
are not an infinite number of disused premises and selling them is becoming increas-
ingly difficult. Thus, while it is correct to count on this source of income, the sales 
cannot be regarded as “a bottomless sack of money”.
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In a financial sense too, our state has fulfilled, or even exceeded, the pertinent 
part of the agreement with respect to the Jewish denomination [See Introduction to 
Chapter 5 – AK].
In past two years alone, they have received around 850,000 forints in excess of 
the budget, to make up for the lack of funds.
One has to reckon with the fact that public finance, which has recently been tight-
ened up, will not be in a position to make the extraordinary financial contributions 
in the future.
The task now faced by the Jewish denomination is to radically reduce the size of 
the apparatus and then introduce a system of planned economic management accom-
panied by financial discipline.
3./ Jewish educational institutions
a./ A significant change took place at the Jewish grammar school over the summer, as 
the principal, Mr Zsoldos, resigned from his post and went into retirement.
His deputy and Sándor Scheiber, the Religious Instruction teacher, showed 
solidarity with Zsoldos, and they too left the grammar school. László Davidovics, a 
member of our Party and an old Party worker, was appointed as the new principal. [...]
b./ We must address the situation of the Rabbinical Seminary in more detail, because 
that institution is headed by Dr Sándor Scheiber and because the composition of the 
teaching staff is not comforting from a political standpoint. It is an undeniable fact 
that the Rabbinical Seminary is now subject to Scheiber’s monocracy and omnipo-
tence. The management of the seminary should be the task of a so-called Executive 
Committee. Included among the members of the Executive Committee are several 
members of the boards of the NRHI and the BIC, including Endre Sós, the chairman. 
However, this committee is not operational, and it has allowed management to be in 
Scheiber’s hands.
Another fact is that the students graduating from the seminary in the past 1–2 
years cannot be called progressives in terms of their politics; indeed, they sympathise 
with Zionism.
[…]
Dr Scheiber has also played a significant role in spreading this political attitude. He is 
respected by theologians for his outstanding knowledge and bigoted religiosity, and 
because he is a talented speaker and a good teacher.
All of these features and his comfortable financial situation (Clems monies) [sic! 
– AK] have encouraged Scheiber to have his students or an even wider milieu accept 
his indifferent political views [meaning: not supporting the existing political system – 
AK].
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Should Dr Sándor Scheiber be regarded as clearly a reactionary? If the question 
could only be answered with a yes, then our task would be easier – he must be dis-
missed, various means must be used to suppress him, etc. While Scheiber is not a 
friend of our People’s democracy system, the fact that someone is not our friend does 
not necessarily mean that he is our enemy; nor can one exclude the possibility that 
someone who is not yet our friend, will not become one later on.
In Scheiber’s case this will not be easy, but it cannot be ruled out. He is an Ortho-
dox Jew dressed in the skin of a Neolog, who takes his religion seriously, has more 
than the average amount of nostalgia for the ancient homeland, Israel. And – and this 
is not rare among academic people – he is extremely foppish to science and above all 
to what is valued in “Western” Jewish circles.
We should not give up on Scheiber, even in the future. At the same time, in view of 
his current political and human conduct and attitudes, we cannot accept him as he is.
He needs to be dealt with in a multifaceted and differentiated fashion.
To recognise his knowledge and his abilities and to esteem him on the basis of his 
actions, and then express our trust in him accordingly. (In essence this aim is served 
by the authorisation of his current trip to England.) When he deserves it, we should 
express our recognition of him – for he is a vain man.
At the same time, we must criticise him; indeed, we should even “put him in his 
place” by taking the right measures, in all cases where this is necessary, for otherwise 
he will run away and go off the rails.
We must make it clear to him, applying correctly selected and alternate methods, 
that a love of one’s religious denomination is only realisable, both in Hungary and 
abroad, in conjunction with a love of one’s homeland, and that for him too this is the 
only way to get on.
[…]
In the meantime, however, certain measures must be taken to break his over-devel-
oped “self-confidence” and “self-esteem”.
To this end, I propose the following:
 – His closest associates and supporters must be separated from him in a methodi-
cal manner. […] And this task can be performed gradually and methodically.
 – The monocracy of Scheiber at the Rabbinical Seminary must be broken, and his 
perceived monopolistic position shaken up. To this end, we need to arrange for 
the new board to reintroduce the earlier practice whereby the rector of the semi-
nary could be replaced every year, based on a proposal by the Executive Commit-
tee and a nomination by the NRHI. The resigning rector could then serve as vice 
rector in the new academic year. Similarly to the theologies of other churches, we 
could manage to ensure that a suitable rector might keep the official position for 
2–3 academic years. [...]
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 – We need to ensure that the Seminary Executive Committee meets the standards 
of the vocation and refuses to let the theoretical and political management be 
snatched out of its hands.
 – We should take action to ensure that theology teachers who are too old or indif-
ferent are steadily replaced by suitable rabbis.
[…]
Financial aid from abroad and its management.
The accounting of the social assistance managed by the KSZB [Central Social Commit-
tee] is in order, has been checked by our office, and use of the sums is expedient: (e.g. 
soup kitchen, orphanage, hospital, nursing home, personal assistance etc.).
This cannot be said about the management and “expedient” use of funds pro-
vided by the Claims Conference – originally for cultural purposes.
This situation arose because the so-called Claims Committee, which was estab-
lished for the use of cultural assistance, did not meet the standards of its vocation; 
it let the financial management be taken over by Dr Sándor Scheiber, who was then 
able, in view of the lack of proper controls, to distribute the sum as if it were “pocket 
money” – often for objectives that did not best serve Jewish culture.
At the same time, institutions such as the Jewish museum, which do really serve 
and preserve the Jewish past and Jewish culture, are still struggling with unresolved 
financial problems, owing to the pettiest of personal differences.
[…]
 (Sándor Telepó)
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10 Chairmanship Elections at the National Representation of 
Hungarian Israelites and the Budapest Israelite Congregation
21 December 1965
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/1
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 2.
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Directorate III/II, Sub-department 5-a.
Subject: On the status of the chairmanship elections at the National Representation of 
Hungarian Israelites and the Budapest Israelite Congregation
Memorandum
In January 1966, and in March, elections for the position of chairman will be held at 
the Budapest Israelite Congregation and the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites.
With a view to suppressing the reactionary elements and guiding the elections in 
the right direction, we have pushed out several Israel-centric persons from the lead-
ership through the use of network and operational means and with the collaboration 
of the State Office for Church Affairs. Some of these people were replaced by reliable 
and loyal persons, but also the number of members of the board was reduced, which 
will make it easier to direct the life of the Jewish denomination, and there will be a 
reduction in unnecessary expenditures, etc.
Using various pretexts we initiated conversations with several important persons 
of the religious life. The conversations and hearings held with persons who have been 
compromised to a greater or lesser extent resulted in a reduction in the level of activ-
ity of members of the reactionary wing and helped to steer the elections in the right 
direction.
We undertook several measures by way of the operational network, by means of 
which we sought to ensure that our candidate will receive the majority of votes in the 
upcoming elections. The indications we have received to date, show that the overt and 
secret measures were successful in terms of their overall effect.
As we had indicated previously to our leaders, the leaders of the State Office for 
Church Affairs have decided on the holding of open elections. The competent forums 
of our Party have also accepted the principle of free elections.
This principle means that the chairmen of the Budapest Israelite Congregation 




About a week ago, Comrade József Prantner, chairman of the State Office for Church 
Affairs, announced – after the Presidential Council of the People’s Republic of 
Hungary had approved the above list – the approved list of persons for election as the 
competent leaders of the Jewish religious community, and he emphasised that two 
candidates for the chairmanship would run in the elections, whereby the chairman 
would be the one whom the Jewish denomination chooses. This marked the begin-
ning of the election campaign within the Jewish denomination. 
III.
For our part, we have accepted the principle of free elections, and – as we mentioned 
already in the first part – we have prepared and launched a series of measures, 
through the application of which we hope to ensure the election of Dr Géza Seifert.
Concerning the elections, we have held talks on two occasions with Comrade 
Imre Miklós, the vice chairman, and with his colleagues. During the negotiations, we 
agreed upon the following:
1./ Endre Sós, the current chairman, cannot stay any longer at the National Represen-
tation of Hungarian Israelites, and together we support the election of Dr Géza Seifert.
The issue is such that the leaders of the State Office for Church Affairs are agreed 
on the candidature of Dr Géza Seifert and the support given to him, but externally 
the free election principle will be upheld. The task has fallen to us to influence the 
election campaign by directing the public mood in the right way, so that, as the end 
result, Endre Sós is removed from the leadership and Dr Géza Seifert is placed at the 
head of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites.
2./ The removal of Endre Sós, who, as we have jointly determined, has not been a 
success as chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites, should 
occur using the most peaceful of means. (To this end, utilising the mood that has 
arisen among the rabbis and in agreement with the State Office for Church Affairs, 
we provided an opportunity, by means of the influence won through network oper-
ational means, for the Rabbinical Council to convene and adopt a resolution on the 
most peaceful administration of the chairmanship elections. The Rabbinical Council 
has convened, and at the meeting the unanimous decision was taken to offer clear 
support, within their districts, for the candidature of Dr Géza Seifert, and to request 
Sós resign from the post of chairman for the sake of the community.
[…]
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5./ On the issue of the vice chairmanship of Dr Mihály Borsa, we agreed that Comrade 
Imre Miklós would speak with him in person and make clear to him that the Central 
Social Committee is an integral part of the National Representation of Hungarian Isra-
elites and that if he decides against taking on the denominational role that goes with 
the vice chairmanship, then there would be no obstacle to him resigning from the post 
of chairman of the Central Social Committee, etc. 
6./ Finally, we agreed – at the wish and to the satisfaction of both sides – that we 
would co-ordinate more closely the relations on issues of religious policy between the 
two bodies, especially during the period of the elections.
At present, there is no crucial issue concerning which there is disagreement 
between the State Office for Church Affairs and our opinion. We have debated all the 
problems arising in a comradely atmosphere and in agreement.
This is how the current situation relating to the chairmanship elections at the 
National Representation of Hungarian Israelites can be summarized in brief.
Police Major Ferenc Mélykuti
Completed in 1 copy
 Documents   321
11 Policy Measures in the Field of the Jewish Religious Community
18 May 1968
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/2
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 3.
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Directorate III/II, Sub-department 4-A.
Subject: Implementation of church policy measures undertaken and in progress in 
the field of the Jewish religious community
Memorandum
Budapest, 18 May 1968
Based on the proposal approved by the Head of the Ministry of Interior’s Director-
ate III, in the course of 1967 we realised [handing over secretly gathered information 
to the juridical authorities – AK] the Zionist grouping code-named “SHALOM”. With 
the ending of the investigation and in the spirit of the additional measures that were 
approved in our proposal, we informed, by way of the Ministry of Interior’s Investiga-
tive Department, the leaders of the State Office for Church Affairs of the content and 
nature of the case. In doing so, our purpose was that, having received the informa-
tion, they should be able to take appropriate church policy measures in the field of the 
Jewish religious community.
With our agreement, the leadership of the State Office for Church Affairs sum-
moned to its offices the senior secular and religious leaders of the Jewish denomi-
nation and told them about the aforementioned matter. The State Office for Church 
Affairs explained the position of the Hungarian state and requested those present to 
express their opinions on the matter.
In essence the leaders of the denomination distanced themselves unanimously 
from the activities of the Zionist groups and offered assurances concerning their 
loyalty to the People’s Republic of Hungary.
Having received the information at the State Office for Church Affairs and after a 
discussion of the questions arising, Dr Imre Benoschofszky, the chairman of the rab-
binical council, took the matter before the rabbinical meeting with a view to inform-
ing the rabbis of the events and of further church policy measures, as well as the 
position of the state on this issue. The rabbis and the secular leaders made statements 
condemning the harmful Zionist activities, and then they distanced themselves in a 
memorandum from such harmful activities. 
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[…]
II.
Since it has been established, based on data obtained in the “Shalom” case and in the 
course of a network operational investigation of the National Rabbinical Seminary, 
that negative and damaging influences prevail at the Rabbinical Seminary (whereby, 
in consequence of Zionist propaganda, several students have left the country illegally, 
have emigrated or have taken part in education for young people in a Zionist spirit), 
we agreed with the State Office for Church Affairs on the elaboration and implemen-
tation of the following personnel and religious policy measures:
1./ With the active collaboration of the State Office for Church Affairs, we shall intro-
duce the rotation in the position of the director of the National Rabbinical Seminary. 
In this way, we can exert adequate pressure on Dr Sándor Scheiber, director of the 
Rabbinical Seminary, for the purpose of persuading him to move the education of the 
rabbinical students in a positive direction. If he fails to do so, with reference to the 
rotation system, a more loyal and politically appropriate person can be appointed as 
director at any time.
The introduction of the new system is now in progress.
2./ Based on consultations with us, the State Office for Church Affairs shall take steps 
to ensure the introduction of instruction in the social sciences, with the aim of devel-
oping correct political education and shaping a world view. For this purpose, a reli-
able and politically well-trained teacher will be appointed at the Rabbinical Semi-
nary. The measure is already underway.
3./ At our proposal, the State Office for Church Affairs will, in future, give greater 
attention, by way of the competent desk officer, to more intensively concerning itself 
with the teachers and students of the Rabbinical Seminary, doing so on an individual 
basis.
[…]
4./ We proposed to the competent staff members of the State Office for Church Affairs 
that, for the sake of educating in the right direction those Jewish youths who are 
drawn to the religious community, a special programme must be elaborated with the 
involvement of loyal religious and secular leaders.
The leaders of the State Office for Church Affairs agree with our proposal and will 
take steps themselves to this end.
Note: Based on the conclusions drawn from the methods and nature of the Zionist 
endeavours and groups arising within the ranks of the denomination, we see that 
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young people are demanding actions and events organised by the institutions that 
are closer to their circle of interests and are more flexible. Here we are thinking of 
the on-going imperative of organising – at the time of the minor and major Jewish 
festivals – positive events of a religious, political, social and cultural nature that also 
include dancing, whereby the objective would be to gradually eradicate Zionism from 
the thinking of Jewish youths.
The aim of the measures that have been briefly outlined is to sow the seeds of 
Socialism and internationalism among these circles, with the anti-Fascist soil as a 
departure point and with the help of more flexible methods. We need to make them 
understand that the survival of Jewry is only possible in Socialism, and then gradu-
ally turn them into people who are loyal to Socialism and to the People’s Republic of 
Hungary.
We have supported the implementation of the above measures by way of the 
network persons and we shall support it even more forcefully in the future.
I have attached to this memorandum a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the 
Budapest Israelite Congregation rabbis of 24 January 1968.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ferenc Mélykuti
Completed in 1 copy / 4 pages
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12 Reports on the World Federation of Hungarian Jews and the 
Meeting of the Former Pupils of the Jewish Grammar School
2 October 1973
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/3




[Handwritten note by L. Karasz in the margin – AK]: Comrade Ambrus, The nature of the topic and 
the danger it means for the People’s Republic of Hungary is a matter of course, therefore it was 
unnecessary to add the remark about whether the Israeli intelligence had or did not have a role in it.
Information report
Reports concerning the World Federation of Hungarian Jews and the meeting of Sep-
tember 2, 1973 of the former pupils of the Jewish Grammar School in Budapest
(Only for members of the Political Committee)
The 28th Zionist World Congress, held in Jerusalem in January 1972, adopted a resolu-
tion for the cohesion and unity of Jews living outside Israel – principally in the Socialist 
countries, among them the People’s Republic of Hungary – and for the launch of their 
emigration to Israel or the acceleration of such emigration. The principles and practical 
realisation of this resolution were debated and approved at a conference of the World 
Federation of Hungarian Jews, held in Tel Aviv on 8–11 May 1973. At the conference, 
the WFHJ elected – on account of various considerations – a new leadership. The U.S. 
citizen Tibor J. WALDMAN, president of the American branch of the WFHJ, was elected 
as overall chairman, while Dr KAUDERS BEN CION, president of the Israeli branch, was 
elected as co-chairman. An objective of the new leadership is the more intense propa-
gation and realization of the resolutions of the Zionist World Congress. Extremist views 
such as this were heard: “It is time for the emigration of the entire Jewish population 
in Hungary, to which end a consistent struggle must be launched”. In their view, “Hun-
garian Jewry has to be awoken to the need to consider not only what it can expect from 
Israel but also what it can give Israel”. They also want to raise awareness that “they are 
awaited in Israel and will be welcomed there”.
In certain Western – above all American, Canadian and Israeli – newspapers, a pro-
paganda campaign for the popularisation of the resolutions has already begun. György 
EGRI, chief editor of “MENORA,” a Zionist magazine published in Canada, called atten-
tion to the fact that “Hungary is the only country behind the Iron Curtain with a signif-
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icant Jewish population, from which there has been no emigration in recent years”. In 
his view, “it is a false notion that Hungarian Jewry does not want to emigrate because it 
is doing well. There is an intent – particularly among young people – and the only thing 
lacking is encouragement and assistance”. In Egri’s view, preparations for a wave of 
emigration from Hungary should be made both in Israel and in America.
The organisation of a meeting of students who had graduated from the Jewish 
Grammar School in the 1930s, at the Radnóti Miklós Grammar School on 2 Septem-
ber and then at the Gellért Hotel [after 1961 the original building of the JGS served as 
the building of the grammar school named after the poet Miklós Radnóti – AK], may 
be viewed as part of the announced propaganda campaign. (We provided informa-
tion about preparations for this meeting on 29 August 1973.) The fraternity of former 
pupils of the Jewish Grammar School was established in 1969 at the initiative and 
with the financial support of the U.S. citizen Dr László TAUBER, a professor of surgery, 
and a meeting was held first in New York and thereafter every year in a different city 
(Toronto, Washington, Montreal). Key roles in organising the meeting in Budapest 
have been played by László GEIGER, the co-president of the American branch of the 
WFHJ, by the U.S. citizen Pál ELEK and by several Hungarian citizens. The meeting 
held at Radnóti Grammar School was attended by approximately 130 persons, while 
188 attended the event at the Hotel Gellért. Eighteen of those in attendance arrived 
from the American continent. Some of them also attended the Debrecen congress of 
physicians, held in late August 1973. Among the Hungarian citizens in attendance 
there were several persons in senior positions (e.g. members of staff from the National 
Planning Office, the Ministry for Foreign Trade, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
the Karl Marx University of Economics and the State Book Distribution Enterprise 
etc.). They also invited representatives of the Fencing and Athletics Club [Vívó és Atlé-
tikai Club, VAC, a Zionist sports club founded in 1906 – AK], a sport club that was 
officially closed down in 1952 on account of its overt Zionist activities. In addition to 
people of various age groups, several youths were also in attendance. 
At the meeting, both the foreign and the Hungarian speakers praised the “vibrant 
Jewish life” which had characterised the grammar school. The glory of the grammar 
school had been spread, in their view, by the fact that it had completed many eminences 
and several of its teachers had undertaken recognised scientific work, thereby develop-
ing further Jewish science and old literary traditions. Still, its greatest merit was that 
the Jewish spirit is still alive even today, even if “the stone that was thrown had broken 
the surface of the water, and the water is glistening again, the stone is still down there 
in the riverbed”. In his speech, Dr László Tauber stated that they were seeking to spread 
everywhere the sense of Jewishness and Jewish cohesion that had been drummed into 
them at the grammar school, and for as long as even a single Jewish grammar school 
pupil remained alive, these teachings would be upheld. In his view, the large numbers 
in attendance at the meeting demonstrate that “the spirit of the Jewish Grammar School 
has forged us together and is keeping us together”. He also recalled the close relation-
ship that had existed between the former Jewish Grammar School and the Fencing and 
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Athletics Club. He emphasised the role played by various sportsmen who, in the compe-
titions, had “represented the entire Jewish people”.
One of the speakers said – among other things – that “we shall live forever, 
because it is our calling to uphold the humane spirit, philanthropy and a humanity 
that faces extinction”. 
According to unverified information, the organisers of the meeting wish to create 
a “Hungarian group in the fraternity of former Jewish grammar school pupils” from 
among former pupils of the school who are still living in Hungary. The plan is to hold 
the next meeting – scheduled for 1974 – in Israel.
According to our information, further objectives of the World Federation of Hun-
garian Jews are as follows:
 – the realisation of the old plan for the National Representation of Hungarian Isra-
elites to become a member of the WFHJ;
 – education and influence of Jewish youth in a nationalist spirit;
 – within the framework of the organisation “AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS”, the 
provision of support and assistance to the activities of the WFHJ for the purpose 
of establishing closer relations between foreign and domestic Jewry – between 18 
May and 19 October 1974, they plan to send, on 11 occasions, groups of 40 people 
to the People’s Republic of Hungary;
 – in both Europe and the United States of America, they will establish emigration 
offices for the purpose of launching a wave of emigration from Hungary;
 – to achieve a situation in which the position of the leadership of the WFHJ is real-
ised – namely that the WFHJ – as the central body of Hungarian Jewry – is called 
to proceed “in the matter of the universal problems facing Hungarian Jewry” 
vis-à-vis the government of the United States of America and the governments of 
other countries, as well as the diplomatic representations.
Note: Concerning the meeting of the former pupils of the Budapest Jewish Grammar 
School, no data arose that would suggest that Israeli intelligence lay behind it. To detect 
and prevent this and other similar meetings, our organs will implement active measures.
(The information stems from reliable and verified sources.)
Police Lieutenant-Colonel Sándor Ambrus
Deputy Head of the Directorate
Completed in 4 copies
SUBMITTED TO:
Copy no. 1: Police Maj.-Gen. P. Rácz
Copy no. 2: Police Maj.-Gen. L. Karasz
Copy no. 3: Inform. Processing and Supervisory group directorate
Copy no. 4: Deposited
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13 On the Activities of Domestic and Foreign Zionists
6 February 1975
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/5
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 6.
Memorandum
on experiences of the activities of domestic and foreign Zionists
Our operational experiences show that the main direction of hostile activities of a 
Zionist nature corresponds with activities of this nature undertaken by international 
reactionary forces. They consider their main task to be sustaining and fostering the 
Jewish spirit as well as preventing assimilation. To this end, they organise group 
meetings, with the involvement principally of young people, and then they seek to 
influence them in this spirit.
Another attribute of their activities is popularising Israel and supporting its poli-
cies, while also taking a stand against the policies of, and being hostile towards, the 
Soviet Union. We have one-sided indications that, alongside the propaganda work in 
support of Israel’s policies, they are also supporting Israel financially and organising 
collections. (To date, we have not been able to document such a case or check it from 
various sides.)
There are a significant number of people who maintain active correspondence 
and personal contact with their relations and acquaintances living in Israel or in other 
Western countries. Several have requested passports for travel to the FRG, whence 
they travel on to Israel without the knowledge of the Hungarian authorities. Some-
times Hungarian citizens meet in Romania with their relatives from Israel, arranging 
such meetings by letter.
Experiences of the activities of foreign Zionist individuals and organisations directed 
at Hungarian Jews:
The World Federation of Hungarian Jews, which is a member of the “World Zionist 
Organization”, is making efforts to involve the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites (NRHI) in the activities of the international organisations, with a view to 
strengthening their influence over the NRHI.
The NRHI regularly receives from the Joint annual assistance worth 750,000 
dollars. At present, talks are under way concerning the granting of an additional and 
extraordinary sum of 600–800,000 dollars to the NRHI over a period of several years.
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They regularly check how the sums are used, and so they often have an opportu-
nity to come to Hungary. They use such visits to collect various reports and to survey 
the situation, etc.
For instance, in December 1974, Dr Israel MOWSHOVITZ, president of the Rabbin-
ical Council of New York, arrived in the country. He visited the various institutions of 
the NRHI, and then, in the course of discussions, expressed an interest in the follow-
ing questions:
 – Is there antisemitism in Hungary?
 – Do Jewish youth organisations exist?
 – Do people want to emigrate to Israel?
 – Does the Jewish religious community have contacts with other religious denom-
inations?
He called on the leaders of the denomination to urgently begin a dialogue above all 
with the Protestant churches and win them over for the “cause of Israel”.
Concerning the treasurer of the World Federation of Hungarian Jews, László 
Keller, we have data showing that he organises and supports the emigration of Hun-
garian persons.
Counter-intelligence is currently undertaking operational processing and inves-
tigative work in 4 cases with opened operational folders and 2 preliminary investiga-
tions.
In their nature, these are primarily groups of young people. At their meetings the 
main aim is establishing group cohesion among the young people and fostering the 
Jewish spirit.
In these cases, we have around 100–120 persons under processing or control as 
part of the preliminary investigations.
Among these, the following are particularly noteworthy:
 – “Direktor” code-named case, approx. 30–40 persons meet regularly
 – “Jubilálók” [Jubilants] code-named case, approx. 15–20 persons
 – “Segélyezők” [Supporters] code-named case, approx. 12–15 persons
 – 2 groups among people who resettled in Hungary from Carpatho-Ukraine, approx. 
15+15 persons
 – 10 additional persons from Carpatho-Ukraine are under surveillance, who are 
forwarding letters between their acquaintances living in the Soviet Union and in 
Israel. 
Among the Socialist countries, there are – in view of the people who resettled in 
Hungary from Carpatho-Ukraine – direct points of contact in terms of counter-intelli-
gence with the Soviet Union.
During the past two years, 1,130 people received permission to resettle in Hungary. 
It would seem that, by means of such resettlement, they hope to facilitate their joining 
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their relatives in Israel or the West. Our data suggest, however, that so far only a few 
people have moved on to the West.
At present, we are aware of two groups among those who resettled in Hungary. 
Each of these groups comprises approx. 15 persons. In terms of their attitudes, they 
are strongly pro-Israel and anti-Soviet.
[…]
Agent “Gromov” of the Soviet state security organs has also reported on the Grünz-
weig group [a group of Carpatho-Ukrainian Jews around the physicist Miklós Grünzweig 
living in Hungary – AK]. The comrades have suggested that we should elaborate a plan 
for the agent to come to Hungary and for the joint processing of the group. A response 
is currently being elaborated.
Agent “Zóla” of the Soviet state security organs resettled in Hungary from Ungvár 
[Uzhhorod – AK] and is currently living in Budapest. The comrades have offered to 
transfer him, but this has not occurred so far. “Zóla” has a good opportunity to obtain 
intelligence in the grouping run by Mrs Szanka [an other group of Carpatho-Ukrainian 
Jews around Mrs. Szanka living in Hungary – AK] and so his transfer as soon as possi-
ble is a necessity.
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14 On the Operations in the Jewish Religious Community in 1977
16 November 1977
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/5
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 6.
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
III/III, Sub-department 1-c.
Subject: work in 1977
Summary report
The operational status of reactionary forces in the Jewish religious community in 1977 
was as follows:
In the preceding years, we registered a great deal of interest as well as intensive 
information gathering activity on the part of various Zionist and Jewish nationalist 
organisations with regard to the situation of Hungarian Jews, their life circumstances, 
religious life and position in society. We attributed all of this to the fact that there is 
minimal demand for emigration amongst Hungarian Jews, who are generally satisfied 
with their life and the other circumstances that socialist society assures them.
In addition, we also discovered attempts to involve and activate the leaders of 
the Hungarian [Jewish] denomination in various Jewish organisations. In this field, 
the leaders of the World Jewish Congress were particularly active. At the same time, 
they sought to show a loyal face to the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries and – 
emphasising the necessity of the universality of the WJC – to strengthen contacts with 
Jewish leaders in the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries.
The data gathering and data evaluation activities of earlier years continued in 
1977. We acquired knowledge of a number of individual and group visits to Hungary, 
in the course of which data were gathered on Hungarian Jewry.
Based on the results obtained in the course of the evaluation of data, WJC leaders 
have concluded that Hungarian Jews are living under proper circumstances and, 
moreover, that similar circumstances should be provided to Jews living in the other 
Socialist countries. In essence, they speak of a Hungarian model, which could serve 
as an example to the other Socialist countries. Several leaders specifically stated this.
A fundamental change has occurred in the attitude of WJC leaders to Hungar-
ian Jewry. They are giving particular attention to the Hungarian Jewish leaders, and 
NAHUM GOLDMANN and several WJC leaders wish to travel to Hungary in December 
1977, while the new president of the WJC, P. KLUTZNIK [sic! – AK], also wishes to come 
in January 1978.
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This heightened interest, apart from giving emphasis to the role of Hungarian 
Jewry, can also be attributed – according to operational data – to an intent to request 
the Hungarian Jewish and state leaders to act as mediators in the establishment of 
contacts between the WJC and Soviet Jewry.
[...]
The old situation still prevails in relation to the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites and the World Federation of Hungarian Jews. The leaders of the WFHJ seek 
to strengthen their influence over Hungarian Jewish leaders. They regularly travel 
to Hungary, establishing contacts and offering financial support of an insignificant 
amount to the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites. To strengthen their 
positions here, they seek to develop good relations with members of the Hungarian 
diplomatic representations in Washington and at the UN as well as with the World 
Federation of Hungarians.
We have also experienced attempts by other Zionist and non-Zionist organisa-
tions to build relations, but these have not yet come to fruition, and so we do not 
know in detail their true aims and objectives.
The postal dispatch to Hungary of hostile propaganda material by various organi-
sations and private individuals has continued. In particular, one should highlight the 
activities in this field of the BIRD information agency (Jerusalem). The BIRD agency 
regularly sends – to various Hungarian bodies, organisations and private individuals 
– summary information material on events in the Middle East and Africa, which are 
primarily anti-Soviet in content. Most of the material has been removed from circula-
tion and destroyed by Department III/3.
In the first half of 1977, private individuals often sent newspaper articles of hostile 
content in their letters to relatives and acquaintances. Most of these were – at our 
behest – removed by Department III/3 from the post and destroyed. This activity has 
exhibited a declining trend in the second half of the year; the amount is significantly 
less than in the preceding period.
[…]
Group and individual Jewish travel to Hungary has continued – from the U.S., the UK, 
the FRG and Israel. The travellers usually visit the Jewish institutions and take part in 
various events and meetings where, in statements or simply through their presence, 
they bear witness to a conduct that is nationalist and popularises Israel and the asso-
ciated U.S. policies and which also emphasises the worldwide cohesion of Jews. They 
are careful, however, not to go beyond the limits of the law. Of particular significance 
in this regard was the 25-member Israeli delegation that appeared at the FIJET con-
gress in October; the delegation was led by Dan Ofry, who works for Israeli radio and 
has extreme Zionist views.
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The effect of such endeavours manifests itself in various forms in the domestic 
aspect of counter-intelligence.
In earlier periods, the leaders of the National Representation of Hungarian Isra-
elites undertook a policy that was consistent and in line with religious policy. Under 
the influence of the above, this has changed as follows.
Even today they still completely accept the direction set by the State Office for 
Church Affairs and they represent this position in their statements at international 
forums.
At the same time, in terms of their actions and their statements to one another, 
one can experience a degree of Western orientation or one might also say a Jewish 
nationalist orientation. Perhaps this was already present earlier on, but it has cer-
tainly grown stronger this year.
This is best reflected in the tone whereby before they take a position on any issue, 
in almost every case they ask what the West will say or what will the leaders of the 
WJC, the WFHJ and the Joint say. Or, for instance, a completely unknown journalist 
happens to arrive, let’s say, from Canada. They give him priority attention and deal 
with him at the chairmanship level, lest he should write something “disparaging” 
about them in his article, and so forth.
Or the chairman and the secretary-general took part, on several occasions, in 
meetings of a Jewish nationalist nature organised by the targeted person “DIREKTOR” 
[Sándor Scheiber – AK], emphasising and approving of – through their presence – the 
spirit prevailing there.
The spiritual/intellectual centre of the Zionist and Jewish nationalist activity 
continues to be the targeted person “DIREKTOR” and his milieu. It can be clearly 
concluded that a Jewish elite is being trained at the Friday evening meetings held 
at the Rabbinical Seminary. Similarly to earlier periods, these meetings are attended 
by 100–150 people. Jewish leaders, journalists and other people in intellectual occu-
pations regularly attend the meetings, occasionally even giving talks whose main 
message is often the necessity of worldwide Jewish unity and the importance of Isra-
el’s role.
With a view to reducing assimilation, various marriage agencies continue to 
mediate in terms of the Soviet–Hungarian and Hungarian–Western relations. The 
organiser of this continues to be the targeted person “DIREKTOR”. 
During the year, by way of measure 3/e, we made certain of the extremely hostile 
attitudes of “DIREKTOR”. He made strongly hostile and anti-Soviet outbursts in con-
nection with the Moscow conference of World Religions. Or, while preparing a speech 
for the centenary anniversary of the Rabbinical Seminary, one of his closest friends 
sought to persuade him to include in the speech the terms “liberation,” [by the Soviet 
Union – AK], “socialism,” and the “People’s state” but he strongly rejected this, saying 
that he was not a prostitute.
Despite all this, thanks to the aforementioned new orientation of the leaders of 
the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites, it can be stated that the status 
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of the targeted person has become even firmer, and so he is even more audaciously 
carrying out his detrimental activities and also openly expressing his hostile views.
The groupings of a Jewish nationalist nature that we observed in earlier periods 
continue to exist. However, owing to the operational disruptive measures carried out 
under various covers, the holding of meetings in public places – e.g. in the Duna-
park and Európa restaurants – has largely ceased. Many people have left the groups, 
but those who remain, having been atomised, continue to meet in smaller groups in 
private apartments. Next year, one of our tasks will be to obtain specific data about 
such groups and then take further disruptive measures.
The operational status of those people who resettled in Hungary from the Soviet 
Union has not essentially changed during the year. There continues to be lively contact 
between them and, on the one hand, their relatives and acquaintances who are still 
in the Soviet Union and, on the other, persons who emigrated to Israel or to other 
Western countries. It often happens that they simultaneously invite persons living 
in the Soviet Union and those who have emigrated to the West, and these persons 
then meet with each other here, but we have not observed specific hostile actions and 
activities in this context.
The contacts of resettled persons continue to be dominated by material interests 
and trafficking; they undertake such activities in a wide-ranging manner.
During the year, we did not receive data of specific hostile activity in this category.
II.
1./ The number of pieces of information that came into our possession in 1977: 496
a./ Their sources:
a./ Network (persons)   153
b./ Technical    145
c./ Official contact   3
d./ From a co-organisation  44
e./ Operative analysis   32
f./ Reported    -
g./ other means   119
b./ Secret investigation:  54
c./ Preliminary checks:  11
d./ Required taking of measure: 69 
  2./ Evaluation of secret investigations and preliminary checks:
[…]
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“DIREKTOR” code-named case 13-Cs-759 and 11-SZ-8983/.
The group folder was opened by the Interior Ministry’s III/II-4 Department on 20 May 
1971. According to the basic information, the director of the National Rabbinical Sem-
inary and three of his associates exploited legal loopholes to undertake wide-ranging 
illegal organising activities among Jewish youths.
We employed several network persons in the case, and we also applied the 3/e 
and “K” checks.
The data and information arising in the course of the checks clearly proved that 
in recent years the National Rabbinical Seminary has become the site of widespread 
illegal Jewish nationalist organising activities, directed by the head of the Seminary.
Exploiting the legal loopholes to the fullest extent, they organise and hold Friday 
evening meetings, at which Jewish nationalist speeches and talks are given.
On a regular basis, foreign persons are invited to the meetings, who are then given 
a chance to speak there. The targeted person is in close contact with several foreign 
international Zionist organisations and individuals.
The information arising in the course of the checks prove that the hostile activi-
ties are centred on one person.
Based on the above, we suggest the closure of this group folder and the continua-
tion of the matter in a personal folder.
We opened the “SZ” folder [personal folder – AK] code-named “DIREKTOR”, Nr. 
11-SZ-8983 on 9 May 1977.
In the course of processing, we concluded that the targeted person, as the head 
of the National Rabbinical Seminary, is seeking, by way of his domestic and foreign 
contacts, to establish an operational situation which enables him to get rid of the 
control of the leadership and direction of the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites.
He undertakes wide-ranging organising activities at the international level with 
a view to gaining recognition for his person and his “scientific” activities. He actively 
searches for contacts and opportunities at home and abroad on the basis of which he 
would be recognised at the state level too.
Based on his hostile and reactionary attitudes and his boundless drive for posi-
tions, he opposes the denominational leaders that are loyal to the state.
On occasion he criticises them and seeks to discredit them. Under the legal aus-
pices of the institute he runs, he has gathered around him those Zionist and Jewish 
nationalist intellectuals who take a reactionary and oppositional stance against our 
society.
We have concluded that the targeted person has extremely hostile views and reg-
ularly makes anti-Soviet and anti-Communist statements among his narrow circle 
of friends, abusing the Soviet Union. Despite the greatest efforts of the competent 
leaders, he firmly refuses to even mention in his speeches “liberation”, “Socialism”, 
“People’s state” or other such similar terms.
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In the matter, we applied several network persons as well as the measures 3/e and 
3/a. We gave signals to the heads of the State Office for Church Affairs.
“FŐMÉRNÖK” [Chief engineer] preliminary checks
From 18 May 1977, we have held under a preliminary check FERENC LOVÁSZ (b. 1929). 
[...]
According to the basic information, illegal Jewish religious services and religious 
instruction sessions were held for youths in the apartment of Ferenc Lovász. In the 
course of the preliminary checks, we found that from time to time a loose-knit group 
of youths would meet at Ferenc Lovász’s apartment. Ferenc Lovász plays a role as 
initiator, intermediary and organiser in the arrangement of the meetings. In terms of 
those attending and its activities, the youth group is closely linked with the Friday 
evening meetings at the National Rabbinical Seminary.
The head of the grouping and most of the young people are under the spiritual/
intellectual direction of Dr Sándor Scheiber.
We prolonged the preliminary checks on one occasion. We employed two network 
persons in the investigation, and we applied measure 3/a for a period of 30 days.
[…]
3./ Measures of a preventive nature:
In addition to the secret investigations and preliminary checks, we have also imple-
mented several measures with a view to preventing various hostile objectives and 
steps of such nature. The most important of these were as follows:
 – We took several measures concerning the filling of the chairmanship and other 
senior posts at the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites, the purpose 
of which was to prevent persons with hostile attitudes from occupying such posi-
tions.
 – We checked continuously – by way of the “K” check – postal dispatches to or from 
Israel. At our behest, much material of hostile content was seized and destroyed.
 – We continuously monitor the visa applications of persons seeking to travel to 
Hungary from Israel, and at our suggestion the applications of several persons 
with hostile attitudes who wished to come to the country, were turned down.
 – Regarding travel to and from Hungary, we prevented the departure of several 
people and one person was put on the list of persons prohibited to enter Hungary.
 – Utilising passport applications and other legal opportunities, we had conversa-
tions with several people, who then assisted in the disruption of various groups 
or we prevented the formation of a group.
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In general we can state that our measures were successful. It is necessary, however, to 
apply similar methods to a greater extent in the future.
4./ Network measures:
[…]
Numbers in the network:
On 1 January 1977: Secret informers:  9 persons
   Agent:   1 person 
   “K” apartment:  1
   “T” apartment:  1
   Total:   12 persons
[…]
In the annual plan, we anticipated employing more informers, but we did not imple-
ment the plan owing to the unsuitability of the persons, avoidance of the field and for 
other objective reasons. Nor did we manage to recruit among people who resettled in 
Hungary from the Soviet Union.
[…]
5./ Use of operational means:
During the year, we used operational technical means in secret investigations, in pre-
liminary checks, for checking network persons and for goals of a preventive nature.
In numbers:
3/e  in 1 instance
3/a  in 7 instances
“K” checks were used on 20 people (based on the list)
Measure 3/e was used in the secret investigation “DIREKTOR.”. The bugging was 
undertaken in July, in two official rooms […]. The period since then has provided very 
valuable data from an operational and political perspective about the hostile foreign 
contacts of the targeted person, his hostile attitudes, activities, and objectives.
Use of measure 3/a was successful in each case. It greatly assisted our operational 
work. In every case we drafted evaluative reports.
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The “K” checks were successful principally in an Israeli aspect. A lot of material 
of hostile content had to be seized and destroyed. We received valuable data about 
various leaders of the World Federation of Hungarian Jews and their contacts in 
Hungary.
6./ Persons affected by the measures:
During the year we took measures against a total of 9 persons. These were:
 –  Pre-trial detention:    1 person 
 –  House search:    3 persons 
 –  Police warning:    1 person 
 –  Inclusion on list of banned persons  
[not allowed to enter Hungary – AK]:  1 person 
 –  Prevention of entry to Hungary:  2 persons 
 –  Prevention of departure from Hungary:  1 person 
In all cases, the measures accorded with the requirements of legality.
[…]
11./ International relations:
In 1977, we had common actions with the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and GDR state secu-
rity organs.
We had several common initiatives with the Soviet state security organs, which 
related to the implementation of tasks by agents.
In two instances we took part in personal discussions. We offered them written 
information on five occasions concerning information of an international nature 
acquired by way of the network.
We turned to the Czechoslovak state security organs with one request for infor-
mation, to which we received an answer. Similarly, we too provided one piece of infor-
mation.
At the request of the GDR state security organs, we checked a group that arrived 
in Hungary from the FRG. We then provided information on what we had learned.
Police Lieutentant-Colonel József Fülöp 
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15 The Centenary of the National Rabbinical Seminary
16 December 1977
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/5
Folder: “Zionists undertaking hostile activities” [“Ellenséges tevékenységet kifejtő cionisták”], vol. 6.
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Report
Celebrations to mark the centenary of the National Rabbinical Seminary (Budapest) 
were held in Budapest on 5–6 December 1977.
In addition to the Hungarian guests, 34 people from the Western countries and 17 
representatives of Jewish organisations in the European Socialist countries took part.
For the first time ever, 4 leaders of the World Jewish Congress attended the event 
in Hungary.
 – Dr Nahum Goldmann, founding president
 – Armand Kaplan, director of the international department
 – Dr Siegfried Roth, director of the European Section
 – Gerhard M. Riegner, secretary-general of the WJC
Other participants included:
 – Three leaders of the World Federation of Hungarian Jews – Miklós Nánási, László 
Keller, Arthur Schneier – persons living in the United States.
 – The vice chairman and a member of staff of the American Jewish Committee 
(JOINT) [sic! – AK]
 – The vice chairman and secretary of Societé de Secours, the Swiss aid organisa-
tion.
 – The director of the Memorial Foundation, a cultural organisation.
In the course of their official statements and private conversations, the leaders of the 
WJC and several delegates noted how they considered the event to be of major signif-
icance, because they could obtain personal experience of the life of Hungarian Jewry. 
They assessed this experience as positive and as better than expected.
All of them also emphasised the significance of the event in terms of providing an 
opportunity for an international meeting at which the leaders of the WJC and other 
organisations could hold direct discussions with the leaders of the Jewish communi-
ties in the Socialist countries.
Speakers at the event addressed the past, present and future of world Jewry. They 
spoke in a loyal tone and extremist expressions were not heard. They consciously 
avoided mentioning Israel and the Middle-East problem.
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The central theme of Dr Nahum Goldman’s [sic! – AK] speech was the current 
situation of Jewry. He explained how Jews needed to struggle on two fronts, first exter-
nally against antisemitism and neo-Fascism and for the implementation of human 
rights, and so forth. Secondly, they must struggle – and this is the main issue – for 
order in their own ranks. In his judgement, Jewry is threatened by the danger of 
assimilation. The most valuable elements of Jewish youth are being swallowed up by 
society; the intellectual and spiritual values of Jewry are being lost. The principal task 
is to prevent this from happening.
One could observe how the leaders of the WJC acted in line with a pre-determined 
division of roles.
Dr Goldman held talks with state and religious leaders. His schedule was organ-
ised and administered by Armand Kaplan. Dr Siegfried Roth dealt with the Soviet del-
egates and was in close contact with Dr Sándor Scheiber, the director of the seminary. 
Gerhard Riegner sought to establish close relations with the Czechoslovak and Polish 
delegates and then hold discussions with them.
Their opinions and ambitions, as expressed in the course of their activities, can 
be summarised as follows:
Subjects at the focus of discussions with the various leaders of the National Rep-
resentation of Hungarian Israelites were a revival of Hungarian Jewish cultural life 
and the issue of cohesion and activation among Jewish youth. WJC leaders stated that 
they were satisfied with the religious life of Hungary Jewry and the conditions pro-
vided for it, but that greater efforts should be made to propagate and revive Jewish 
culture.
A pledge was made concerning the intent of the Memorial Foundation to provide 
more funding for Hungarian Jewry, subject to the National Representation of Hungar-
ian Israelites issuing an assurance that the sum would be used for cultural rather than 
social purposes. Based on this, press and book publications should be increased, and 
the launch of a Hebrew language course would perhaps be necessary, concluded by 
the issuing of a certificate.
In the course of the negotiations, WJC leaders mentioned to the leaders of the 
National Representation of Hungarian Israelites that they would like for the repre-
sentative of Hungarian Jewry – similarly to Yugoslavia and Romania – to move from 
observer status to permanent membership of the WJC. In this way, they could be 
elected to the Advisory Council, thereby making the work more successful. 
They asked whether, if the situation in the Middle East were to be resolved, there 
might be a possibility of holding a meeting of the European Section of the WJC in 
Budapest. The leaders of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites did not 
give a concrete response.
They announced the intention to establish, in 1978, a commission in Paris or 
Vienna which would comprise various Jewish scientists and public figures with the 
task of working on a Jewish-Arab rapprochement. They expressed their wish that 
a representative of Hungarian Jewry should take part in the commission, and they 
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would like Dr Sándor Scheiber to be this person. As they did not receive a clear answer 
concerning Dr Sándor Scheiber, the writer György Száraz was mentioned at Scheiber’s 
proposal, and Dr Siegfried Roth then contacted him.
Dr Siegfried Roth held discussions with Dr Sándor Scheiber, who informed him in 
detail of the internal situation and leaders of the National Representation of Hungar-
ian Israelites. During this conversation, Scheiber vilified those leaders who support 
the official religious policy, accusing them of being informers [of the secret services 
– AK].
He stated that Imre Héber, the chairman of the National Representation of Hun-
garian Israelites, who had been elected eight months earlier, was an honest Jew of 
goodwill, whom, however, the aforementioned persons were misleading. He advised 
Roth that both in the West and in Hungary, efforts were required to strengthen Imre 
Héber’s position vis-à-vis “these people”. The means of strengthening him were to 
provide proper press coverage and to make him popular in this way, and that Héber 
should be made aware of this. [Scheiber] recommended to Roth that Héber be given 
their confidence in the West and that they should do their utmost to ensure he pre-
vails. 
WJC leaders and the leaders of the National Representation of Hungarian Israel-
ites discussed the visit to Hungary of the new president of the WJC, P. Klutznyk [sic! 
– AK]. They agreed on the visit taking place on 15–18 January 1978.
WJC leaders stated their demand that Klutznyk be received by the state at the 
same level as had been Goldman. They also requested the leaders of the National 
Representation of Hungarian Israelites to convene a meeting and make it possible for 
Klutznyk to speak before a larger audience.
They noted that this would be Klutznyk’s first visit to a Socialist country, and that 
he also planned to make such visits to Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1978.
It was their wish that he should receive a reception in these countries too – one 
that would be similar to his reception in Hungary.
On 5 December, WJC leaders visited the representatives of Soviet Jewry at their 
hotel and held a long a discussion with them.
They did not mention the issue of emigration in the course of this discussion, 
which addressed three main issues:
 – Shortcomings of religious freedom and in fostering Jewish culture. In this respect, 
they stated that they were willing to send appropriate press material and books, 
but that the leaders of Soviet Jewry had to give an assurance that the material 
would then be distributed and disseminated. The Soviet delegates stated that 
they had no need for such material.
 – A primary problem, in their view, is Soviet Jewry’s lack of a unified organisation 
whose leaders could then represent Soviet Jews abroad. They consider the estab-
lishment of such an organisation to be necessary. The opinion of the Soviet Jews 
on this issue was that such an organisation could not be established in the form 
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presented, because Soviet Jews live in several Soviet republics, scattered around 
[the Soviet Union].
 – Dr Goldman mentioned that he would like to visit the Soviet Union. He said that 
he is waiting to receive an official invitation and that he hopes to be received 
at the proper state level. The Soviet delegates avoided giving a concrete answer, 
citing the absence of their chairman, without whom a decision on the matter 
could not be taken.
During his stay in Budapest, Dr Nahum Goldman held, on several occasions, conver-
sations with the other WJC leaders and other foreigners that were noteworthy in terms 
of the international political and economic issues covered.
From these conversations we can conclude that the WJC leaders have close rela-
tions with leading circles in the FRG – with government and Party leaders there – and 
with Austrian government leaders.
In the course of one conversation, Goldman told his partner in conversation that 
two days before his arrival in Budapest he had talked with Willy Brandt for several 
hours. Brandt had informed him that a visit to Bonn by Comrade Brezhnev could not 
be arranged before February 1978. This was – allegedly – because of the position of 
the leaders of the United States, who wanted Comrade Brezhnev to visit the United 
States first, and only thereafter travel to Bonn. They knew, however, that the visit to 
America could not take place sooner – i.e., before February.
Goldman told several persons that he plays a mediatory role between the leaders 
of the FRG’s three political parties – the SPD, CDU and CSU. The aim of such media-
tion is to smooth over differences of view between the Party leaders or at least to bring 
their respective positions closer. To this end he has held talks with Brandt, Schmidt, 
Kohl and Strauss. He has successfully brought together Kohl and the two Social Dem-
ocratic leaders, but there are still difficulties with Strauss.
The good relations between the government of the FRG and the WJC leader are 
also manifested in the substantial funding provided by the government of the FRG. 
In the near future, a sum equivalent to 180 million dollars will be made available for 
the assistance of Jews who have emigrated from the Soviet Union. This amount would 
be granted not to Israel but to the WJC. According to Goldman, the Jewish emigrants 
from the Soviet Union will go not to Israel but primarily to America, where, however, 
there is no need for such support. For this reason, the money will be used for some 
other purpose.
His idea is to divide up a part of the sum among various foundations. The other 
part would be used to create a secret fund to finance initiatives and campaigns that 
serve the new policy of the WJC.
A committee comprising a narrow circle would be established to oversee the use 
of the secret fund thus established. In a legal sense, the committee would operate as 
a body directing the struggle against antisemitism and neo-Nazism. Members of the 
committee will be selected soon.
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Goldman also spoke of his intent to organise a conference in Vienna in early 1978, 
which would be attended by various Jewish and Arab academics and public figures. 
In organising this conference, he is receiving assistance from the leaders of the FRG. 
Willy Brandt had spoken of approx. 20 persons who could be invited to the conference 
from Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco. Goldman himself has a similar list of 11 persons, 
whose invitation to the conference is being organised. They did not mention in person 
who will attend; nor did they speak of the concrete programme.
N O T E
Contents of the 5 tape recordings in the envelope:
4–8 December 1977, in the room in the Grand Hotel Margitsziget (Budapest) in 
which JAKOV FISHMAN, the chief rabbi of Moscow, and JAKOV MICKENBERG, vice 
chairman of the Moscow Jewish Congregation have stayed.
On 5 December, they were visited by World Jewish Congress leaders DR NAHUM 
GOLDMANN, founding chairman, ARMAND KAPLAN, director of foreign affairs, and 
DR SIEGFRIED ROTH, director of the European Section of the WJC, and a conversation 
lasting 2.5 hours was held in Mickenberg’s room.
The conversation – which was held in Yiddish – was recorded by secret means, 
and the attached tapes contain it.
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16 The Jewish Clerical Reaction in the Past 3 Years
[Undated, probably 1978 – AK]
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O-17169/5




Our experiences of the activities of Jewish clerical reaction in the past 3 years can be 
summarised as follows:
I.
Operational situation of the topic area.
Concerning the nature, forms and methods of the hostile Zionist and Jewish nation-
alist activities in the topic area, three periods can be identified beginning in the early 
1960s:
 – Until 1967, the Israeli Embassy in Budapest was active and, in essence, they 
played the main role; foreign influence was predominant.
 – After 1967, the foreign influence and orientation declined significantly. The centre 
of activities switched to the National Rabbinical Seminary. Instead of large-scale 
public events organised in the congregations, the focus switched to loose-knit 
groups of people coming together in public places, restaurants and private apart-
ments.
 – The third period dates to 1972–73, at which time Western Jewish organisations 
– with Israel remaining in the background – launched a large-scale campaign 
to integrate Hungarian Jewry in the work and sphere of communication of the 
international Jewish organisations.
The goals in each of the periods were essentially the same: to uphold and strengthen 
the Jewish spirit principally among young people, to emphasise the worldwide cohe-
sion/solidarity of Jews, and the necessity of supporting Israel, and making its role 
popular. After 1967, these ambitions were coupled with anti-Soviet and anti-Commu-
nist agitation and propaganda.
The past five years have seen the gradual and large-scale activation of hostile 
Zionist forces. The activation has proceeded in two directions. On the one hand, 
regular relations have been established with Hungarian Jewish leaders. To this end, 
visits to Hungary have become a regular occurrence; various Western Jewish leaders 
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and the leaders of the World Federation of Hungarian Jews have visited the country 
every one or two months to strengthen and foster their relations with Hungarian 
Jewish leaders.
To render relations even closer, they make use of the financial possibilities pro-
vided by the Joint. The discussion of financial problems, as well as the checks on the 
use of the funding granted, provide additional opportunities for them to maintain 
contact on an on-going basis and – furthermore – to influence and, on occasion, to 
blackmail.
In recent years, the activists of various Jewish organisations, as well as persons 
and groups of the most varied social status, have visited the country for the purpose 
of gathering data and appraising the situation and life circumstances of Hungarian 
Jewry. Such efforts have ranged from broad social assessments to the recording of the 
tiniest of details.
Such include, for instance:
 – The number of Hungarian Jews, their organisational life, their institutions.
 – Media, newspapers, book publication, cultural life, opportunities for fostering 
Jewish culture.
 – Possibilities for sustaining religious life, providing the conditions for such.
 – The situation and position in society of Hungarian Jews. Are there Jewish uni-
versity professors? Are Jewish youths discriminated against when applying for 
college or university?
 – Do Jews want to emigrate? The position of the state on emigration matters, possi-
ble discrimination as a consequence of this factor.
 – The situation of Jewish young people, do they have organisations etc.?
Such assessments have been made by hundreds of people, from the vice chairman of 
the World Federation of Hungarian Jews, to a journalist from South America, to the 
mayor of a city in the FRG.
In 1975–76, the U.S. Embassy in Budapest also became active in this field. 
Embassy officials of various ranks – sometimes acting on a pretext – have visited the 
offices of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites. In 1977, following the 
appointment of Kaiser as ambassador, such activity increased further. The ambassa-
dor makes a show of going to the Dohány Street Synagogue, and he has invited the 
leaders of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites to his apartment on 
several occasions, and so forth.
The process will peak in December 1977 with the visit to Budapest of Dr Nahum 
Goldmann, chairman of the WJC, who seeks to hold talks with the leaders of the 
National Representation of Hungarian Israelites and with our senior government 
leaders.
Another form of hostile activity consists of various Western Jewish information 
centres – e.g. the BIRD information centre in Jerusalem – sending to the country, on 
a regular basis, propaganda material which is addressed to various government and 
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non-government organisations, to other organisations and to private individuals. In 
such material, they provide information on political problems and areas of tension 
in the Middle East, Africa and South America. The main topic is the Soviet Union’s 
policy in these regions, which is evaluated, in the main, from a hostile perspective, 
and so the material is suitable for inciting an anti-Soviet mood.
Among the material sent to Hungary a noteworthy element are various cut-out 
newspaper articles, mostly from “ÚJ KELET,” [New East, Hungarian-language news-
paper published in Israel from 1948 until 2016 – AK] which also contain Hungarian-re-
lated information of a hostile content.
Here we should also mention our experiences regarding persons who have reset-
tled in Hungary from the Soviet Union. At present, approx. 10,000 such persons are 
living in Hungary. Most of them are in close contact with their relatives who moved 
to Israel or to another Western country and with similar persons who stayed in the 
Soviet Union. They receive some of them as visitors, and in many cases persons still 
living in the Soviet Union and others who migrated to the West meet up in Hungary. 
Many of the persons living in Hungary serve as intermediaries between people in the 
Soviet Union and others who migrated to the West. They forward letters, official docu-
ments, and messages; indeed, they even undertake the forwarding of hostile, anti-So-
viet publications. For instance, anti-Soviet works by Solzhenitsyn and published in 
the West were sent to the address of a Budapest resident, who then forwarded them to 
given addresses in the Soviet Union.
All these efforts had an activating effect on the domestic elements of the category.
Further loose-knit groupings came into being with the involvement of Jewish 
youths, and the groupings are larger in size than were the previous ones. We know 
of 4–5 restaurants and public places of entertainment where such meetings are held 
regularly.
There are even more groupings that come together in private homes. We have data 
on approx. 8–10 such groupings.
The main aim at such meetings still corresponds with the aims and ambitions of 
Zionism. Their main objective is to foster the Jewish spirit, to acquire knowledge of 
Jewish history, to create cohesion among youths, and to hinder assimilation by pro-
moting “clean” marriages. (Jew with Jew.)
From time to time, they also address, in an indirect fashion, political issues. By 
learning about the situation of their relatives and acquaintances in Israel or the West, 
they popularise Israel and the Western lifestyle, keeping people’s interest in Israel on 
the surface.
Other persons disseminate Zionist and anti-Soviet material received by post 
or brought into the country by visitors. In one case, a person sold for money to his 
acquaintances copies of “ÚJ KELET” that had been brought into the country. We even 
initiated criminal proceedings concerning the dissemination of such material. Jewish 
persons also sold such books in second-hand bookshops.
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Various persons have organised Hebrew language lessons for groups of 6–8 
people in their apartments. They receive the necessary materials and language books 
from their Western contacts.
There is even one person who holds group discussions with young graduates 
about the relationship of various social scientific and religious issues. The intellec-
tual centre for such activities remains the National Rabbinical Seminary.
Every Friday evening, 100–150 people come together at the Seminary, where they 
can hear lectures on Jewish history and culture. The leaders and activists of Western 
Jewish organisations take part in these meetings, in many cases giving lectures of a 
Jewish nationalist nature and content.
At these meetings, marriages are mediated not only between domestic Jewish 
youths but also in a Hungarian–Soviet and Hungarian–Western relation. We can eval-
uate this as a method of resettlement to Hungary from the Soviet Union or of emigra-
tion from Hungary to the West.
The central role played by the Rabbinical Seminary is also indicated by the fact 
that students from the Seminary are present at most of the aforementioned meetings 
held in public places and in private apartments, and these students have a leading 
role.
These activities and the role of the Rabbinical Seminary have become “official” 
in the recent period. Firstly, because they take place with the knowledge of the State 
Office for Church Affairs and, secondly, because the leaders of the National Represen-
tation of Hungarian Israelites have recently attended, on several occasions, the Friday 
evening meetings and have participated in the meetings.
From the operational situation portrayed, it can be concluded that Zionism and 
Jewish nationalism have strengthened their positions in our country in recent years. 
They are using our country as a base against the other Socialist countries, in par-
ticular the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, according to the latest data, the leaders of the 
Western Jewish organisations seek to utilise the Hungarian Jewish leaders to establish 
contact with the leaders of Soviet Jewry and, perhaps, with state leaders too.
It is expected that, in consequence of the high-level visits that are to take place 
soon, Jewish nationalist activity will increase and become even more manifest.
In the counter-intelligence field, we must mention two things in terms of our 
operational positions. One of them is that, in the leadership of the National Repre-
sentation of Hungarian Israelites, we have satisfactory positions in both network and 
technical terms. Using these positions we are able to survey the field and obtain data 
of operational value about foreign hostile efforts.
The other side is that in relation to various groupings, we do not have an appro-
priate information base; what we do have is good, but it is not enough. In this field, we 





Until 1974, the counter-intelligence field belonged to Department III/II-4, where the 
operational work was performed on the basis of the particular aspects of counter-es-
pionage.
After the transfer of responsibilities we had to realise the following main tasks:
 – The material received and the operational equipment had to be re-categorised 
and re-evaluated in accordance with the criteria of domestic counter-intelligence, 
and we had to establish the bases and information sources necessary for success-
ful work.
 – The main task was to acquire, on a continuous basis, information of operational 
value and of assistance to [the formulation of] religious policy on domestic and 
foreign hostile endeavours, objectives and methods. We then have to draft appro-
priate information material on these for the leadership and, if necessary, for the 
state security bodies of friendly countries, etc.
 – We had to organise the investigation and control of the Jewish national groupings 
that had come into being and of the persons involved in such activities, thereafter 
taking proper measures to disrupt such groups and suppress and terminate their 
detrimental activities.
After the transfer of responsibilities we continuously restructured and elaborated the 
employment line of network persons. Using the existing materials we selected those 
persons that were suspected of pursuing hostile propaganda work and anti-Soviet 
activities or who had such contacts, and we began to check them and continuously 
process them.
 We determined that the decisive majority of such persons were aged 70–80 or 
were even older, and so there was no possibility of taking overt measures against 
them. By means of various operational combinations, however, we were able to reduce 
their harmful activities. Such measures were, for instance: we seized and destroyed 
hostile or Jewish nationalist material sent to them. Or: we asked people who knew 
them to answer questions about them, which they clearly told them or their family 
members, etc. 
It is a fact that the activity of such persons declined significantly in 1977.
There were, however, persons in a younger age group among them. For instance, 
the targeted person codenamed “LEVELEZŐ” [Pen friend] regularly received material 
of hostile content from Israel and from the FRG, which he then passed on to his circle 
of acquaintances and he also undertook hostile agitation by word of mouth. We pro-
cessed the case within the framework of a secret investigation and then passed the 
case on to Department III/1 for the purpose of an inquiry. In the course of the inquiry, 
several witnesses were heard and a house search was held. The targeted person was 
convicted by the court and several police authority warnings [verdict issued by a police 
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court against persons who were under investigation for committing political offences – 
AK] were issued.
All of this became widely known in the category, and we observed a significant 
deterrent effect.
[…]
In the course of the processing work, several Jewish nationalistic groups were uncov-
ered. Having identified the members of the groupings, we took measures to disrupt 
and disorganise them. Such measures were, for instance:
 – We made signals to various state organs and to the work bosses of the persons 
participating in the groupings.
 – Based on command 04/1963 of the Ministry of Interior, we summoned several 
persons to the Passport Department, and in the course of the discussion, we 
asked about the activities undertaken by the grouping and its membership, etc. 
We made it clear during such conversations that we had received the information 
from a leading figure in the grouping.
 – We sought then to strengthen this by network means [by informers – AK]. All these 
measures led to an atmosphere of distrust; they searched for “infiltrators” etc.
In consequence of these measures, many people left the groups. Some groups broke 
up, while others became atomised and their numbers declined.
[…]
In addition, we also took – and continue to take – several measures of a preventive 
nature to reduce the effect of hostile materials flowing in from abroad and of the 
harmful activities of visitors, for instance:
 – We continuously keep under the “K” checks “K” materials arriving from Israel 
and from the Western Jewish organisations and known persons. We are continu-
ously seizing materials of hostile content.
 – We are regularly monitoring […] persons arriving from Israel. We do not allow 
into the country those Israelis who have hostile attitudes or who are suspected of 
conducting such activities.
 – We also constantly check up on persons from Israel and other Western countries 
who come to visit persons who have resettled in Hungary from the Soviet Union. 
Here too, we have prevented several persons from entering the country.
 – We have implemented several network members’ journeys to various Western 
Jewish organisations and to their leaders, from which we obtained valuable infor-
mation. In case of need, we have forwarded such information to the state security 
organs of the friendly countries.
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IN SUMMARY: Based on the information obtained, it can be stated that interna-
tional Zionism is making efforts to influence Hungarian Jewry and to acquire posi-
tions among them for the purpose of strengthening its influence. This influence and 
its effect have grown perceptibly in the past 1–2 years, and this serves to encourage 
domestic reactionary elements.
In consequence of our measures, we managed, from time to time, to disrupt the 
domestic hostile elements, to provoke distrust among them, and to hinder to a certain 
extent the realisation of their hostile activities.
It must also be acknowledged, however, that, in view of the substantial increase 
in hostile endeavours, the previous extent of measures is proving to be insufficient to 
suppress the hostile endeavours.
For this reason, new intelligence sources, the more intense and combined use of 
operational means, and more effective measures, will be required.
Police Lieutenant-Colonel József Fülöp  
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17 Appendix. Orientation for a Systematic Register of the People 
of Jewish Origin
1985
Archival Collection of the Ministry of the Interior, Prague, collection A 34/1, Folder 45150
10th Administration of the Corps of National Security
1985
Orientation for a Systematic Register of the People of Jewish Origin active in 
objects monitored by counter-intelligence sections of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 10th, 11th 
and 12th Administration of the Corps of National Security
Within the problematic of the fight against Zionism in a non-Judaic sphere, under 
the nationwide project SPIDER, we have conducted a consistent record of the people 
of Jewish origin, who can be bearers of pro-Zionist ideas and can be exploited for 
a hostile activity against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, finding out and 
unfolding hostile activities of people of Jewish origin, particularly demonstrations 
of Zionism and Jewish bourgeois nationalism, illegal groupings of people of Jewish 
origin dealing with hostile activity against the ČSSR and other Socialist countries, 
and groupings of people of Jewish origin related to foreign Jewish and Zionist organi-
sations. A permanent attention is given to the most important spheres of social activ-
ity, in which, according to the latest findings, have arisen conditions for a spread of 
Zionism and Jewish bourgeois nationalism, and those spheres of social activities, in 
which the concentration of people of Jewish origin occurs. At present these spheres 
seem to be the following:
a) media
b) culture
c) science and education
d) health service
e) domestic and foreign commerce 
Given the elaboration of the specifics of the problematic of the fight against Zionism 
in the non-Judaic sphere, in which the people of Jewish origin are dispersed, working 
in varied areas of social activities, the operations themselves are conducted in objects 
that are selected for elaboration within the relevant Administrations and Sections of 
the State Security. To secure a systematic registration of the people of Jewish origin, 
50 This document was attached to the informative report on “Countrywide Project Spider”, written by 
the head of the Organizational and Operational Section of the Second Administration of CNS (count-
er-intelligence dealing with external enemy) in June 1987. First published in Marie Crhová, Jews under 
the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. In Jewish Studies at the CEU. III. Yearbook 2002–2003, ed. 
András Kovács (Budapest: Central European University, 2004), 290–294.
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a comprehensive survey of the spheres of their activity, tracing and unfolding their 
hostile activity, and paralysing the negative influence of the foreign Zionist and 
Jewish organisations on the activity of the Czechoslovak Jewish religious community, 
the elaboration itself must be conducted in a close co-operation with the relevant 
Sections of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 10th, 11th, and 12th ACNS, which will secure a complete and 
integrated information flow on the people of Jewish origin. The information is being 
collected at the 1st Department of the 4th Section at the 10th ACNS, which is the guaran-
tor of the nation-wide project SPIDER.
The Tasks For the Operation Sections of the 10th Administration of the CNS and the 
2nd Section of the Administration of the State Security
 – determine the employment (at the army administration and retirement fund) 
of the people registered in the nation-wide project SPIDER. People working in 
selected objects will be suggested for control to relevant units.
 – find out adult children of the people registered in the nation-wide project SPIDER, 
others – see parents.
 – request from other relevant units data of people suspected of a relation to Jewish-
ness and Zionism, inspect them in the archives, and suggest their control retro-
spectively (people that work in selected objects).
To secure a consistent course when registering the people of Jewish origin, it is neces-
sary to introduce these terms:
1) person of Jewish faith – is a person, who is active at the JRC (or a Synagogue Con-
gregation) and is kept on the list of its members or a person, who, although not par-
ticipating in the JRC’s (Synagogue Congregation’s) activities, is registered on the list 
of members. 
2) person of Jewish origin – is a person, who does not profess Jewish faith and is not 
kept in the JRC’s (Synagogue Congregation’s) register, but at least one of the parents 
is/was of Jewish faith, or, before 1948, declared Jewish nationality, or was a member 
of the Zionist organisation Hashomer Hacair, which worked legally in the ČSSR till 
1948, or any other Zionist or Jewish organisation. 
Information Collected at 4th Section of the 10th ACNS
1. Information about the work of the people of Jewish origin/faith in individual sub-
jects and about their work categories.
2. Information containing state-security findings about the activities of the people 
of Jewish origin/faith, particularly:
a) dissemination of Zionist ideas and ideas of Jewish bourgeois nationalism
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b) contacts with foreign Zionist and Jewish organisations
c) activity in one of the JRC or Synagogue Congregations in the Czech Socialist 
Republic or Slovak Socialist Republic
d) previous activity in Zionist organisations operating on the territory of the 
ČSSR till 1948
e) propagation of Jewish religion
f) keeping any sort of contacts with people of Jewish origin abroad
g) frequent departures for capitalist countries, both business and private trips
h) illegal groupings of people of Jewish origin, e.g. Yiddish classes, various cul-
tural or literary clubs, choirs and the like, formed by the people of Jewish 
origin
i) other state-security findings about a negative activity of people of Jewish 
origin
3. Information about people of Jewish origin – foreigners – that come to the ČSSR 
for various purposes – tourism, business and the like, and information contain-
ing state-security findings about their activities.
4. Information about the leading officials and members of the foreign Zionist and 
Jewish organisations.
5. Information about the activities of the foreign Zionist and Jewish organisations in 
respect of the USSR.
6. Information about the activities of the employees of capitalist states’ embassies 
in the ČSSR in respect of the Jewish Religious Community in the ČSSR.
Information-sending to the 4th Section of the 10th ACNS
1. When information about an activity of a person of Jewish origin, Czechoslovak 
citizen, is traced in an object selected for elaboration at the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 10th, 
11th, 12th ACNS, such information must be sent in a form of a register card.
2. In case any state-security findings are traced about such a person, this informa-
tion must be elaborated in “AZ“ form and sent together with the register card.
3. When tracing information about foreigners, people of Jewish origin, leading offi-
cials and members of the foreign Zionist and Jewish organisations, the activities 
of these organisations as well as about illegal groupings of people of Jewish origin 
on the territory of the ČSSR, such information must be sent in “AZ” form.
Processing Register Cards
On the register card of the Ministry of the Interior, store number 27, the following data 
will be:
a) code name SPIDER in the right upper corner
b) family name and first name, including the former ones, academic degree
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c) date and place of birth
d) the way Jewish origin/faith of the person was authenticated (Jewish registries, 
membership at JRC and the like)
e) residence
f) occupation, profession, social status and positions held
g) membership in political and social organisations of the National Front
h) parents of the registered person (personal data)
i) siblings of the registered person (date and place of birth, employment)
j) wife/husband of the registered person (date and place of birth, employment, and 
her/his parents with personal data)
k) children of the registered person up from the age of 15 (date and place of birth, 
residence, employment, their wives’/husbands’ – date and place of birth, employ-
ment)
l) a picture of the registered person will possibly be attached
To the Interior Ministry Register Card – store number 27 will be clipped an Interior 
Ministry Register Card – store number 29, which will include following findings about 
the particular person: 
a) indications and findings about a pro-Zionist activity (if the person in question has 
been reported upon before, penalised)
b) contacts with and important departures for foreign countries
c) other important state-security information
One of the parents of the particular person must always be of Jewish origin. In case 
the family members, who are cited on the register card, have been found to be of 
Jewish origin, an individual card must be issued. The cards will be made only for 
people permanently residing in the ČSSR. When processing information for the 2nd, 
3rd, 4th, 10th, 11th and 12th Sections of the ACNS, it is possible to make use of the existing 
central register of the people of Jewish origin/faith at the 1st Department of the 4th 
Section at the 10th ACNS.
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Fedorenko, Nikolai Trofimovich – Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1955–1958; thereafter 
Soviet ambassador to Japan. Appointed as Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United 
Nations, and Soviet representative at the Security Council of the UN in 1963.
Fekete, János – Deputy President of the National Bank of Hungary from 1968; first Deputy President 
of the NBH 1980–1988.
Fisch, Henrik – Rabbi of the Dohány Street Synagogue in Budapest 1959–1971. 
Fishman, Jakov – Chief Rabbi of Moscow’s Choral Synagogue 1971–1983.
Fock, Jenő – Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP 1957–1961; Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers 1961–1967; Chairman (prime minister) 1967–1975.
Foertsch, Friedrich Albert – Lieutenant General of the Wehrmacht; prisoner of war in the Soviet 
Union 1945–1955, where he was sentenced to 25 years of forced labour. After his release, he 
joined the Bundeswehr of the FRG. Inspector General of the Bundeswehr 1961–1963.
Fuchs, Frantisek – Head of the Council of Jewish Communities in Czechoslovakia 1966–1974.
Garai, Róbert – Hungarian diplomat, served at the Legacy of Hungary in Tel Aviv 1955–1959; 
Ambassador in Djakarta 1962–1964; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1972–1985.
Geréb, Sándor – High-ranking officer in the Department for Political Investigations of the Hungarian 
intelligence service; later at the State Security Directorate of the Hungarian Ministry of Interior; 
head of department responsible for church affairs 1966–1971.
Gerstenmaier, Eugen (see also Gerstenmöyer, Gertonmöyer, Gertenmayer) – Member of the German 
anti-Nazi resistance in the Third Reich; politician of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
after 1945; member of the Bundestag 1949–1969; President of the Bundestag 1954–1969.
Globke, Hans – Official at the Ministry of Interior in Nazi Germany, participated in drafting several 
anti-Jewish laws. Director of the Federal Chancellery of the FRG under Konrad Adenauer 
1953–1963. Sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in the GDR in 1963. 
Goldman, Ralph I. – American Zionist activist, a confidant and advisor of David Ben-Gurion. 
Associate Director of the Israel operation of the Joint in 1968; Chief Executive of the Joint 
1976–1985 and 1986–1988.
Goldmann, Nahum (see also Nachum Goldmann, Goldman) – Founder and President of the World 
Jewish Congress 1948–1977; President of the World Zionist Organization 1956–1968.
Goldstücker, Eduard – Czechoslovak literary historian, journalist and diplomat; first Ambassador 
of Czechoslovakia in Israel 1948–1951; political prisoner 1951–1955; one of the leaders of the 
reform movement from the early 1960s and later the Prague Spring. 
Gomułka, Władysław – Polish Communist Party leader, First Secretary of the Polish Workers’ Party 
1943–1948; First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party 1956–1970. 
Görög, János – Hungarian lawyer and later diplomat; head of the Department of International Law at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1983–1989; first Hungarian Ambassador to Israel 1989–1994.
Grechko, Andrei – Soviet general, Marshal of the Soviet Union; Minister of Defence 1963–1976; 
Commander of the Unified Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact 1961–1967. 
Hazai, Jenő – Hungarian Communist functionary; Deputy Minister of Defence until 1956; head of the 
counter-intelligence department at the Ministry of Interior 1957–1962.
Hayman, Erwin – Swiss attorney; worked for the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
after World War II; represented the Joint on behalf of the Swiss-based Société de Sécours et 
d’Entraide (SSE) in Eastern Europe in the 1960s. 
Házi, Vencel – Official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hungary from 1957; Ambassador in Iraq 
and Greece; head of department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1964–1968; Deputy Foreign 
Minister 1968–1970 and 1976–1983. 
Héber, Imre – Chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites (MIOK) and the 
Budapest Israelite Congregation (BIH) 1977–1985.
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Heller, Bohumil – President of the Council of Jewish Religious Communities in Bohemia and Moravia 
1985–1989.
Heves, Lajos – Lawyer; Chairman of the MIOI (National Bureau of Hungarian Israelites) and the 
Budapest Israelite Congregation (BIH) 1953–1957.
Hoettl, Georg Wilhelm – Austrian Nazi and SS officer; worked for the German central intelligence and 
security agency, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) 1939–1945. After the German invasion 
of Hungary in March 1944, he participated in organizing the deportation of Hungarian Jews. 
Hollai, Imre – Hungarian functionary; head of the Foreign Policy Department of the HSWP 
1960–1963; Ambassador in Greece 1964–1970; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1970–1974 
and 1980–1984; head of the Hungarian UN delegation 1974–1980. 
Horowitz, Louis D. (see also Luis Horovitz) – American Jewish official; representative of the Joint in 
Tunisia in the early 1950s; Director General of the Israeli services of the Joint 1958–1962; held 
leading positions in the European branch of the Joint in the 1960s and 1970s.
Horváth, Imre – Minister of Foreign Affairs in Hungary and member of the Central Committee of the 
HSWP 1956–1958.
Horváth, István – Hungarian Minister of Interior 1980–1985 and 1987–1989; Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the HSWP 1985–1987. 
Horváth, János – President of the State Office for Church Affairs (ÁEH) in Hungary 1952–1959.
Ilku, Pál – Hungarian Minister of Culture 1961–1973. 
Illyés, Gyula – Hungarian writer and public intellectual, leading representative of the interwar 
“populist” group of writers. 
Juhár, Zoltán – Hungarian Deputy Minister of Interior Trade 1969–1982; Minister of Interior Trade 
1982–1987; Ambassador in Australia and New-Zealand 1988–1990.
Kádár, János – General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party 1956–1988; Chairman of 
the Council of Minister (Prime Minister) 1956–1958.
Kadelburg, Lavoslav – President of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Belgrade 1964–1991; 
member of the Executive of the World Jewish Congress.
Kaiser, Philip Mayer – United States Ambassador in Budapest 1977–1980.
Kállai, Gyula – Hungarian Minister of Culture from 1957; Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
1960–1965; Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) 1965–1967; Chairman of the 
Parliament 1967–1971 .
Kálló, Iván – Hungarian Ambassador in Italy 1951–1956; Minister at the Legation of Hungary in Israel 
1957–1959.
Kaltenbrunner, Ernst – SS Obergruppenführer and head of the German central intelligence and 
security agency, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA); sentenced to death in Nuremberg, 
1946. 
Kaplan, Armand – Secretary General of the French Section of the WJC from 1950; Deputy Director of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Head of the International Department of the WJC in 1969. 
Karasz, Lajos – Hungarian state security official; held various leading positions at the state 
security organs 1962–1973; Deputy Minister of Interior and Head of the III. General Directorate 
(intelligence and counter-intelligence) 1973–1982. 
Karádi, Gyula – Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Hungary 1957–1967; Deputy 
Chairman of the National Office for Economic Planning 1967–1973.
Kardos, Géza – Hungarian Deputy Minister of Finance 1957–1968.
Kasztner, Rudolf (see also Kastner, Rudolf and Kasztner, Rezső) – Head of Vaad, the Rescue and 
Relief Committee during the Nazi occupation of Hungary of 1944. Conducted the “blood for 
goods” negotiations with Eichmann. After the war, he moved to Israel, where he was accused of 
collaboration. Assassinated in Tel Aviv in March 1953. 
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Kauders, Ben-Zion (see also Ben Cion Kauders) – Director of the legal department of the Hungarian 
National Association to Assist Jews (OMZSA) in 1943. Elected as Co-chairman of World 
Federation of Hungarian Jews in 1978.
Keller, László – One of the leaders of the New York-based World Federation of Hungarian Jews from 
the early 1960s until 2003, and the World Jewish Congress.
Klein, Theo – President of the Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France (CRIF) 
1983–1989; French Chairman of the European Jewish Congress in 1986.
Klutznick, Philip (see also Klutznyck, Klutznik, Klutznyk) – President of the World Jewish Congress 
1977–1979.
Komócsin, Zoltán – Hungarian party functionary; member of the Central Committee and the Political 
Committee of the HSWP 1957–1974; secretary of the Central Committee, responsible for foreign 
affairs 1965–1974.
Kós, Péter – Diplomat; Hungarian Ambassador in the USA and head of the Hungarian mission at the 
UN 1956–1957; head of a department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1957–1961; Hungarian 
Ambassador in various countries (Ghana, India, Japan) from 1961.
Koucký, Vladimir – Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 
responsible for foreign affairs 1958–1968.
Kriegel, Frantisek – Doctor, Czechoslovak politician, member of the Communist Party reform wing 
before 1968; as Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front, and member of 
Presidium of the Central Committee of CPCz, one of the leaders of the Prague Spring.
Kubowitzki, Leon – Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress 1945–1948.
Lahav, Yehuda (Weiszlovits, Istvan) – Israeli journalist of Hungarian origin; banned from entering 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia 1969–1981.
Lakatos, Ernő – Deputy President of the Information Office of the Council of Ministers of Hungary 
1969–1977; President of the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency 1980–1982; head of the Agitation 
and Propaganda Department of the HSWP Central Committee 1982–1988.
Lévai, Jenő – Hungarian writer, editor and journalist, first historian of the Holocaust in Hungary. 
Losonci, András – Hungarian medical doctor; Chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian 
Israelites and the Budapest Israelite Congregation 1985–1989.
Losonczi, Pál – Hungarian politician; Member of the HSWP Central Committee from 1957; Minister of 
Agriculture 1960–1967; President of the Council of Presidents (Head of State) 1967–1987.
Máté, Miklós – Hungarian rabbi, teacher and headmaster of the Secondary School of the Jewish 
Congregation of Budapest 1967–1979. 
Mere, Ain-Ervin – Estonian military officer; Obersturmbannführer in the Waffen SS and head of the 
Sicherheitspolizei in Estonia. After the war, he was accused of arresting and killing Estonian 
Jews during the Holocaust. 
Mélykuti, Ferenc – Lieutenant-Colonel of the Hungarian security services; responsible for Jewish 
issues 1965–1973. 
Mód, Péter – Diplomat; Ambassador and Head of the Permanent Representation of Hungary at the 
UN 1957–1962; First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1962–1968; Ambassador in France 
1968–1974.
Miklós, Imre – Leading official of the State Office for Church Affairs (ÁEH) 1951–1989; Deputy 
President 1956–1970; President, State Secretary 1971–1989.
Mikunis, Shmuel (Samuel) – Secretary of the Central Committee of the Palestine Communist Party in 
1939. General Secretary of the Communist Party of Israel 1948–1974.
Mowshovitz, Israel – President of the New York Board of Rabbis in the 1960s. Member of the rabbis’ 
delegations to the Soviet Union to investigate the conditions of Soviet Jewry in 1956. He also 
traveled to Poland, Romania, and other countries on similar missions.
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Nagy, János – Hungarian diplomat; Ambassador in various countries 1957–1971; Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 1971–1980; State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1980–1985. 
Németh, Miklós – Hungarian politician; held leading positions at the Department of Economic Policy 
at the Central Committee of the HSWP 1983–1987; Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime 
Minister) 1988–1990. 
Norden, Albert – East-German Communist politician, member of the Central Committee of the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany from 1955. Head of the Agitation Committee 1955–1967; 
member of the Political Committee from 1958; responsible for propaganda and foreign policy 
until 1979. 
Novotný, Antonín Josef – General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1953–1968; 
President of Czechoslovakia 1957–1968.
Nyerki, Gyula – Chargé d’affaires ad interim at the Legation of Hungary in Israel 1959–1965.
Oberländer, Theodor (see also Oberlaender) – Officer of the Wehrmacht; Minister for Expellees 
(Bundesvertriebenenminister) in the FRG 1953–1960. Accused of participating in the killing of 
Jews in Lviv in 1941, tried in absentia in the GDR in April 1960, resigned his post. 
Olt, Károly – Hungarian Minister of Finance 1950–1956; head of János Kádár’s secretariat 
1956–1959; President of the State Office for Church Affairs 1959–1961.
Orbán, László – Head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the HSWP 1959–1967; Deputy 
Minister of Culture 1967–1974; Minister of Culture 1974–1976; Member of the HSWP Central 
Committee 1957–1978 
Pereszlényi, Zoltán – Diplomat, official of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1966; 
served at the department of Arab and African states; Ambassador in various Arab states 
1981–1986 and 1989–1993.
Péter, János – Hungarian delegate at the peace talks after the Second World War; Reformed Church 
bishop 1949–1956; Head of the Institute of Cultural Relations 1956–1958; Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 1958–1961; Minister of Foreign Affairs 1961–1973; member of the Central 
Committee of the HSWP 1966–1988. 
Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich – Soviet politician; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine 1957–1963; Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
1965–1977.
Prantner, József – Official holding various positions at the State Office for Church Affairs 1951–1961; 
President of the State Office for Church Affairs 1961–1971.
Pudlák, Ján – Deputy Foreign Minister of ČSSR in 1967.
Puja, Frigyes – Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Hungary 1959–1973; head of the Department 
of Foreign Policy of the Central Committee of the HSWP 1963–1968; First Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 1963–1973; Minister of Foreign Affairs 1973–1983; member of the Central 
Committee of the HSWP 1966–1989.
Pullai, Árpád – Hungarian functionary, member of the HSWP Central Committee 1962–1985; Head of 
Party and Mass Organisations Department 1966–1976; in charge of foreign affairs 1973–1975. 
Rapai, Gyula – Deputy Head of the HSWP Department for Agitation and Propaganda 1958–1961; 
Ambassador in Moscow 1970–1976.
Ránki, György (see also George Ranski) – Hungarian historian of economic history and World War 
II; Deputy Director, and later Director of the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences 1962–1986. 
Riegner, Gerhart Moritz (see also Gergart, Gerhard, Rieger, Rigner) – Secretary General of the World 
Jewish Congress 1965–1983. 
Robinson, Donald M. – Leading official of the Joint in the United States 1970–1985.
Rosen, Moses (see also Mózes Rósen, Rózen) – Chief Rabbi of Romanian Jewry 1948–1994; 
President of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Romania 1964–1994. 
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Roth, Siegfried later Roth, Stephen (see also Sigrid Róth, Sigfrid Róth, Stephen Róth) – Jewish 
politician born in Hungary. First post-World War II Director of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) 
office in Budapest; moved to the United Kingdom in 1947, where he became general secretary 
of the WJC British Section, then the WJC European Director; director of the WJC’s Institute of 
Jewish Affairs in London from 1966; Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews 1979–1985; Chairman of the UK Zionist Federation 1985–1990.
Rusakov, Konstantin Viktorovich – Soviet politician, official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1964; 
head of a department of the Central Committee and assistant to the General Secretary, Leonid 
Brezhnev 1968–1977. 
Sauckel, Fritz – German Nazi politician, Gauleiter of Thuringia. Sentenced to death in 1946. 
Scheiber, Sándor – Hungarian rabbi and Jewish scholar; Director of the Rabbinical Seminary in 
Budapest 1950–1985. 
Schneier, Arthur – Viennese-born rabbi, human right activist; survived Nazi occupation in Budapest 
and emigrated to the United States in 1947; Senior Rabbi at Park East Synagogue in New York 
City 1962–2012; member of the U.S. Delegation for Return of the St. Steven Crown to Hungary 
in 1979.
Schön, Dezső (see also Schőn) – Journalist, worked for the Zionist newspaper Új Kelet [New East] in 
Transylvania; left for Israel in 1948; editor-in-chief of Új Kelet 1975–1986.
Sebes, István – Hungarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1956–1959; Ambassador in Austria 
1959–1964. 
Seifert, Géza – Hungarian lawyer; Deputy Chairman of the Budapest Israelite Congregation (BIH) 
from 1957; Chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites (MIOK) and the 
Budapest Israelite Congregation 1966–1976. 
Sík, Endre (see also Sik) – Member of the Hungarian Communist emigration in Moscow before World 
War II; Minister of Foreign Affairs 1958–1961; member of the Central Committee of the HSWP 
1959–1970.
Šik, Ota – Czech economist and politician, one of the key figures of the Communist reform 
movement and the Prague Spring; Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia April–September 
1968; fled to Switzerland after the Soviet invasion.
Singer, Israel – American Jewish official, Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress 
1986–2001. 
Slánský, Rudolf – Czech Communist politician; General Secretary of the Communist party 
1946–1952; arrested, sentenced to death in a show trial and executed in 1952.
Słowikowski, Jan – Polish diplomat; Polish Charge d’Affaires in Israel 1954–1958.
Sobolev, Arkady – Soviet diplomat; Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations 1955–1960. 
Sós, Endre – Journalist; Chairman of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites (MIOK) and 
the Budapest Israelite Congregation (BIH) 1957–1965, editor-in-chief of the Jewish newspaper 
Új Élet [New Life].
Steinberg, Elan (see also Elen) – Leading functionary of the WJC; Executive Director of the WJC 
1986–2004.
Szántó, Dénes – President of the National Bank of Hungary 1956–1960.
Szarka, Károly – Hungarian diplomat and politician; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 1956–1968, 
Ambassador in Egypt 1968–1970; Hungarian Ambassador to the UN 1970–1974; Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 1974–1983; Ambassador in Japan 1983–1987. 
Száraz, György – Hungarian journalist, writer, author of Egy előítélet nyomában [In the Wake of a 
Prejudice] (Budapest, 1976), the first essay published on antisemitism in Hungary after the 
1956 Revolution.
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Szilágyi, Béla – Hungarian politician and diplomat; head of a department at the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade until 1958; Hungarian Ambassador in Great Britain 1959–1963; Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 1963–1970; Ambassador in Greece 1970–1975. 
Szirmai, István – Hungarian functionary; Zionist activist in Transylvania in his youth; functionary of 
the Romanian Communist Party from 1931, and later of the Hungarian Communist Party; held 
various senior posts after 1945; arrested and accused of Zionist conspiracy in 1953, released 
in 1954. Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP responsible for ideological issues 
1959–1966; member of the Political Committee of the HSWP 1962–1969.
Szűrös, Mátyás – Hungarian functionary, diplomat; Ambassador in the GDR 1975–1978; Ambassador 
in the Soviet Union 1978–1982; member of the Central Committee 1978–1988; Secretary of 
the Central Committee of the HSWP responsible for foreign affairs 1983–1988; provisional 
President of State 1989–1990. 
Tauber, László – Doctor; head surgeon at the Jewish hospital of Budapest 1940–1945; practiced 
medicine in the US from 1947; founder of the Tauber Institute for the Study of European Jewry at 
Brandeis University. 
Telepó, Sándor – Functionary of the State Office for Religious Affairs (ÁEH) in Hungary in the late 
1960s, responsible for Jewish affairs. 
Tuval (Touval), Meir – Israeli lawyer, diplomat; Minister at the Israeli Legation in Hungary 
1956–1959.
Ulbricht, Walter – East German Communist politician; Secretary General of the Socialist Unity Party 
in GDR 1950–1971; Head of State 1960–1973.
Várkonyi, Péter – Hungarian politician and diplomat; head of János Kádár’s secretariat 1961–1965; 
Deputy Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Central Committee of the HSWP 
1968–1969; member of the Central Committee 1975–1989; Secretary of the Central Committee 
responsible for foreign affairs 1982–1983; Minister of Foreign Affairs 1983–1989; Hungarian 
ambassador in the Unites States 1989–1990. 
Vilner, Meir – Israeli Communist politician, leader of the Communist Party of Israel; member of the 
Knesset 1949–1990, representing various pro-Soviet Party factions. 
Weiler, Jack D. – American businessman; held a number of positions in the Joint, including Vice 
Chairman 1958–1973, Chairman of the National Council 1966–1973, Chairman 1975–1977, and 
Honorary President 1978–1995.
Winkelmann, Otto – SS Gruppenführer, Chief SS and Police Commandant in Hungary during the 
German occupation; witness in the Eichmann trial.
Wisliceny, Dieter (see also Wisliczeny) – SS Hauptsturmführer, a member of Adolf Eichmann’s 
commando organizing the ghettoization and liquidation of Jewish communities of Greece, 
Hungary and Slovakia; executed in 1948.
Yahil, Chaim – Director General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel 1960–1964.
Yaron, Yerahmiel Ram – Israeli diplomat; Minister at the Embassy of Israel in Hungary 1958–1962.
Zhivkov, Todor – First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the head of state of the 
People’s Republic of Bulgaria 1954–1989. 
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